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ABSTRACT
The thesis integrates insights drawn from a number of social science
disciplines into a single framework designed to explain female-male
earnings differences. Using firm level data to explore the determinants
of female-male earnings differences, we test alternative hypotheses that
relate to human-capital attributes, occupational structure of the firm,
internal relationships in the firm, and extra-firm household relations
of individual employees. Specifically, the empirical analysis tests the
impacts on earrings of human-capital attributes such as age and quantity
and quality of education, functional and hierarchical occupational
segregation, commitment to the firm, informal networks, perceived
discrimination, commitment to the home, dominant-careers, and early
socialization.
Empirical analysis is based upon cross-sectional data generated by means
of a questionnaire survey administered in 1983 to employees of three
large Canadian firms. The 2559 observations are primarily salaried
professional, technical, and managerial employees, of whom 31 percent
are females. The author designed the questionnaire to generate data
that would permit the testing of the range of alternative hypotheses
mentioned above. Three unique contributions of the thesis are the
framing of the alternative hypotheses, the design of the questionnaire,
and the construction of the variables to capture the impacts of the
various hypotheses.
Across the three samples, the total mean female-male earnings differen-
tial ranges from just under twenty percent to just under forty percent.
In keeping with the firm-specific nature of the data bases, regression
analysis is carried out firm by firm. First, we analyze the determi-
nants of earnings across all individuals by estimating OLS regressions
on each of the total samples. We also estimate regressions on married
sub-samples in order to test hypotheses that are unique to this group.
We then estimate regressions for females and males separately as a
prelude to the decomposition of the female-male earnings differential
into coefficients, attributes, and interaction components.
The regression coefficients of the total samples as well as the married
sub-samples reveal substantial negative returns to sex, supporting the
hypothesis that discrimination on the basis of gender is a significant
determinant of female-male earnings differences. Although certain
Abstract
hypotheses are supported in some samples and not in others, age, years
of service with the company, hierarchical occupational segregation,
working overtime without pay, and division of labour in the household
have the most generally significant impacts on earnings differentials.
In the decompositions of the female-male earnings differentials, each of
the three samples yields a distinct pattern in the allocation of the
differential to the coefficients, attributes, and interaction compo-
nents. The main sources of the differential in Sample 1 are occupa-
tional segregation and the interaction of an employee's occupation and
the rate of return to that occupation. In Sample 2, the attributes
component dominates because males have more human capital and are in
better paying jobs than females. The coefficients component, a measure
of earnings discrimination, is also substantial--on the order of 16
percent in the total sample and 11 percent in the married sub-sample
--because males get higher returns to human capital and early sociali-
zation than females. The heterogeneous nature of the observations in
Sample 2--the inclusion of some non-salaried but predominantly salaried
employees--may account for the importance of earnings discrimination for
this sample but not for the more homogeneous Sample 1. In the Sample 3
decomposition, years of service with the company and early division of
labour in the home have the major impacts on the female-male earnings
differential.
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Women in the Canadian Labour Force
Over the last three decades there has been a significant shift in
the sex composition of the paid labour force in a number of advanced
industrialized nations. The shift has been particularly pronounced in
Canada. In 1951, females made up only 22 percent of the Canadian labour
force, but presently make up well over 52 percent. In 1960 the labour
force participation rate of Canadian females advanced to 30 percent and
was the lowest amongst nine major industrial countries. By 1981 it had
climbed to 52 percent, amongst the highest rates for these nations (see
Table 1-1).
There are many factors underlying this increased involvement of
Canadian females in the paid labour force. There are "push" factors:
with families faced by inflationary pressures, many married females have
had to enter the labour market just to make ends meet. According to the
National Council of Welfare, if females in two-parent families had not
worked, the proportion of Canadian families below the poverty line in
1979 would have gone up from one in eight to one in four. In the 1970s,
the contribution of married females to the incomes of families in which
two parents worked was just under 30 percent (see Table 1-2). In these
families, wives were still not, on average at least, the primary bread-
winners, but nonetheless their contributions to family incomes were
clearly significant.
There are "pull" factors: during the post-World War II boom, new
opportunities opened up for females to enter the labour market, in no
small degree due to a heightened consciousness on their part of the
possibilities for personal development acquired by contact with, and
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Table 1-1
Female Participation Rates in Nine Industrialized Countries
1960, 1970, and 1981.
Country 1960 1970 1981
Canada 30.1 38.3 51.6
United States 37.7 43.3 52.1
Australia NA 40.4 45.5
Japan 52.7 49.3 46.7
France 41.6 40.1 43.1
West Germany 41.2 38.4 38.5*
United Kingdom 39.5 42.0 46.6*
Italy 33.8 26.8 29.9**
Sweden NA 50.0 60.5*
*Preliminary figures
**Rate in 1980
NA = not available
1 The rates for Canada in this table, which are drawn from the Labour
Force Survey, differ slightly from those in other tables, which are
based on census data.
Source: C. Sorrentino, "International Comparisons of Labor Force
Participation. 1960-81," Monthly Labor Review 106, no. 2
(February 1983).
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Table 1-2
Average Percentage Contributions of Women in the Labour Market to Family
Earnings in Two-Parent Families1 by Number and Age of Children
Canada, 1971, 1975, and 1979
Number and Age Family Earnings
of Children 1971 1975 1979
No children2  34.5 33.8 32.4
Children under 6 only 27.9 28.6 28.2
Children aged 6 to 15 only 23.9 25.0 25.0
Children under 6 and
children aged 6 to 15 21.6 21.8 25.3
Weighted average 28.9 28.9 28.7
Notes: 1 Head aged less than
2 For the purposes of
years of age.
65.
this table, a child is defined as being under 16
Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Consumer Finances, special tabulations.
Economic Council of Canada, Annual Review, On The Mend, Ottawa, 1984.
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participation in, the "women's movement." Not only are more females
employed in female-dominated occupations, such as nursing, secretarial
work, and teaching, but to some extent they have also moved into male-
dominated jobs in both managerial and manual occupations.
Education has apparently provided a central means by which females
can gain entry into the labour market. As can be seen from Table 1-3,
from 1971 to 1981 the labour-force participation rates by level of
education increased by more than 20 percent amongst females with a high
school diploma, vocational-school certificate or diploma, or a bache-
lor's degree. More importantly, as females acquired more education,
their labour-force participation rates climbed much more rapidly than
did those of males.
The availability of more reliable methods of birth control tech-
niques as well as greater information about, and acceptability of, their
use appears to have aided the entry of females into the paid labour
force. In 1960 the fertility rate (live births per 100 females of ages
15 to 44) of Canadian females was 13.1, the highest level among the nine
largest industrial countries; by 1980 it had fallen to 6.7, an average
level [Sorrentino, 1983]. Today, females have acquired a greater
ability to choose between careers and families and to plan how to
combine the two over time.
Table 1-4 suggests that marital status has been critical in permit-
ting females to have children while participating in the paid labour
force. In 1981, 45 percent of married females with children under two
years of age participated in the labour force as compared with 25
percent in 1971--an increase of 84 percent. Among married females in
1971, the participation rate of those without children was higher than
Table 1-3
Participation Rates of Women and Men in the Labour Force by Level of Education, Canada
1971 and 1981
Women Percent Change Men Percent Change
Level of Education 1971 1981 1971 - 1981 1971 1981 1971 - 1981
Primary or less 22.2 24.3 9.5 62.2 57.7 -7.8
Secondary 38.5 46.6 21.0 74.5 73.0 -2.1
Vocational diploma or
certificate 51.9 65.0 25.2 88.0 85.4 -3.0
Post-secondary or non-
university diploma 55.5 66.1 19.1 88.6 89.6 1.1
University without degree 59.6 69.3 16.3 87.0 88.2 1.4
Certificate 63.3 72.6 14.7 89.5 90.6 1.2
Undergraduate level 63.1 77.4 22.7 90.3 92.2 2.1
Bachelor's degree 69.0 78.3 13.5 92.5 91.5 -1.1
Master's degree or doctorate 70.0 80.8 15.4 91.1 92.4 1.4
Total 39.9 51.7 29.6 76.4 78.2 2.4
Source: Special compilation from the 1971 and 1981 Censuses, Statistics Canada.
Economic Council of Canada, Annual Review, On The Mend, Ottawa, 1984.
Table 1-4
Participation Rates of Women and Men in the Labour Force by Family Status, Canada
1971 and 1981
Women Percent Change Men Percent Change
Family Status 1971 1981 1971-1981 1971 1981 1971-1981
Married:
Without Children 40.6 49.6 22.2 73.5 72.5 -1.4
Child(ren) under 2 years 24.6 45.3 84.2 94.2 96.5 2.4
Child(ren) 3-5 years 30.8 51.2 66.2 93.8 96.2 2.6
Child(ren) 6-16 years 40.3 59.0 46.4 92.8 94.8 2.2
Single:
Without children 53.5 62.0 15.9 63.4 69.4 9.5
Child(ren) under 2 years 41.7 39.7 -4.8 83.9 81.6 -2.7
Child(ren) 3-5 years 52.0 49.4 -5.0 84.7 86.9 2.6
Child(ren) 6-16 years 59.7 60.6 1.5 80.7 81.3 0.7
Other
Without children 28.6 31.8 11.2 56.2 63.8 13.5
Child(ren) under 2 years 33.4 50.2 50.3 84.5 87.2 3.2
Child(ren) 3-5 years 44.0 60.3 37.1 85.8 91.0 6.1
Child(ren) 6-16 years 53.5 66.4 24.1 86.0 90.4 5.1
Total 39.9 51.7 29.6 76.4 78.2 2.4
Source: Special compliation
Economic Council of
from the 1971 and 1981 Censuses, Statistics Canada.
Canada, Annual Review, On the Mend, Ottawa, 1984.
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for those with children. By 1981, this was no longer the case. Over
the same period, participation rates among single females with preschool
children decreased somewhat, although the participation rate for single
females without children increased by 16 percent. The increase of par-
ticipation rates of separated, divorced, and widowed ("other") females
with children lay between the very high increases for married females
with children and the very low or negative increases for single females
with children.
Despite the rise in female labour-force participation rates, a
fairly stable male-female earnings gap persisted from 1971 to 1981 (see
Table 1-5), although, when decomposed by level of education, females
with university degrees clearly made some relative gains. From Table
1-5 it seems apparent that those females with the highest education
levels had the greatest gains in earnings relative to males with the
same education levels. Specifically, from 1971 to 1981, those with a
first university degree increased their relative earning power by over
25 percent and those with a master's degree or doctorate by over 12
percent, whereas females with a secondary education increased their
relative earning power by less than eight percent and those with primary
education or less by just over two percent.
It is now well recognized that much of the earnings gap between the
sexes is due to the occupational segregation of females into a relative-
ly small number of low-paying "female jobs," such as secretarial and
clerical work [Blau, 1977; Gunderson, 1975 and 1979; Hartmann and
Treiman, 1981]. Table 1-6 provides an indication of the shifts in
occupational segregation that took place from 1971 to 1981 as well as
the impacts of these shifts on relative earnings. In 1971 females made
Table 1-5
Average Earnings of Women and Men by Level of Education, Canada, 1971 and 1981
Average Earnings Relative Average Earnings Relative Percentage Change in
(1971) Disparity (1981) Disparity Relative Disparity
Level of Education Women Men Women/Men Women Men Women/Men 1971 - 1981
Primary or less 2,783 5,387 51.67 7,587 14,390 52.71 2.04
Secondary 3,145 6,343 49.58 8,127 15,208 53.44 7.77
Vocational diploma or
certificate 3,564 7,325 48.65 8,956 18,578 48.20 -0.93
Post-secondary or non-
university diploma 4,129 7,500 55.05 9,998 18,086 55.28 0.42
University, no degree 5,111 8,295 61.62 12,148 19,590 62.01 0.63
Certificate 5,742 10,037 57.21 14,794 26,319 56.21 -9.63
Undergraduate level 3,515 6,468 54.34 9,161 16,982 53.94 -0.74
Bachelor's degree 6,847 14,975 45.72 16,691 29,048 57.46 25.67
Master's degree
or doctorate 8,508 15,212 55.93 19,751 31,457 62.79 12.27
Total 3,561 6,952 51.22 9,589 17,807 53.85 5.13
Source: Special compilation from the 1971 and 1981 Censuses, Statistics Canada.
Economic Council of Canada, Annual Review, On The Mend, Ottawa, 1984.
Table 1-6
Numbers1 and Average Annual Earnings of Women and Men in the Twenty Highest-Paying
and Twenty Lowest-Paying Occupations 2, Canada, 1970-71 and 1980-81
Women Men
Number Earnings Number Earnings
1971 1981 1970 1980 1971 1981 1970 1980
20 Highest Paid3 32,050 125,755 8,118 18,253 216,470 481,220 19,024 34,520
20 Lowest Paid4 750,045 1,175,430 2,319 6,076 698,580 845,960 4,047 9,559
Notes: 1 Excludes those who reported zero or negative earnings for the year preceding the census - i.e., 1970
or 1980.
2 Using Statistics Canada's 1971 occupational classifications, 498 occupations have been combined into
200 groups. Of these 200 groups, the 20 lowest and highest paid occupations in 1970 have been
chosen on the basis of combined female and male earnings.
3 Directors general, physicians and surgeons, dentists, judges and magistrates, lawyers and notaries,
osteopaths and chiropractors, optometrists, sales, advertising and purchasing managers,
veterinarians, architects, air pilot, navigators and flight engineers, university teachers, members
of legislative bodies, administrators-teaching, personnel and industrial management, management
occupations, administrations in medicine and health, government administrators, air transport
foremen, physicists.
4 Babysitters, waiters(esses), hosts(esses) and stewards, guides and others, other farm, horticulture,
and animal husbandry, inspecting and sampling, fabrication of textile products, sewing machine
operators, other fabrication of textile products occupations, other apparel and furnishing service
occupations, packaging occupations, other occupations - fishing, hunting, trapping, tailors and
dressmakers, chefs and cooks, knitting occupations, other occupations - library file and
correspondence clerks, other sales occupations, shoemakers and repairs, barbers and hairdressers,
health care, labouring occupation - not elsewhere classified.
Source: Statistics Canada, 1971 and 1981 censuses, special tabulations.
Economic Council of Canada, Annual Review.
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up less than 13 percent of the labour force in the twenty highest-paying
occupations, and within these occupations their earnings were about 43
percent of those of males. Over the following decade, some headway was
made: by 1981 females held just under 21 percent of the jobs in the top-
paying occupations and were earning about 53 percent of male incomes.
Over the same period, however, the number of females was increasing
faster than the number of males in the twenty lowest-paying occupations.
In 1971, females held 52 percent of the jobs in these occupations, while
in 1981 they held 58 percent. On the other hand, within the low-paying
occupations, the male-female earnings gap closed somewhat: from about 57
percent in 1971 to about 64 percent in 1981. Looking at these changes
in participation and earnings of males and females in the highest-paying
and lowest-paying occupations, it is clear that between 1971 and 1981
females entered the highest-paying occupations at a faster rate than
they entered the lowest-paying occupations. As a result, there was an
improvement in the overall earnings position of females relative to
males. Nevertheless, even in the highest-paying occupations, a very
large earnings gap still persists in 1984.
As Table 1-5 shows, there was some narrowing of the earnings gap
(from 51.2 percent to 53.9 percent) over the decade. It could be argued
that now that females are increasingly committing themselves to full-
time participation in the labour force, the earnings gap will soon (say
in a decade or two) become history--if not for all females then at least
for females who enter the most lucrative occupations. For example, it
might plausibly be hypothesized that, given the relatively recent entry
of females into the highest-paying occupations, the earnings gap ref-
lects an experience gap that is highly correlated with age. If so, as
-11-
males retire and as females become both more numerous and more experi-
enced in these occupations, the earnings gap should disappear.
But until tested, a plausible hypothesis remains just that. It was
the concern over the determinants of the earnings gap and other issues
to do with female labour-force participation that led the Economic
Council of Canada to develop a series of projects on women and the
labour market--of which this study is one. The purpose of the study is
to examine the determinants of the relative earnings of males and
females within large corporate bureaucracies, with particular (but not
exclusive) attention to be paid to managerial and technical personnel.
The remaining chapters of this thesis report the theoretical structure,
methodology, and statistical results of my research for the Economic
Council of Canada as well as some thoughts on the policy implications of
the findings for governments, corporations, and households.
Chapter 2 surveys theories of income discrimination on the basis of
sex, as well as the empirical evidence on the determinants of the earn-
ings gap. Chapter 3 presents a theoretical framework that synthesizes
and extends the insights of the work by economists on earnings discrimi-
nation presented in Chapter 2 and also incorporates some relevant ideas
and concepts from the fields of psychology and sociology. A series of
testable hypotheses concerning earnings inequality are then generated,
with an indication of the type of information that would be needed to
perform the statistical tests. Chapter 4 outlines the logic and design
of the employee questionnaire used to gather the relevant data. Parti-
cular emphasis is placed upon the types of variables that can be cons-
tructed from the questionnaire data and how specific variables relate to
the various hypotheses put forth in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 contains a
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discussion of how the data base was actually generated, including de-
tails on how the companies came to participate in the study and the way
the questionnaires were distributed and collected. In the concluding
section of this chapter, overviews are presented of the general charac-
teristics of the firms that participated in the study and average
female-male differences in the company samples (before-tax earnings by
age, labour-force experience, years of service with the company, level
of education and area of concentration, occupation within the company,
and family status. Chapter 6 presents a discussion of the rationale
behind the specification of the statistical models for regression
analysis. The specific hypotheses to be tested (a subset of hypotheses
from Chapter 3) are described as well as the statistical techniques to
be used. The empirical results are then detailed. Chapter 7 summarizes
the empirical findings and draws out the general implications of these
findings for policy.
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Chapter 2 Male-Female Earnings Differences: Theories and Empirical Studies
I. Theories
This chapter presents a general discussion of five theories that
have been put forward to explain earnings inequalities. The most con-
ventional approach is human-capital theory, which argues that people get
paid according to investment in education and on-the-job training. A
derivative of human-capital theory, however recognizes unexplained ear-
nings differences and attributes them to tastes for discrimination:
prejudices against some types of people that are unrelated to their
productive capability enter into the utility functions of other types of
people. Discrimination results when those with discriminatory tastes
are able to maximize their own utility. Screening theory, in contrast,
shifts the focus from prejudice to imperfect information. Employers have
stereotypical views of the productive capabilities of certain groups of
prospective employees. In the presence of imperfect information concer-
ning the capabilities of specific people within those groups, employers
view all job candidates in terms of the stereotype. The results of such
practices may be a form of statistical discrimination. Dual labour-
market theory differs from screening theory in placing the focus on
institutional barriers to occupational mobility and earnings advancement
within the labour market that favour some groups relative to others in
their access to better-paying jobs. Labour-market segmentation theory
is a direct derivative of dual labour-market theory, but places more
emphasis on both the societal nature of the institutions that generate
inequality and the role of behavioural traits as opposed to cognitive
capabilities in determining access to jobs and earnings.
-14-
Human capital
Wage differences between males and females exist, and have persisted
over time. Why? In a perfectly competitive world in which all labour
has homogenous productive qualities, profit-maximization by employers
would ensure that each worker receives a wage equal to the value of the
marginal product of labour. If we drop the assumption that all workers
have the same productive qualities, then wages would differ but all
workers would still be paid the value of the marginal product of labour
in any given employment.
Human capital theory [Becker, 1965] recognizes that different wor-
kers have different productive qualities because of individual choices
to invest in activities whereby productive capabilities are attained.
According to this theory, females are (biologically) suited for work in
the home--nurturing husbands and children. Female labour-force partici-
pation depends on the relative returns of work in the home (the produc-
tion of children and husbands) and work in the labour market (the pro-
duction of marketable goods and services). An implication is that for
significant proportions of their lives, females can derive relatively
high "income" by working in the home, whereas males, being males, can-
not. In the utility-maximizing household, nonparticipation by females
in the paid labour force will be the result of rational decision-making,
given the returns to labour in the home and the labour market. As a
result, females choose to accumulate less "human capital" over the life
cycle than do males, where "human capital" is defined as education and
on-the-job training that renders one more productive in the paid labour
market.
Mincer and Polachek [1974] explicitly extend the human-capital model
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to a theory of male-female income differences. It is assumed a priori
that females go through a personal calculus whereby they anticipate
having and rearing children and consequently expect to withdraw from the
labour force. There are two reasons why planned labour force withdrawal
discourages investment in human capital applicable to the labour market.
First, it shortens the time-frame for returns to such investments.
Second, those skills that have been developed, whatever they might be,
depreciate during periods of labour-force withdrawal. In sum, total
investment in human capital relevant to the labour market is less the
longer the periods of planned withdrawal from labour- force participa-
tion.
The human-capital model can also be applied to occupational segrega-
tion on the basis of sex. Given their attachment to the home, females
choose to enter those occupations for which little investment in human
capital is needed. A corollary to this theory is that females would
choose to exclude themselves from occupations that would require that
they invest in relatively large amounts of human capital, or firms may
be unwilling to bear the cost of on-the-job training for females.
Alternatively, it could be argued that females do invest in on-the-job
training in the home, and that occupational segregation reflects the
entry of women into the types of paid jobs for which housework has
prepared them best. If so, the withdrawal of females from these types
of jobs in the labour force would not result in the depreciation of
previously acquired skills. While this application of human-capital
theory might account for occupational segregation, it would not, how-
ever, explain why female-dominated jobs in the labour market tend to
have a lower valuation than those dominated by men.
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Tastes for discrimination
Within the human-capital framework, male-female earnings differences
that can be explained by differences in investment in human capital
would not be considered to reflect discrimination. It is only demand-
side phenomena that are embedded in hiring practices of firms that can
generate discriminatory outcomes. "Tastes" cannot be directly measured,
so the empiricist merely asserts that the unexplained residual reflects
the extent of the taste for discrimination by managers, workers, or even
consumers. Although the "taste" theory of discrimination was originally
intended to explain black/white discrimination [Becker 1957], it might
also be extended to a theory of sex discrimination using a trade model.
If extended to a theory of sex discrimination, it is assumed that males
have a physical and psychological aversion to associating with females
in the workplace, and hence experience a disutility when females are
hired to work alongside of them.
Consider two societies, M and F, where F is relatively labour abun-
dant and M is relatively capital abundant. Both societies are assumed
to have identical production functions. When no discrimination exists,
trade occurs. Society F exports labour and M exports capital until equal
marginal products are achieved in M and F. Now, assume that males have
a distaste for working with females, so that the proportion of F labour
working with M capital becomes an argument in M's utility function.
Given this distaste, employers from society M are prepared to sacrifice
profits to preclude association with members of society F. Employees
from society M will also be prepared to accept a lower wage to avoid
being employed with members of society F.
Bergmann [1974] has followed Becker's earlier work [1957] in attri-
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buting occupational segregation by race and sex to tastes for discrimi-
nation on the part of employers. Unlike Becker as well as Mincer and
Polachek, Bergmann assumes that females and blacks in general have the
same potential for accumulating human capital as do white males.
Bergmann's explanation of occupational segregation by race and sex draws
upon the early theories of non-competing groups put forth by Cairnes
[1874], Fawcett [19181, and Edgeworth [1922]. She argues that emplo-
yers, who are predominantly white males, have a taste for discrimination
that leads them to deny entry of blacks and females into most occupa-
tions. These occupations then become the preserves of white male
workers. Like blacks, females are forced to crowd into a few occupa-
tions, lowering the value of the marginal product of labour and hence
the wage in those employments. Males, on the other hand, are paid
higher wages in the occupations they dominate than they would receive if
entry by females was not artificially restricted.
There are problems with the Bergmann model. To begin with, it is
not at all clear that the impact of a "taste for discrimination" can be
analyzed in the same way with respect to blacks and females. In a
racist society, whites may not want to associate with blacks, but in a
sexist society the problem in the workplace is often that males want to
associate too closely with females--hence the emergence of the problem
of sexual harrassment with its implications for the relations between
males and females in the labour force. This assymetry between the
positions of blacks and females is simply not addressed by those who
begin their analysis with a "taste for discrimination".
In addition, Bergmann's model lacks any explanation for the motives
that lead employers to exclude females from some--in fact most--occupa-
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tions. Indeed the theory contains no explanation of why the occupation
of being an employer is male-dominated in the first place. Nor does it
tell us why individual employers have a distaste for employing females
in most occupations, but are willing to employ them in a few. Unlike
the human-capital theorists, Bergmann does not assume that females are
ideally suited to some employments and males to others. Presumably, in
her model, all employers begin by attempting to hire males, but as the
excess supply of female workers grows, and their wages fall, some
employers are led to overcome their tastes for discrimination andhire
females.
But the fact that they hire females in only a few occupations, so
that occupational segregation arises, would have to occur because of a
distaste on the part of male workers for working with females, perhaps
enforced by union or professional practices. Bergmann, however, does
not argue that some jobs are ideally suited for females and some for
males. Therefore, her model contains no theory of why females are
crowded into certain types of jobs--elementary school teaching, nursing,
clerical work--rather than others. Like most theories that rely on
unobserved tastes to "explain" discrimination, Bergmann's theory merely
rationalizes a labour-market situation that has historically evolved.
She does not attempt to explore the socio-economic determinants of this
evolution.
In Becker's model, the firm takes technology and prices as given. If
it does not make the right choices in its allocation of resources, it
cannot compete. But implicit in Becker's theory is the assumption that
firms pursue goals other than profit maximization. In this case firms
in M pursue the taste for discrimination (that is, the avoidance of
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association with members of F). If firms can successfully pursue the
taste for discrimination, the implication is that these firms have some
control over product markets- that is they do not merely respond to the
dictates of the market as in traditional economic theory. As in beha-
vioural theories of the firm [see, for example, Williamson, 1962],
firms have discretionary market power.
As Arrow [1973] has pointed out, if these firms are embedded in a
competitive economy, then discriminatory firms should not be able to
compete over the long run if some firms pursue profit-maximization
rather then the taste for discrimination as their goal. Given discri-
mination in the labour market, nondiscriminating firms will be very
willing to hire females at less than the competitive wage, thereby
gaining a cost advantage over those firms who continue to shun females.
Nondiscriminating employers will net economic rents, that will equal the
difference between what they have to pay female workers and the value of
the marginal products of these workers. Nondiscriminating firms will
capture a larger market share, forcing discriminating firms to exit from
the industry. As they expand, and as new nondiscriminating firms enter
the industry, all discriminatory rents will be bid away until discrimi-
nation in pay no longer exists.
Screening
Theories of discrimination have, however, been proposed that do not
rely upon "tastes for discrimination" on the part of employers. In
particular, screening models view discriminatory hiring practices as
being motivated by the nature of the jobs themselves in combination with
the objective perceptions on the part of employers as to what types of
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workers would best fill these jobs. Some types of occupations require
high levels of recruitment costs as well as initial productivity and/or
on-the-job training at the firm's expense. Hence the firm incurs both
wasted expense if a particular employee does not perform as expected,
either immediately or in response to training, as well as high turnover
costs if the employee who is hired (and where training is involved)
becomes more productive but does not maintain his or her attachment to
the firm. Therefore the firm wants to hire workers who have the highest
probability of both possessing the necessary initial productive charac-
teristics and remaining with the firm.
In a world of imperfect information, however, the firm faces con-
siderable uncertainty in this regard when hiring and training any parti-
cular worker. In the face of uncertainty concerning the performance of
individual workers, the firm attempts to use more impersonal information
in deciding who to hire. Such hiring practices may be quite rational
from the point of view of the profit-maximizing firm, but may neverthe-
less result in statistical discrimination [Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973;
Spence, 1974; Aigner and Cain, 1977].
For example, it is generally known that the labour-force turnover of
females is considerably higher than that of males [Perry, 1972]. Hence,
for jobs where turnover costs are high, employers tend to hire only
males. Given imperfect information, ascriptive characteristics are used
as a proxy for actual worker characteristics. If the future conforms to
the statistical trends of the past and if the amount of hiring done by
the firm is large enough to be affected by statistical regularities
within a reasonable time horizon, employers will reduce turnover costs.
But, as a result, some females who would have stayed with the firm
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are not hired, whereas some males who will in fact cause the firm to
incur turnover costs are hired. On an actuarial basis, the profit-
maximizing firm has made the right hiring decisions. Nevertheless, for
lack of perfect information about individual workers, some females
suffer from discrimination due to the fact that they are female. That
is, being viewed as a stereotypical female employee becomes a negative
externality for individuals who happen to be female.
The model has logical appeal, but it may not adequately reflect the
complexities of hiring decisions. When used as a theory of sex discri-
mination, screening models make strong assumptions about the unobserva-
bility of an individual female's ability. Personnel managers, however,
know much more about job applicants than merely gender. Employers
typically also have information on an individual's race, age, address,
schooling, marital status, number of dependents, health, criminal
record, previous work experience, test results, references, as well as
the way in which the applicant presents himself or herself in a job
interview. Although gender may play some role in the hiring process, it
cannot simply be assumed a priori that it is the single most important
factor determining the hiring decision.
One important implication of the screening model approach to sex
discrimination is that incorrect beliefs by employers concerning the
relative costs and benefits of hiring males and females could poten-
tially set up a signal to females concerning their employability in
particular occupations that will become a self-fulfilling prophecy even
as females as an ascriptive group increase their long-run attachment to
work in the paid labour force. If females know a priori that employers
are sex-biased in hiring, they may choose not to invest in the acquisi-
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tion of productive characteristics that are relevant for occupations
that require long-term attachment to the firm. One result of such
responses to market signals would be the exacerbation of overcrowding of
females (who have now increased their labour-force participation rates)
into those occupations in which they have historically tended to find
employment.
Dual labour markets
Even though the screening models may be criticized on certain
grounds, they have succeeded in going further in an explanation of the
interaction of supply and demand on the labour market than either the
human-capital or tastes models. Recognizing the fact that employee
productivity in, and attachment to, the workplace cannot be known at the
time of the labour-market exchange, the models are able to portray
individual employers as being motivated by observable costs, not by
unobservable tastes. In particular, insofar as they focus on turnover
costs, screening models come to conclusions concerning sex discrimina-
tion that are very similar to those derived from dual labour-market
models.
Dual labour-market theory has emerged out of the institutional
tradition in U.S. labour economics [see, for example, Slichter, 1919;
Dunlop, 1957; Slichter, Livernash, and Healey, 19601, a tradition in
which the focus is on the relation between the internal structure of
employment in the firm ("internal labour markets") and the hiring
practices of the firm on the external labour market. In their extension
and refinement of this tradition, Doeringer and Piore [1971] argue that
the existence of internal labour markets or, more accurately, internal
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job structures, is the key demand-side factor separating what they call
the primary labour market from the secondary labour market.
The primary or core labour market is to be found in occupations,
firms, and industries that use advanced technology and require large-
scale capital commitments. Economies of scale create firms that are
oligopolistic in the product market. The capital-intensive nature of
the production processes necessitate high levels of on-the-job training,
if only to ensure that workers do not make costly mistakes. As a re-
sult, the nature of the technology requires the development of internal
job structures with well-defined promotion ladders. Over time, these
job structures become institutionalized in the firm; Doeringer and Piore
have defined an internal labour market as an administrative unit within
which the pricing and allocation of labour is governed by a set of
administrative rules and procedures that define the limits of horizontal
and vertical occupational mobility. With high productivity through the
use of capital-intensive methods and high profitability derived from
oligopolistic market power, firms in which the primary labour market
predominates can afford to pay high wages and fringe benefits to primary
labour-market workers--rewards that are typically enforced by high
levels of unionization. Moreover, quite aside from unionization, once
they gain entry to the internal job ladders through "ports of entry"
from the external labour market, primary labour-market workers are no
longer in competition with workers on the external labour market in
their climbs up the job ladders.
In contrast, workers in low productivity, labour-intensive occupa-
tions, firms, and industries enter the secondary labour market where
turnover costs are low because of the nature of the technology, and
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profit margins are low because of the highly competitive structures of
industrial organization. In the secondary labour market, wages and
fringe benefits are low, and labour turnover is high. There is little
unionization. Working conditions are poor, and there is little chance
for promotion or on-the-job training. These characteristics of jobs
tend to reinforce economically undesirable characteristics of workers
who perform these jobs. People who lack skills receive low wages in the
secondary labour market; but low wages and poor working conditions keep
them from enhancing their skill levels. Hence, once in the secondary
labour market, it is difficult to acquire those characteristics that
might enable one to gain entry to the primary market. In effect, dual
labour markets give rise to noncompeting groups.
How well can dual labour-market theory explain the different econo-
mic positions of males and females in the Canadian labour market? As
was argued in Chapter 1, much of the earnings gap is due to the occupa-
tional segregation of females into a relatively small number of low-
paying "women's" jobs, such as secretarial and clerical work, teaching,
child-care, and health services. Insofar as these occupations are
characterized by low pay, low skill requirements, high turnover, little
unionization, and little opportunity for advancement through their work,
employment in these occupations would fit the description of the secon-
dary labour market. But the characteristics of "women's" work does not,
in fact, fit so neatly into the dual labour-market categories. In
Canada, some occupations, such as teaching and nursing, requiring high
levels of skill development have become highly unionized and are rela-
tively highly paid. Other occupations, such as secretarial work, also
require fairly high skill levels, but are not so highly paid.
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Whether out of economic circumstances (the income of females has
become increasingly important to basic standards of living for families)
or out of the aspirations for work that goes beyond the kitchen, females
have tended to remain in the paid labour force longer and with more
persistence. For those females who have become permanent members of the
labour force, the critical issue raised by the dual labour-market
distinction between primary and secondary work is whether or not and to
what extent there are possibilities for career advancement through
promotion. Quite in keeping with the dual labour market notion that it
is the nature of jobs that creates the characteristics of workers rather
than vice versa, it could be argued that many females who aspire to
permanent participation in the labour market develop only sporadic
attachment because of their decreased lack of investment to secure
primary labour-market jobs.
Labour-market segmentation
Although its main focus is on the nature of internal job structures,
the dual labour-market perspective raises the issue of the relation
between the types of occupations that males and females perceive as
available to them in the economy and the ways in which males and females
develop as participants in the paid labour force. Recently, attempts
have been made to put the relation between jobs and workers in broader
socio-economic perspective [Gordon, Reich, and Edwards, 1982]. Labour-
market segmentation theory argues that the internal structures of jobs
are shaped more to suit the hierarchical authority structures within the
firm than to provide successive (vertically-related) stages of on-the-
job training.
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Different levels of the corporate hierarchy require different types
of behavioural characteristics that are crucial to individual perfor-
mance. For example, a person who is unable to delegate authority or
give orders could not be productive at higher levels of the hierarchy,
while a person who is unwilling or unable to take orders could not be
productive at lower levels. In other words, productivity at work is
viewed not only in terms of the technical capabilities of workers, but
also in terms of behavioural traits [Edwards, 1976 and 1977].
The labour-market segmentation perspective on the nature of work
raises the issue of how different types of behavioural characteristics
are acquired. Bowles and Gintis [19761 have argued that the most impor-
tant impact of schooling on the economic success of individuals is
because of the inculcation of behavioural characteristics that are
valued on the paid labour market, and that in fact the predominant func-
tion of schooling is to reinforce and transmit differential behavioural
traits acquired through social acculturation in the family--the influ-
ence of the behaviour of parents on that of their children [see Kohn,
19691. Hence the combination of social acculturation in the family and
behavioural reinforcement in the schooling system functions to reproduce
the hierarchical division of labour that is found in the typical work-
place.
Although Bowles, Gintis, and Edwards confine their own empirical
analyses to differences among white males, it would seem fruitful to
extend their approach to differences between males and females. Whereas
human-capital theory takes the sex-based division of labour as given--
with females being seen as ideally suited for work in the home--the
labour-market segmentation perspective asks how and to what extent the
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attitudes and behavioural characteristics of males and females are
shaped to reproduce the sex-based division of labour. In other words,
like the hierarchical division of labour in the enterprise, the sex-
based division of labour is inherently hierarchical: power resides with
those (typically men) who control the household pursestrings, and the
role of those (typically women) who must live off the earnings of others
is to serve the needs of their "master".
Moreover, when females who accept a subservient role in the home
enter the paid labour force, they tend to look for work where they can
use their "service" skills. In addition, they are typically willing to
accept wages that are supplementarey to family income, because they view
their participation in the labour force in this light. Insofar as
family wages for males and supplementary wages for females remain the
norms in society, even female heads of households who have to support a
family on a full-time basis tend to find employment most readily in
"women's" occupations and at "women's" (that is, supplementary) wages
[for an historical perspective, see Humphries, 19781.
II. Empirical evidence
All these theoretical approaches are in need of empirical testing.
Econometric efforts to account for the persistent earnings gap between
males and females have not been particularly successful. Two empirical
approaches dominate the literature, one focusing on supply-side im-
pacts--the effects of worker characteristics on earnings--and the other
on demand-side impacts--the effects of job and occupational characteris-
tics on earnings.
The usual approach to estimation of the earnings gap is to estimate
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two separate earnings functions for males and females where Earnings =
f(Human Capital). The estimated equations are then used to calculate
how much earnings disparities would be reduced if females had the same
levels of human capital as males. Female earnings are re-estimated,
substituting in the means from the male wage regression equation for
each of the human-capital characteristics. An estimate is derived of
the average earnings expected if the only difference in average earnings
between males and females was due to differences in the measured human-
capital characteristics.
The variables typically used in the human-capital approach are edu-
cation, on-the-job training, and experience--all those attributes
embodied in the worker that determine the worth of the employee to the
employer. There is normally no significant difference between males and
females in terms of years of schooling (in U.S. studies, differences in
years of education tend to be greatest between whites and blacks rather
than between males and females). Hence, most approaches focus on work
experience as the central explanation for earnings differences. Human-
capital differences generally explain between 10 to 25 percent of the
earnings gap [Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973; Sandell and Shapiro, 1978;
and Sawhill, 1973].
But some recent studies that utilize the human capital approach go
further in explaining the earnings gap [Mincer and Polachek, 1974 and
1978; Corcoran and Duncan, 1978]. Using data drawn from the National
Longitudinal Survey and the Survey For Economic Opportunity (large U.S.
national samples of married white wage and salary workers between ages
30 and 44), Mincer and Polachek found that differences in work experi-
ence alone account for almost half of the earnings differences. Their
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central variables are education, actual labour market experience, and
length of service with the firm.
If we assume that occupation is a way to qualify the quantity of
investment in human capital, the Corcoran and Duncan study, which
excludes occupation, can therefore be taken as a pure test of the
human-capital model. As the theory states, economic agents invest in
human capital as long as they can anticipate future returns on their
present investments in education and experience. Under perfectly
competitive assumptions, individuals have perfect mobility and perfect
information about the economy and search for the highest return on their
human capital, all of which implies that, in the long run at least,
competitive forces will equalize returns on human capital across occupa-
tions and industries. That there are differences in returns for those
in various occupations implies the existence of market imperfections.
These imperfections include institutional rigidities to job mobility as
well as discriminatory practises on the part of employers. The authors
attribute almost one-third of the earnings gap to differences in work
experience and over one-tenth to differences in on-the-job training.
Females have less total work experience and on-the-job training. The
authors note that differences in on-the-job training may result from
discrimination in access to jobs with training opportunities.
Like Mincer and Polachek, Corcoran and Duncan utilize an available
U.S. national data source--the ninth survey taken as part of the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics. This survey was administered in 1976 to
household heads and 3,000 wives, who were part of a national represen-
tative sample of almost 6,000 families. The questionnaire that formed
the basis of the study included direct questions on the training content
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of jobs, work history patterns, absenteeism because of an employee's
illness, absenteeism due to illness of other family members, self-
imposed restrictions on both job location and work hours, as well as
plans to stop working for reasons other than training [Corcoran and
Duncan, 1978, 51. Their indicators of labour-force attachment include
the last four factors listed above. These factors, however, explained
none of the earnings gap. Insofar as females stay out of the labour
force to rear children, when they do work their combined commitment to
work in the home and in the labour market does not have a negative
effect on earnings. The authors do note, however, that the wages of
wives may be lower if moves of married couples are dictated by the
careers of husbands. As Mincer and Polachek also note, geographic
labour mobility of married women is often exogenous to the model due to
the job changes of the husband [1978, 190].
Within the human-capital approach, "experience" is used in most wage
equations as a proxy for acquired productivity characteristics. The
majority of studies utilizing national data sets are handicapped by the
lack of a measure for actual labour-force experience. The proxy util-
ized in studies using such data sets is (in years) age minus education
minus six (or five). The fact that both Mincer and Polachek and
Corcoran and Duncan use measures of actual labour-market experience
undoubtedly goes some way in accounting for their relative success in
explaining the earnings gap. But nevertheless, the returns to exper-
ience for females remain significantly lower than the returns to exper-
ience for males, and hence even in the most successful human-capital
studies a large unexplained residual remains.
It should be noted that insofar as a correlation between wages and
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experience is observed, it is difficult to ascertain whether it is
higher productivity derived from on-the-job training or simply greater
seniority that results in higher pay. Productivity, in the textbook
sense, is defined as a measure of output per unit of resource input and
can be easily measured where work is on a piece-rate basis. But such a
straightforward relationship between input and output is usually not the
case. The work of Medoff and Abraham [1979] utilizes performance evalu-
ations as a direct measure of individual productivity for managers and
professional employees in a single firm. They find that earnings are
significantly correlated with experience, but not with performance
ratings (that is, their measure of productivity). They therefore equate
experience with seniority rather than productivity, and pose a problem
for human-capital theorists who tend to assume that experience is an
appropriate measure of productivity.
While Medoff and Abraham certainly pose a challenge to the assump-
tions of human capital theory, we might question whether performance
ratings given by supervisors to subordinates reflect current relative
productivities, given the inherent biases that must enter into such sub-
jective evaluations. Although they do not explore differences between
males and females in their study (their sample is made up entirely of
white males), the findings of Medoff and Abraham have potentially impor-
tant implications for estimating the earnings gap insofar as it is males
who maintain longer-term attachments to the firm than do females and
find it easier to climb internal job ladders to reap the rewards of
seniority.
Differences between males and females across broadly defined occupa-
tional categories explain little of the male-female earnings gap [see
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Brown, Moon, and Zoloth, 1978 and Buchele, 1982 where five to seventeen
occupational categories are used]. Researchers have achieved greater
success in explaining the earnings gap by gaining access to data sets
that contain more narrowly defined occupational descriptions. Using 295
three-digit Census occupations, Sanborne [19641 accounts for 71 percent
of the male-female earnings difference. The study, however, includes no
variables that describe characteristics of jobs so we do not know why
occupational differences account for the gap.
Three conclusions emerge from the literature surveyed above. First,
males and females are employed in different kinds of jobs that yield
females lower wages than males. Second, even when they are employed in
the same kinds of jobs, females are paid less than males. Third,
differences in the stocks of human capital do not adequately explain the
major part of either of the above. These conclusions--and the associ-
ated unexplained residuals--have led researchers in different direc-
tions. The Polachek [1981] explanation of the lower earnings of females
rests upon the specialization of female labour within the family.
Females rationally choose jobs that maximize current wages and minimize
their investment in training. England [1982], however, has refuted the
predictions made by Polachek's theory. She concludes that there is no
evidence that plans for intermittent employment make the choice by
females of traditionally female occupations an economically rational
one. She states furthermore that human-capital theory has not generated
an explanation of occupational sex segregation that fits the evidence.
It can be argued that studies that utilize either more narrowly
defined occupations or firm-level rather than national-level data bases
will explain more of the differences in earnings between the sexes.
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[See Agarwal,1982 for a good summary of firm-level and national-level
data bases for the United States and Canada.] The greater the number of
factors controlled for, the smaller the differential will be. Most of
the work on sex discrimination done thus far has utilized national data
sets. Models for estimating the earnings gap that use national data
sets are underspecified. Supply-side characteristics, such as educa-
tion, experience, occupation, and hours and weeks worked, have been
included in such models, but direct measures of performance, seniority,
absenteeism, and turnover have not. Underspecification on the demand
side appears to be even greater. For example, none of the studies has
included demand-side factors, such as the nature of the firm's product
market, industrial membership, technology, and size of the firm.
Demand-side factors are important in terms of an employers' ability to
pay. For example, different firms operating in the same labour market
can pay different wage rates to workers in the same occupation. The
importance of these demand-side variables is demonstrated by the work of
Blau [1977]. She examines the distribution of male and female workers
between firms and concludes that even when occupations are integrated, a
large portion of earnings differences between the sexes is because
females are employed in low-paying firms as compared to high-paying
firms.
Publicly available firm-specific data bases for use in economic'
analysis are uncommon. In the case of male-female earnings differences,
such firm-specific data sometimes become available when a researcher has
been called in to analyze a particular discrimination suit. Even then,
for reasons of confidentiality, the researcher may not be given the
right to publish the results of the analysis. Nevertheless, a variety
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of firm-specific studies have been done [for the United States: Malkiel
and Malkiel, 1973; Cassell, Director, and Doctors, 1975; Ferber and
Westmiller, 1976; Gordon and Morton, 1976; Osterman, 1979; for the
United Kingdom: Chiplin and Sloane, 1976; Siebert and Sloane, 1981; for
Canada: Robson and Lapointe, 1971; Shrank, 1977; Stelcner, 1979].
In a pioneering firm-specific study, Malkiel and Malkiel [19731
utilize data on 272 professional employees of a single firm (a research
institute). They study the patterns of employment to analyze the
allocation of jobs. After adjusting for actual labour-market exper-
ience, post high school education, marital status, college field of
study, rate of absenteeism, and personal productivity (as measured by
the number of publications), the female-male earnings ratio increases
from 66 percent to between 75 and 89 percent. The firm provided the
researchers with a 13 point ranking of job levels designed to indicate
an individual's level of responsibility. By combining the job-level
index with the other variables, the adjusted earnings ratio becomes 98
percent. Malkiel and Malkiel assume homogeneity with respect to career
interests and attachment to the labour force, and therefore conclude
that there is no discrimination in the form of unequal pay for equal
work but rather discrimination due to job assignment. Females with the
same qualifications as males are assigned to lower-level jobs. On the
average, the level for male employees was 2.8 steps higher than for
females. About one-half of the gross job-level difference can be attri-
buted to the different characteristics (such as education and experi-
ence) of the males and females in the sample. The remaining half of the
difference is unexplained and may be attributed either to discrimination
against females or to other productivity-related characteristics that
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may differ by sex -- characteristics that the researchers were admitted-
ly unable to measure.
Osterman [1979] analyzes sex discrimination amongst 700 employees in
a metropolitan publishing firm. Unlike Malkiel and Malkiel, Osterman
does not assume that all employees are on the same job ladder. The
central feature of his analysis is to identify hierarchically-structured
job clusters (or internal labour markets) in terms of functions requi-
ring related skills in order to investigate the male-female earnings
differences within job clusters. Osterman concludes that the sex differ-
ential in earnings within clusters of similar jobs is much greater if
marriage and children variables are excluded. Male employees reap
higher returns from being married and having children than do female
employees. He concludes that managers in this firm simply believe that
married males with children deserve higher earnings than comparable
females.
In an earlier study, Cassell, Director, and Doctors [1975] contrast
discrimination within three separate internal labour markets. Unlike
Malkiel and Malkiel and Osterman who focus on professional and manager-
ial employees, Cassell, Director, and Doctors use a sample made up of
2300 blue collar and nonmanagerial white-collar employees. Cassell et.
al examine the internal job structures of three separate firms. They
estimate the standard wage regression with age (which is used as a proxy
for precompany experience), race, sex, military experience, and a set of
education dummies. They identify four types of discrimination: i)
time-of-hire grade discrimination, but no post-hire discrimination for
minority workers, ii) time-of-hire wage discrimination for females, iii)
post-hire wage discrimination for females, and iv) post-hire grade dis-
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crimination for females. A more specific finding is that in incentive-
paid jobs, females receive grade promotions as rapidly as males who
began at the same level, but tend to have lower earnings within each
grade.
The most significant Canadian study to utilize a human-capital model
to explore earnings differentials within a specific firm is one by
Schrank [1977]. Schrank studies sex discrimination in faculty salaries
at Memorial University in Newfoundland for 1973-1974. His data base
includes 598 faculty workers of whom 494 are males and 104 are females.
The main finding is that a large salary differential exists between the
sexes because of differences in training and experience. A substantial
unexplained difference arose between males and females who seemed to be
professionally equivalent. To examine variation in patterns of discri-
mination throughout the university, he estimates pooled sample regres-
sion equations for individual faculties, such as Arts, Science, and
Education. His major findings are that female faculty members are paid,
on average, less than males with identical qualifications and experience
who are in the same job. In addition, females are discriminated against
in promotions to higher academic ranks and appointments. Evidence of
sex discrimination in faculty salaries appears in all sectors of the
university.
Two interesting British studies, Chiplin and Sloane [1976] and
Siebert and Sloane [1981], utilize the human-capital model in a firm-
specific context. The Chiplin and Sloane paper is based on a sample of
266 professional males and 269 females in a "specific occupation within
a particular organization". As in the Osterman and Malkiel and Malkiel
studies, the sample is made up of professional employees with high
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academic qualifications, and data were collected from the firm's person-
nel records for individual employees. The firm is divided into two
levels, with level 2 being higher than level 1 in terms of mean earnings
and experience. The firm under study operates with a strong internal
labour market with entry entirely restricted to level 1. Promotion to
level 2 is a function of experience in level 1. Within each level there
are grades that determine salary.
Two types of experience variables are included in the model, the
first being work experience within each level and the second, work
experience outside the company. With respect to education, Chiplin and
Sloane assume that the majority of individuals in the sample possess
identical years of schooling, because the occupational requirements are,
in all cases, for a particular educational level. It is with this
rationale in mind that they suppress the schooling variable in the
model.
They estimate two separate equations for "basic" and "gross" sala-
ries. Basic salary refers to the remuneration associated with the
current job, while gross salary refers to the gross remuneration ob-
tained over the twelve-month period. The results indicate that at least
two-thirds of the variance in the log of salaries for the basic model
can be explained by the experience variables. Specifically, the level 2
variables (for supervisory experience) are significant at the 1 percent
level. For the male gross salary equation, the outside experience
coefficient is significant, but negative, indicating that the firm under
study operates with a pronounced internal labour market for this type of
job. In the female gross-salary equation, the experience variable at
level 1 has a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that on
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average, females spend a longer period of time at level 1. In the
actual measurement of discrimination, females are better paid according
to the male equation than if rewarded according to their own earnings
function. A general conclusion of the Chiplin and Sloane study is that
while there is discrimination in terms of access to a higher-level job
classification, it is possible to explain over half the difference in
the proportions of males and females in the two grades in terms of
different average characteristics, particularly length of experience.
Furthermore, where females are promoted, they tend to be assigned to
less responsible posts at lower salaries, the same conclusion reached by
Malkiel and Malkiel for their U.S. firm.
The other major British study by Siebert and Sloane [1981] uses data
obtained from the personnel files of five firms in light engineering,
finance, the public sector, food processing, and clothing. Separate
regressions relating weekly and annual earnings to experience and
education are run, not only according to sex, but also according to
marital status. Siebert and Sloane argue that employers might unjusti-
fiably regard marital status as a proxy for commitment to work, indica-
ting employment instability in the case of married females, but stabi-
lity in the case of married males.
The results indicate that service with the firm and education are
the most significant determinants of pay for all four sex-marital groups
in all companies. The insignificance of outside service, coupled with
the significance of internal service suggests strong internal labour
markets. Their most important finding, however, is sex discrimination
in the engineering company. Single females are paid up to 16 percent
less than single males with similar characteristics. Marital status had
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no effect in the engineering company and the clothing factory. They
also assert that the financial institution exhibits a preference for
hiring single females while the public service department prefers
married to single persons of either sex.
III. Summary
A number of general conclusions can be drawn from these empirical
studies. The first is that studies based on human-capital models that
utilize national data sets find that females earn 60 percent or less
than males. There is, therefore, no controversy over the existence of a
large pay gap. There is, however, some difference of opinion concerning
the causes of the differential. Research findings vary depending on (i)
the explanatory variables used in the model, and (ii) the data base used
to test the model.
Studies that utilize national data sets and a human capital model
can account for 10 to 25 percent of the variation in earnings, while
firm-level studies can account for 25 to 90 percent. The majority of
studies reveal that to the extent that productivity is improved by
simply doing the job, earnings will be related to experience. For those
firm-level studies where strong internal labour markets exist, years of
service with the company are more highly correlated with earnings than
years of experience outside the company. In the firm-level studies,
education and experience are highly significant in most but not all
equations, while age is sometimes significant. At the level of the
firm, the explanatory power of the human capital model seems high, given
the small number of variables included in the model.
Firm-level studies obviously permit the researcher to control for
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more factors than do national or regional studies, thus reducing the
size of the unexplained residual. The major disadvantage of firm-level
studies compared to more aggregated studies is the lack of generality of
the findings of the former for the economy as a whole. The advantage of
generality is somewhat dubious, however, when such a small portion of
the earnings variance can be explained. It is the view of this resear-
cher, at least, that the sources and mechansims of male-female earnings
differences have to be better understood before general conclusions can
be drawn. Given the state of our present empirical knowledge on the
sources of male-female earning differences, firm-level studies are in
order.
To further our knowledge of this issue, it is not just more sophis-
ticated data bases that are needed. We need to develop our conceptuali-
zation of sex-based earnings determination. Notwithstanding the exis-
tence of a number of studies that look at promotions within firms along
internal job ladders, most of the empirical work on sex discrimination
to date has been based on the human-capital model. As indicated in the
first part of this chapter, a number of alternative hypotheses concer-
ning the determinants of male-female earnings differences are suggested
by the screening, dual labour market, and labour-market segmentation
approaches. In general, however, these hypotheses have not been well
enough specified for use in empirical work, including not only actual
hypothesis testing, but also the acquisition of data that might make it
possible to distinguish among alternative hypotheses.
To what extent then can the theories outlined in the first part of
this chapter generate testable hypotheses that can lead us to an under-
standing of the male-female earnings gap? Are there additional theore-
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tical perspectives originating from outside the discipline of economics
that might be useful for a more comprehensive understanding of the
determinants of the earnings gap? The following chapter addresses these
questions, first by summarizing a perspective that, tries to integrate
the relevant theoretical approaches, and then, drawing upon this pers-
pective, by specifying nine hypothesis to explain male-female earnings
differences.
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Chapter 3 Testable Hypotheses
I. Introduction
A particular theory is only useful if it enables us to formulate
testable hypotheses. Over time, a theory only remains useful if it
increases our knowledge of underlying causal factors and, thereby,
reduces the size of the unexplained "residual". The problem is that,
while we theorize, the world that we are trying to understand itself
undergoes change. Factors that may have had explanatory power at one
point in time may no longer be significant, while new factors of poten-
tial importance might have to be integrated into our model. Hence, to
generate potentially relevant testable hypotheses, we must not only
synthesize the insights of the theoretical perspectives that are already
at hand in the literature, but also seek to extend our perspective to
take into account the changing historical situation.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the extent and nature of the participa-
tion of females in the Canadian labour force has changed dramatically
over the last two decades, and it appears that the significant changes
may be far from over. The increasing involvement of females in the paid
labour force means that strains have been put on the traditional sex-
based division of labour. In the world of paid work, moreover, females
are increasingly entering occupations that have traditionally been
almost the exclusive preserves of males. As stated above, one problem
for hypothesis testing is that history matters. The behaviour of both
employers and employees will be influenced by their perceptions of the
relation between males and females in the workplace as well as by vested
interests inherent in the historically-given status quo.
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To get at these issues of the relation of perceptions and hence
behaviour to the evolving reality, and the consequences for the relative
earnings of males and females, we require much more specifically defined
hypotheses than those that can be directly derived from the theories
outlined in Chapter 2. It should also be noted that many, if not most,
of the theories outlined above were not specifically developed to under-
stand male-female earnings differences, and hence the theories will not
necessarily build upon the differential constraints that males and
females face in the labour market. We require a theoretical framework
that recognizes the special constraints that women face in the labour
market in general and in a corporate bureaucracy in particular. The
construction of such a framework would, in our view, begin with an
examination of the broader impact on earnings of the ways that males and
females relate in the household as well as the different ways in which
males and females are socialized.
Discrimination aside, the fact that, on average, males do better
than females in the pursuit of careers implies that males have superior
career-relevant skills than females. If this is the case, then a number
of more profound questions are raised. How did males acquire superior
skills than females? For policy purposes it is important to know
whether the career-relevant skills were acquired prior to or after
entering the corporate structure. Studies that invoke screening models
imply that employers are reluctant to invest in the upgrading of the
skills of females because they perceive them as being primarily attached
to their families rather than to the firm. Hence the corporation runs
the risk of being denied a return on this investment in human capital.
One implication of such an attitude on the part of employers is that
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females who do want to seek careers have to acquire the relevant train-
ing at their own expense, whereas males can often acquire it at company
expense.
Females may also be deterred from investing in skills and pursuing
careers by the absence of women at or near the top of job ladders
[Kanter, 1977]. This "demonstration effect," itself deriving from the
fact that females have only recently begun to vie in significant numbers
for male-dominated jobs, may result in the reproduction of male domi-
nance. Note that this outcome may occur even in the absence of an
explicit policy of discrimination on the part of the firm. Rather
females may choose not to acquire skills, to bid for promotion, to put
in unpaid overtime, or they may choose to enter only those types of
bureaucratic occupations (such as personnel management) where their sex
has already made some progress.
The result of these constraints may well be occupational segregation
within the bureaucratic structure, mirroring the observed occupational
segregation in the society at large, with females predominating in
low-paid managerial and technical jobs that have relatively short
internal job ladders. As affirmative-action policies in the United
States have recognized, discrimination cannot be dismissed as an issue
just because females (or racial minorities) choose not to enter certain
lines of work. The relevant policy issue may be rather the elimination
of constraints that lead females to perceive their range of opportuni-
ties as being narrower than that of males.
The existence of male-dominated hierarchies within large corpora-
tions may provide males with better access to information and the
attention of superiors. It has been argued that the development of
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mentor relations are important for promotion within bureaucratic struc-
tures, and that males tend to have more mentor relations than females
[Kanter, 1977; Thompson, 1978; Harlan and Weiss, 1981]. This line of
argument recognizes that it is not impersonal market relations that
determine internal promotion, but rather the personal knowledge that
superiors have of subordinates. Superiors may not view themselves as
discriminating against females. But the fact that they develop mentor
relations more easily with males than with females leads them to make
promotion decisions on the basis of incomplete information. It has also
been observed that the motivation to improve and advance may be signifi-
cantly affected by the degree of encouragement that supervisors give to
subordinates. Males may receive substantially more information than
females concerning the possibilities for promotion.
All these factors internal to the firm may lead females to perceive
their work as jobs rather than as careers, thus reinforcing the percep-
tions of employers that the first loyalty of females is not to the firm
but to the household. In fact, given the patriarchal attitudes of males
and the nature of the early socialization of females, this perception
may be correct even for females who genuinely wish to pursue careers.
The choice for career-oriented females is then to avoid such constraints
by avoiding marriage and or childbearing. That females have to make
such choices while males do not amounts to institutional discrimination,
and raises important issues for corporate and public policy concerning
the provisions of daycare, the granting of paternity leaves, and accom-
modating the locational needs of two-career families. Indeed, as
pointed out above, even females who, for the sake of their careers,
resolve to avoid the constraints imposed by family relationships, may
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fall victim to statistical discrimination if employers simply assume
that, because they are females, they are subject to these constraints.
It is therefore important to ascertain the extent to which females
in bureaucracies are constrained by the division of labour in the house-
hold and by the career preferences and requirements of their husbands or
partners. Research must address the difficult and subjective question
of the extent to which females acquiesce to constraints in a male-
dominated culture. As recognized in the "fear-of-success" literature
[Horner, 1972; Hennig and Jardim, 1977], females may experience great
difficulty in competing for "male" jobs because the behavioural attri-
butes required to succeed in these jobs--aggressive behaviour and the
exercise of authority for example--contradict the ideals of feminine
behaviour for which females have been socialized to strive.
The fear-of-success literature raises a crucially important issue
concerning the nature of career-relevant skills within the enterprise.
Although it is generally assumed that such skills are cognitive, and
hence can be learned by those who possess the motivation and mental
capacities, some economists have argued that career-relevant skills are
behavioural, being the products of long periods of socialization within
the family and schooling system [Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Edwards, 1976
and 1977]. It can be argued, for example, that the ability to exercise
authority, which is surely an important determinant of productivity in
most higher-level bureaucracies, cannot simply be learned by someone who
has been raised to accept patriarchal dominance. One policy implication
of this perspective is that equality between the sexes in the workplace
requires that bureaucratic structures be changed to adapt to female
behavioural traits rather than that females adapt to masculine culture.
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The obvious cultural conflict that would be involved in altering bureau-
cratic structures points to the potentially deep-seated nature of the
unequal positions of males and females in the corporate economy.
The approach just outlined may be viewed as creating a bridge bet-
ween the work of social psychologists who seek to understand individual
preference formation and the work of economists who seek to document the
economic outcomes of the choices that are made. Supporting this bridge
is the work of sociologists who seek to understand the nature of the
institutional constraints that determine different ranges of choices for
different segments of the population. The following hypotheses repre-
sent attempts to specify the nature of differential social constraints
that males and females face, the related differences in behaviour
manifested by choices made subject to these constraints, and economic
impact of such constrained optimization.
II. Hypotheses
A number of testable hypotheses are suggested by this theoretical
synthesis. Most conventional is the human-capital hypothesis that
posits differential acquisition of education and experience as the
source of male-female pay differences. The occupational-segregation
hypothesis that argues that to a significant extent males and females
are not allocated to jobs according to productive capabilities (as for,
example, reflected in human-capital measures) but rather because some
(generally lower-paying) jobs have been stereotyped as "women's work"
while others have become the preserve of males. When looking at male-
female differences within companies where internal job ladders are
operative, an independent and chronologically prior source of occupa-
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tional segregation may be the initial allocation of males and females to
entry-level positions that may, in turn, hold out greater or lesser
prospects of advancement within the firm. To test whether there is
entry-level occupational segregation on the basis of sex, we put forth
the port-of-entry hypothesis.
But the ability of males and females to take advantage of labour-
market opportunities may be limited by the social relations of the
household. The commitment-to-the-home hypothesis is designed to test
whether differential household responsibilities of those who participate
in the labour market have a significant impact on their earnings. A
related hypothesis, that applies only to employees who are currently
living with a spouse or partner, tests the impact of a "dominant-career"
on earnings. The dominant-careers hypothesis posits that employees
whose spouses or partners support their careers (in a number of ways to
be specified below) will achieve higher earnings than employees who do
not receive such support, and particularly when, to the contrary, it is
the employee under consideration who is expected to support the career
of the spouse or partner.
The commitment-to-the-home hypothesis, therefore, can also be viewed
as testing the impact of commitment to the labour market on earnings.
But, in addition, people pursue careers within specific firms. The
commitment-to-the-firm hypothesis posits that "organization men and
women"--such as those who work overtime without pay--will achieve higher
earnings than those who simply see their position in the firm as a
nine-to-five job. Of course, an underlying cause of differential
commitment to the firm--and whether an individual views his or her
employment as a job or as a career--may be differential commitment to
-49-
the home (including in some cases the dominant career of a spouse or
partner).
Promotion and earnings may also be dependent on the informal rela-
tions that particular employees develop within the firm. The informal-
networks hypothesis is designed to test whether the quantity and quality
of informal contacts that an employee has with superiors are significant
determinants of earnings. Our particular purpose here is to ascertain
whether males are better at establishing informal networks than females
and to what extent. It may also be the case that females do not seek
out promotion opportunities and higher earnings within the firm because
they do not think that a woman has much chance of upward mobility. The
perceived-discrimination hypothesis is put forth to test whether the
perceptions that employees have of sex bias in the firm's promotion
practices are significant determinants of earnings actually achieved.
A final hypothesis--the early socialization hypothesis--addresses
the potentially inbred nature of attitudes, motivation, and social
skills that may have impacts on earnings. With the exception of the
contribution to earnings of high-school education (a level that is
attained by almost all managerial, professional, and technical employees
in a modern corporation), all of the previous eight hypothests focus on
the impacts of adult experiences on the relative earnings of females and
males. The early-socialization hypothesis posits that the female- or
male-orientation of childhood activities and parental-role models will
have significant impacts on the earnings of an individual as an adult.
In order to indicate the types of variables that would have to be
constructed to capture the phenomena that these nine hypotheses are
intended to reflect, the nature of each of the hypotheses will now be
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discussed in more detail. With the appropriate data set (see Chapters 4
and 5), we will then be in a position to test these nine hypotheses by
means of multivariate regression analysis (see Chapter 6).
The Human-Capital Hypothesis
The standard neoclassical approach to analyzing pay discrimination
draws upon national data sets to explain pay differences between males
and females in terms of schooling and on-the-job experience. These
variables, however, explain only a minor portion (about 40% of the
variance) of the gap between the sexes [in the Canadian context, see
studies by Ostry, 1968; Holmes, 1976; Gunderson, 1975 and 1979; Robb,
19781. The residual is then attributed to discrimination.
The simplest way to improve significantly upon these studies is to
acquire data that will yield a more accurate measure of experience than
the measure typically utilized. The traditional proxy for experience
has been an individual's age minus years of schooling minus six, applied
to both males and females. This measure may adequately approximate the
labour experience of males, but it does not adequately measure the
employment experience of females. On the average, females enter and
exit from the labour force more than males because of childbirth and
other household responsibilities (for example, job loss when a spouse or
partner changes location). Ideally, we would want a more detailed data
base that would yield a real, as opposed to proxy, measure of experience
for each observation.
Given the problem of occupational segregation, we would also like to
know the specific types of training that males and females have ac-
quired. The returns to education may be very different, depending upon
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the area of concentration (for example, arts as opposed to physical
sciences). Most studies find that, on average, males and females have
almost equal amounts of education measured simply by time. Area of
concentration, therefore, could prove to be important as a determinant
of differential outcomes. Such a finding, however, would raise a more
profound question: why do females invest in types of education that tend
to have relatively low rates of return?
The Occupational-Segregation Hypothesis
As a whole, the occupational segregation of females in the Canadian
economy has been fairly well documented. But for lack of firm-specific
data, the occupational segregation of females within large corporations
has received little, if any, empirical analysis. Firm-level data would
provide information on present occupation and occupational mobility
within the firm as well as pay grade, enabling us to determine which
types of jobs and occupations are male dominated and which types are fe-
male dominated. From supplementary firm-level data on the occupational
structure of internal job ladders, we could then examine the extent to
which horizontal distribution in employment determines vertical mobi-
lity. Specifically, we could assess whether, within corporate bureau-
cracies, female-dominated occupations in general and female-dominated
jobs in particular provide normal access to shorter or more dead-end job
ladders than do those occupations and jobs within which males dominate.
The Port-of-Entry Hypothesis
The port-of-entry hypothesis posits that an individual's initial
broad occupational category or department within the firm affects his or
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her subsequent upward mobility in the same company. Ports of entry will
have such an effect only if, in and of themselves, they give employees
differential access to vertical job ladders. If so, the initial hori-
zontal distribution of individuals across occupational categories or
departments will determine their subsequent vertical mobility. The
career and earnings possibilities of females may be limited relative to
those of males because females may have been concentrated in ports of
entry that gave them access to relatively truncated job ladders. The
port-of-entry hypothesis might also be termed the initial-occupational-
segregation hypothesis.
The Commitment-to-the-Home Hypothesis
Screening theories argue that, particularly in jobs demanding long.
term attachment to the firm, cost-minimizing employers prefer to hire
males rather than females. It is supposed that females will tend to
impose higher turnover and absenteeism costs on the enterprise because
of their primary attachment to the household. But screening theories
implicitly view the initial hiring decision as the be-all and end-all of
the employer-employee relation. Females suffer statistical discrimina-
tion in the labour market (or labour exchange), not in the labour
process (that is, within the firm). To test the screening hypothesis,
we would need data that compared the productivity-related attributes as
well as ascriptive characteristics, such as sex, of not only employees
actually hired, but also those job applicants denied employment in the
firm.
Statistical discrimination against females (such as that envisaged
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by screening theories) might occur within the firm, even when employers
have considerable information about the personal attributes and produc-
tivity performances of males and females. Just because a current emp-
loyee is a female and therefore might get married, have (more) children,
follow her husband to a new job in a new location, etc., the employer
might assume that her first commitment will be to the home, and this
assumption might prejudice the treatment of the female employee relative
to the male employee in ways that are detrimental to the advancement of
her career (for example, denial of promotion or on-the-job training).
Of course, male employees might also get married, father children, have
wives who are offered attractive jobs in different locations, etc., but
employers might assume that the careers of males will always take
precedence over servicing the direct needs of wives and children [for a
controlled experiment that tested the attitudes of 1500 top executives
in the U.S. and that found support for this proposition, see Rosen and
Jerdee,1974].
Insofar as screening methods are used by the firm in hiring and pro-
moting, it is not clear whether employers actually consult statistical
records or operate on the basis of "conventional wisdom" in their
treatment of males and females. In any case, to test the statistical
discrimination version of the commitment-to-the-home hypothesis as a
determinant of male-female earnings differentials, we would need to know
what employers were thinking about the family commitments that current
employees might have in the future when they offered promotions, assign-
ments, training, etc. to employees with different productive and ascrip-
tive attributes.
In their treatment of employees, however, employers might also be
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influenced by commitment to the home as manifested by actual absenteeism
of employees for family-related reasons. To test this more concrete
version of the commitment-to-the-home hypothesis, we would need to know
more than just the duration and frequency of absences; we would need to
know why employees are absent. An ideal data set would break absence
down into its associated microcomponents, such as absences due to
pregnancy and family responsibilities and absence due to illness.
Much has been written on the theme that "a woman's work is never
done." We are therefore interested not only in the amount of time that
employees take off from work for household matters, but also how the
responsibility for such tasks as cleaning and cooking are allocated in
the household even when an individual is working full-time. An ideal
data base would have information on division of labour within the house-
hold for full-time employees in order to capture the degree to which the
burden imposed by this division of labour constrains the income-earning
activities of employees of different sexes.
It would also be of interest to examine the impact of the sex-based
division of labour on attempts by males and females to secure promo-
tions. For example, a recent study contends that the reason females do
not get promoted is that they do not wish to be promoted [Hoffman and
Reed, 1981]. It is argued that females do not bid for posted promotion
opportunities. But the Hoffman and Reed study does not explore the
factors constraining the choices that females do make, such as the
choice not to bid for a posted promotion opportunity. It may be that,
because of household responsibilities, females feel incapable of assum-
ing increased corporate responsibilities, a constraint that may not
apply to males.
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The Dominant-Career Hypothesis
For those individuals who are married or attached, another powerful
constraint on the careers of females may be the career requirements of
their husbands or partners. The pursuit of careers often requires
geographic mobility (and perhaps especially when one partner works for a
multi-branch enterprise). Therefore, situations may often arise when
one career has to give way for another--or at least when the material
and psychological costs of not doing so in terms of commuting, duplicate
household facilities, and disrupted family life may be considered by one
or both of the partners as being too great.
In general, for those who have careers, a larger proportion of mar-
ried women than married men will be members of dual-career households.
Hence, precisely because of the survival of the pure sex-based division
of labour within some family units, we would expect that males as a
group will be less constrained by dual-career problems than females as a
group. Information on the existence of the dual-career problem and on
which career is dominant in household decision-making would permit us to
ascertain the extent to which married males and married females face
different constraints in the pursuit of careers and the implications of
such differences for observed earnings and promotions.
The dominant-career variable may also be highly correlated with such
variables as unpaid overtime, mentor relationships, and bids for promo-
tion--a person who feels he or she has little control over the location
or longevity of his or her career may be less willing to devote time to
activities and strategies that are instrumental in career building.
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Commitment-to-the-Firm Hypothesis
Mincer and Polachek [1975], who based their study on a national data
set, found the child variable to be insignificant in explaining differ-
ences in full-time earnings among females as a whole, but negative and
significant when limited to a subsample of highly educated females with
strong labour-force attachment. They suggest that this subgroup res-
ponds to marriage and children not by working part-time, but by working
fewer hours in a full-time job. Commitment to the firm and commitment
to the home might be seen, therefore, as two sides of the same coin.
More commitment to the home, however, might reflect not so much less
commitment to a particular firm, but less commitment to the labour mar-
ket in general. To test the impact on earnings of the commitment-to-
the-firm hypothesis as distinct from commitment to the labour market in
general, we would need measures that reflect the extent to which emplo-
yees view their future prospects for advancement as occurring within
their current firm. For managerial and professional employees, one
measure of commitment to the firm might be the willingness to put in
unremunerated working time. Another indicator would be the number of
outside jobs an individual has applied for since being with the company.
We can assume that individuals who are committed to the company would
apply for fewer jobs or none at all. Still another good indicator of
commitment to the particular firm could be the salary increase that
would be required to entice an individual away from his or her present
job to take another position with the same promotional prospects. We
would want to know whether, on the basis of these indicators, male
employees reveal more commitment to the firm than do female employees.
-57-
The Informal-Network Hypothesis
Virtually all large organizations have rules and procedures for pro-
motion and pay increases that are in principle meritocratic. Individual
preferences are not supposed to determine professional advancement.
Personal relationships are assumed to be independent of an individual's
career progression. Alongside these formal procedures, however, infor-
mal interpersonal networks will inevitably arise. In pursuit of the
firm's goals, trust and loyalty are essential, and hence the corporation
cannot function on a purely impersonal basis. Moreover the people who
inhabit the corporate structure will strive to develop personal rela-
tions within that structure for the sake of furthering their own goals.
These informal networks may supply superiors with information con-
cerning the loyalty of subordinates that cannot be derived from formal
performance evaluations. In making or recommending promotions, super-
iors may be more influenced by particular personalities than by any
objectively determined productive characteristics of their subordinates.
Indeed, the key to promotion in a large bureaucratic structure may well
be the development of a mentor relationship as discussed earlier.
Informal networks may also be important in that they allow people to
discover what opportunities are available. Those with better access to
these networks will have an advantage over those with lesser access in
positioning themselves for promotion. In the male-dominated atmosphere
of the large corporate enterprise, it is very conceivable that male
employees will be better able to become involved in informal networks
than female employees, with a relatively positive impact on their
earnings.
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The Perceived-Discrimination Hypothesis
The perceived-discrimination hypothesis tests the proposition that
the success of females in gaining promotion within the corporation is
adversely affected by the low proportion of females who have already
gained promotion. The argument is that females at lower and middle man-
agerial positions observe the current situation at the higher managerial
levels, and they assume that the situation will persist. As a conse-
quence they may be less motivated than men to invest in skills, contri-
bute their unpaid overtime, or seek to develop informal networks within
the firm, thus lessening their chances of promotion. To test this
hypothesis requires data on whether employees think that there is sex
bias in promotion and whether the number of people of a certain sex in
top positions affects the motivation of males and females at lower
levels of the corporate hierarchy to strive for advancement.
The Early-Socialization Hypothesis
Despite the rapid influx of females into the paid labour force over
the past few decades, it is probably true that married women are viewed,
and view themselves, first as mothers (as do mothers who are not mar-
ried) and wives and second as income earners. Married men, on the other
hand, may well view themselves as income earners first and fathers and
husbands second. Insofar as females in general do not have access to
jobs from which they can derive a family wage whereas males in general
do, there is clearly a material basis for these perceptions. But even
when these material constraints are lifted, there may still be a strong
subjective element that leads even managerial and highly skilled females
to see their household roles as dominating their corporate roles.
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Psychologists and sociologists have argued that the types of activi-
ties that male and female children are encouraged to pursue and the
types of role models they are encouraged to follow in their childhood
prepares females for mothering and nurturing within the home, while
preparing men for competing and aggressing in the world of paid work
[Chodorow, 1980]. To some extent the sex-based division of labour is
socio-biological. Females, not males, bear children and lactate. But
well before females even think about the decision to marry or have
children or pursue careers, they are exposed to psychological processes
that emphasize mothering, not income earning.
Most females who are already participating in managerial and profes-
sional careers have the objective potential to put income earning ahead
of mothering. But, unlike males, they may be constrained in so doing by
ingrained psychological instincts. It would be of interest to examine
the systematic relation between the quality of early socialization of
males and females and economic outcomes. By gathering data on the early
socialization of males and females, we could test the hypothesis that
male-female differences in types of childhood activities and role models
are significant determinants of male-female earnings and promotion
differences within the corporation.
III. Summary
Throughout this discussion of the testable hypotheses, reference has
been made to the nature of the "ideal data set." As will be discussed
In Chapter 4, no data set even approaching the ideal was readily avail-
able for purposes of analyzing the sources of male-female earnings
differences in Canada. A critical stage of the project was the genera-
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tion of an appropriate (if not ideal) data set based upon a specially-
designed questionnaire. The first part of the following chapter,
therefore, points out the deficiencies, from the perspective of the
hypotheses set out above, of the data bases that were available to
analyze male-female earnings differences in Canada. The second part of
the chapter goes on to show how a more germane set of variables has been
constructed from the questionnaire that we have developed.
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Chapter 4 Hypothesis Testing with Questionnaire Data
I. Existing Data Bases
There exist three main data sets that can be used as a basis for
research on the earnings gap between males and females in Canada. How-
ever useful these data sets may be, they do not include the kind of
information necessary to test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3.
After discussing the nature of these data bases, an assessment will
be made of the strengths and weaknesses of the main studies that have
utilized them. We then explain how the data generated by means of a
firm-level questionnaire for this project overcomes some of these weak-
nesses. Finally, we show how relevant variables can be constructed from
the questionnaire responses to test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter
3.
The three existing data sources suitable for analyzing the male-
female earnings gap in Canada are (i) the Annual Survey of Consumer
Finance, (ii) the Department of Labour Annual Survey of Wage Rates,
Salaries and Hours of Labour, and (iii) the Census data collected every
ten years. It should be noted that there exists in Canada no data base
that is comparable to the U.S. National Longtitudinal Survey data base
that contains work histories of individuals over time. Data bases such
as these are invaluable sources and are particularly useful when analyz-
ing female participation in the labour force, because they contain
information on exit from and reentry into the labour market.
The Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) was conducted intermittently
from 1951 to 1971. It is only since 1971 that it has been conducted on
an annual basis. Aggregate data are available in annual reports, and
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the underlying micro-data tapes containing observations on individuals
are also available. The central drawback to the data base is that it
does not resample the same individuals over time.
The only study that utilizes this data base is by Holmes [1976].
Drawing his observation from the SCF for 1967, he fits separate regres-
sions for males and females, in which he specifies the following as
independent variables: age, weeks worked, region, residence, immigration
status, class of worker, marital status, occupation, and the nature of
work (full-time or part-time) as well as education. His approach is
slightly different from most in that he generates life-cycle incomes for
individuals. Holmes finds a gross differential in male-female earnings
of 59 percentage points, of which about 15 percentage points is accoun-
ted for by worker characteristics. In considering the impact of these
characteristics over the life-cycle, Holmes shows that the potential
earnings of the female university graduate rise from the level of the
male high-school dropout to that of the male high school graduate.
Three-quarters of the gross differential remains unexplained: earnings
discrimination against females in the Canadian labour market is esti-
mated to be 44 percent of male earnings.
The second major data base used to estimate the earnings gap is the
Occupational Wage Survey (OWS) published annually by Labour Canada in
Wage Rates, Salaries and Hours of Labour. The data are constructed on
the basis of company reports that give the earnings of males and females
for specific, narrowly-defined occupations. Gunderson [1983, 60] (the
first researcher to use this data base [Gunderson, 1975]), argues that
this data source enables researchers to compare male and female wages
and salaries within a narrowly-defined occupation, controlling for
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interoccupational, interindustry and interregional wage differences.
When using the Occupational Wage Survey data, it is not necessary to
control for other productivity-related factors, such as education,
experience, or initiative; to the extent that these factors matter, they
would result in different job descriptions. What is central, Gunderson
asserts, is that the person can do the job, not that the person brings
certain characteristics to the job. As he notes, someone with low
formal education, but considerable work experience, may be in the same
narrowly-defined occupation as one with the opposite characteristics.
The OWS data are relatively current, being generated annually, and
the structure of the data allows occupations to be specified as being
either in the primary or secondary labour market [Aw, 1980]. But the
narrowly-defined occupational designations that are the distinctive
feature of this data source have changed considerably over time. And
just as many occupational titles change, so do the inherent skills that
make up the jobs in those occupations. Hence it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to do time-series analyses with these data. The data
source also precludes researchers from analyzing the magnitude of the
earnings gap that is due to differences in the productive attributes of
males and females.
Given the fact that these data are generated at the level of the
firm and within narrowly-defined occupations, the OWS enables us to
calculate the potential male-female earnings differences within occupa-
tions, an advantage from the policy point of view because it is at this
particular level that equal pay legislation applies. Gunderson [1975]
shows that male wages exceed female wages by 22 percent in jobs with
identical job descriptions. The differential is 8 percentage points
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smaller in occupations with incentive-pay systems, implying that a
payment system based on results will help to achieve equal pay. Another
finding is that unionized companies had smaller differentials. Accor-
ding to Gunderson, this indicates that unions bargain for equal pay.
The actual switch-over of equal-pay legislation from the Human Rights
Act to the Employment Standards Act (which as Gunderson notes was meant
to make the legislation more effective) had no significant impact on
narrowing the male-female wage differentials.
Another major finding of the Gunderson study is the negative and
statistically significant coefficient for the company-size variable,
indicating that larger companies have smaller male-female wage differ-
ences than smaller companies. On the basis of wage differences in the
trade sector, it is inferred that the preferences of customers are an
important source of discrimination. This coefficient is 11 percentage
points larger than the coefficient for the service-industry reference
group.
The third major source utilized to analyze the male-female earnings
gap in Canada is Census data. This data set offers excellent coverage
of the population. It is available in published reports and in the
Public Use Sample Tapes of individual records. Based on these published
reports, aggregate comparisons can be made between the 1961, 1971, and
1981 data. Information is available on employment and wage income,
cross-tabulated with age, education, class of worker (wage earner or
self employed), weeks worked, part-time and full-time work, and occupa-
tion.
A central drawback of this data base is that it is published only
once every ten years. Moreover, the information is not available until
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several years after the reference period. The 1981 tapes, for example,
only became available in late 1983. An additional shortcoming of the
Census data is the absence of important variables, such as actual work
experience and seniority as well as union status--all of which are
central to analyzing the earnings gap.
The two most important studies that utilize the Census data are by
Robb [1978] and Gunderson [1979]. Robb estimates separate regressions
for males and females in Ontario. In an attempt to deal with the lack
of an actual measure of labour-force experience, she compares the ear-
nings of all males and single females over thirty years of age, as well
as the earnings of all other males and all other females. Her rationale
in making these comparisons is that single females aged thirty and over
are, as a group, more like males in terms of career motivation and
labour-force attachment, so that an analyst is, in effect, controlling
for these critical variables.
Robb follows Oaxaca [1973] in her equation specification in that the
earnings differentials are first calculated with the full regression and
without standardization for personal characteristics for occupation and
industry. The rationale behind the specification technique developed by
Oaxaca is that by using the full regression, researchers will obtain a
lower limit for discrimination. It may also be the case that there is
discrimination between occupations as well as within specific occupa-
tions. By controlling for occupations and industry, we exclude the pos-
sibility that different occupation and industrial distributions for
males and females may reflect occupational discrimination. Alternative-
ly, by excluding the occupation and industry variables, it is argued
that discrimination will be overestimated. We are "allowing" an unfair
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advantage to workers who are actually less productive not because of
personal productivity-related attributes but because they are concen-
trated in particular occupations and industries that have low levels of
productivity. The combination of the two regressions enables resear-
chers to acquire a "band" for discrimination [Oaxaca, 1973, 699; Robb,
1978, 357].
Robb finds that, between all males and all females, discrimination
accounts for 58.9 percent of the logarithmic earnings differential in
the full regression and 75.4 percent of the differential in the "per-
sonal characteristics" regression. These results are somewhat compar-
able to those of Oaxaca: 52.9 percent and 78.4 percent respectively.
Her regressions for all males and single females over thirty yield
substantially changed estimates; discrimination accounts for only 14.7
percent of the differential in the full regression and 36.9 percent in
the regression not standardized for occupation and industry. A more
detailed examination of her results reveals that males are rewarded more
highly than females for comparable education and experience. As for the
occupational variables, although males have an occupational distribution
that yields higher earnings, females appear to gain an earnings advan-
tage when they enter certain occupations. But the fact that part of the
earnings difference is accounted for by differing occupational distribu-
tions is an indicator of some occupational discrimination.
Gunderson's [1979] results are based on a single full regression
equation for males and females across Canada that contains more vari-
ables than Robb's. His results, however, are quite similar. Of the
earnings difference, 63 percent can be attributed to wage discrimination
and 37 percent is attributable to males having greater amounts of wage
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determining characteristics. His results reveal that a substantial
portion of the overall earnings advantage of males can be explained by
their greater experience and their better occupational and industrial
distribution as well as their marital status. For the same education,
experience, and marital status, females receive lower earnings than
male--all of which are the standard findings in the literature.
The work that has used these three data sets to analyze the male-
female pay gap in Canada has increased our understanding of the extent
of earnings differences and discrimination. But it has had little to
say about the institutional sources of male-female earnings differences
or the mechanisms of discrimination. Specifically, the nature of these
data sets does not permit researchers to test the kinds of hypotheses
outlined in Chapter 3. Previous research has not explored the impact of
social relationships within the corporation and the family on male and
female earnings differentials.
II. The Generation of Appropriate Firm-Level Data
Within economics at least, the academic literature to date has not
concerned itself with how males and females acquire personal character-
istics and attitudes that may be important determinants of labour-market
outcomes. As affirmative-action legislation in the United States has
recognized, the barriers to acquisition of income-producing traits may
be the real source of discrimination. To argue that females are not
discriminated against because they have not acquired as much in the way
of productive attributes as have males may be to test for discrimination
after the fact. In addition, we need to know more about what constitutes
a productive attribute.
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Standard economic analyses tend to ignore issues such as motiva-
tional factors or division of labour in the household. As Mincer and
Polachek [1974, 170] note: "That the differential allocation of time and
investments in human capital is sex linked and subject to technological
and cultural changes is a matter of fact that is outside the scope of
our analysis". Polachek [1975] recognizes that the structural differ-
ences between male and female wage equations are in part the result of
-the division of labour within the family. It is our view that such a
recognition should lead us to explore the extent to which many of the
estimates of sex discrimination are subject to significant bias.
To answer the questions raised by the theoretical perspective in
Chapter 3 requires data on the special constraints that females face in
acquiring productive attributes and pursuing careers in the corporate
economy. If males do better than females in the pursuit of careers, it
may indeed be that males have more or better career-relevant skills than
females. But how did males acquire more or better skills than females?
For policy purposes it is important to know whether career-relevant
skills were acquired before or after entering the corporate structure.
Past research has been constrained by both inadequte data bases and
inadequate conceptualization of the institutional nature of the problem.
In Chapter 3, we have begun to grapple with the problem of conceptuali-
zation, an ongoing process that must be stimulated and directed by
empirical analysis.
To overcome the shortcomings of the existing data bases, we have
developed a questionnaire that generates cross-sectional information
needed to test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3. The analysis of
male-female earnings differences is based upon data reported by 2511
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employees (31 percent females) in three Canadian firms. The data are
self-reported and comes from a questionnaire administered primarily to
technical, professional, and managerial employees (in one company a
broader occupational spectrum was included, although over three-quarters
of the sample for this firm are bureaucratic employees). The general
occupational focus allows us to analyze earnings differences among that
portion of the labour force who have already invested in human capital.
The firm-specific nature of the data base permits us to control for the
particular behaviour and circumstances of firms, while at the same time
extending the scope of analysis to an investigation of internal mobility
within a firm.
In what follows, we list by hypothesis the variables that have been
generated from the questionnaire data. For each variable, the assigned
name is given as well as the specific definition. We also indicate (by
number as they appear on the copy of the questionnaire in Appendix 1)
the relevant question numbers used to construct each variable.
VARIABLES AND DEFINITIONS:
Sex discrimination
Sex: SEX, 1 if female, 0 if male (Q.2).
Human capital
Age: AGE, Age in years (Q.1)
AGE2, Age in years squared (Q.1).
Levels of education:
EDHS2, 1 if high school, 0 otherwise (Q.7).
EDTS2, 1 if CEGEP, community college, or technical
institute, 0 otherwise (Q.7).
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EDCS2, 1 if college classique, bachelor's degree or
equivalent, 0 otherwise (Q.7).
EDPS2, 1 if master's or doctorate, 0 otherwise (Q.7).
Area of educational concentration:
ACON1, 1 if area of concentration is in humanities, or
the arts (includes degrees in literature, fine
arts languages, history or equivalent), 0 otherwise (Q.8).
ACON2, 1 if area of concentration is in social sciences (includes
economics, anthropology, political science, sociology,
education, business, psychology, and communications or
equivalent), 0 otherwise (Q.8).
ACON3, 1 if area of concentration is in applied sciences (includes
chemistry, biology, physics, environmental studies,
engineering, computer science, statistics, maths, or
equivalent), 0 otherwise (Q.8).
ACON4, 1 if area of training either in high school or beyond is
technical or vocational (includes electrical, carpentry,
plumbing, secretarial, or equivalent), 0 otherwise (Q.8).
Full-time labour force experience:
FTLFEX, full-time labour force experience in years (Q.13).
FTLFEX2, full-time labour force experience in years squared (Q.13).
Employment with present company:
FYSERVC, full-time years of service with the company (Q.10).
FYSERVC2, full-time years of service with the company squared
(Q.10).
Occupational segregation
For sample 1, the following jobs have been aggregated into the following
hierarchical occupations:
OCCi, 1 if team leader, project leader or supervisor, 0 otherwise
(Q.9 ).
OCC2, 1 if analyst or programmer, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
OCC3, 1 if clerk or technician in operations support or computer
operator, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
For sample 1, the functional (or departmental) occupations are:
-71-
SDN1,
SDN2,
SDN3,
SDN4,
For s
1 if technical suppport, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
1 if software development, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
1 if operations support, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
1 if computer operations, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
ample 2, the occupational categories are:
OCCI, 1 if director, chief of division, manager, or administrative
staff, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
OCC2, 1 if clerical staff (includes secretary, typist,
receptionist, or data entry clerk) (Q.9).
OCC3, 1 if engineering staff, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
OCC4, 1 if scientific research staff (includes chemist, biologist,
agronomist, geologist, or surveyor), 0 otherwise (Q.9).
OCC5, 1 if computer staff (includes analyst or programmer), 0
otherwise (Q.9).
OCC6, 1 if secondary services staff or unskilled labourer, 0
otherwise (Q.9).
OCC7, 1 if financial staff (auditor, accountant, budget analyst, or
real estate agent), 0 otherwise (Q.9).
OCC8, 1 if primary service staff (health, librarian, archival, law,
or education), 0 otherwise (Q.9).
OCC9, 1 if skilled labourer (line installer, machinist,
electrician, carpenter), 0 otherwise (Q.9).
OCC10, 1 if public relation staff, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
OCC1l, 1 if bluecollar supervisor, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
For sample 3, the occupational categories are:
OCC1, 1 if scientific staff, engineering staff or computing staff,
o otherwise (Q.9).
OCC2, 1 if management, administrative staff, or financial staff, 0
otherwise (Q.9).
OCC3, 1 if clerical staff, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
Port of entry
First departments into which individuals were hired (for sample 1 only;
recent company reorganizations that affected department and occupational
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made it impossible to gather reliable information on the first
departments into which individuals were hired for samples 2 and 3):
FDN1, 1 if technical support, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
FDN2, 1 if software development, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
FDN3, 1 if operations support, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
FDN4, 1 if computer operations, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
FDN5, 1 if in miscellaneous category, 0 otherwise (Q.9).
Commitment to the home
Marital status:
MARRIED, 1 if married or living together as a couple, 0 otherwise
(Q.3).
Number of children living with the respondent:
CHILD1, total number of children 5 years and under (Q.5).
CHILD2, total number of children 6 years and over (Q.5).
Time taken off from job for reasons other than a vacation:
LFAM, number of weeks absent from the labour force due to pregnancy
and personal or family responsibilities (Q.17).
Division of labour in the household (applies only to marrieds or
persons living with another as a couple):
DLHH, an index of household responsibilities that ranges from 0 to
300, constructed by totalling the percentages of cooking,
housework/cleaning, and the transportation of children (jobs
that have traditionally been the responsibility of females)
done by the respondent (Q.42).
Dominant career
Willingness to move for the sake of spouse's/partner's career (applies
only to marrieds or persons living with another as a couple):
UMOV, 1 if yes, 0 if no or don't know (Q.34).
Support of spouse or partner for respondent's career (applies only to
marrieds or persons living with another as a couple):
SPSCAR2, 0 if not at all, 1 if offers moderate support, 2 if is
extremely encouraging (Q.35).
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Willingness of spouse or partner to move for the sake of respondent's
career (applies only to marrieds or persons living with another as a
couple):
SPMOB, 1 if yes, 0 if no or do not know (Q,36).
Willingness of a spouse or partner who is a professional to move for the
sake of the respondent's career (applies only to marrieds or persons
living with another as a couple):
SPSTRPRM, 1 if spouse or partner is a professional (Q.37A), and if
SPMOB = 1, 0 otherwise.
Relative importance of respondent's career to the family with respect to
income, career commitment, and personal satisfaction (applies only to
marrieds or persons living with another as a couple):
IMCARTF, 1 if respondent's, 0 otherwise (Q.39A).
Commitment to the firm
Overtime work without pay:
WWOP, number of times that respondent worked overtime without pay
in 1982 (0 if never, 5 if 1-10 times, 15 if 11-20 times, 25
if more than 20 times) (Q.20).
Increase in pay that would be necessary to entice the respondent to
leave his or her with present firm to go to a similar job, with similar
promotional prospects, in another firm:
CAROT, percent increase in pay (Q.14).
Outside jobs applied for while employed with present company:
OSJAP1, 1 if one or more outside jobs applied for, 0 otherwise
(Q.19 ).
Total absence from the company:
TOTABFC, total number of weeks taken off from the company for
reasons other than a vacation (Q17).
Informal network
Use of informal networks for career advice:
INFORM, an index of informal networks, constructed on the basis of
the following weights for each contact: top executive = 3,
current supervisor = 2, previous supervisor = 2, personnel
= 1, colleague in area = 0, colleague in other area = 0,
someone outside the company = 0 (Q.47).
For example, if an employee has had two contacts with a top
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executive for career advice and two such contact with a
previous supervisor, his or her INFORM index would be 10
(that is, (2x3) + (2x2)]. The weights used to construct
INFORM are designed to capture the quality of each type of
contact made in terms of the possible impact on earnings
and promotion. The resulting index represents both the
quality of the contact and the frequency with which an
individual employee seeks out information regarding career
prospects from that contact, the assumption being that the
higher the level of contact, the higher the weight. The
rank order of the weights is based on a hierarchy, but, as
with all attempts to convert quality to quantity, the size
of the weights is, somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless, in
the absence of a direct measure of the quality of informal
networks, the relative weights seem reasonable.
Perceived discrimination
Perception of respondent that the employer has discriminated against him
or her on the basis of sex:
PERCD, 1 if discrimination on the basis of sex perceived, 0
otherwise (Q.29).
Extent to which the number of people in top positions of respondent's
sex affects his or her motivation to be promoted:
MOTS, 0 if the number of people in top positions of respondent's
sex has no impact on motivation, 1 if it has a moderate
impact, 2 if has significant impact (Q.31).
Early socialization
Gender-orientation of early childhood activities:
EARSOC, an index of the gender-orientation of early socialization
that ranges from 6 to 15, representing the summation of
items 1, 3, and 6 in Question 44. The lower the value of
the index, the more masculine oriented was the respondent's
early socialization experience (Q.44).
The male-oriented activities listed in Question 44--playing
competitive sports, having a paper route, and playing with
cars--constitute a somewhat crude, as well as stereotypical
measure of early socialization, but they nevertheless serve
as a way of testing the the extent to which inbred
masculinity or femininity have impacts on earnings (Q.44).
Early demonstration effect of the division of labour in the home between
the respondent's parents when he or she was growing up:
EARDL, an index ranging from 0 to 5, where a value of 0 manifests a
household with a non-traditional division of labour and a
value of 5 manifests a household with a traditional division
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of labour (Q.45).
For each of household repairs and auto maintenance, a score
of 1 was entered if there was a check in the Father column,
and a score of 0 otherwise. For each of cooking,
housework/cleaning, and childrearing, a score of 1 was
entered if there was a check in the Mother column, and 0
otherwise. The scores were then summed up to yield the
EARDL index.
III. Summary
The development of these variables makes it possible to test the
nine hypotheses put forth in Chapter 3. In Chapter 5 details are
provided as to how the companies that participated in the study were
selected, and then the demand-side and supply-side characteristics of
the three firm-level samples are described.
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Chapter 5 The Data Base
I. Selection of the Companies and Collection of the Data
The investigation of Sex Differences in Pay and Promotion in Canadian
Bureaucracies is based on the data of 2561 employees in three large com-
panies. The analysis focuses primarily on full-time, salaried personnel.
In the samples drawn from companies 1 and 3, all employees are employed
in either technical, managerial, or professional occupations. Approx-
imately three-quarters of the sample drawn from company 2 are in one of
the above three salaried categories, while the remainder are in lower-
level clerical positions.
To solicit the participation of companies, an initial letter was sent
to twenty companies in both the service and manufacuring sectors that
were listed in the Financial Post 500. The letter was followed up by
telephone conversations and interviews. Only fifteen of the twenty
companies responded, and only five of these decided to participate in
the final study. Subsequently, another company--designated Sample 2
below--heard about the project, and volunteered to participate.
The reasons given by the ten that did not want to participate
included the following: our firm is trying to cut costs and improve
productivity, and such a project would take up considerable management
time; our firm is going through the throes of various organizational
changes; similar studies have already been undertaken; women in our
company do not have problems of this nature. Some companies indicated
that they did not permit studies of this nature or any other type.
In May 1983, a detailed pretest was done on the smallest of the six
participating companies--a publishing company with 75 employees. Along
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with a cover letter to the employees, the employer sent a letter indica-
ting that their participation was entirely voluntary and that anyone
deciding to participate should deposit the questionnaire in a box by the
front door as they were leaving to go home on a Friday night. As it
turned out only six people completed the survey.
The main lesson to be learned from the pretest was that companies
had to become more actively involved in administering the questionnaire.
The main form that this involvement was to take would be to encourage
employees to participate, while stressing, more strongly than was done
in the pretest, the confidentiality of the responses. In addition, I
wrote cover letters to be distributed with the questionnaires that
stressed the confidentiality of the responses (see the cover letters in
the appendix to this chapter). One simple way to ensure respondents a
much higher level of confidentiality was by sending along envelopes that
could be sealed after the completion of the questionnaire. The response
rates of all the other five companies that agreed to participate in the
study was greatly improved.
The questionnaire responses for all five of these companies were
coded and entered on computer tape. At a late stage of the project, it
was decided not to analyze two of the samples because of resource cons-
traints. The two samples that were not analyzed were the smallest, with
136 and 119 usable responses respectively.
Sample-selection bias is inherent in the acquisition of question-
naire data through the voluntary participation of corporate organiza-
tions. It may be that these companies were confident that the study
would reveal no systematic evidence of sex discrimination. On the other
hand, since the data source remains confidential, the company may very
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well have agreed to participate in order to obtain more insight into
areas of personnel administration where there were improvements to be
made. In any case, we do not expect to be able to make overarching
generalizations about female-male earnings differences in Canada from
these case studies. Given that many of the hypotheses, put forward in
this study have never been tested before at the firm level, our primary
interest is to discern the relative impacts of alternative hypotheses in
a bureaucratic setting, however the necessary participation of the com-
pany might be obtained.
An additional, and more important, source of bias may have been the
self-selection of individuals who took the time to fill out the ques-
tionnaires. It may be that those who felt most strongly about the
issues raised in the questionnaire took the time to answer it. One
company (see Table 5-1) distributed the questionnaires to one section of
its operations, and ensured that all employees filled it out. In the
other two companies (from which samples 2 and 3 were drawn), the comple-
ted questionnaires were only 40 percent and 18 percent, respectively, of
those distributed. It is impossible to state with any degree of cer-
tainty what type of bias such response rates may impart to the empirical
results.
II. Company and Sample Characteristics
Table 5-2 shows those characteristics of the companies from which
samples 1, 2, and 3 were drawn that can be disclosed.
Sample 1
The first company is a large, private, multinational company located
Table 5-1
General Characteristics of Samples
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
Total Employed 8,000 18,975 3,118
Total Professional, Managerial, Technical (PMT) 6,200 NA NA
As Proportion of Total Employed 77.5% NA NA
Total Females Employed 2,400 3,493 312
As Proportion of Total Employed 30.0% 18.4% 10.0%
Total Males Employed 5,600 15,482 2,806
As Proportion of Total Employed 70.0% 81.6% 90.0%
Total Questionnaires Distributed 416 5,000 1,500
As Proportion of Total Employed 5.2% 26.4% 48.1%
As Proportion of PMT 6.7% NA NA
Total Responses 416 2,000 270
As Proportion of Total Distributed 100.0% 40.0% 18.0%
As Proportion of Entire Company 5.2% 10.5% 8.7%
As Proportion of PMT 6.7% NA NA
Total Usable Reponses 386 1,915 260
As Proportion of Total Distributed 93.0% 38.3% 17.3%
As Proportion of Entire Company 4.8% 10.1% 8.3%
As Proportion of PMT 6.2% NA NA
Total Number of Females in Sample 178 550 65
As Proportion of Total Employed 2.2% 2.9% 2.1%
As Proportion of Total Females Employed 7.4% 15.8% 20.8%
As Proportion of Total Responses 42.8% 27.5% 24.1%
As Proportion of Total Usable Responses 46.1% 28.7% 25.0%
Total Number of Males in Sample 206 1,365 195
As Proportion of Total Employed 2.6% 7.2% 6.3%
As Proportion of Total Males Employed 3.6% 8.8% 7.5%
As Proportion of Total Responses 49.5% 68.5% 72.2%
As Proportion of Total Usable Responses 53.4% 71.3% 75.0%
NA = not available
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Table 5-2
Characteristics of the Three Companies
CoCharacteristics
Size (Number of Employees)
Age
Region
Ownership of Company
Research and Development
Industrial Sector
Multinational
mpany 1 Company 2
8,000 20,000
40 27
Quebec Quebec
Private Public
Yes Yes
Manufacturing Service
No Yes
Company 3
3,118
11
Ontario
Private
Yes
Manufacturing
No
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in Quebec. It employs 8,000 workers, is 40 years old, does research and
development and is in the manufacturing sector. The specific portion of
the company sampled represented the majority of technical, managerial,
and professional personnel employed in the computer branch of the com-
pany.
Initial contact was made with the company in early November 1982, and
final data collection occurred in early June 1983. The company adminis-
tered 416 questionnaires in the company cafeteria to specific groups of
employees at specific times. These employees represented 6.7 percent of
the professional, managerial, and technical personnel employed by the
company. They were given one hour to complete the questionnaire, and
then to place it in a sealed envelope. Of the 400 questionnaires, all
were completed, but because of reporting error and incomplete responses,
only 386 questionnaires could be used.
The total number of females and males in- the company is 2400 and
5600 respectively. Of the 386 usable observations, 178 were females and
206 were males. The total number of females in the sample represent 7.4
percent of the females employed in the company, 2.2 percent of the total
population of the company, 48.2 percent of the total responses, and 46.1
percent of the total usable responses. The 206 males in the sample
represent 3.6 percent of the males employed in the company, 2.6 percent
of the total population of the company, 49.5 percent of the total res-
ponses, and 53.4 percent of the total usable responses. Breakdowns on
the number of males and females in technical, managerial, and profes-
sional positions were not available for any of the samples.
There were four major departments in the company in which profes-
sional, technical, and managerial employees were represented. In terms
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of the hierarchical structure they were from the top-down: technical
services, software development, operations support, and computer opera-
tions. The seven basic job titles were team leader, project leader,
supervisors (who were also senior
analysts), analysts (junior, intermediate, and senior), programmers
(junior, intermediate, and senior), operations support (enumerated
O/S.1, 0/S.2, and O/S.3), and computer programmers (with junior, inter-
mediate, and senior levels).
Sample 2
The third company is a public-utilities company located in Quebec.
It employs 18,975 workers, is 27 years old, is not a multinational, is
in the service sector, and is involved in R&D.
This particular company provided the largest of all the samples, but
not all employees in this sample are professional, managerial, and tech-
nical. The respondents are all French speaking and responded to the
translated version of the questionnaire.
Unlike the other companies in the study that were initially solicited
by letter, this company heard of the study and contacted the project
director about participating. The distribution and collection of the
questionnaires were undertaken entirely by the company and occurred in
mid-August 1983. A total of 5,000 questionnaires were sent out to 11
different regional areas in the Province of Quebec (a condition upon
which the company insisted in agreeing to participate in the study). We
do not have information on how many questionnaires were sent to each
region.
Of the 5000 questionnaires distributed, 2000 were returned, for a 40
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percent response rate. But because of reporting error and incomplete
responses, only 1915 questionnaires were usable, or 38.3 percent of
those distributed. Employees represented in the sample were 10.1
percent of all those employed by the company. There were 550 females
and 1365 males in the final usable sample. For the females, this
represents 15.8 percent of the females in the company, 2.9 percent of
the total population of the company, 27.5 percent of the total responses
and 28.7 percent of the usable responses. For the males in the sample,
this represents 8.8 percent of males in the company, 7.2 percent of the
entire population of the company, and 71.3 percent of the final usable
sample.
The company had recently reorganized its department and occupational
categories, so that useful data on first departments, first job titles,
and first pay grades were not available, as they were for company 1. We
have differentiated employees by seventeen fairly narrowly defined occu-
pations: 1. Member of management, chief of division, or director (inc-
ludes advisors and consultants to the above); 2. Member of administra-
tive staff (includes assistants, officers, agents, charges, preposes);
3. Member of clerical staff (includes secretarial, typist or reception-
ist); 4. Member of engineering staff (includes archetects and planners),
5. Member of scientific staff (includes chemists, biologists, agrono-
mists, geologists, surveyors and draftsmen); 6. Member of computer staff
(includes analysts, operators and programmers); 7. Member of communica-
tions staff (telephone operators, general telecommunications); 8. Member
of marketing and sales staff; 9. Member of finance staff (includes
auditors, accountants, and budget analysts); 10. Member of service staff
(health, librarian, archival, law, education); 11. Member of unskilled
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labour staff (includes construction, drivers); 12. Member of skilled
labour staff (includes line installers, machinists, electricians,and
carpenters); 13. Member of public relations; 14. Member of bluecollar
supervisors (includes foremen, coordinators, and construction planners);
16. Member of customer services; 17. Member of unidentifiable or inade-
quately defined occupation. The occupations have all been drawn from
the raw printout for job titles that individuals put on their question-
naires combined with a list of over 4000 titles provided by the company.
The above occupational categories have been collapsed into 11 final
categories, as indicated in Chapter 4.
Sample 3
The last sample is a private, high-tech company, in the manufac-
turing sector in Ontario. This company is involved in the telecommuni-
cations industry, is not a multinational, employs 3,118 employees, and
is 11 years old. It is also involved in R&D.
Initial contact was made with this company in October 1982. The
company assumed distribution of the questionnaire through the company
mail. But unlike the other companies, as a condition of its participa-
tion in the study, Company 3 insisted that employees be able to use
Canada Post to return the questionnaires to the project director at the
Economic Council of Canada. It also meant that although the distribu-
tion of the questionnaires occurred in early July, completed question-
naires were not received until early September 1983. A total of 1500
questionnaires were distributed. Of these, 270 were returned but due to
reporting error only 260, or 17.3 percent of those distributed, were
usable. The usable sample represents 8.3 percent of those employed by
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the company. There are 65 females and 195 males in the usable sample.
Females in the sample were 20.8 percent of the population of emp-
loyed females, 2.1 percent of the employees of the company, 24.1 percent
of the total responses, and 25 percent of the usable responses. Males
in the sample were 7.5 percent of the population of employed males, 6.3
percent of the employees of the company, 72.2 percent of the total
responses, and 75 percent of the usable responses.
The job titles have been categorized into the following groups: 1.
scientific staff; 2. engineering staff; 3. management staff; 4. compu-
ting staff; 5. administrative and financial staff; 6. clerical and
secretarial staff.
The preceding occupational categories have been collapsed into 3
final categories, as indicated in Chapter 4.
III. Descriptive Statistics
The following portion of Chapter 5 provides a statistical overview of
the characteristics of Samples 1, 2, and 3 (for details of the various
cross-tabulations, see Appendix 3).
Sample 1
Females are more equally distributed than males within the younger
age cohorts. Males are much better represented in the older age groups.
There are two possible explanations. First, in line with the increasing
participation of females in the labour force, the company may not have
hired as many females as males, say, ten or fifteen years ago as it does
now. Second, some females who were hired earlier may have dropped out
of the labour force to have children or, perhaps perceiving that their
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chances for promotion with this particular company were slim, may have
left the firm more readily than males.
In the 18-24 age cohorts, males, on average, earn less than females.
Even though males and females have equivalent minimum values for ear-
nings, the maximum value for males is higher. Therefore the average
result suggests that the company is hiring more males than females at
the lowest pay levels. The increase of earnings with age is greater for
males than for females. There is only a small difference in the minimum
earnings levels, but the maximum earnings differences indicate that
males get promoted to higher pay grades more frequently or rapidly.
It is often argued that, although on average females and males have
similar years of schooling, they tend to have less labour-force exper-
ience. Labour-market experience, as it has been used in this study, is
measured by the actual number of years in the labour force. The measure
excludes years that were spent either raising children at home and/or
years spent full-time at school.
The longer the time that males spend in the labour force, the greater
their earnings relative to females. The minimum earnings levels tend to
be equivalent, but the maximum earnings levels exhibit a significant
difference.
Because this study examines individual employees at the level of the
firm, we can examine the relationship between before tax earnings and
full-time years of service with the present company as distinct from
labour-market experience. Like labour-force experience, the female/male
earnings ratio fluctuates as years of service with the company increase.
Males tend to have been with the company much longer than female emplo-
yees but even for comparable years of service the returns to females are
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much lower than for males. In some categories--specifically 10-12 years
of service--females earn on average much less than the minimum earnings
for males.
Education has provided a central means by which females have gained
entry into the labour market in general and into specific jobs in Sample
1 in particular. The actual average years of education for males and
females in Sample 1 are similar: females have 16.29 years of education
and males 16.46. But there appear to be significant differences in the
levels of education that males and females have obtained, and even more
so in the areas of concentration that they have pursued. In this sam-
ple, 30.8 percent of females, but only 12.1 percent of males, special-
ized in the humanities, while 18.2 percent of females and 14.1 percent
of males concentrated in the social sciences. In addition, 50.2 percent
of females and 69.2 percent of males held degrees in the applied sci-
ences. We cannot tell from these figures whether the company simply
prefers to hire more males with computer-science degrees or whether it
is constrained in its hiring by the supply of females with computer
science degrees on the labour market.
It should be noted that Sample 1 does not contain any females with a
professional degree--a degree that is associated with the highest level
of remuneration. The majority of individuals in this sample have col-
lege degrees. The average earnings for males and females with a commun-
ity college or CEGEP degree tend to be equivalent. The average earnings
for males with college degrees tends to be higher than for females. The
fact that the returns to holding a college degree are less for females
than for males may reflect the particular quality of the degree ob-
tained. One reason for the disparity is because, as a high-tech com-
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pany, this firm favours or requires individuals with degrees in computer
science, and most of these degrees are held by males. For both females
and males, the pay of individuals holding science degrees tends to be
higher than that of employees with other types of degrees.
Sample 1 is the only company in the analysis for which we have
information on within-job earnings for individuals. The earnings dis-
parity varies by the job groups as well as the numbers of males and
females within each group. The job groups have been divided up accor-
ding to skill, where skill reflects the particular expertise or author-
ity required to perform a particular job. The information obtained from
interviews with the employers of Sample 1 indicated that entry-level
requirements for any position above that of operations support required
a bachelor's degree in computer science (or the equivalent). Such
positions include those of computer programmers and analysts.
The highest female/male earnings ratio--1.093--is amongst computer
operators (JOB6). This position is divided into the junior, intermed-
iate, and senior levels. A total of 48 percent of the positions are
taken up by females, indicating that no crowding is present. We can
only speculate that the reason that females are paid more than males is
because they are considered to be better workers.
The second highest ratio--.982--is in operations support (JOB5)
where females make up 64 percent of the job group. Unlike the computer
operators who are encouraged and frequently promoted up to a higher O/S
level, few, if any, employees go from an O/S position up to a higher
position of analyst or programmer.
The position of analyst is hierarchically superior to that of pro-
grammer, and it has a earnings ratio of .896, which is higher than the
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.856 earnings ratio for programmers. This fact contradicts the gener-
ally held view that ratios decrease as we move up the hierarchy. Note,
however, that female programmers make up 40 percent of all programming
positions, but only 15 percent of analysts positions.
The lowest ratio within all of the job categories is .716 for super-
visors. Females make up 31 percent of all supervisors. Female and male
supervisors have similar minimum earnings, but they also have the lar-
gest maximum earnings disparity of all the positions where females are
represented.
In general, in those jobs in which males dominate, average earnings
are higher. In the lower-paying jobs, where females are better repre-
sented, males tend to get paid the same as or less than females.
The seven jobs can be aggregated into three broader hierarchical
occupations: OCCI, team leader, project leader, and supervisor; OCC2,
analyst and programmer; and OCC3, operations support and computer
operator. The most striking feature about these categorizations is the
decreasing earnings ratio as we move up the occupational hierarchy. It
is also worth noting that females are clustered in the lower-paying OCC3
category.
Employees are divided into two family-status groups--those who are
married or living with another as a couple and those who are single
(which includes those divorced, separated, or widowed). Both of these
groups are examined with respect to the number of children that they
have living with them.
Individuals who are female, married, and have children earn less than
females who are married and do not have children. On the other hand,
males who are married and living with children six years of age and up
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earn more than males or females without children as well as males or
females living with children five years and under. Male single emplo-
yees have higher average earnings than female single employees. But
note that the seventeen females who are single and living with children
earn on average more than females who are in any of the marital cate-
gories. Further, the three females in this company who are single with
children five years and under earn on average more than any of the other
groups of females in the company.
Sample 2
Females are more equally distributed within the younger age cohorts
18-29. Males are much better represented in the older age groups. The
possible explanations for these distributions have already been sugges-
ted in discussing Sample 1. In all the age cohorts, males on average
earn more than females. Even though males and females have somewhat
equivalent minimum values for earnings, the maximum value for males is
higher. The maximum earnings differences indicate that males get
promoted to higher pay grades more frequently, or perhaps more rapidly,
than females.
As in Sample 1, the longer the time males spend in the labour force,
the greater their earnings relative to females. The minimum earnings
levels tend to be equivalent, but the maximum levels of earnings by
labour force experience appear to be significantly different.
Like the preceding table on years of labour-force experience, the
female/male earnings ratio fluctuates as years of service with the
company increase. Males tend to have been with the company much longer
than female employees, but even for comparable years of service the
-91-
earnings for females are much lower than for males.
There is a gap in the actual average years of education for males
and females in Sample 2: females have 13.66 years of education and males
14.93. We note that 2.9 percent of females but only 1.6 percent of
males in the sample specialized in the humanities, while 8.3 percent of
females and 9.2 percent of males concentrated in the social sciences.
11.1 percent of females and 19.6 percent of males held applied science
degrees. The greatest proportions (77.5 percent of the females and 69.5
percent of the males) have some type of vocational training.
The majority of individuals in this sample have high school and com-
munity college degrees. The average earnings gap between males and
females is highest for those with community college or CEGEP degrees.
The average earnings for males with college degrees is also higher than
for females. Sample 2 contains 37 females and 216 males with profes-
sional degrees. Yet amongst this group, females on average earn only
75.2 percent of what males earn.
Amongst college graduates the greatest earnings gap is between
females and males holding science degrees. But for females as well as
males, this degree brings the earnings. The largest proportion of males
and females have only high school education and this is where the
earnings gap tends to be highest.
The occupations have been divided up according to skill, where skill
reflects the particular expertise or authority required to perform a
particular job. The earnings disparity varies by occupation as well as
by the numbers of males and females within each group.
In terms of absolute numbers, females are crowded into the lowest-
paying clerical staff category--OCC2. The within-occupation earnings
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gap between males and females in this category is relatively high. The
highest female-to-male earnings ratio--1.054--is amongst the skilled
labour group, OCC9. But there are only 3 females and 229 males in OCC9,
implying that this may not be a representative sample of females.
The second highest ratio--.957--is in secondary services (OCC6)
where there are only 2 females and 28 males. Moving up the hierarchy,
the lowest ratio--.779--is between female amd male managers. The
minimum and maximum earnings for females are substantially less than for
males in this occupation, a finding noted also in Sample 1. In general,
in those jobs in which males dominate, average earnings of all employees
are higher. It might also be noted that there were no female bluecollar
supervisors.
Individuals who are female, married (or living with someone as a
couple), and do not have children earn less than females who are married
and do have children. Males who are married and living with children
six years of age and up earn more than males or females without children
as well as males or females living with children five years and under.
Male single employees have higher average earnings than female single
employees. But the twelve females who are single and living with
children who are six years and up earn on average more than females who
are in any of the marital categories. There is also a large earnings
disparity in favour of males for single employees living with children
six years of age and up--a category in which there are more males than
females.
Sample 3
Males are predominant in all age cohorts. Females are best repre-
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sented relative to males within the younger age cohorts. With a ratio
of .918, males on average earn just slightly more than their female
counterparts in the 18-24 age cohorts. The increase of earnings with
age is greater for males than for females. There is only a small
difference in the minimum earnings levels but the maximum earnings
differences indicate that males get promoted to higher pay grades more
frequently or rapidly.
The longer the time that males spend in the labour force, the
greater their earnings relative to females, though there are some
exceptions at 0-1 and 12-14 years. The minumum earnings levels tend to
be moderately in favour of females. The maximum levels of earnings by
experience sre heavily in favour of males.
The female/male earnings ratio fluctuates as years of service with
the company increase. Male employees tend to have been with the company
much longer than female employees, but even for comparable years of
service the earnings of females are much lower than for males. Indeed,
in some categories--specifically 6-8 years of service--females earn on
average much less than the minimum earnings for males.
The actual average years of education for males and females in
Sample 3 are very different--females have 15.84 years of education and
males 18.43. 10.9 percent of females, but only .05 percent of males in
the sample, specialized in the humanities, while 15.6 percent of females
and 4.7 percent of males concentrated in the social sciences. In the
applied sciences, 35.9 percent of females and 89.0 percent of males held
degrees.
There also appear to be significant differences in the levels of
education that males and females have obtained, and even more so in the
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areas of concentration that they have pursued.
Females in Sample 3 tend to be more equally distributed across all
levels of education than in the other two samples, while the largest
numbers of males tend to be clustered in the college and professional
degree categories. The returns to females for each level of education
tend to be substantially lower than those of males with the same level
of education. The fact that the returns to holding a college degree are
less for females than for males may reflect the particular quality of
the degree obtained. The firm from which Sample 3 is drawn is a high-
tech company involved in R&D, and therefore it tends to favour indivi-
duals with degrees in the sciences. Most of these degrees are held by
males.
The company tends to hire more individuals with science (in this
case engineering) degrees than other areas of concentration. Amongst
both males anf females, individuals holding science degrees also tend to
get paid more highly than all the other categories of degrees.
The occupations for Sample 3 are very narrowly defined. The first
occupation (OCCI) is made up of the scientific, engineering, and com-
puting staff; OCC2 is taken from management, administration and finance;
and OCC3 is clerical staff. The largest number of females are employed
in OCCI. The highest male-to-female earnings ratio--.697--is amongst
this group. The only other comparable ratio is for OCC2 (note there
were no male clericals in this sample) where we find that females earn
59 cents for every dollar that a male earns.
Individuals who are female, married, and have children earn more
than females who are married and do not have children. On the other
hand, males who are married and living with children six years of age
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and up earn more than males or females without children as well as males
or females living with children five years and under. Male single
employees have higher average earnings than female single employees.
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Chapter 6 Empirical Analysis
I. Model Specification
The model developed here explicitly specifies how an individual's
career development and perceptions as well as the departmental and
occupational structures of the firm affect earnings. Our model tests a
broader array of hypotheses than are standard in the male-female earn-
ings differences literature. In Chapter 3, we have discussed these
hypotheses in detail, showing how they can be derived from various
theoretical approaches to the nature of the labour market. In Chapter
4, we have constructed variables with which to test these hypotheses
using our questionnaire.
The model encompasses four categories of hypotheses that seek to
explain male-female earnings differences: human capital, demand-side
variables reflecting the firm's departmental and occupational structure,
the internal relations of the firm as experienced by the individual, and
external relations that might affect an individual's career development.
Our human-capital model includes age and its quadratic, the level of
education, the area of concentration, full-time years in the labour
force and its quadratic, and full-time years of service with the company
and its quadratic. The conventional definitions of the human-capital
variables are experience in the labour force, on-the-job training, as
well as education. Sometimes age, marital status, and the number of
children are included for good measure. Most data sets used to test the
model lack an actual measure for experience. The usual proxy for
experience has been an individual's age minus years of schooling minus
six, applied to both males and females. This measure does not adequate-
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ly reflect the labour-force experience of females, who, on average, exit
and enter from the labour force more than males. Our data set measures
experience in terms of actual years and months in the labour force.
Besides total labour-force experience, we have a separate measure of
years of service with the company. In addition, our model captures a
qualitative dimension of the human-capital hypothesis in the form of an
individual's area of educational concentration (for example, arts as
opposed to physical sciences) that may prove an important determinant of
differential outcomes. In sum, we believe that our specification of the
human-capital model permits us to test a fuller and richer interpreta-
tion of the theory than is generally found in the literature.
Our model includes demand-side variables reflecting the horizontal
and vertical organization of the firm (a detailed discussion of the
departmental and occupational categories for each of the three samples
has been presented in Chapter 4). An individual's functional department
reflects his or her position in the firm's horizontal organization,
whereas an individual's place in the occupational hierarchy reflects his
or her position in the vertical organization of the firm. These vari-
ables are designed to test the occupational-segregation hypothesis in
terms of the allocation of individuals to types of work as well as to
hierarchical positions. Where the data permit (in Sample 1 only), we
also include an individual's initial position within the firm in order
to test a variant of the dual labour-market hypothesis--to what extent
do the initial positions in the company of females and males have an
impact on earnings differences.
In our model, there are three hypotheses that seek to explain how
the internal relations of the firm as experienced by the individual
-98-
affect individual earnings. The first hypothesis tests whether the
commitment of individual employees to the firm has a significant impact
on their earnings. The measures of an individual's commitment to the
firm are the extent to which he or she works overtime without pay, the
number of times he or she has applied for outside jobs, and the salary
increase that would be required to entice the employee away from his or
her present job to take another position at another firm with the same
promotional prospects. The second commitment-to-the-firm hypothesis
examines the extent to which individuals have access to informal net-
works that might aid their earning power. Our measure of informal
networks is an index of the quality and quantity of contacts that an
individual has with hierarchical superiors--contacts that presumably aid
his or her advancement in the firm. The third hypothesis examines the
impact of perceived discrimination--the extent to which individuals
perceive that gender in and of itself is a factor in promotion within
the firm. One variant of the perceived discrimination hypothesis posits
that the sex-composition of those in top corporate positions adversely
affects the work motivation, and hence the earning power, of those of
the under-represented sex lower down the hierarchy. A second variant of
the perceived-discrimination hypothesis posits that an individual's
perception that they have been the subject of sex discrimination will
adversely affect their earnings, either because such discrimination has
actually occurred or because the perception that it has occurred has an
adverse impact on work motivation and the desire to invest in human
capital.
The final set of hypotheses focuses upon relational factors external
to the firm that might affect an individual's career development. We
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consider three types of factors that have been prominent in the sociolo-
gical literature. First, we focus upon the early socialization that an
individual received while she or he was growing up. Specifically, we
explore the impact on current earnings of the stereotypical gender-
orientation of both early childhood activities and the role models pro-
vided by parents. Second, we examine the impact on earnings of an indi-
vidual's current household responsibilities and relations, including the
presence of children of different ages, marital status, and division of
labour in the home. Third, for individuals who are married or living
with someone as a couple, we examine the impact on earnings of dual
careers if and when they are present. In particular, we test the hypo-
thesis that the spouse's support for the career of an employee will have
a significant impact on earnings.
The model used in the empirical analysis is the semi-log earnings
equation that is standard in the literature on male-female earnings
differences.
ln(Yi) = b0 + EbI*SEXi + Eb *Xii + Ee.
where Y. = the earnings of individual i,
SEXi = the sex of individual i (1 if female, 0 if male),
X.. = explanatory and control variables j for individual i.
3
In the full-regression model for this study, the relevant explana-
tory and control variables are those presented in the second part of
Chapter 4. The regressions were run on samples from the three com-
panies. As indicated in Table 5-1, Sample 2 has by far the largest
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number of observations. Sample 1 has the highest response rate and the
second largest number of observations. Assuming that problems of selec-
tivity bias discussed earlier are not too great, we consider the data
sets for Samples 1 and 2 to be quite robust. We are less confident
about the robustness of Sample 3--the sample with both the smallest
number of observations and the lowest response rate. Although we dis-
cuss the statistical results from Sample 3 below, we place more relia-
bility on the findings from the first two samples.
A more sophisticated model of the determinants of earnings could
have been developed. But given the novelty of many of the hypotheses
that are being tested (see above Chapters 3 and 4), it was deemed advis-
able to use a model that is basically a direct expansion of that used in
the existing male-female earnings-differences literature. The semi-log
earnings equation specified above assumes that all the explanatory vari-
ables are exogeneous, and that therefore the statistical properties of
the dependent variable will be the same as the disturbance term. In
particular, we are assuming that earnings are log-normally distributed.
Under these assumptions, the semi-log earnings function extends the
conventional human-capital approach that argues that an individual's
earnings are determined by past investments in human capital. An indi-
vidual invests, for example, in schooling in order to earn a rate of re-
turn, while the employer is willing to pay a rate of return to indivi-
duals who have made this investment insofar as the employment of human
capital adds to the productivity of the firm. The actual rate of return
is, of course, determined by the market equilibrium of supply and demand
for the particular productive attribute.
In their own extension of this approach, Malkiel and Malkiel [1973]
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add marital status to a semi-log earnings equation, but recognize that
it is difficult to interpret the coefficient of such an attribute as a
rate of return in the manner of, for example, the rate of return to an
additional year of schooling. Given the variety of personal attributes
that have been put forth as independent variables in Chapter 4, this
criticism of the extension of the human-capital model bears some consi-
deration.
One way of justifying the treatment of the coefficients of such
variables as MARITAL (marital status), CHILDL and CHILD2 (the child
variables), DLHH (the division of labour in the household), and EARSOC
(early childhood activities) as rates of return to these personal attri-
butes is to draw upon the literature on hedonic prices [Rosen, 1974].
The notion of hedonic prices has been developed to explain competitive
market behaviour where product differentiation is based upon the attri-
butes contained in the product. In the labour market, the product being
offered for sale is the labour-time of the individual, which has poten-
tial value to employers because of the quality of the labour services
embodied in the product. The quality of the labour services can best be
described by the personal attributes of the individuals who are selling
their labour-time.
If we view earnings as equal to the value of the marginal product of
the individual, then the variables in the earnings equation can be con-
strued as factors (or proxies for factors) that affect the marginal pro-
ductivity of the individual. The firm hires the labour-time of the in-
dividual in order to secure these attributes, and it pays the individual
an amount equal to the value of the marginal product of his or her com-
bined attributes. If the attributes that are valued (either positively
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or negatively) by the firm also enter into the individual's utility
function--which is to say that the individual has incurred costs to
acquire these attributes for which she or he expects a rate of return
--then the coefficients of the variables might be interpreted as equili-
brium shadow prices for each attribute.
In the context of this study, however, whether or not the rates of
return are equilibrium shadow prices is not of great importance for two
reasons. First, the firm-specific nature of the study means that we
have little way of knowing whether the markets for the particular attri-
butes are in equilibrium or not. Second, and of more importance, be-
cause our focus is on internal job ladders and advancement through pro-
motion within a particular firm, market forces will be working only
imperfectly to determine the rates of return to particular attributes.
On the one hand, information is imperfect on the market because the
productive attributes of individual employees will have become known to
the current firm but not necessarily to other firms that could be poten-
tial employers. On the other hand, the employee might find it risky to
seek employment with another firm where he or she is (and his or her
attributes are) less well-known, and therefore to some extent the
current employer will have monopsony power.
Under these conditions, we can simply interpret the coefficients of
attributes as firm-specific rates of return. Discrimination enters the
model by considering the possibility that firms will value individuals
differently on the basis of sex. If, controlling for all other factors,
the coefficient of SEX is negative and statistically significant, then
there is evidence of possible discrimination.
For each of the samples, we estimate a full model that includes all
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of the four categories of hypotheses set out above. We also estimate a
personal model that drops the demand-side variables--what we define as
the occupational variables--and, in the case of Sample 1 only, the port-
of-entry variables and the functional-department variables. This model
then contains variables that measure only the personal characteristics
of individuals in the samples. We also estimate a model that contains
only the human-capital variables so that we can see whether the addition
of the more non-conventional occupational segregation, internal rela-
tions, and external relations hypotheses have a significant impact on
the explanatory power of the model. We repeat this estimation procedure
for a subsample of people who are married or living with someone as a
couple (that is, MARRIED = 1) in order to test the dominant-careers
hypothesis and a variant of the commitment-to-the-home hypothesis--
division of labour in the home--that applies only to this sub-sample.
In Section II below, we shall begin our discussion of these regres-
sion results by looking at changes in the size and significance of the
coefficient of SEX as well as the coefficient of determination (R-
squared) as we go from the human-capital to the personal to the full
model. An increase in R-squared as we add explanatory variables to the
model indicates that the model is more fully determined, while a dec-
rease in the size of the sex coefficient as we add explanatory variables
to the model indicates a systematic relation between these variables and
sex. For each of our three samples, we shall then discuss the most sig-
nificant results of the regression analysis for the full and personal
models run on both the total sample and the married sub-sample.
In Section III of this chapter, we shall examine the results of the
full and personal models estimated for females and males separately,
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using the decomposition technique to isolate the sources of the earnings
differences between females and males and measure their impacts in terms
of the coefficients, attributes, and interaction components of the
earnings differential.
II. Regression Results
For Sample 1, the arithmetic average earnings are $18,271 for
females and $23,027 for males, yielding a ratio of .793; for Sample 2,
$24,340 for females and $36,424 for males, yielding a ratio of .668; for
Sample 3, $22,825 for females and $37,219 for males, yielding a ratio of
.613. Ordinary-least squares regressions have been estimated with the
natural log of before-tax 1982 earnings as the dependent variable, so
that the focus of the study is on the female/male earnings ratio rather
than the dollar differential between males and females. Note also that,
because of the semi-log functional form, the expected earnings predicted
by the regression equations are to be interpreted as geometric rather
than arithmetic means.
Table 6-1
Impact of Sex on Earnings and the Coefficient of Determination in the
Human Capital, Personal and Full Models
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
SEX 2 SEX 2 SEX 2
Model coefficient R coefficient R coefficient R
Human Capital -.1298 (.0194) .543 -.2447 (.0134) .557 -.3056 (.0556) .574
Personal -.0866 (.0303) .672 -.1860 (.0241) .587 -.2501 (.0661) .664
Full -.0590 (.0161) .914 -.1590 (.0239) .628 -.2410 (.0684) .670
Note: standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: See Appendix 5
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To what extent does sex discrimination underlie these earnings
differentials? Table 6-1 summarizes the impact of the variable SEX (1
if female, 0 if male) in the human-capital, personal, and full models
for each of our three total samples and married sub-samples. It also
indicates the explanatory power of each of these models as summarized by
the coefficient of determination.
For all three samples, the F-tests reveal that the independent vari-
ables representing social relationships internal and external to the
firm in the personal models add significantly to the explanation of ear-
nings variation in the human-capital models. The demand-side variables
in the full models add significant explanatory power to that provided by
the personal models in Sample 1 and 2, but not in Sample 3 (F-tests are
presented in Appendix 6). Note that the proportions of the variance
explained by the human-capital model are similar for all three samples,
and that the proportions explained by the personal models are similar
for Samples 1 and 3. But Sample 1, which has the lowest R-squared of
the three human-capital regressions has the highest R-squared of the
three personal regressions and by far the highest R-squared of the three
full regressions. The proportion of the variance explained by the per-
sonal model in Sample 1 is higher than the proportions explained by the
full models in the other two samples.
There is an obvious reason why Sample 1 appears so well specified by
the full model when compared to the other two samples. The data were
collected from one relatively specialized sector of the company--its
computer arm--in which the hierarchy of present occupations was more
self-evident than in the other two samples that were drawn from broader
occupational cross-sections of their respective companies. In addition,
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we were able to obtain data on current department and first department
(or port of entry) for Sample 1, but we could not develop any meaningful
categories for Samples 2 and 3.
The higher coefficients of determination in the personal models for
Samples 1 and 3 compared to Sample 2 may be due to the fact that only
Sample 2 contains some non-managerial personnel (about 37 percent of the
total sample). In the design of the hypotheses that relate to non-human
capital personal characteristics, we were particularly influenced by a
literature that pertains primarily to managerial personnel. Our per-
sonal model may, therefore, be somewhat underspecified for non-
managerial personnel.
In all cases the coefficient of SEX is negative, highly significant,
and declines in magnitude as we go from the human capital to the per-
sonal to the full models. These results indicate that sex discrimina-
tion is a determinant of female-male earnings differences. The fact
that the sex coefficient declines in magnitude as we augment the model
with additional hypotheses indicates a systematic relationship between
the added explanatory variables and sex. For Sample 1, the imputed
costs for being female-that is, the proportionate shortfall of female
earnings to male earnings attributable to sex, holding all other factors
in the particular model constant--vary from 12 percent in the human
capital model to 8 percent in the personal model to 6 percent in the
full model; for Sample 2, 22 percent in the human capital model, 17 per-
cent in the personal model, and 15 percent in the full model; for Sample
3, 26 percent in the human capital model, 22 percent in the personal
model, and 21 percent in the full model.
Note that Sample 1, for which the R-squared is highest for the
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personal and full regressions, also is the sample in which the impact of
sex on the percentage earnings differential between males and females is
lowest. Clearly, omitted variable bias is of more importance in Sample
2 and 3 than in Sample 1. To some extent, and perhaps to a large ex-
tent, SEX can be viewed as a residual variable rather than an explana-
tory variable. As such it may be picking up the impact of omitted vari-
ables that are correlated with sex. For example, the omission of port-
of-entry from the Sample 2 and 3 models may be part of the reason that
the impacts of SEX are so high in these models.
The regression results for the full and personal models on the total
samples and the married sub-samples are presented in Tables 6-2 through
6-7. These models test the human-capital, occcupational, internal-
relations, and extra-firm hypotheses across females and males, holding
sex constant. These results, therefore, permit us to discern which of
the proposed explanatory variables have significant impacts on earnings
regardless of gender. Comparisons of the full and personal regressions
also permit us to explore the relation between the demand-side variables
(which are omitted in the personal models) and the personal characteris-
tics encompassed by the other three categories of hypotheses. The fol-
lowing summary of the most important statistical findings from each of
the three total samples and married sub-samples will serve as a frame of
reference in Section III of this chapter, where we employ the decomposi-
tion technique to analyze the particular sources of female-male earnings
differences.
Sample 1, drawn from a large multinational company involved in
research and development, is made up of 368 individuals, of which 197
are male and 169 are female. In both models (see Table 6-2), AGE is
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TABLE 6-2
FULL AND PERSONAL EARNINGS EQUATIONS
FOR TOTAL SAMPLE 1
FULL MODEL PERSONAL MODEL
Variable Coefficient
CONSTANT 8.3348f.
SEX -0.05909
HUMAN CAPITAL
AGE 0.0816-a
AGE2 -1.1346-E3 "
EDTS2 -0.0326
EDCS2 -0.0064
EDPS2 0.1634a"
ACON2 -6.7025-E4
ACON3 -1.1993-E3
ACON4 -0.1601
FYSERVC 1.3115-E4
FYSERVC2 3.1022-E3
FTLFEX -8.3301-E4l
FTLFEX2 5.0024-E6
DEMAND SIDE
OCC1 0.2737 A
OCC2 0.1643
SDN1 0.2093
SND2 0.1045
SDN4 0.0183
FDN1 0.0796A/
FDN2 0.0677
FDN4 -0.0146
FDN5 0.08230
INTERNAL RELATIONS
TOTABFC 8.8988-E4
OSJAP1 -0.0135
WWOP 4.4862-E4
CAROT 1.5126-y3a/
INFORM 0.0107a
PERCD -2.6935-E3
MOTS1 
-7.7444-E3
EXTRA-FIRM RELATIONS
MARITAL 0.0153
CHILD1 -0.0171-E3
CHILD2 -0.0129
LFAM -1.8351-E4
EARSOC 1.6318-E3
EARDL -2.7058-E3
S.E.
0.2256
0.1607
0.0148
2.3962-E4
0.0334
0.0318
0.0604
0.0154
0.013
0.0901
3.9168-E4
-1 .6220-E7
2.9441-E4
1.3903-E6
Coefficient
8.44901V
-0.0866A/
0.07 94-a/
110980- 3
-0.161
5.6427- 3
0.4464
-0.0593 t
0.0966
-0.1794_ 
-a1.8748-E3
-4.5293-E6
2.0047-E3 '
9.0598-E6
0.0270
0.0263
0.0273
0.0244
0.0184
0.0273
0.0246
0.0173
0.0314
1 .2379-E3
0.0116
1 .0342-E3
5.0717-E4
2.7779-E3
0.0136
9.3842-E3
0.0115
8.9577-E3
9.1541-E3
1 .533 4-E3
2.2043-E3
4.6345-E3
2.5314f3
-0.0557
4.5585-E 3 /'
1.7791- 3
0.-0302"
-0.0338
-0.0268
6.72003
-0.0405
-0.0318
-1.7006-E3
3.2557-E4
0.0114
R 2
NUMBER OF
OBSERVATIONS 369
a = significant at 1% level.
b = significant at 5% level.
S.E.
0.3896
0.0303
0.0262
4.3 042-E4
0.0620
0.0601
0.1115
0.0291
0.0233
0.1700
6.9866-E4
2.7750-E6
5.5565-E4
2.6148-E6
2.3470-E3
0.0219
1.8624-E3
9.5901-E4
5.0619-E3
0.0256
0.0179
0.2192
0.0169
0.0172
2.9286-E3
4.2026-E3
8.8371-E3
.672
369
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TABLE 6-3
FULL AND PERSONAL EARNINGS EQUATIONS FOR
MARRIED SUB-SAMPLE 1
WJLL MODpEL
Variable Coefficie t
CONSTANT 8.678T
SEX -0.0733
HUMAN CAPITAL
AGE 0.0592a
AGE2 -7.7277-E4
EDTS2 -0.0425
EDCS2 -0.0448
EDPS2 0.1149
ACON2 0.0106
ACON3 0.0149
ACON4 -0.1589
FYSERVC -3.7419-E4
FYSERVC2 1.9657-E6
FTLFEX -6.0139-E4
FTLFEX2 3.9364-E6
DEMAND SIDE
OCC1 0.3136.a
OCC2 0.1985A/
SDN1 0.1847
SND2 0.08420
SDN4 -0.0119
FDN1 0.063
FDN2 0 . 0 6 59 /
FDN4 -0.0117
FDN5 0.0477
INTERNAL RELATIONS
TOTABFC -2.9463-E4
OSJAP1 -1.5982-E3
WWOP -1.536-E4
CAROT 1.8412-E3
INFORM 9.2872-E3"
PERCD -0.0137
MOTS1 -2.1034-E3
EXTRA-FIRM RELATIONS
CHILD1 -6.2142-E3
CHILD2 -0.0136
LFAM 5.0765-E4
DLHH 6.9116-E5
EARSOC 4.1987-E3
EARDL 2.3717-E4
UMov 9.7563-E3
SPSCAR2 -6.5209-E3
SPMOB -0.1625
SPSTRPRM -0.0201
IMPCARTF 0.0219
S.E.
0.3023
0.0250
0.1915
3.0228-E4
0.0407
0.0381
0.0703
0.0173
0.0154
0.0885
4.4889-E4
1 .8632-E6
3.5695-E4
1 .7206-E6
PERSONAT. MO)FT.
Coeffic ent
8.413 0
0.0261
0. 085 2"
-1.2004 3
-0.2026
-0.0973
0:327 3.
1.5203- 3
0.13332f
-0.2560_
1.7458-E 3
-5.3103-E6
-2.042-E3
1.0188-E5A"
0.0329
0.0308
0.0295
0.0261
0.0227
0.0315
0.0291
0.0192
0.0358
1 .2367-E3
0.0133
1. 1780-E3
5.8908-E4
3.2041-E3
0.0156
0.0108
0.0100
0.0117
1 .5779-E3
1 .1269-E4
2.4095-E3
5.1147-E3
0.1057
8.4529-E3
0.1424
0.0329
0.1631
1 .2206-E3
-0.0387
3.840 -E3
1.6859y3
0.0301
-0.0513
-0.0263
-0.0247
-0.0222
-1.4177-E3 h
-5.5684-E4
4.270-E3
0.0145
-0.0596
-0.0310
-0.0292
-0.0166
0.068 4/
R2
NO, OF OBS,
a = significant
b = significant
-922
257
.934
257
at 1% level.
at 5% level.
S.E.
0.5461
0.0494
0.0355
5.7158-E4
0.0795
0.0756
0.1341
0.0347
0.0284
0.1755
8.3363-E4
3.2054-E6
7.0965-E4
3.3987-E6
2.4790-E3
0.0263
2.2690-E3
1 .1528-E3
6.1464-E3
0.0310
0.0215
0.0196
0.0231
3.2027-E3
2.2055-E4
4.8626-E3
0.0103
0.0312
0.0170
0.0283
0.0665
0.0327
MML MODEL
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TABLE 6-4
FULL AND PERSONAL EARNINGS EQUATIONS FOR TOTAL SAMPLE 2
FULL MODEL PERSONAL MODEL
Variable Coefficient
CONSTANT 9.5040s
SEX -0.1590 a
HUMAN CAPITAL
AGE 0.0221A
AGE2 -2.4181- 4-'
EDTS2 0.1130:'
EDCS2 0.1361
EDPS2 0.2785E
ACON2 -0.0367
ACON3 0.0574
ACON4 -4.2538-E3
FYSERVC 2.1456-E3i
FYSERVC2 -3.4697-E6"
FTLFEX 5.2088-E4
FTLFEX2 -8.8692-E6
DEMAND SIDE
OCC1 0.2299Z/
OCC3 0.1156
OCC4 0.1099/
OCC5 0.8531
OCC6 -0.1242
OCC7 0.0544
OCC8 0.0479
OCC9 0.1173'
OCC10 0.0137
OCC11 0.10690/
INTERNAL RELATIONS
TOTABFC 7.4649-E4W
OSJAP1 -0.0136
WWOP 5.2132-E3 "
CAROT -3.1540-E4
INFORM 1.1125-E4
PERCD -0.0149
MOTS1 5.6018-E3
EXTRA-FIRM RELATIONS
CHILD1 0.02740"
CHILD2 0.0223
MARITAL 4.7801-E3
LFAM -3.0403-E4
EARSOC -1.9814-E3
EARDL 1.3140-E3
S.E.
0.1237
0.0239
6.5782-E3
8.2426-E5
0.0127
0.0231
0.0275
0.0414
0.0407
0.0404
2.3669-E4
5.7138-E7
2.9662-E4
6.1502-E6
Coefficient
9.5020 "
-0.1860
0.0248A/
-2.8667-P4k
0. 114(F
0.-1737A/
0.330 9 /
-2.6446- 3
0.084
-0.0137
2.1456-E3
-3-0808-E6
7.1171-E4
-1.0646-E6
0.0188
0.0311
0.0498
0.0319
0.0428
0.0402
0.0264
0.0188
0.0258
0.0235
2.3486-E4
0.0117
1.0831-E3
2.6332-E4
4.7616-E4
0.0229
0.0114
9.0697-E3
6.7153-E3
0.0145
2.0995-E4
3.9857-E3
5.3259-E3
-8-9341-E4
-0.0141
7.3003-E3
-1.1817-E4
5.7837-E4
-9.3348-E3
-7.4750-E3
0.0230
0.0270J
-3.5549-E3
-2.9675-E4
-4.0592-E3
4.6007-E3
R2
NO. OF OBS.
.6281
1893
a = significant at 1% level.
b = significant at 5% level.
S.E.
0.1283
0.1241
6.8013-E3
8.5116-E5
0.0132
0.0236
0.0269
0.0427
0.0412
0.0416
2.4550E-5
5.9624E-7
3.0887E-5
6.4073E-7
2.4550-E4
0.0122
1 .1143-E3
2.7589-E4
4.9772-E4
0.0240
0.0119
9.5134-E3
7.0012-E3
0.0152
2.2013-E4
4.1686-E3
5.5496-E3
.587
1893
-. 622
1506
.588
1506
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TABLE 6-5
FULL AND PERSONAL EARNINGS EQUATIONS
FULL MODEL . . .
Variable Coeffi ent
CONSTANT 9.5701
SEX -0.1197
HUMAN CAPITAL
AGE 0.0189"
AGE2 -2.0703 4
EDTS2 0.112P
EDCS2 0.1106 A/
EDPS2 0 .2700W
ACON2 0.0106
ACON3 0.0903
ACON4 0.0143
FYSERVC 2.1915-E3 "
FYSERVC2 -3.5239-E6
FTLFEX 3.6647-E4
FTLFEX2 -6.3579-E7
DEMAND SIDE
OCC1 0.2117 A
OCC3 0.1225"
OCC4 0. 1692
OCC5 0.1114
OCC6 -0.1225
OCC7 3.2763-E3
OCC8 0.0464
OCC9 0.0865*
OCC10 0. 0179
0CC11 0.0871s/
INTERNAL RELATIONS
TOTABFC -6.6609-E4
OSJAP1 
-0.0187
WWOP 4.7 808-E 3&/
CAROT -4.4156-E4
INFORM 3.0191-E4
PERCD -0.0331
MOTS1 -8.4606-E3
EXTRA-FIRM RELATIONS
CHILD1 0.0245
CHILD2 0.0264A/
LFAM -3.6904
DLHH -3.0284-E4
EARSOC -2.9348-E3
EARDL 1.2980-E3
UMOV 3.7179-E3
SPSCAR2 -0.0120
SPMOB 0.0239
SPSTRPRM -0.0290
IMPCARTF 0.0347
S.E.
0.1485
0.0313
7.5421-E3
9.3572-E5
0.0145
0.0272
0.0319
0.0527
0.0512
0.0523
2.6687-E4
6.3779-E7
3.3364-E6
6.8315-E7
FOR MARRIED SUB-SAMPLE 2
PERSONAL MODEL
Coeffici nt S.E.
9.538W. 0.1526
-0.1355 0.0320
0.0214
-2.4884- 4
0.118S
0.1484
0 . 3 2 8 7a'
0.0359
0.1276h/
3.5899-E3
2.2048-E3
-3.0908-E6
5.5572-E4
-9.0986-E7
7.7170-E3
9.5604
0.0148
0.0275
0.0310
0.0539
0.0519
0.0534
2.7283-E4
6.5581-E7
3.4364-E4
7.041 1-E7
0.0215
0.0350
0.0596
0.0407
0.0465
0.4649
0.0300
0.0210
0.0287
0.0249
2.8518-E4
0.0132
1 .2090-E3
3.0172-E4
5.2648-E4
0.0287
0.0129
9.6683
7.3824-E3
3.1057-E4
1 .2698-E4
4.5934-E3
6.0284-E3
0.0141
9.7453-E3
0.0144
0.0460
0.0195
-7.2916-E4/
-0.0210
6.9359-E3W
-3.5924-E4
6.2709-E4
-0.0301
9.8793-E3
0.0185
0.0292/
3.9426-E4
3.0167-E4b/
-3.7040-E3
3.9732-E3
1.0505-E3
-5.5977-E3
0.2743
-
6
.
8111- 3
0.04585
2.9623-E4
0.0137
1 .2264-E3
3.1320-E4
5.4567-E4
0.0299
0.0134
0.0100
7.6379-E3
3.2266-EE4
1.3193-E4
6.2331-E3
6.2331-E3
0.0147
0.0101
0.0149
0.0477
0.0202
R2
mNO FOS
.622
150a , n a
a = significant at 15% level
b = significant at 5% level
.588
1Rn6
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TABLE 6-6
FULL AND PERSONAL EARNINGS EQUATIONS FOR TOTAL SAMPLE 3
FULL MODEL PERSONAL MODEL
Variable Coefficient
CONSTANT 8.15330'/
SEX -0.2410W
HUMAN CAPITAL
AGE 0.0611
AGE2 -7.8439-E4
EDTS2 0.0260
EDCS2 0.1608
EDPS2 0.2748
ACON2 0.2475
ACON3 0.2300
ACON4 0.0588
FYSERVC 4.6118-Er"
FYSERVC2 -8.486-E6
FTLFEX 2.2978-E3/
FTLFEX2 -4.1688-E6
DEMAND SIDE
OCCi 0.0842
OCC2 0.1745
INTERNAL RELATIONS
TOTABFC -1.5116-E3
OSJAP1 0.0275_
WWOP 5.0 9 81-E 3
CAROT -1.5108-E3
INFORM -3.3442-E4
PERCD 0.1538
MOTS1 -0.0503
EXTRA-FIRM RELATIONS
MARITAL 0.2480
CHILD1 -7.6673-E3
CHILD2 -0.0421
LFAM 1.7841-E4
EARSOC 9.0751
EARDL 9.2722-E3
S.E.
0.5261
0.0684
0.0290
3.8331-E4
0.1083
0.1223
0.1259
0.1455
0.1324
0.1501
1 .0554-E3
3.4275-E6
1 .1583-E3
2.6696-E6
Coefficient
8.2894.a
-0.2501.a
0.0575-b/
-7.2696-E4
0.0378
0.1765
0.2831
0.2293
0.1798
-0.0154
4.8830-E3 1
-9.1927-E6
2-.5445-E36
-4.749 -E6
0.1153
0.1197
9.3632-E4
0.0480
2.1941-E3
1.2755-E3
9.8992-E4
0.1150
0.0549
0.0527
0.0397
0.0316
3.3097-E4
6.1715-E3
0.0188
-1 .6894-E3
0. 0413
6 .3606-E3 "
-1.6615-E3
-2.9667-E4
0.1640
-0.0593
0.2654'a
-2.2344-E3
-0.0419
5.6709-E5
1.5314-E3
0.0121
R2
NO. OF OBS.
.670
254
a = significant at 1% level
b = significant at 5% level
S.E.
0.5180
0.0661
0.0290
3.8200-E4
0.1086
0.1224
0.1263
0.1454
0.1305
0.1400
1.0364-E3
3.4077-E6
1 .1521-E3
2.6452-E6
9.3347-E4
0.0476
2.1009-E3
1 .2779-E3
9.9374-E4
0.1145
0.0548
0.0527
0.0397
0.0317
3.2637-E4
6.1850-E3
0.0187
254
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TABLE 6-7
FULL AND PERSONAL EARNINGS EQUATIONS FOR MARRIED SAMPLE 3
FULL MODEL PERSONAL MODEL
Variable Coefficient
CONSTANT 9.2684a/
SEX -0.0782
HUMAN CAPITAL
AGE 0.0288
AGE2 -3.6397
EDTS2 -8.0680-E3
EDCS2 0.1099
EDPS2 0.2237
ACON2 0.2246
ACON3 0.191
ACON4 0.0582
FYSERVC 1.3322-E3
FYSERVC2 -4.6642-E7
FTLFEX 2.9097-E3
FTLFEX2 -5.3329-E6
DEMAND SIDE
OCC1 -0.0212
OCC2 0.0861
INTERNAL RELATIONS
TOTABFC -1.0928-E3
OSJAP1 -2.0642-E4
WWOP 4.6903-E3
CAROT -1.8392-E3
INFORM -4.7231-E4
PERCD -0.0356
MOTS1 0.0107
EXTRA-FIRM RELATIONS
CHILD1 0.4757
CHILD2 -5.2229-E3
LFAM 4.1479-E5
OLHH -1.3453-E3
EARSOC -4.4817-E4
EARDL 0.0109
UMOV 0.0705
SPSCAR2 -0.0549
SPMOB 0.0509
SPSTRPRM -0.2397
IMPCARTF 0.1078
S.E.
0.4749
0.0738
0.0247
3.0800-E4
0.1049
0.1095
0.1104
0.1150
0.0977
0.1259
8.7358-E4
2.7652-E6
1 .0223-E3
2.1266-E6
Coefficient
9.2867a
-0-0581
0.0270
-3.0092-E4
-0.0369
0.1015
0-2009 
0.2371
0.1486
6.5656-E4
1. 9 170-E 3b
-2.0849-E6
3.0453-E3
-6.0521-E6
S.E.
0.4366
0.0727
0.0250
3.1094-E4
0.1028
0.1083
0.1094
0.1163
0.0973
0.1091
8.4894-E4
2.7206-E6
1.0314-E3
2.1326-E6
0.1093
0.1153
7.1624-E4
0.0405
1.7869-E3
9.7357-E4
7.0302-E4
0.1155
0.0481
0.0292
0.0250
2.5598-E4
4.1456-E4
5.1574-E3
0.0165
0.0488
0.0309
0.0409
0.1121
0.0598
-1 .3546-E3
0.0117
6.0045-E 3a '
-1 . 9 866-E3
-4.3055-E4
-0.0635
6.1867
0.0500
-6.5740-E3
-1.2793-E4
-1.5320-E3
1.3153-E3
0.0153
0.0646
-0.0437
0.0510
-0.2170
0.0902
7.1694-E4
0.0406
1.7212-E3
9.8417-E4
7.1192-E4
0.1145
0.0484
0.0295
0.0253
2.4873-E4
4.1287-E4
5.1739-E3
0.0165
0.0490
0.0309
0.0414
0.1129
0.0602
R2
NO. OF OBS.
.743
182
a = significant at 1% level.
b = significant at 5% level.
.733
182
S. E.
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significant and positively related to earnings. The negative and signi-
ficant relation between the quadratic of age indicates that earnings
rise at a decreasing rate with age. Both these results are as expected.
Full-time labour force experience, however, is negatively related to
earnings with a significant impact, while its quadratic is positive and
significant--quite unexpected results. These results may be due to
multicollinearity among age, labour-force experience, and experience
with the company. An analysis of the combined impact of these variables
in Sample 1, under some reasonable assumptions, reveals that an addi-
tional coterminous year of age, labour-force experience, and service
with the company increases earnings by 15 percent (see Appendix 8 for
details of this calculation).
In all three samples, we estimate the implied rate of return for a
year of advanced education, on the assumption that a technical degree
represents two years, a college degree five years (standard in Quibec),
and a professional degree ten years. For Sample 1, the impact of tech-
nical and college education on earnings cannot be distinguished from
that of high school, but the relative impact of a professional degree is
highly significant and positive. The holder of a professional degree
gains an earnings differential of 18 percent over someone with a high
school degree. Note that no females in the sample had a professional
degree, so that the 18 percent earnings differential pertains to males.
In the personal model, we drop the occupational (hierarchical and
functional) and port-of-entry variables. Any correlation between these
variables and those that remain in the model renders the coefficients of
the latter subject to left-out variable bias. This bias, however, is
interesting in its own right. To the extent that the left-out variables
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are endogenous, determined in part by the remaining variables in the
system, the comparison of the full and personal models reveals the
indirect effects of the exogenous variables through the channels of
occupation and advancement. Thus, not only can we analyze the direct
impacts of personal characteristics on earnings variation, but also we
gain some insight into the indirect impacts of the personal variables
through occupational segregation, port of entry, and functional or
horizontal departments.
In the personal model, a social-sciences concentration, becomes
negative and significant, implying a 6 percent earnings difference when
compared to a humanities concentration. This change probably occurs
because of correlation with the port-of-entry variable. A person's area
of concentration would most likely have the greatest impact in determin-
ing his or her initial job. This explanation would not hold, however,
if a concentration in the humanities were also correlated to a roughly
equivalent extent with the same ports of entry as an area of concentra-
tion in the social sciences. Holding a science degree has a positive
and significant impact on earnings (implying a 10 percent difference),
whereas the possession of such a degree was insignificant in the total
regression. This change was expected because, as stated earlier, over
the past several years a computer sciences degree has been a necessary
prerequisite for entry into the programmer and analyst jobs in this
particular firm. The significance of the area of concentration variable
supports our hypothesis that the quality of the degree obtained is
important to earnings.
In the models that include the demand-side variables, occupations
are categorized both by hierarchical and functional position in the
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firm. Given the other variables in the models, the significance of the
hierarchical and functional occupational variables indicates either that
inefficiency exists in the allocation of jobs within the firm or that
our model does not capture all the personal attributes that contribute
to vertical mobility. For example, if included personal-attribute vari-
ables could explain what makes an individual a team leader rather than a
technician, then hierarchical or functional position per se would not be
important as a determinant of earnings. In terms of hierarchical com-
parisons, a manager makes 31 percent more, and programmers or analysts
earn 18 percent more, than an identically qualified individual who is a
computer operator. With the exception of the computer operations de-
partment, functional dummy variables are positive and significant, indi-
cating that those in technical support and software development earn
significantly more--23 percent and 11 percent, respectively--than those
in operations support.
In our study, employees are classified by their first functional de-
partment to test whether current earnings are related to port of entry.
The first department dummies indicate that two departments, (technical
support and software development) as well as the "not-elsewhere-
classified" department are significantly different from the excluded
operations support department. The implied differentials are 8 percent,
7 percent, and 9 percent, respectively. Analogous to our discussion of
the current hierarchical and functional occupational variables, port of
entry would not be a significant determinant of earnings if there was an
efficient allocation of people to their first jobs or if we had included
all the attributes that determined both initial job placements and sub-
sequent advancement.
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To understand why some people might have more access to internal job
ladders than others, we examine the extent to which individuals partici-
pate in the internal relations of the firm and how they perceive their
position in the firm's hierarchy. For males and females together, there
are no significant impacts on earnings because of total absence from the
company, outside job applications, or working overtime without pay. But
another indicator of commitment to the firm, CAROT--the percent in-
crease in pay needed to induce one to leave the company--has a signifi-
cant impact on earnings. An individual who would require 10 percent
more than she or he is currently earning to leave the company earns a
1.5 percent premium compared to an individual who would leave the com-
pany with no earnings increment. In line with our hypothesis, it can be
argued that an individual with a low supply elasticity to the outside
labour market sees his or her future with the firm as better than an in-
dividual with a high supply elasticity and that this greater commitment
to the firm manifests itself in better performance for the firm, resul-
ting in higher current earnings.
In the personal model, the pursuit of an outside job becomes signi-
ficant with a negative impact on earnings. A comparison with the full
model estimates implies that this variable is correlated with lower-
paying occupational categories. Individuals who apply for one or more
outside positions earn 5 percent less than those who do not attempt to
leave the firm. A comparison of the full and personal models also
indicates that a correlation exists between the more highly-paying
occupations and the extent to which employees do extra unpaid work. In
the personal model, an individual employee who works overtime without
pay 4 times earns a premium of 2 percent over an individual employee who
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does no unpaid overtime, a differential that is statistically signifi-
cant.
Informal networks within the firm are measured by an index (INFORM)
of both the frequency and quality of contacts with superiors who may
exert influence over an employee's upward mobility. The index has a
highly significant and positive impact on earnings in both the total and
personal models.
Turning to extra-firm relations, a comparison of the full and per-
sonal models indicates a correlation between employees with children
under 6 and the lower-paying occupations. In the personal regression
run on the married sub-sample, the division of labour in the household
variable is negative and significant, indicating that a married indivi-
dual who is less constrained by household responsibilities earns more
than an individual who is more constrained.
The main reason for examining a sub-sample of married employees is
to highlight the effects of a dual-career household on the individual's
earnings. For this purpose, the following variables have been included:
whether or not the individual is willing to relocate to advance the
career of the spouse, whether a spouse or partner is supportive of the
employee having a career, whether a spouse would be willing to relocate
in order to benefit an employee's career, whether the spouse is profes-
sional and willing to relocate for the sake of an employee's career and
the importance of the employee's career to the family. The only vari-
able supporting the dominant-careers hypothesis is the importance of the
career to the family in the personal model, a finding that individuals
in higher-paying occupations are more likely to have the primary career.
Sample 2, drawn from a large, public-sector utility company, is the
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largest of all the samples. Regressions were run on 1892 individuals--
1354 males and 538 females--all of whom are French-speaking (they re-
ceived French translations of the questionnaires and responded in
French).
Of the human-capital variables, AGE is positively related to ear-
nings and significant. Like Sample 1 we find that there are decreasing
rates of returns to maturity. Full-time years of service with the com-
pany is positive and significant, while earnings rise at a decreasing
rate the longer an individual works with the company. Unlike the re-
sults in Sample 1, the signs of labour-force experience and its quad-
ratic are as expected, although the only significant coefficient is the
linear term in the personal regression. All the education variables are
positive and highly significant for both the total and personal models,
strongly supporting the conventional human-capital hypothesis. As in
Sample 1, holding a science degree has a positive and significant impact
on earnings, again supporting the hypothesis that the quality of the
degree obtained is of some consequence for earnings.
There are eleven occupational categories (aggregated from about
12,000 job titles) included in the full model. In terms of hierarchical
status, from top down, they are management, financial staff, scientific
research staff, engineering staff, computer staff, public-relations
staff, primary-services staff, bluecollar supervisors, skilled labour-
ers, clerical staff, and secondary-services staff.
A manager earns 26 percent more than an identically qualified cleri-
cal staffperson (the reference group), while both engineering staff and
scientific research staff earn 12 percent more. Individuals in the
skilled-labour category also earn 12 percent more than clerical staff,
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most likely because the skilled workers belong to militant public-sector
unions. Computing staff earn 9 percent more than clerical staff, blue-
collar supervisors 11 percent more, but secondary-services staff 12 per-
cent less. Note that there are no females in the bluecollar supervisor
group.
In Sample 2, we are unable to examine the impact on earnings of
mobility up internal job ladders from initial ports of entry. We can,
however, explore aspects of the commitment of individuals to the firm
and their perceptions of their chances for mobility within the enter-
prise. In contrast to the results from the other samples, absence from
the company for reasons other than a vacation has a negative and signi-
ficant impact on earnings. Further, those individuals who work overtime
without pay one time (the mean in the sample) earn significantly more
than individuals who do no unpaid overtime work. It might be noted that
in Sample 1, the mean value for working overtime without pay was almost
4 and in Sample 3 almost 11. We assume that the relatively small amount
of unpaid overtime done by those in Sample 2 may be due in part to the
presence of non-bureaucratic employees. Perhaps this is because, unlike
Samples 1 and 3 that are drawn from private-sector firms, Sample 2 is
drawn from a firm in the public sector, where promotion is based more on
seniority than performance, and where people are more inclined to "work
to rule" (in this case, coming to work at nine and leaving at five).
Another contrast with the other samples is that those who have chil-
dren in Sample 2 reap significantly higher earnings than those who do
not. The returns to having an additional child, 5 years and under, is 2
percent, and 6 years and over, 3 percent. This employer may perceive
employees with children as more stable. Amongst the married sub-sample,
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a highly negative coefficient supports the division-of-labour-in-the-
household hypothesis, indicating that those individuals who are less
constrained by household duties earn more. In the personal model, the
finding that individuals with the household's primary career earn signi-
ficantly more than individuals whose career is less important to the
household supports the dominant-careers hypothesis. Note that, as in
Sample 1, this variable has a significant impact in the personal model
but not in the full model, suggesting a correlation between higher-
paying positions in the firm and having the dominant-career.
Sample 3, a medium-sized high-tech company, has a total of 253
employees, with 189 males and 62 females. There may have been signifi-
cant self-selection among those who responded, because the responses as
a proportion of the questionnaires distributed was only 17 percent--by
far the lowest of all the samples. The results derived from this sample
may not, therefore, be representative of the underlying population.
Analogous to the results of the other samples, AGE is positively
related to earnings and significant, with a decreasing rate of return to
maturity. The extra returns to holding technical and college degrees
cannot be distinguished from the returns to high-school education. But
an individual with a professional degree earns 32 percent more than a
high school graduate, an annual rate of return of 3 percent. Occupa-
tions in Sample 3 are categorized by hierarchical position in the firm,
with management, administrative, and financial personnel at the top;
scientific, engineering, and computing staff in the middle; and
clerical/secretarial staff at the bottom. The occupational variables
are not significant determinants of earnings in any of the models, sug-
gesting that there is an efficient allocation of people to jobs within
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the firm and/or that for this sample our model captures all the personal
attributes that contribute to vertical mobility.
Examining the internal relations of the firm, we note that those
individuals who worked overtime without pay 11 times (the sample ave-
rage) in 1982 earned 6 percent more than an individual who did no unpaid
overtime work. Of the extra-firm factors that may affect earnings, we
find that marital status functions as a positive and significant deter-
minant of earnings in both models. We might posit that employers per-
ceive marital status as evidence of apparent stability, just as they
might view those individuals with children as more stable employees.
Amongst the married sub-sample, the division-of-labour-in-the-household
variable is negative and significant at the 1 percent level--a finding
common to all samples. The dominant-career variables indicate that an
employee whose spouse is professional and is willing to relocate for the
sake of that employee's job earns significantly less than an employee
who has an unwilling spouse.
In summary, across all samples certain variants of each of our four
categories of hypotheses--human capital, occupational, internal rela-
tions, and extra-firm relations--have significant impacts on earnings.
These results confirm the prime argument that motivated this study;
namely, that the traditional human-capital framework should be extended
to include both demand-side factors and social relationships.
Among the human-capital variables, age is important across all the
samples. Years of service with the company, which is highly correlated
with age, has an additional significant impact in two of the three sam-
ples. In general, the contributions of age and company experience domi-
nate the expected human-capital impacts of labour-force experience. In
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all the samples, holders of a professional degree appear to be duely
rewarded. In addition, in two of the three samples, a scientific back-
ground yields an individual a clear-cut advantage in pay. This finding
suggests that the quality as well as the level of education should be
taken into account in human-capital models.
It is difficult to make generalizations about the impacts of occupa-
tions across all samples because each occupational structure is unique
to the particular firm. Moreover, we were able to gather much more
information about occupational status and mobility for Sample 1 than for
the other two. With this caveat in mind, all our findings reveal that
managers earn significantly more than any of the other groups within the
samples. Given the hierarchical structures of the corporations in our
study, we are, of course, not surprised to find that managers are highly
paid relative to other employees. Nevertheless, given all the other
factors held constant in our model, there is no inherent reason for a
significant positive return to being a manager. In one case, the exis-
tence of strong unions among skilled workers appears to have a signifi-
cant impact on earnings. We did not collect data on the union status of
employees, mainly because we were mainly interested in managerial level
personnel. The inclusion of a union variable may well have picked up
this occupational impact. In the one sample where we are able to test
the port-of-entry hypothesis, initial departmental placement in the firm
is an important determinant of earnings, lending support to the indepen-
dent importance of internal job ladders as a means to higher earnings.
Amongst the internal-relations variables, working overtime without
pay is significant across all the samples in the personal models and in
two of the three samples in the full models. We view these results as
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very strong support for the commitment-to-the-firm hypothesis because
the interpretation of unpaid overtime as a "gift exchange" [see Akerlof,
1982] within the firm is clear-cut. The employee gives his or her extra
labour to the firm, with no assurance that the firm will return the gift
in the form of promotion or higher pay. The significance of this vari-
able indicates that individuals who are presently being better rewarded
expect the "gifts" of higher pay to continue to be forthcoming in the
future if they give the firm their "gifts" of unpaid work now. A longi-
tudinal analysis would be needed, however, to document this relationship
more fully. Various other internal-relations hypothesis are supported
in one or the other of the samples. In Sample 1, which is clearly the
most homogeneous sample in terms of internal job structures, informal
networks have a significant impact on earnings even in the full model,
while outside job applications have a significant impact in the personal
model. In Sample 2, absence from the company for reasons other than a
vacaation has a significant negative impact.
Amongst the extra-firm factors, division of labour in the household
is negative and significant across all married sub-samples for the
personal models and in two of the three full models. Dual realms of
responsibility, which of course have traditionally been seen as being
the lot of females, have a significant impact here across both males and
females. Whether or not work in the home affects the earning power of
females more than males is a result that will have to await the upcoming
decomposition of the female-male earnings differential from regressions
run for females and males separately. In two of the samples for the
personal models, individuals who have the primary career in the house-
hold earn significantly more than individuals whose career is less
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important to the household, supporting the dominant-career hypothesis.
In the total samples, marital status is an important determinant of
positive earnings for Sample 3, but not for any of the other samples.
The impact on earnings of having children also varies across samples.
In Sample 1, the presence of young children in the home inhibits ear-
nings, but in Sample 2, having children who are both young (under the
age of 6) and older tends to increase earnings. One plausible reason
for the different impacts of the child variables is the fact that Sample
1 is drawn from a company in the private sector, whereas Sample 2 is
drawn from a company in the public sector. It is considered discrimina-
tory for a public-sector company to inquire whether or not employees
have children. It might be argued that the public-sector company,
lacking information about the family responsibilities of its employees,
cannot discriminate in terms of pay and promotion against those who do
have children. But again, this form of discrimination is generally
considered to be a problem for females rather than males. We must turn
to a comparison of the results of the models run on females and males
separately to take the analysis further.
III. Decomposition
For each sample, the estimation of separate regressions for females
and males permits us to decompose the difference in the mean-estimated
earnings of females and males into three components according to the
following identity:
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(1) lnBTES - lnTEm = E[(bf-bm)* f] + E[bf*(Xf-X)] - E[(bf-bm )(Rf m)2
where lnTESf and 1lnTE-Sm, are the logarithms of average earnings from
females and males respectively, bf and bm are vectors of regression
coefficients for females and males respectively, and X and Xm are vec-
tors of the means of the explanatory variables for males and females
respectively.
The term, E[(bf - bm *f], is called the coefficients component, and
shows (in log points) the difference in earnings between females and
males that is due to differences in the rates of return that each group
receives for attributes, given the mean attributes possessed by females.
The term, E[b *(x - X )], is called the attributes component, andf fm
shows (in log points) the difference in earnings that is due to diffe-
rences in mean attributes, given the estimated female rates of return to
attributes.
The term, -E[(bf - bM)*(Xf - XM)], is called the interaction compo-
nent, because it shows the extent to which the female-male earnings dif-
ference is due to the interaction of coefficient and attribute differ-
ences rather than due only to the independent effects of coefficient
differences and attribute differences as captured in the first two com-
ponents. The interaction component indicates, therefore, that the dif-
ferences in coefficients and attributes are correlated. We might argue
that such correlation occurs because the respective rates of returns to
attributes to females and/or males influence each of the sexes in their
decisions to acquire attributes. If this be the case, then a single-
equation model, such as we have used throughout this study, may not be
appropriate. Although the potential need for a more sophisticated model
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has already been implicitly raised in the theoretical discussions in
Chapter 2, we have chosen to follow the literature in using less sophis-
ticated econometric specifications. Nevertheless, one function of the
decomposition of the OLS results is to see whether in fact the inter-
action component is large, a finding that would indicate that further
research is required to specify a model of female-male earnings differ-
ences in which attributes are determined endogenously.
Given the decomposition identity specified in (1), a negative
coefficients component will indicate an unfavourable position for
females relative to males in terms of rates of returns to attributes,
while a negative attributes component will indicate an unfavourable
position for females in terms of attributes endowments. In our model,
the quantity of attributes is always positive. Therefore, when both the
coefficients component, E[(bf - bm)*X f, and the interaction component,
-E[(bf - bm )*(f - Rm)], are negative, females must have both lower
rates of return and fewer attributes than males. Having fewer attri-
butes is not always unfavourable to females because an attribute such as
the division of labour in the household (DLHH) or early childhood acti-
vities (EARSOC) may have negative rates of return. Therefore, if males
have more of this attribute (in these cases, more household work or more
female-oriented childhood activities), females may have an earnings ad-
vantage. In all cases where the earnings advantage goes to one sex and
the attributes advantage goes to the other, the sign of the interaction
component will depend upon which element dominates the other, that is, a
negative interaction component indicates an earnings disadvantage for
females, but not neceesarily both coefficient and attribute disadvan-
tages. Note that the interaction component is -E[(bf - b )*(f -m*
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Therefore, if females have both higher returns and more attributes than
males, the interaction result will decrease the female-male earnings
differential.
The decomposition identity could also have been specified using male
weights:
(2) lnBTZ5 - lnBTES = E[(b f-b m)*X mI + E[b m*(X -m ) + E[(b f-b )*(X f- )].
Comparing (1) and (2), E[(b f-bm)* m = E[(b f-b)*X ] - E[(b f-bm)*(Xf-X)I
and Z[bm*(Xf Xm)] = Elb f*(X fXm)] - E[(bf-bM)*(Xf Xm)]. When the inter-
action component is zero, the coefficients and attributes components are
equal whether female or male weights are used. When the interaction
component is small, the relative magnitudes of the respective components
in (1) and (2) will be similar. It is, therefore, only when large coef-
ficient differences are associated with large attribute differences that
the index number problem becomes an issue; that is, the choice of female
or male weights in carrying out the decomposition becomes a matter of
concern.
From a policy point of view, however, the use of the female weights
would seem to be more appropriate for our purposes. We are assuming
from the outset that females are disadvantaged relative to males in the
labour market, an assumption that is borne out by the statistical re-
sults presented above. Therefore, policies (whether household, firm, or
government) should be focussed on differences in coefficients given the
attributes that females actually have, differences in attributes given
the coefficients that females actually have, and the interaction of the
two differences. It would not appear appropriate to evaluate female
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disadvantages under the counterfactual premises that females have male
mean attributes and male rates of return as implied in (2).
Within the econometric literature, the interaction term has been ig-
nored in the decomposition of female-male earnings differences [Oaxaca,
1973; Holmes, 1976; Robb, 1978; Gunderson, 1979; Osterman, 1979]. Using
our notation, the typical decomposition combines male and female weights
in the following manner:
(3) lnTESf - lnBTES = [(bf - b )*X ] + E[b *(Xf - X)].
The coefficients component in (3) is identical to the coefficients
component in the formulation in (1), while the attributes component in
(3) is identical to the attributes component in (1). Compared to (1),
however, the interaction component has been absorbed into the attributes
component in (3), while compared to (2), the interaction component has
been absorbed into the coefficients component. The attribute component
in (1) shows the proportion of the total earnings difference that is due
to female-male attributes differences, given female rates of return;
whereas the attributes component in (3) shows the proportion that is due
to attributes differences given the male rates of return.
Our previous discussion has already indicated the disadvantages of a
decomposition formulation such as (3) that mixes male and female weights
into the first two components, and as a result does not show the inter-
action component. In the absence of the interaction component, we have
no indication of the extent to which the use of either male or female
weights matter in the derivation of the first two components. By the
same token, we have no measure of the degree to which differential
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attribute acquisition may be endogenously determined in response to
differential rates of return. Without a formulation that yields the
interaction component, for policy purposes, we cannot separate the
extent to which female earnings would be improved by greater attribute
endowments holding current estimated rates of return constant--as mea-
sured by the attribute component in (1)--from the extent to which female
earnings would be improved by a more complex simultaneous alteration of
attributes and rates of return--as measured by the interaction component
in (1).
With this theoretical background on alternative decomposition formu-
lations, we now summarize the decomposition results using female weights
for the female and male regressions estimated in Part II of this chap-
ter. Details of the decompositions with both male and female weights
are presented in Appendix 9. The impact on earnings differentials of
the intercepts always appears only as part of the coefficients component
of the decomposition. Osterman [1979] treats the intercept differential
as a separate "unexplained" component, whereas Gunderson [1979] includes
it as part of the coefficients component. We follow Gunderson in this
matter, because we want the coefficients component to indicate earnings
discrimination, whether explained or unexplained. Moreover, as stated
in Part II of this chapter, our interpretation of the intercept is that
it reflects the returns to individuals who are in the excluded cate-
gories of the dummy variables as well as simply unexplained returns.
From the tables presented in Appendix 9 below, the reader can easily
calculate the impact of the coefficients component without the inter-
cept.
Table 6-8 summarizes the percent total earnings differential for
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Table 6-8
Decomposition of Female-Male Earnings Differential
(percent)
Coefficients Attributes Interaction Total
Component Component Component Differential
Sample 1 TFR 3.53 -11.10 -10.95 -18.52
TPR -11.73 -11.48 4.69 -18.52
MFR 0.76 -9.74 -13.10 -22.08
MPR -8.88 -13.34 0.13 -22.08
Sample 2 TFR -15.93 -27.01 9.75 -33.18
TPR -16.81 -21.51 5.14 -33.18
MFR -11.27 -33.98 10.36 -34.89
MPR -10.76 -30.65 6.51 -34.89
Sample 3 TFR -76.76 3.91 33.40 -39.49
TPR -74.19 2.67 32.03 -39.49
MFR -0.76 -82.24 44.18 -38.82
MPR 8.84 -68.63 20.97 -38.82
TFR = total sample, full regression
TPR = total sample, personal regression
MFR = married sub-sample, full regression
MPR = married sub-sample, personal regression
Source: see Appendix 9.
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each regression and the associated percentages of the differential
accounted for by each of the three components in (1). For each sample,
we shall examine the decomposition for the full regression and personal
regression estimates based on the total samples and married sub-samples.
In Sample 1, drawn from a large multinational in research and deve-
lopment, females earn 19 percent less than males. Little of the differ-
ential is due to earnings discrimination as reflected in the coeffi-
cients component. In the full decomposition, the most negative total
impact for females is due to occupational segregation, where females
earn 16 percent less. In the personal decomposition, the human-capital
hypothesis and the intercept pick up much of the impact of the dropped
hypotheses, although in opposite directions. The negative impact on the
human-capital variables indicates that, given their human-capital endow-
ments, females are channeled into the lower-paying occupational catego-
ries. Males earn 59 percent more than females because of human-capital
variables.
The full coefficients component is positive for females, indicating
earnings discrimination of 4 percent in their favour. The positive
value of the coefficients component is largely the result of early soc-
ialization. The regression coefficients show that females receive pos-
itive returns to the two early socialization variables (both of which
have higher values when early socialization is more female-oriented),
while males receive negative returns. Of particular importance within
this hypothesis are the returns to early childhood activities, a higher
value of which reflects the female orientation of these activities. In
the personal decomposition, the coefficients component becomes negative,
indicating that females now earn 12 percent less than males because of
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rates of return. As in the total impact, human capital, and in parti-
cular age, dominates the coefficients component. In Sample 1, older
males tend to be in much higher-paying positions within the firm than
older females.
In the full decomposition, females earn 11 percent less than males
because of the attributes component. The occupational-segregation and
port-of-entry hypotheses have the greatest impacts. A comparison of the
port-of-entry coefficients of each of the regressions for females and
males indicates that initial functional placement in the firm has a
significant impact on current earnings amongst females but not amongst
males. In the female regression, those who entered the company in
technical support, software development, and miscellaneous ports of
entry have current earnings that are, respectively, 14, 12, and 38 per-
cent higher than the earnings of those who entered in computer opera-
tions. But relatively few females either begin or end up in these
better-paying departments, as the decomposition results indicate. The
promotion opportunities for males are greater than they are for females,
apparently because males have access not only to longer but also to a
wider array of internal job ladders. In the personal decomposition, the
attributes component changes very little. Now, however, human capital,
and in particular age, stands out as the major factor in determining the
overall attributes component. Not only do older males get paid better
than older females as indicated by the coefficients component, but on
average males are older than females in this sample.
The full interaction component is also negative, and therefore -ref-
lects the disadvantages of females relative to males in both coeffi-
cients and attributes. The earnings differential associated with the
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interaction component is -11 percent. The largest impacts are found in
occupational segregation and commitment to the home. Although both
males and females receive negative returns to commitment to the home,
the coefficients component for this hypothesis indicates that per unit
of commitment females are less penalized. But the fact that on average
females have more units of commitment to the home means that the inter-
action of the coefficients differences and attributes differences is
negative, and therefore unfavourable to females. In the personal decom-
position, the interaction term changes significantly, becoming positive,
mainly because of the positive impact of early socialization. Despite
the fact that females have more of the negatively-rewarded, female-
oriented early socialization attributes than males, the even more
negative returns to males turn this factor into an advantage for females
in the interaction of returns and attributes.
In the married sub-sample, the intercept of the full decomposition
is much more negative than in the total sample comparison, although in
the married personal decomposition the intercept is highly positive. In
both married decompositions (but particularly in the full), human-
capital is very high and positive, with the coefficients component being
the dominant factor. Married females receive extremely high returns to
AGE relative to married males. This result may occur because married
males are on average older and have already reached the peak of their
(relatively steep) earnings profiles, whereas married females are
younger and are just beginning to move up their (relatively flat)
earnings profiles. Neither commitment to the home nor dominant careers
has a strong impact in any of the components of the decomposition.
In Sample 2, drawn from a large public-sector utility, the total
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differential is 33 percent in favour of males. In the full decomposi-
tion, the major hypotheses that explain the differential are human
capital and early socialization. Within the human-capital hypothesis,
age is an important factor that favours males, but the most dominant
factor underlying the human-capital impact is full-time labour-force
experience. In contrast to Sample 1 where early childhood activities
and the gender-orientation of parents' role models were positive, both
the elements of early socialization are now negative. About three-
fifths of the impact of early socialization is due to the earnings
disadvantage that females have because of the female-orientation of
early childhood activities. In the personal decomposition, early
socialization replaces human capital as the hypothesis with the largest
negative impact.
In the full decomposition, the coefficients component is 16 percent
in favour of males. The negative impacts of human capital and early
socialization are of about the same order of magnitude, and account for
the importance of these hypotheses in the total differential. The grea-
test absolute impact in the coefficients component, however, is found in
the intercept element, which is large and positive, indicating that the
base earnings of females are more than the base earnings of males. In
the personal decomposition, human capital has only a small coefficients
impact, indicating that across occupations, females are not receiving
substantially lower returns to their investment in human capital than
males. But early socialization has even a larger negative impact than
in the full decomposition, indicating a correlation between early soc-
ialization differences and occupational differences, for which there is
no intuitive explanation.
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The overall attributes component is 27 percent in favour of males,
and all the components of the constituent hypotheses are negative as
well. The largest negative impacts are human capital, where years of
service with the company are particularly important, and occupational
segregation, where males are particularly favoured by their predominance
in management positions. It is interesting to note that the coeffi-
cients component for occupational segregation is positive, although not
large. The female and male regression coefficients indicate that the
dispersion between females in clerical jobs (the excluded occupational
category) and females who get into better-paying positions is greater
than the dispersion between clerical males and higher-level males, and
this impact must be offsetting any tendency for females to be clustered
in lower-paying jobs. The attributes component becomes somewhat less
negative in the personal decomposition. All of the entries in the
attributes component remain negative, with no dramatic changes from the
full decomposition.
The full interaction component favours females by 10 percent. The
major influence is occupational segregation, where the positive coeffi-
cients difference (indicating more earnings dispersion by occupation
amongst females than amongst males) more than counteracts the negative
attributes difference. In the personal decomposition, the impact of the
interaction component falls to 5 percent, half its level in the full de-
composition. An inspection of the positive impact of early socializa-
tion reveals that care must be taken in interpreting the interaction
component. In this case, females have more of an attribute (more
female-oriented early socialization) than males for which they receive a
lower--and indeed negative--return, and yet the net interaction result
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is favourable to females.
The results of the married decompositions are similar to those of
the total decompositions, and the impacts of dominant career and commit-
ment to the home on the total differential are small. By dropping occu-
pational segregation and port of entry, the impact of dominant career
changes from small and negative to small and positive; in the personal
male regression those males whose spouses support their careers earn
less than those whose spouses do not--a rather counterintuitive finding.
In Sample 3, drawn from a medium-sized high-tech company, the total
differential favours males by 39 percent (the largest proportional
difference of the three samples). In the full decomposition, the inter-
cept is very large, indicating that the explanatory variables account
for considerably more variance in earnings in the male regression than
in the female regression. Human capital, and, in particular years of
service with the company, is important in the total impact, as is early
socialization, where the percentage impact of the early division of
labour in the home is about three times larger than that of early child-
hood activities. In the personal decomposition, early socialization
continues to have a strong positive impact, but both the intercept and
commitment to the firm have negative impacts. All the entries in the
commitment-to-the-firm hypothesis are negative, with CAROT being by far
the most important. Males have higher earnings than females because it
would take more of a monetary inducement to get them to leave the firm.
The full coefficients component is 77 percent in favour of males, a
finding of very substantial earnings discrimination. The basis for this
result is found in the differential base earnings of males and females
as reflected in the intercept differential. Without the intercept ele-
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ment the coefficients component would be slightly in favour of females.
The fact that the intercept term, or base earnings, is so much higher
amongst males than amongst females is in itself something that needs to
be explained through a better specification of the model. Even though
not adequately explained by our model, what this result does indicate is
that the route to higher earnings may be very different for females than
for males. Human capital has a high positive impact because females get
a much higher return than males for years of service with the company.
The human-capital advantage is, however, more than offset by the nega-
tive of commitment to the home, where absence from the labour force due
to personal and family responsibilities is the main factor. The per-
sonal coefficients component favours males by 74 percent. Except for
the intercept and human capital (which continues to be quite favourable
to females), the entries are similar to those in the full decomposition.
In both the full and personal decompositions, the attributes compo-
nent is 4 percent in favour of females because they have more of the
valued human-capital attributes than males. In particular, the large
positive impact of the quadratic of years of service with the company is
because females get increasing rates of returns to years of service with
the company.
The full interaction component is positive and very large, accoun-
ting for 33 percent of the total differential. The major factor that
apparently favours females is commitment to the home. But again, the
interaction term must be given careful interpretation. In this case,
females receive a lower (although slightly positive) return to commit-
ment to the home than males, but have more of this less valued attri-
bute. Two "negatives" simply make a "positive": in substance, if not in
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result, the interaction component hardly reflects a situation favourable
to females. The personal interaction component is somewhat smaller than
in the full decomposition, but still accounts for over 30 percent of the
differential with the magnitudes of the hypothesis entries similar to
those in the full decomposition.
Relative to the total sample decompositions, the intercept of the
married sample decompositions go from being very large and negative to
being even larger, but positive. Human capital exhibits a similar
reversal. Years of service with the company no longer has an important
impact, but the negative impact of AGE has become large--quite in
contrast to the positive impact of AGE in the married decompositions for
Sample 2. Married females, however, gain a considerable advantage from
the impact of labour-force experience, due to a much higher coefficients
component and despite a negative attributes component. Dominant career
has a strong positive impact, mainly due to the coefficients component.
The major entry within the dominant-career hypothesis is SPSCAR2--the
support that a spouse give to an employee's career. Amongst married
males, the return to this attribute is negative, whereas, amongst mar-
ried females, it is positive. In addition, amongst males, the average
impact of the mean amount of housework on earnings is a 9 percent reduc-
tion, and amongst, females, a 37 percent reduction. The total impact of
commitment to the home is highly negative due to both the coefficients
and attributes components.
To summarize the decomposition results, in Sample 1, there is a 19
percent earnings differential in favour of males. The difference is due
to earnings discrimination--indeed females do somewhat better on returns
to attributes than do males, largely because of the impact of early
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female socialization. Where females lose out relative to males is in
the possession of earnings-relevant attributes that are either captured
by or related to occupation within the firm or port of entry. The
interaction component is also negative, reflecting the disadvantages of
females relative to males in both rates of return to attributes and the
acquisition of attributes. The earnings differential associated with
the interaction component is 11 percent. The largest impacts are found
in occupational segregation and commitment to the home. Although both
males and females receive negative returns to commitment to the home,
the coefficients component for this hypothesis indicates that per unit
of commitment, females are penalized less. The fact that on average
females have more units of commitment to the home means that the inter-
action of the coefficient and attributes differences is negative, and
therefore unfavourable to females.
In Sample 2, the primary explanations for the earnings differential
of 33 percent in favour of males are the human-capital and early-
socialization hypotheses. Within the human-capital hypothesis, full-
time labour force experience is the dominant factor favouring males,
and, in addition, age is also an important attribute. The coefficient
component of almost 16 percent in favour of males can also be explained
mainly by the human-capital and early-socialization hypotheses. Males
do some 27 percent better than females because of their attributes, in
particular because of levels of human capital (especially years of ser-
vice with the company) and access to better-paying occupations. Males
are particularly favoured in the acquisition of managerial positions.
The interaction component favours females by almost 10 percent, with the
major influence being occupational segregation.
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In Sample 3, the total earnings differential favours males by almost
40 percent, the largest differential of the three samples. Both human
capital (and in particular years of service with the company) and early
socialization have the major impacts on this differential. Within early
socialization, the influence of early division of labour in the home on
the earnings differential is about three times larger than that of early
childhood activities. In the coefficients component, females are fav-
oured by human-capital attributes because, unexpectedly, they receive a
much higher rate of return than males for years of service with the
company. This human-capital advantage is, however, more than offset by
the negative impact of commitment to the home, where absence from the
labour force for personal reasons and family responsibilities is the
main factor penalizing females. The attributes component favours
females because they have more of the highly-valued human-capital attri-
butes than males. In particular, females atypically get increasing re-
turns to years of service with the company. The interaction component
is positive and very large, primarily because females receive a less
negative return to this attribute than males, but have more of it.
As can be seen in Table 6-8, each of the three samples yields a dis-
tinct pattern in the allocation of the total differential to the coeffi-
cients, attributes, and interaction components.
In the Sample 1 full regressions, the main source of the differen-
tial is occupational segregation (an attribute) and the interaction of
an employee's occupation and the rate of return to that occupation.
When the occupational segregation hypothesis is dropped in the personal
regressions, the favourable impact for males is picked up by the human-
capital element of the coefficients component, indicating that males in
-142-
higher-paying occupations get a higher return to their human capital
than do females.
In Sample 2, the attributes component again dominates because males
have more human capital and better-paying jobs than females. But the
coefficients component is also substantial--on the order of 16 percent
in the total sample and 11 percent in the married sub-sample--because
males get higher returns to human capital and early socialization than
females. This last result indicates that females are penalized more
than males for having had feminine-oriented childhood experiences. The
fact that earnings discrimination is important in the full model for
Sample 2 but not for Sample 1 may be because well over one-third of the
observations in the Sample 2 data set are non-salaried employees,
whereas all employees in Sample 1 are salaried.
In Sample 3, the results for both the total sample married sub-
sample decompositions are dominated by the intercept terms, which are
included in the coefficients components in Table 6-8. Across all these
female-male comparisons, commitment to the home has a large impact in
favour of males (see Appendix 9). But in going from the total sample to
the married sub-sample the intercept term goes from being highly nega-
tive to highly positive, indicating that not only better but also
different specifications of the earnings functions might be required to
understand the sources of female-male earnings differentials in this
firm.
Notwithstanding these different patterns, it is possible to make
some summary statements about the decomposition results from all three
samples. There is fairly consistent evidence of earnings discrimination
in the total personal regression models. Sample 3, as we have seen,
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yields some unexpected results, with very different decompositions of
the total differential for the total sample and marrieds only. With the
exception of Sample 3, differences in attributes are a more potent
determinant of earnings differences than rates of return. To some ex-
tent, the source of these differences can be described as institutional
discrimination--as in the case of early socialization, which has a large
impact on male-female differences in all the samples (although in some
cases in the form of earnings discrimination). The acquisistion of
female-oriented early socialization attributes cannot be simply dis-
missed as a rational choice that females, but not males make. Even when
choice in the acquisition of attributes by the respondents is a clear
possibility, as in the case of area of concentration in higher educa-
tion, it would seem advisable to look more closely at whether or not
males and females face differential social constraints in making these
choices, before simply assuming that the unequal outcomes represent the
best of all possible worlds.
IV. Summary
A summary statement of the statistical findings across all samples
can only be that certain variants of our four categories of hypotheses
--human capital, occupational, internal relations, and extra-firm
relations-- have significant impacts on earnings. As indicated above
these results confirm the prime argument of the study; namely, that the
traditional human-capital framework should be extended to include
demand-side, intra-firm, and extra-firm factors.
Of the human-capital variables age has a significant and positive
impact on earnings across all the samples. On average, the contributions
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of age and years of service with the company dominate the expected
human-capital impacts of labour-force experience. Two other findings
suggest that the quality and the level of education should be taken into
account in human-capital models. In all samples, holders of a profes-
sional degree get higher returns, and in two of the three samples a
scientific background yields an individual a clear-cut earnings advan-
tages over the designated reference group. In the decomposition for
samples two and three, the largest components of the differential are
also due to human capital.
Amongst the internal-relations variables, working overtime without
pay is significant and positive across all the samples. We view these
results as strong support for the commitment-to-the-firm hypothesis, in
that the employee gives her or his extra labour to the firm with only an
implicit understanding that the firm will return the "gift" in the form
of promotion or higher pay. Also, in Sample 1, which is the most homo-
geneous sample in terms of internal job structures, informal networks
have a significant and positive impact on earnings, while outside job
applications have a negative and significant impact on earnings. In
Sample 2, absence from the company for reasons other than a vacation
also has a significant, negative effect on earnings.
Some extra-firm factors were also important. Across the married
sub-samples, the division of labour in the household is negative and
significant, implying that individuals who do more housework earn less
in the firm. Also, dual realms of responsibility, traditionally the lot
of females, have significant impacts on earnings. In all of the sample
decompositions, the impact of early socialization is strong, suggesting
that the sources of female-male earnings may be deeply imbedded in the
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social structure. If so, quick and fast policy solutions to mitigate
sex-based earnings differentials may not be appropriate. If female-male
earnings equality is a desired outcome, then more far-reaching institu-
tional and cultural reforms may be necessary.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
This thesis has made two major contributions to the literature on
earnings differences between females and males . The first is the in-
tegration of insights drawn from a number of social science disciplines
into a single framework designed to explain female-male earnings differ-
ences. The second contribution is that the analysis goes considerably
further than the conventional literature on female-male earnings differ-
ences in attempting to distinguish between pure earnings discrimination
and earnings differences that are due to unequal institutional cons-
traints that females and males face--a form of inequality that can be
labelled institutional discrimination. Specifically, we locate cons-
traints on career choices of males and females and the sources of insti-
tutionalized discrimination that females or males face within the firm.
Using firm-level survey data, we test a number of alternative hypotheses
relating to human-capital attributes, organizational structure of the
firm, internal relations that individuals experience in the firm, and
external household relations that affect the earnings of bureaucratic
employees. We broaden the model to include extra-firm personal attri-
butes (such as early socialization, marital status, the number of child-
ren in the family, the division of labour in the home) as well as intra-
firm personal attributes (such as perceived discrimination, informal
networks, and unpaid overtime).
Besides going beyond the conventional literature by examining how
various social processes affect earnings differences, we also improve
upon the human-capital analysis itself. In our analysis, we have gener-
ated better measures of human-capital variables, such as experience and
education, than are typically available. For example, rather than using
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proxies for labour-force experience or years of service with the com-
pany, we have acquired actual measures. For education, we capture not
only the specific level of education, but also the quality of the educa-
tion received, particularly in terms of the area of concentration for a
bachelor's degree.
In keeping with the firm-specific nature of the data base, the anal-
ysis has proceeded on a firm-by-firm case-study basis. In particular,
we explore the relation between the occupational structures in different
firms and earnings differentials. Our statistical analysis permits us
to determine the importance of particular variables as determinants of
earnings over all individuals (the total sample regressions) as well as
between males and females (the decompositions). (Appendix 7 also con-
tains a detailed discussion of the separate regression findings for the
sub-samples of females and males.)
Our regression analyses of the total samples as well as married sub-
samples indicate substantial negative returns to sex, supporting the
hypothesis that discrimination on the basis of gender is a significant
determinant of female-male earnings differences. To gain more insight
into the particular sources of female-male earnings differences, we
employ the decomposition technique based upon the estimation of separate
earnings functions for females and males. Across the samples, the total
mean female-male earnings differential ranges from just under twenty
percent to just under 40 percent.
As we have shown in Table 6-8 and discussed above, each of the three
samples yields a distinct pattern in the allocation of the total differ-
ential to the coefficients, attributes, and interaction components.
Focusing on the full models that include demand-side as well as supply-
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side variables, the main source of the total earnings differential in
Sample 1 is occupational segregation (an attribute) and the interaction
of an employee's occupation and the rate of return to that occupation.
In Sample 2, the attributes component again dominates because males have
more human capital and are in better-paying jobs than females. But the
coefficients component is also substantial--on the order of 16 percent
in the total sample and 11 percent in the married sub-sample--because
males get higher returns to human capital and early socialization than
females. Again, the heterogeneous nature of the observations in Sample
2--the inclusion of non-salaried as well as salaried employees--may
account for the importance of earnings discrimination for this sample
but not for the more homogeneous Sample 1. In Sample 3, the results for
both the total sample and married sub-sample decompositions are domina-
ted by the intercept terms, although in different directions. In addi-
tion, commitment to the home has a large impact in favour of males.
The general results of our study can be usefully compared with three
previous investigations of female-male earnings differentials--those of
Malkiel and Malkiel [1973], Osterman [1979], and Gunderson [1979]. The
first two studies are similar to ours in that they are firm-level, and
focus on salaried workers. Although based upon a nation-wide sample of
waged and salaried workers in Canada, the Gunderson study is of interest
to us because the data base is Canadian.
Osterman's in his [19791 study of salaried personnel in a publishing
company attempts to analyze the impact of internal labour markets on sex
discrimination. Our Sample 1 contains only salaried workers in the com-
puter arm of the corporation, and in terms of educational level and
homogeneity of occupational focus, appears to be similar to Osterman's
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sample. Nevertheless the female-male earnings differential in his sam-
ple approaches 40 percent, whereas in our sample it is under 20 percent.
At 66 percent, the R-squared for the total sample reported by Osterman
is very close to our total personal R-squared of 67 percent. In decom-
posing the female-male earnings differential, Osterman's coefficient
component (including the intercept term) is 18 percent in favour of
males, mainly because of years of service with the company, whereas our
coefficients component is 4 percent in favour of females, mainly because
of the impact of early socialization. Osterman's combined attribute and
interaction component yields an earnings differential of 19 percent,
with the quadratic of years of service and the number of children having
the greatest favourable impacts for males, whereas our combined attri-
bute and interaction component yields a differential of 22 percent, with
occupational segregation having the greatest favourable impact for
males.
Osterman criticizes the Malkiel and Malkiel [1973] study of a male-
female earnings differences in a research organization because their
specification of demand-side job categories in terms of hierarchical
levels fails to reflect the firm's internal labour markets. Osterman's
own demand-side categories are in terms of functional (or what he calls
skill) distinctions, which, he argues, reflect skill-related job clus-
ters that contain internal job ladders. Along with Osterman, we view
the internal labour market hypothesis as extremely important to any
study of earnings differences in large organizations, and particularly
when examining salaried employees, who generally look to vertical mobi-
lity in the firm for a career. The significant impacts of occupational
segregation in Samples 1 and 2 in our study confirms the importance of
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an analysis of the relation between internal job ladders on earnings.
But we do not necessarily follow Osterman in viewing the extent of in-
ternal job ladders in the firm as being determined exclusively by func-
tion or skill. In bureaucratic organizations, people often move across
functional departments as they make their way up the hierarchy. In
looking across functions, Osterman may capture one possible dimension of
the positioning of individuals on internal job ladders, whereas, in
looking at hierarchical levels holding other factors constant, Malkiel
and Malkiel may capture the relative ability of individuals to move up
job ladders regardless of function.
The data contained in Sample 1 in our study permit us to test the
impacts of both of these dimensions-- current functional department and
current hierarchical level--on current earnings variation. In addition,
we have been able to analyze the impact of port-of-entry functional de-
partments on current earnings differences. In the total regression for
Sample 1, all three dimensions of occupational categorization have
significant impacts on earnings. In the decomposition of the full model
for Sample 1, we find that hierarchical levels and ports of entry, but
not current functional departments, are important sources of the female-
male earnings differential.
Of the samples in our study, Sample 2, which contains non-salaried
as well as salaried employees, seems most comparable to Gunderson's
[1979] sample drawn from the 1971 Canadian Census. The Sample 2 earn-
ings differential of 33 percent in favour of males is somewhat below the
40 percent differential in Gunderson's sample. In his study, greater
rates of returns to attributes yield males earnings that are 23 percent
higher than females receive, with the main impacts coming from earnings
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discrimination in education and experience. In our Sample 2, earnings
discrimination yields a males a differential of 16 percent, mainly be-
cause of labour force experience and early socialization advantages over
females. In his study, the combined impact of the attributes and inter-
action components is a 17 percent earnings differential in favour of
males, primarily because of labour force experience. In our sample,
these components combined also give males a 17 percent advantage, with
the main advantage coming form years of service with the company. In
sum, despite the differences in the sources from which the two samples
were drawn as well as the different specifications of the earnings func-
tions, the findings of our Sample 2 study and Gunderson's study yield
broadly similar results. Recall however, that to make these comparisons
we have had to follow Gunderson's practice of combining the attribute
and interaction components of the female-male earnings differential--a
practice that obfuscates the independent impact of the possession of
attributes on earnings differences. In particular, for our sample, the
combination of the two components would lead us to ignore occupational
segregation as a primary reason for the earnings disadvantages of
females.
Indeed, despite the broad similarity of the overall results pre-
sented above, the primary differences between Gunderson's results from a
national sample and our results from a firm-level sample derive from our
more detailed specification of the characteristics of the model. In
keeping with the emphasis of analyses of female-male earnings differ-
ences over the last decade or so, we find occupational segregation to be
an important demand-side determinant of the female-male earnings differ-
ential. On the supply-side, we find not only returns to human-capital
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factors but also the gender-orientation of early socialization to be
particularly important determinants of the earnings differences between
the sexes. This last result is a wholly new, and intriguing, quantita-
tive finding, but (as discussed in earlier chapters) one that has re-
ceived considerable qualitative discussion in the literature on women in
the labour force.
In our view, the results of this study are robust enough to warrant
futher research along the same lines. One potential problem that future
research should address more fully is possible selectivity bias in the
response to questionnaires. Survey research of the type carried out in
this study requires the utmost cooperation of personnel management in
the distribution and collection of the survey instrument, and of emplo-
yees in taking time and care to respond to the questionnaires. Even
then selectivity bias may still remain in that the firms that the more
cooperative firms may be qualitatively different than the less coopera-
tive firms in terms of the relative treatment and experiences of male
and female employees. Short of imposing the dissemination of the infor-
mation on firms (just as, for example, firms must supply the government
with social insurance information), there do not appear to be practical
ways of overcoming the potential problem that those individuals and
firms who cooperate may be significantly different than those who do
not.
In our view these data problems are, however, more than offset by
the benefits to be reaped from the availability of the type of data that
we have been able to collect. Only with such data can we begin to test
alternative hypotheses that derive from the insights of sociology, orga-
nization behaviour, and economics. Indeed there is much more in the way
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of analysis that can be done with our data sets than we have been able
to pursue in this thesis. For example, rather than analyzing the deter-
minants of earnings, we could make the rate of promotion (promotions per
year of service to the firm) and distance of promotion (pay grades per
promotion) the dependent variables in our to explore more directly
whether and why males move up the career ladder faster than females.
To some extent, the source of these differences can be described as
institutional discrimination. Two institutional factors that have an
important impact in this study are current hierarchical occupation and
port of entry, both of which appear to be highly correlated with area of
educational concentration. It may very well be that females do not
secure the training necessary to get in higher-paid jobs because they
perceive that these occupations are not open to people of their sex. If
this be the case, then it would be quite plausible to argue that the
existing labour market and internal hierarchical structure determine
adverse outcomes for females, even though females may be said to choose
these outcomes. Such an argument is, of course, a rationale for affir-
mative action programs.
Another general finding of this study is the adverse impact of
household division of labour on both married females and married males,
although females are generally more affected because of the greater
amount of housework that they do. Obviously, if people are to have
households, and particularly ones with children in them, someone has to
do the work. A prominent economist has argued that it is at this point
that public policy ends: economists and policy makers should not invade
the privacy of the household.
But the results of this study have confirmed the notion that house-
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hold relations--whether in early childhood or in adulthood--do affect
careers and earnings, and constitute part of a continuing social pro-
cess. This study goes beyond an overly narrow focus on technical attri-
butes to explore the impact of social relationships--issues of the
differential impact on males and females of the family, school, and
organization of the workplace. Although the thesis structure has been
developed within the discipline of economics, we have been able to in-
corporate the approaches of such disciplines as organizational behaviour
and sociology into the overall framework. In our view, any further ad-
vances in understanding the differing economic experiences of males and
females must occur within a conceptual framework that integrates the
various approaches in the social sciences. Quite apart from the parti-
cular findings of this thesis, the approach developed here will be use-
ful for those intent on extending or in developing yet a new integrated
framework.
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APPENDIX 1
QUESTIONNAIRES IN ENGLISH
WITH FRENCH TRANSLATIONS
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Personnel Questionnaire
1. low old are you?
2. What is your sex? ( ) Male ( ) FeMale
3. Please indicate your present marital
1. ( ) Single
2. ( ) Married
3. ( ) Divorced
status?
4. (
5. (
6. (
Check one
) Widowed
) Living together as a couple
) Separated
4. Do you have any children living with you? Check one
1. ( ) Yes ( ) No (If no, go to question 61
5. Indicate the number of children living with_ ou who are:
1. ( ) 5 years and under 2. ( ) 6-12 years old 3. ( )over 12 years old
6. Please give the following information about your income, your spouse/ partner's
income (where possible) as well as the number of weeks you were both employed in
your present firms during the period of 1982.
Yourself Spouse or Partner
1. Earnings before taxes in
present firm in 1982
2. Number of weeks employed
in present firm in 1982
7. Please indicate the levels of education obtained by yourself and your spouse or
partner. Please check for each individual the highest educational level
achieved.
Yourself
Spouse or
Partner
Less than high school graduation
High school graduation
CEGEP
Community college
Technical institute
College classique
Bachelor's degree
Undergraduate diploma
or certificate
(include teaching)
Professional degree
(e.g., low, medicine)
Master's degree
Doctorate
8. In your education please indicate:
Yourself Spouse or Partner
1. Area of concentration
for highest degree
completed
9. Please give the following information about your employment
your present firm. for example indicate if you are presenti
assistant but were initially hired as a secretary. Also ind
attached to these jobs and dates of placement.
Your first: Job Title
Grade Level
Date of Plagement
Your present: Job Title
Grade Level
Date of Plaeement
0. now long have you been employed with your present company?
Years Months
1. Full time basis
2. Part time basis
experience in
y an administrative
icate if grades are
11. Nas the nature of the work that you do changed since you have been with the
firm? 1. ( ) Yes 2. ( ) No
Page 1
I
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Page 2
12. Now long have you been doing more or less the some kind of work that you are
presently doing with your firm? Years Months
13. bow long have you been in the labour force (exclude years full-time in school
and raising full-time children at home)?
1. Full-time __ Years ___ Months
2. Part time e__ ars __ Months
14. Of the total time you have been in the labour force, what is the total time you
have been unemployed? Years Months
Answer questions 15 and 16 only if you presently supervise or manage, or have
supervised or managed, other employees. If not, go to question 17.
15. How many employees did you supervise or manage both directly and indirectly in
your first position with the company?
16. Now many employees do you presently supervise or manage both directly and
indirectly in your company?
17. If you have taken time off from your present job for reasons other than a
vacation, please indicate the amount of time taken off, the reason, as well as
whether or not the company granted you the time off vith or without pay.
Not Pay was
Granted Granted Pay was Not
Length of Time Off by by Avail- Avail-
3f7. mth#. wks. Company Company able able
1. Own illness or
disability
2. Pregnancy
3. Personal or family
responsibilities
4. Going to school
5. Other
18. What is the total mount of time that you have been unable to work since you had
your first job? Enter the total amount of time for each of the following
reasons.
Years Months Weeks
1. Own illness or
disability
2. Pregnancy
3. Personal or family
responsibilities
4. Going to school
5. Other
19. How many outside jobs have you applied for since you have been with your present
company?
1. ( ) None 3. ( ) 4-6 jobs
2. ( ) 1-3 jobs 4. ( ) more than 6 jobs
20. Please indicate how many times in 1982 you worked overtime in your firm.
Check where relevant
With Pay Without Pay
not at all
1 - 10 times
11 - 20 times
more than 20 times
21. Indicate the percentage increase in pay that would be necessary to entice you to
leave your job with your present firm to go to a similar job, with similar
promotional prospects in another firm. (e.g. at 10% increase, or 501 increase
etc.)
The next series of questions we want to ask you has to do specifically with your
promotional history in your present firm. Please answer as accurately as possible.
bear in mind that because you do not sign your name on this questionnaire, all the
information you give cannot be traced back to you once you have placed it in the
sealed envelope.
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22. Indicate which one of the following you would prefer. Check one.
1. ( ) Being promoted and receiving higher earnings
2. ( ) Receiving higher earnings without being promoted
3. ( ) Being promoted without higher earnings
23. Bow many times bave you applied for a promotion since you have been with your
company? Check one.
1. ( ) none 3. ( ) 2 times 5. ( ) 4 times
2. ( ) 1 time 4. ( ) 3 times 6. ( ) other (specify no. of times)
24. Now many times have you applied and not received a promotion since you have been
with your company? Check one.
1. ( ) none 3. ( ) 2 times 5. ( ) 4 times
2. ( ) 1 time 4. ( ) 3 times 6. ( ) other (specify no. of times)
25. Row many times have you been offered a promotion since you have been with your
company? Check one.
1. ( )none 3. ( )2thmes 5. ( )4times
2. ( ) 1 time 4. ( ) 3 times 6. ( ) other (specify no. of times)
26. A. now many times have you declined a promotion when one was offered since you
have been with your company? Check one. (If you checked none go to the next
question. If not go to part B of this question.)
1. ( ) none 3. C ) 2 times 5. ( ) 4 times
2. ( ) 1 time 4. ( ) 3 times 6. ( ) other (specify the no.
of times)
B. If you declined a pionotion when one was offered, please specify the
reason. Check one of the following.
1. ( ) Too much responsibility required for the position.
2. ( ) Personal and family responsibilities
3. ( ) Frequent illness
4. ( ) Not enough responsibility
5. ( ) Location of job
6. C ) Not interested
27. How many times
been with your
1. ( ) none
2. ( ) 1 time
have you
company?
3. (
4. (
been offered a promotion and accepted since you have
Check one.
) 2 times 5. C ) 4 times
) 3 times 6. ( ) other (specify no. of times)
28. Would you be interested in pursuing additionnal training (in the
education) at your own expense in order to get promoted?
1. ( ) not interested 2. ( ) very interested
3. ( ) am already paying for outside education
form of outside
29. If you think you have been discriminated against by your employer what was this
discrimination in regards to? Check where applicable.
1. ( ) My age 2. ( ) My sex 3. ( ) My sexual preference
30. If you think you have been discriminated against, what form did this
discrimination take? Check where applicable.
1. ( ) Earnings 3. ( ) Evaluation of my performance
2. ( ) Recommendation for promotion 4. ( ) Support and encouragement
on the job
31. To what extent do you feel that the number of people of your sex in top
positions affects your motivation to be promoted? Check one.
1. ( ) Not a consideration 2. ( ) Has moderate effect
3. ( ) Bas significant impact on my motivation
32. To what extent have you been encouraged by your supervisors to improve and
advance? Check one
1. ( ) not at all 2. ( ) moderately 3. ( ) significantly
33. On the following
position to work
1. ( ) Poor
scale
up to
2. (
what do you think the chances are for a person in your
a higher level? Check one
) Fair 3. ( ) Good 4. ( ) Excellent
We now want to ask you some questions of a more personal nature. Remember that
because you remain anonymous you are protected. Please answer all questions where
applicable. If not married or attached please begin answering question 44. If
married or attached answer questions 34 through 43.
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34. If your spouse's or partner's occupation required that he/she move to another
city to keep his/her present job, or obtain a new one at a similar level, would
you be willing to move? Check one
1. ( ) Yes 2. ( ) No 3. ( ) Don't know
35. To what extent does your spouse/partner support you having a career?
1. ( ) Not at all 2. ( ) Offers moderate support
3. ( ) Is extremely encouraging
Check one
36. If your
willing
I. ( )
present
to go.
Yes
job required jou to move, would your spouse or partner be
Check one
2. ( ) No 3. ( )Don't know
37. A. What is your spouse's/partner's occupation?
5. Where does he/she normally work? Check one
1. ( ) at home 2. ( ) physically away from home
38. (Answer only if you have children) If one of your children were to become ill
while at a daycare centre or at school who would usually get the call and pick
the child up?
1. ( ) I would 2. C ) My spouse or partner would
3. ( ) Would depend on who is more readily available or easily reached
39. A. With respect to income, career comitment and personal satisfaction, whose
job, your's or your spouse's/partner's, is more important to the family?
Check one 1. ( ) Mine 2. ( ) My spouse's/partner's
D. Please indicate why. :Check one
1. ( ) Benefits are better
2. ( ) Income is higher
3. ( ) Personal satisfaction
derived from job is great
4. ( ).Career committment is stronger
5. ( ) Prestige or status is better
40. Do you have any household responsibilities that make you
certain times? 1. ( ) Yes ( ) No
(If you answered yes go to question 41. If not, proceed
41. What are these responsibilities? Check one
1. C ) Childcare or transport of children
3. C ) Looking after another relative
unavailable for work at
to question 421
2. ( ) Housework
4. ( ) Other
42. To what extent are you or your spouse or partner involved in the following
house-related activities? Estimate the percentage of each person's involvement
and enter in the appropriate space. Each activity should add up to 1001. Do
not put checks.
Mostly by Almost entirely by
you spouse or partner
Other
Person
1. Cooking
2. Yard 4 outside
maintenance
3. Housework/cleaning
4. Transportation
of children
43. If you filled out the other person column for any of the above activities please
indicate who would pay for the service.
1. ( ) Paid for by ae 2. ( ) Paid for by spouse or partner
44. As children, our parents emphasized different activities that we should pursue.
Listed below are some fairly common activities. lank the activities from I to 6
in the order that they were emphasized by parents, assigning I as most
emphasized and 6 as least emphasized. For example if you were encouraged to
have a paper route put I after paper route. If learning to cook was least
emphasized put 6 after learning to cook.
1. Play competitive sports
2. Learn to cook
3. Rave a paper route
lank
4. Take care of younger
brothers and sisters
5. Play with dolls
6. Play with cars
Rank
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45. Who was the primary individual who performed most of the following tasks while
you were growing up? Check one for each activity
Mother Father Other
1. Bousehold repairs
2. Auto maintenance
3. Cooking
4. Housework/Cleaning
5. Child rearing
46. Listed below are 4 supervisory and managerial qualities that are commonly
thought to be important for effective performance. Follow instructions A and B
separately.
A. Please rank these qualities generally according to your perception of their
importance for a supervisor/manager to be effective. Assign I-sost important,
4-least important and other numbers in between.
B. Please check off for each quality whether you would consider it to be more
characteristic of a male or female, or equally characteristic of both.
A
General
Characteristics Ranking Male Female Equal
Ability to delegate asuthority
Inter-personal relations
Decision making ability
Business knowledge
47. Have you ever used any of the following for career advice? Please indicate how
many times any of the following have been used. For example, you may have used
personnel 3 times and a colleague 2 times.
Top Executive Colleague in Other Area
Current Supervisor Personnel
Previous Supervisor Someone Outside Company
Colleague in Area
48. What is your perceived need for a mentor (a guide or advisor) to be successful
in your career? Check one of the following.
1. ( ) Necessary for success
2. ( ) Helpful but not necessary for success
3. ( ) Not helpful for success
49. If you presently have a mentor, indicate his or her sex.
1. ( ) Hale 2. ( ) Feale
50. Whether or not you presently have a mentor what sex would you prefer a mentor to
be?
1. ( ) Male 2. ( ) Female 3. ( ) doesn't matter
51. Whom would you rather have as your immediate supervisor or manager? Check one
1. ( ) Male 2. ( ) Female 3. ( ) doesn't matter
52. Do you think you could be more productive with a male manager or with a female
manager? Check one
1. ( ) Male 2. ( ) Female 3. ( ) doesn't matter
53. What sex is your immediate supervisor or manager?
1. ( ) Male 2. ( )Fesle
54. Were you promoted from within your company to fill your present position?
1. ( ) Yes 2. ( ) No
55. Indicate how you view your work. Check one.
1. ( ) As a job 2. ( ) As a career
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questionnaire de l'employf
1. Quel lge aves-vous ? ( )
2. De quel *ae ? ( ) Masculin ( ) Femin
3. Veuillez indiquer votre statut civil actuel.
1. ( ) Cdlibataire 4. ( ) Veuf ou veuve
2. ( ) Marid(e) 5. ( ) Vivant avec un(e) autre comme couple
3. ( ) DivorcE(e) 6. ( ) Spard(e)
4. Avez-vous des enfants vivant avec vous? Coches une seule rdponse.
1. ( ) Oui ( ) Non (Dans la negative, passeh I la question 61
5. Prdcise: le nombre denfants, vivant Evec vous qui sont :
1. ( ) de 5 ens et moins 2. ( ) de 6 1 12 ans 3. ( ) de plus de 12 ans.
6. Veuillez indiquer votre revenu, ainsi que celui de votre conjoint ou partenaire
(si possible) de mime que le nombre de semaines durant lesquelles vous ave:
tous deux it# employds dans l'entreprise ota vous travaillez actuellement durant
l'anne 1982
Votre conjoint
Vous-mtme ou partenaire
1. Revenus avant impat dans votre
enteprise actuelle en 1982
2. Nombre de semaines employees
par l'entreprise acluelle en 1982
7. Veuillez indiquer les niveaux d'dducation obtenus par vous-mime et votre
conjoint ou partenaire; cochez pour chaque individu le niveau le plus ElevE.
Votre conjoint
Vous-nine ou partenaire
Inferieur au dipl&me secondaire
Dip16me secondaire
CEGEP
Collige communautaire
Ecole technique
Collkge classique
B.A.
Dipl8me sous-graduk ou certificat)
(y inclus I'enseignement)
License professionelle
(par exemple, droit, medecine)
MaTtrise
Doctorat
8. Pour votre niveau d'dducation, veuillez indiquer le
Votre conjoint
Vous-mgme ou partenaire
1. Domaine de concentration
du plus haut niveau de
scolaritE atteint
9. Donnez des renseignements concernant votre emploi dans l'entreprise ou vous
travaillez actuellement. Par exomple, precisex quo vous ites actuellement un
adjoint administratif, mais que vous avez d'abord itf engagE(e) comme
secrEtaire. Indiquez Egalement si des niveaux sont prevus dens ces emplois
ainsi que les dates d'entre en fonction.
Votre premier titre d'emploi :
Votre premier niveau d'emploi :
Votre premire date d'entrde en fonction :
Votre titre d'emploi actuel
Votre niveau d'emploi actuel :
La date denvre en fonction de votre emploi actuel
10. Depuis quand Ites-vous I l'emploi de votre entreprise actuelle ?
Annfes Mois
1. A plein temps
2. A temps partiel
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11. La nature do votre travail a-t-elle changt depuis quo vous gtes h l'emploi de
cette entreprise ? 1. ( ) Oui 2. ( ) Non
12. Depuis combion de temps faites-vous plus ou moins 1s uSme genre de travail que
celui que vous faites actuellement dans cette entreprise ?
anndes mois
13. Depuis combien de temps faites-vous activement partie de la main-d'oeuvre
(excluez les anndes d'itude I plain temps ainsi quo celles conseacros h plein
temps I l'dducation de vou enfants) ?
Annies Mois
1. A plein temps
2. A temps partial
14. Au cours de cette expirience de travail, pendant combien de temps au total eves-
vous itE en cbmage ? anndes nois
We rdponde aux questions 15 et 16 que si vous supervisez ou dirige actuellement
d'autrea employes, ou si vous l'avez dijI fait. Sinon, passe: I la question 17.
15. Combien d'employda avex-vous surveillds ou dirigds, directement et
indirectement, lora de votre premier emploi dans cette entreprise ?
16. Combien d'employds surveillez-vous ou dirige-vous actuellement, directement et
indirectement, dane votre entreprise ?
17. Si vous avez pris des congds dans votre emploi actuel pour des raisons autres
que des vacances, veuillez indiquer combien de temps ainsi que lea raisons de
ces absences, et si votre entreprise vous a accordd ce temps avec ou sans
remunkration.
Accordf
par Non Avec Sans
Durde de 'absence lentre- accordi par rimund- rdmund-
ans mois sem. prise lentreprise ration ration
1. Maladie ou
incapacit-
2. Grossaesse
3. Responaabilit&s
personnelles ou
familiales
4. Frdquentation de
l'Ecole
5. Autres
18. Quelle eat la longueur totale du temps durant lequel vous avez dtf incapable de
travailler depuis votre premier emploi ? Indiquez la totalite des absences pour
chacune des raisons suivantes :
Annes Mois Semaines
1. Maladie ou
incapacite
2. Grossesse
3. Reaponsabilitds
personnelles ou
familiales
4. Frdquentation de
lI'cole
5. Autres
19. A combien de postes I l'extirieur avez-vous prdsentd votre candidatu're depuis
que vous travaillez pour l'entreprise actuelle ?
1. ( ) aucun 3. ( )de 4 6 emplois
2. ( ) de 1 3 emploi 4. ( )pour plus de 6 emplois
20. Veuillez indiquer combien de fois vous avez fait du temps supp1fuentaire dane
votre entreprise au court de 1982. Coches A lendroit approprif.
Avec rEmunEration Sans rEmunEration
Aucune
De 1 k 10 fois
De 11 & 20 fois
Plus de 20 fois
21. Pricisez le pourcentage d'augmentation de salaire qu'il vous faudrait pour vous
pousser I quitter votre emploi actuel at prendre un emploi similaire, avec les
aimes perspectives d'avancement, dane une autre entreprise (par exemple, une
augmentation de 10 %, de 50 %, etc.)
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La prochaine s6rie do questions concerne specifiquement l'avancement quo vous aves
obtenu dans l'entreprise ob vous travaille: actuellement. Veuilles rdpondre evec le
plus do precision possible. Souvenez-vous que vous ' avez pas b signer ce
questionnaire at qu'il eat ainsi impossible do vous attribuor les renseignaments qui
y sont contenus dks que vous avez place coo feuilles dons l'enveloppe scellEe.
22. Lequel des changements suivants prefdriez-vous ? Coche: une soul* reponse.
1. ( ) Avoir do lavancement et recevoir un salaire plus 4levE.
2. ( ) Recevoir un selaire plus dlevd sans avancement.
3. ( ) Recevoir de l'avancement sans salaire plus dlevE.
23. Combien de fois avse-vous prdsentE votre candidature pour obtenir do
l'avancement depuis que vous travailles pour l'entreprise qui vous emploie
actuellement ? Coches une seule rdponse.
1. ( ) aucune 3. ( ) 2 fois 5. ( ) 4 fois
2. ( ) 1 fois 4. ( ) 3 fois 6. ( ) autre (precisez le nombre
de fois)
24. Combion do fois evet-vous prdsenti votre candidature, sane avoir obtenu
d'avancement depuis que vous Ites & l'empIoide cette entreprise ? Cocheo une
seule rdponse.
1. ( ) aucune 3. ( ) 2 fois 5. ( ) 4 fois
2. ( ) 1 fois 4. ( ) 3 fois 6. ( ) autre (prdEcise: le nombre
de fois)
25. Combien d'opportunites d'avancement
ftes l'emploi de cette entreprise
1. ( ) aucune 3. ( ) 2 fois
2.( )1 fois 4.( )3 fois
vous ont-elles ite offertes depuis que vous
? Cochez une seule reponse.
5. ( )4fois
6. ( ) autre (precise: le nombre
d'opportunites)
26. A. Combien de fois avez-vous refusi l'avancement qu'on vous offrait depuis quo
vous Stes I l'emploi de cette compagnie 7 Coche: une seule reponse.
(Si vous indique: aucune passe: A le question suivante. Sinon, passes I le
partie B de cette question.)
1. ( ) aucune 3. ( ) 2 fois 5. ( ) 4 fois
2. ( ) 1 fois 4. ( ) 3 fois 6. C ) autre (prdcisez le nombre
de fois)
S. Si vous evez refuse une occasion d'evancement qui vous Etait offerte,
veuillet preciser les raisons. Cochez une seule reponse.
1. ( ) L'emploi comportait trop de responsabilitm.
2. ( ) Responsabilites personnelles et iemiliales.
3. ( ) Frdquentes indispositions.
4. ( ) Pas assez de responsabilites.
5. ( ) Lieu de travail.
6. ( ) Non interess#(e).
27. Combion de fois
que vous Stes h
1. ( ) aucune
2. ( ) 1 fois
vous a-t-on offert de l'avancement que vous aves acceptd depuis
l'emploi de cette entreprise ? Coches une seule reponse.
3. ( ) 2 fois 5. ( ) 4 fois
4. ( ) 3 fois 6. ( ) autre (precise: le nombre de fois)
28. Seriez-vous intdressE(e) I obtenir une formation supplEmentaire ( 'extdrieur
de votre travail) h vos propres frais, afin d'obtenir de l'avancement ?
1. ( ) non-intdressE(e) 2. ( ) tres intdress(e)
3. ( )jele fais ddj&
29. Si vous estime: avoir fait l'objet de discrimination par votre employeur, cette
attitude avait trait h quel facteur ? Coche l'endroit appropriE.
1. ( ) son Ige 2. ( ) mon seze 3. ( ) sea prdfdrences sexuelles
30. Si vous estime: avoir fait l'objet de discrimination, sous quelle forme s'ost-
elle presentie ? Coche: l'endroit appropriE.
1. ( ) salaire 3. ( ) appriciation de mon rendement
2. ( ) recommendation on vue 4. ( ) aide et encouragement dans mon
de l'avancement travail
31. Jusqu'l quel
occupant des
avancement ?
1. ( ) sans
3. ( ) trls
point estimez-vous que It nombre de personnes de votre sexe
postes superieurs vous influencent du point de vue de votre
Coche: une seule rdponse.
rapport 2. ( ) influence modirde
grande influence sur ma motivation
32. Jusqu'h quel point evez-vous Etd encouragE(e) par vom supirieurs h vous
amiliorer vous-smie ot I obtenir de l'avancement ? Coche: une reponse.
1. ( ) aucunement 2. ( ) soddrment 3. ( ) fortement
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33. Indiquez par l'dcbelle suivante lee chances dont dispose une personne dans votre
situation d'atteindre un poste plus dlevd. Coches une seule reponse.
1. ( ) faible 2. ( ) asses bonne 3. ( ) bonne 4. ( ) excellent*
Nous voulons maintenant vous poser quelques questions de nature plus personnelle.
Souvenez-vous que Is caractere anonyme du questionnaire vous assure toute Is
protection ndcessaire. Veuilles rdpondre & toutes lee questions qui vous concerneut.
Si vous n'Ites pas marid(e) ou ne vives pas avec une autre personne, veuilles passer
A la question 44. Si vous l'Etes, rdpondds aux questions 34 1 43.
34. Si l'emploi de votre conjoint ou partenaire exigeait que vous ddmanagiesz dans
une autre ville pour garder cet euploi ou en obtenir un nouveau de nivesu
semblable, accepteriez-vous do le suivre ? Coches une rdponse.
1. ( ) Oui 2. ( ) Non 3. ( ) je n'en suis pas sGr(e)
35. Dans quells mesure votre conjoint ou partenaire encourage-t-il votre carri&re ?
Cochez une r6ponse.
1. ( ) aucunment 2. ( ) uoddrdment 3. ( ) extrimement
36. Si votre emploi actuel exigeait que vous ddnmnagiez, votre conjoint ou
partenaire serait-il pret h vous suivre ? Cochez une rdponse.
1. ( ) Oui 2. ( ) Non 3. ( ) je ne suis pas sGr(e)
37. A. Quelle est l'occupation de votre conjoint ou partenaire ?
B. O0 travaille-t-il normalement ? Cochez une rdponse.
1. ( ) & 1a maison 2. ( ) l'extdrieur du foyer
38. [Ne ripondez que si vous avez des enfants] Si l'un de vos enfants tombait nalade
I la garderie ou h l'cole, qui recevrait normalement l'appel et irait le
chercher ?
1. ( ) moi-aeme 2. ( ) mon conjoint ou partenaire
3. ( ) celui des deux qui serait le plus facilement disponible ou accessible
39. A. Du point de vue revenu, de l'engagement dans votre carri&re et de votre
satisfaction personnelle, quel travail, celui de votre conjoint ou partenaire ou
le v8tre, est-il lo plus important pour la famille ? Cochez une rdponse.
1. ( ) lo mien 2. ( ) celui de won conjoint ou partenaire
B. Veuillez en indiquer Is raison. Coche: une rdponse.
1. ( ) les avantages sont plus grands
2. ( ) le revenu est plus dlev
3. ( ) Is satisfaction personnelle est plus grande
4. ( ) lengagement dans la carriere est plus grand
5. ( ) le prestige et Ie statut social sont plus fleves
40. Avez-vous des responsabilitds familiales qui vous empechent de vous rendre au
travail h certains moments ? 1. ( ) Oui ( ) Non
(Dan@ la nEgative, passes A la question suivante. Dans le cas contraire,
saute: h la question 42)
41. Quelles sont ces responsabilitis ? Coches une reponse
1. ( ) soins ou transport des enfants 3. C ) soins d'un autre parent
2. ( ) travail au foyer 4. ( ) autre
42. Jusqu'l quel degrd vous-meme, conjoint ou partenaire Ites-vous engagi(e) dans
lea activit6s de mEnage suivantes ? Faites une estimation du pourcentage de
participation de chague personne et indiquez-le & l'endroit approprit. Pour
chaque activite, 1e total devrait atteindre 100 2. Ne coches pas.
Presque entierement
Surtout par par non conjoint Autre
Cuisine vous-mfme ou partenaire 
Personne
2. Entretion du jardin
et de l'exterieur
3. Mdnage et nettoyage
4. Transport des
enfants
43. Si vous aves indique un pourcentage dans la colonne autre personne ci-dessus,
veuillez dire qui doit payer pour ce service.
1. ( ) moi-msme 2. ( ) mon conjoint ou partenaire
-165-
44. Enfants, cos parents nous encourageaient b poursuivre diverses activitis. Nous
avons dtabli une list. des plus courantes. Indiquez I rang do 1 h 6 selon
linsistance de vos parents, en accordant I l'activite Is plus encouragde et 6
1 Is moindre. Par exemple, si vous dties surtout encourage(e) k livrer leejournaux, mette: 1 h lendroit appropri&. Si vous Etiez peu pousse(e) b
apprendre h faire I& cuisine, mettes le chiffre 6 vim-h-vi cette rubrique.
Itang Iang
1. Exercer des sports comptitifs 4. Prendre soin 4e frhres
2. Apprendre & cuisiner et soeurs plus jeunes
3. Livrer les journaux 5. Jouer avec des poupdes
6. Jouer avec des voitures
45. Qui s'occupait surtout des tlches suivantes pendant votre dducation ? Cochez una
personne pour chaque activitd.
H0re Pere Autre
1. Petits travaux de rEparation
2. Entretien de l'auto
3. Cuisine
4. Travail adnager
5. Soins des enfants
46. Voici quatre qualitEs gdndralement reconnues come importantes pour le rendement
efficace d'un directeur ou d'un cadre. Suivez lea instructions en A et B
sipardment.
A. Veuillex Etablir le rang de ces qualites selon votre perception de leur
importance pour l'efficacite d'un directeur ou d'un cadre. Accordez 1 h Is plus
importante, et descendez jusqu'& 4 pour Ia moins importante.
B. Veuillez cocher, pour chacune des qualites, selon que vous is considdrez
davantage come une caractdristique de i'home ou de Is femme, ou de fagon Egale
pour les deux.
A 3
Rang
Caractiristiques ' gEneral Homme Feme Egal
Aptitude A dNdguer l'autorit _
Relations interpersonnelles -_'
Aptitude b prendre des dEcisions
Connaissances du domaine -_-_-
47. Avez-vous ddjh eu recours h une des personnes suivantes pour obtenir un conseil
au sujet de votre carriere ? Indiquez le nombre de fois, selon le cas, pour
chacun d'entre eux. Par exemple, vous pouvez vous adresser trois fois au
personnel et deux fois b un collgue.
Cadre supdrieur Collegue d'un autre secteur
Directeur actuel Personnel
Ancien directeur Personne I i'extdrieur de
Collegue du meme secteur l'entreprise
48. A quel degrd estimez-vous avoir besoin d'un conseiller (ou d'un guide) pour
rEussir dans votre carritre ? Coche une reponse.
1. ( ) ndcessaire au succes 2. ( ) utile mais non nicessaire au succes
3. ( ) inutile au succes
49. Si vous avez prdsentement us conseiller, dites de quel sexe il est.
1. ( ) masculin 2. ( ) fiminin
50. Que vous aye& ou non actuellement un conseiller, de quel sexe aimeriez-vous
mieux qu'il soit ?
1. ( ) masculin 2. ( ) fminin 3. ( ) aucune importance
51. Qui prdfdreriez-vous avoir come supdrieur et directeur imaddiat ? Cochez une
reponse.
1. ( ) un home 2. ( ) une feme 3. ( ) aucune importance
52. Croyez-vous pouvoir Stre plus productif(ve) avec un superieur homme ou avec un
superieur femme ? Coche une reponse.
1. ( ) un home 2. ( ) une femne 3. ( ) aucune importance
53. De quel sexe est votre supdrieur ou directeur imadiat ?
1. ( ) assculin 2. ( ) feminin
54. L'emploi que vous occupez actuellement a-t-il dti obtenu grice b un avancement
au sein de i'entreprise ou non ?
1. ( ) oui 2. ( ) non
55. Prdcise: Is maniure dont vous considdrez votre travail. Cochez une rdponse.
1. ( ) come un emploi 2. ( ) come une carribre
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Problems Encountered With the Data
The statistical package used to process the data deleted those observations
where one variable was absent; that is, when an individual did not respond to
one particular variable the computer would delete the entire questionnaire
response for that person. In order to retain as many usable observations as
possible, what was required were a number of mini-programs that set out rules
for dealing with missing data. In what follows, we discuss the general pro-
blems encountered with each variable and the solution to each problem that was
adopted in order to retain and purify the data.
Variable and definition: AGE
Questions without answers: We can easily estimate a person's age if we
consider the number of years they have spent in the labour force, in
addition to their years of schooling (High School = 12 years, CEGEP = 17
years, Bachelors = 17 years, Masters or Doctorate = 22 years minus
the number of years they have been out of the labour force.
Variable and definition: SEX
1 if female
0 if male
Questions without answers: If an individual has not indicated their sex,
it is possible to verify their sex by examining whether or not they have
taken maternity leave or if they indicate they have been subjected to
sexual discrimination. If in each case this procedure has not proved
sufficient, then the entire observation was deleted.
Variable and definition : MARITAL
1 if married or living together as a couple
0 otherwise
Questions without answers: With missing marital status, all that is
required is to check question 6, part b, the before-tax earnings for the
spouse or question 7b, the education for the spouse. A further way of
checking is to see if they answered any of the questions between 34 and
43. If these rules apply, the individual is married or living together as
a couple; if not they are considered to be single.
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Variable and Definition : CHILD1
Total number of children 5 years and under
CHILD2
Total number of children 6 years and over
Questions without answers : If this question is left blank, there is no
other way to interpret it. A "O" is indicated.
Variable and definition : the log of BTES
Actual before-tax earnings for self in 1982
BTESP
Actual before-tax earnings for spouse/partner
NWEPFS
Number of weeks employed in present firm for self in
1982.
Questions without answers If BTES and NWEPFS were missing the
observation was deleted
BTES = mean/sex/group
NWEPFS = mean/sex group
Variable and definition : EDLVLFS
Years of highest level of education completed for
self.
EDLVLSP
Years of highest level of education for spouse or
partner
EDHS2, EDHSSP2
1 if high school, 0 otherwise
EDTS2, EDTSP2
1 if CEGEP, community college, or technical
institute, 0 otherwise
EDCS2, EDCSP2
1 if college classique, bachelor's degree or
equivalent, 0 otherwise
EDPSP2
1 if Master's or Doctorate, 0 otherwise
The above levels assume that high school takes 12 years, CEGEP 14 years, A
bachelor's degree, 17 years, and a prfessional degree an average of 22
years.
Questions without answers : It is fairly simple to identify the level of
education of the individual, as well as the spouse by examining the
answers for question number 8, which is the area of concentration for the
highest degree completed. In the case of the individual not answering the
question, we substitute the mean by sex and job title was substituted.
Where absent for the spouse a mean (depending on whether the individual is
a professional or not,i.e.whether SPOCC=1 or SPOCC=O) was substituted.
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Variable and definition : Area of concentration
ACON1
1 if area of concentration is in humanities
(includes degrees in literature, fine arts,
philosophy, literature, fine arts, languages and
history,or equivalent), 0 otherwise.
ACON2
1 if area of concentration is in social sciences,
(includes economics, anthropology, political
science, sociology, education, business, psychology
and communications or equivalent, 0 otherwise.
ACON3
1 if area of concentration is in applied sciences,
(includes chemistry, biology, computer science,
statistics, maths,physics, engineering, or any
equivalent), 0 otherwise.
ACON4
1 if area of high school training is high school
(includes vocational and commercial training)
Questions without answers: In cases where individuals did not fill out
this question, the observation was deleted.
More than one answer: In those cases where individuals indicated that they
completed more than one degree (for example perhaps 2 bachelor"s degrees),
only the ACON most relevant to their present occupation was coded.
Variables and definition: FJT and SJT
First and second job title
FPGL and SPGL
First and second pay grade level
FDPL and SDPL
First and second date of placement
FDN and SDN
First and second department numbers
Questions without answers: A. When FJT and SJT were missing, and in those
cases where the company structure was known, in terms of departments and
pay grade levels, all we had to do was to check any of these remaining
variables. In the majority of cases, when SJT was missing and was checked
against present pay grade level and second department number we could
isolate the job title. The process was just the reverse when FJT was
missing.
B. When pay grade levels were missing, it was useful to look at other
questionnaires with the same problem. If information was given on job
titles and before-tax earnings it is easy to isolate what the pay grades
are. Before-tax earnings are a good proxy only if SPGL is missing. In
the case where FPGL is missing the issue becomes a little trickier. All
we could do here was to look at FJT and FDN.
-170-
C. If FDPL and SDPL were missing, at least in the first case, all that
was required was to look at question 10 which gives full time years of
employment with the company. It is this way that I determined the
corresponding date. If SDPL was missing, we substitute the answer that was
given in question 12.
D. If FDN AND SDN were missing and pay grades,and job titles, are filled
in and the firm's organizational structure is clear cut and in transition,
in some cases these can be estimated.
Variable and Definition: FYSERVC
Full time years of service with the company
FYSERVC 2
Square of previous variable
PYSERV
Part-time years of service with the company
Questions without answers : If any of the above were missing we needed
only look to question 9 for the first date of placement. If this last
variable was missing, we substitute the mean by sex. If missing for
PYSERV, I put "0".
Questions with questionable answers: If it is the case that answers to
number 10 are greater than FDPL (first date of placement with the company)
then we can be assured that the answer given for question is accurate.
Variable and definition: CNOW
1 if nature of work has changed
0 otherwise
This variable was not used.
Variable and definition: LTDSW
Length of time doing the same kind of work
Questions without answers : In the case where this variable is omitted
from an individual"s questionnaire it is possible to substitute the
response from question 11. If the nature of the work has changed, that is
if question 11 = 1, the amount of time doing the same kind of work would
be equal to the number of years up until JUly 1983 (the time when the
questions were filled out). If on the other hand the nature of the work
had not changed, if Question 11=0, the same answer for number 10 is
indicated, the years of service with the company.
Questions with questionable answers: The responses here can be very
ambiguous and can only be corrected depending on what the individual wrote
for question number 10. For example, it is possible that the number of
months or years written down for question number 12 could be larger than
the number of years employed with the company. In this case we can
correct the answers with what was written for number 10 if the response to
question number 11 was negative. If for question number the response was
positive, the answer for question 12 would be the same as it is for
question FDPL or the first date of placement with the company up until
July 1983.
-171-
Variables and definitions: FTLFEX
Full-time labour force experience
FTLFEX 2
Square of previous variable
PTLFEX
Part-time labour force experience
Questions without answers : In cases where answers to this question are
absent, we utilize the traditional proxy variable, AGE - Years of
schooling - 6.
For PTLFEX a "0" is indicated.
Ambiguous answers : In those cases when FTLFEX is not equal to or greater
than FYSERVC, we proceed as though the individual had not answered the
question.
Variable and definition: UNEMPLOY
Years and months unemployed.
Questions without answers : Nonresponses were substituted with means
The following span of control variables were only available for individuals
who were in managerial or supervisory positions.
Variable and definition: PASSPAN
Actual number of employees first managed
Questions without answers : If individuals do not answer this question we
assume that they do not manage or supervise anybody and set the answers
equal to "0".
Variable and definition: PRESPAN
Number of employees presently manage
Questions without answers : If an individual has not filled this question
in and is a manager, I substitute the means by the group they work in.
Variables and definitions: CDI
Length of time off from the company due to
illness
CDIPOL
1 if the leave of absence was granted by the
company, 0 otherwise.
CDIPAY
1 if pay was available from ;he company, 0
otherwise.
Note that the last two variables in each of the following sets are coded
exactly as the last two in the set immediately above.
CDFAM: CDFAMPOL: CDFAMPAY
Length of time taken off from the company due to
pregnancy and family responsibilities.
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CED: CEDPOL: CEDPAY
Length of time taken off from the company due to
education.
COTH
Length of time taken off due to other reasons.
TOTABFC
Total amount of time taken off from the company
Questions without answers : A "0" is indicated where nothing has been
filled in.
Questions with incomplete answers: One issue is clear, and that is that
if the company pays for a part or a total of the leave most certainly the
leave was granted. Therefore, if it is indicated that the holiday was
paid for by the company, the leave was obviously granted.
In the case when the leave was not remunerated, we cannot confirm that it
was in accordance with company policy.
Matters are complicated further if someone who has taken a leave forgets
to write down whether it was granted by the company and whether they got
paid. For the same reason as given in 1 it seems reasonable to assume
that the company granted the leave. To see if the holiday was remuner-
ated, we can look at how long the person was employed with the company.
For individuals who have worked for more than one year it seems fair to
assume that leaves due to sickness or some sort of physical incapacity
were to be granted. In most cases after working for a year, pregnancy
leave is also covered.
Questions with more than one answer: The greatest problems with more than
one answers are when individuals have indicated that they took a holiday
but that they have been paid and that they have not been paid. That is
some were paid and not entirely paid. This presents interpretive prob-
lems. In this case I have coded the variables as if the individuals
received remuneration.
Variables and definitions: LFDI
Total absence from the labour force due to
illness or disability.
LFAM
Total absence from the labour force due to
pregnancy and family responsibity.
LFED
Total absence time going to school.
LOTH
Total absence time due to other
TOTABFLF
Total absence time from the labour force
Questions without answers: Here a "O" is indicated when a response is
missing.
-173-
Variable and definition: OSJAP
Number of outside jobs applied for since being with
the company.
o if none, 2 if 1-3, 5 if 4-6, 8 if more than 6
OSJAP1
1 if any, 0 otherwise
Questions without answers: If an individual has not filled
in the question a mean by sex is indicated.
Variable and definition: WWOP
Number of times worked overtime without pay in 1982.
o if none, 5 if 1-10 times, 15 if 11-20 times, 25 if
greater than 20 times.
Questions without answers: Where absent, a mean by sex was used.
Variable and definition: CAROT
Percentage increase in pay to leave present company.
Questions without answers: Where missing, a mean by sex was used.
Variable and definition: PREFPERN
Preference to being promoted rather than receiving
higher earnings without being promoted.
1 for 1 or 3, and 0 for 2
Questions without answers: This is a dummy variable and gets deleted if it
was not filled in.
Variable and definition: PROMOAP
Number of times applied for a promotion since
working for present company.
Questions without answers: If this answer was missing, and question 24 is
missing then we substituted the mean by sex. If missing and question 24
is not missing, then we put what was written down for question 24.
(Response to Question 24 must be greater than response to Question 23. If
not, we substituted the answer for question for 24.
Variable and definition: PROMOAPNR
Number of times applied and not received promotion
since working with present company.
Questions without answers: In cases where this answer was missing, it is
important to indicate what was recorded for question 23. If nothing was
indicated for either question we substituted a mean by sex. On the
other hand, if question 23 had "none" as an answer, it was essential to
assign "none" for question 24.
Variable and definition: PROMFF
Number of times offered a promotion since working
with the company.
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Questions without answers: We sustituted a mean by sex.
Variable and definition: PROMDOFF
Number of times declined a promotion when one was
offered.
Questions without answers: We substituted a mean by sex.
Variable and definition: RPROMDF1
Too much responsibility.
RPROMDF2
Personal and family responsibilities.
RPROMDF3
Frequent illness
RPROMDF4
Not enough responsibility.
RPROMDF5
Location of job
RPROMDF6
Not interested
Questions without answers: Because all of the above are dummy variables,
they were immediately deleted when not filled in properly.
Variable and definition: NPROMOS
Number of times offered a promotion and accepted.
NPROMOS = PROMFF-PROMDFF. NPROMOS is now calculated by the number of
promotions you have been offered since you have been with the company
minus the number of times you have declined when one was offered. This
now equals the total number of promotions offered and accepted with the
present company. Means are sustituted for both of these variables when
missing.
Variable and definition: HK
1 if interested, 0 otherwise
Questions without answers: If not completed, the observation gets deleted.
Variable and definition: PERCD
1 if sexual discrimination, 0 otherwise
Questions without answers: If not completed, the observation gets deleted.
Variable and definition: PERCDF1
Form of discrimination (EARNINGS )
PERCDF2
Form of discrimination (RECOMMENDATION)
PERCDF3
Form of discrimination (EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE)
PERCDF4
Form of discrimination (SUPPORT AND MANAGEMENT ON THE
JOB)
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Questions without answers: These were dummies and were deleted.
Variable and definition: MOTS
Effect on motivation of having people in top
positions of similar sex.
o if not a consideration
1 if moderate effect
2 if significant effect
Questions without answers: We substituted the mean by sex.
Variable and definition: MOTSUP
Effect on motivation of being encouraged by superiors
to advance
0 if not at all
1 if moderately
2 if significantly
Questions without answers: We substituted the mean by sex.
Variable and definition: CUPMOB
Perceived chance for upward mobility
0 if poor
1 if fair
2 if good
3 if excellent
Questions without answers: We substituted the mean by sex.
* Questions 34-43 were only answered by married people
Variable and definition: UMOV
Willingness of self to move to support
spouse/partners career
1 if yes. 0 if no.
Questions without answers: If not completed, the observation was deleted.
Variable and definition: SPSCAR2
Support of spouse for having a career
0 if not at all
1 if offers moderate support
2 if is extremely encouraging
Questions without answers: If missing and marital=1, then we substituted
the mean by sex.
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Variable and definition: SPMOB
Willingness of spouse or partner to move to support
career of self.
1 if yes, 0 if no.
Questions without answers: If not completed, the observation was deleted.
Variable and definition: SPOCC
Spouse's or partner's occupation
1 if occupation is professional, 0 otherwise
Questions without answers: If not completed, the observation was deleted.
Variable and definition: SPSTRP
If spouse or partner is willing to move and is
professional.
If SPOCC = 1 and question 36 = yes then SPSTRP = 1
If SPOCC = 1 and question 36 = no then SPSTRP = 0
If SPOCC = 0 then SPSTRP = 0
If SPOCC = 1 and question 36 = missing then SPSTRP =
missing
If SPOCC = missing and question 36 = yes then SPSTRP
= missing
If SPOCC = missing and question 36 = no then SPSTRP
= 0
If SPOCC = missing and question 36 = missing SPSTRP
= missing
Variable and definition: IMCARTF
Order of importance of career of self or spouse to
family
1 if mine, 0 otherwise
RIMPCATF
Reasons for importance for career to family
1 if benefits are better
2 if income is higher
3 if personal satisfaction derived from job is
higher
4 if career committment is stronger
5 if prestige or status is better
This variable appears as a frequency distribution
Questions without answers: If not completed, the observation was deleted.
Variable and definition: SXDMAN
Family responsibilities
1 if family responsibilities make you
unavailable for work, 0 otherwise
Questions without answers: If not completed, the variable was deleted.
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Variable and definition: SXDMRES
1 if involved in the transport of children
2 if involved in housework
3 if looking after another relative
4 if other
This variable appears as a frequency distribution
Questions without answers: In cases where neither Q 41 or Q 40 were
answered, we assumed that the individual had no family responsiblities
that prevented them from going to work and left it blank.
However if a positive answer was written for Q 40, we should logically
expect an answer for Q 41. While it is impossible to know exactly what
the responsibilities were we ascribed a 4 for other. All individuals who
were married or living together as a couple and indicated a "NO" for
question 40 received a "0" for this index.
Variable and definition: DLHH
Division of labour in the household
This variable was calculated entirely in percentages. In these
calculations, we specifically excluded yard and outside maintenance.
Included in these calculations were the percentage participation in
cooking, cleaning, and the transport of children. If a female put 100% for
each item, she would get a total of 300%. If a male put 100% for each
item, he would get a total of 300%. The lower the score for females,
the more they were raised in a fairly nontraditional household where their
spouses or partners do most of the work. But a lower value for males
implies a more traditional division of labour in the home. The only column
summed up here is the" mostly by you" column.
Questions without answers: We substituted means by marital status and
sex.
Variable and definition: EARSOC
Early socialization activities
Items are summed up only for the more masculine activities such as playing
competitive sports, having a paper route, and playing with cars.
Questions without answers: We substituted means by sex.
Variable and definition: EARDL
Early demonstration effect of division of labour
Questions without answers: We substitutes means by sex.
Variable and definition: IMPERF
Qualities of being a good manager
This variable appears as a frequency distribution
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Questions without answers: If absent, the variable was deleted.
Variable and definition: INFORM
Information networks with superiors in firms
The following weights have been assigned for
each contact;
Top exec =3 , Current super = 2, Previous super
= 2, Personnel =1, Colleague in area = 0,
Colleague in other area = 0, Someone outside the
company = 0
Questions without answers: If missing, the entry was assigned a "0".
Variable and definition: PNMENT2
Perceived need for a mentor
0 if necessary for success
1 if helpful but not necessary
2 if not helpful for success
Questions without answers: If missing, we substituted a mean by sex.
Variable and definition: SXMENT
Present sex of mentor
1 for female ,0 for male
Questions without answers: If not completed, the observation was dropped.
Variable and definition: SXPRFMNT
1 if preference is for male
2 if preference is for female
3 if no preference
Questions without answers: If missing, we substituted a mean by sex.
Variable and definition: SXPRFMAN
1 if preference is for male
2 if preference is for female
3 if no preference
Questions without answers: If missing, we substituted a mean by sex.
Variable and definition: HDPRDSXM
Present managers influence over productivity
1 if 1 for Q 52 and 1 for Q 53
1 if 1 for Q 52 and 2 for Q 53
1 if doesn't matter
0 if 1 for Q 52 and 2 for Q 53
0 if 2 for Q 52 and 1 for Q 53
Questions without answers: If either one of these was missing, then the
observation was deleted.
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Variable and definition: PROMOFW
Promoted form within
1 for yes, 0 for no.
Questions without answers: If missing, the variable was deleted.
Variable and definition: PERCW1
Perceived view of work
1 as a job, 0 as career.
Questions without answers: If missing, the observation was deleted.
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APPENDIX 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLES
SAMPLE
1 2 3
1. EARNINGS BY AGE Tables A3-1 A3-9 A3-17
2. EARNINGS BY FULL-TIME LABOUR-
FORCE EXPERIENCE Tables A3-2 A3-10 A3-18
3. EARNINGS BY YEARS OF SERVICE
WITH THE COMPANY Tables A3-3 A3-11 A3-19
4. EARNINGS BY LEVEL OF
EDUCATION Tables A3-4 A3-12 A3-20
5. AVERAGE YEARS OF EDUCATION AND
AREA OF CONCENTRATION Tables A3-5 A3-13 A3-21
6. EARNINGS BY AREA OF
CONCENTRATION Tables A3-6 A3-14 A3-22
7. EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION Tables A3-7A A3-15 A3-23
8. WITHIN JOB EARNINGS Tables A3-7
9. EARNINGS BY FAMILY STATUS Tables A3-8 A3-16 A3-24
Table A3-1
Earnings by Age, Sample 1
(1982 Dollars)
AGE n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
F M F M F M F M
18 - 24 20 20 18,130 16,465 1665 1.101 12,800 12,800 22,500 24,600
25 - 29 65 64 18,012 20,627 -2615 0.873 14,000 14,000 24,600 29,100
30 - 34 69 56 18,240 22,331 -4091 0.816 15,600 15,800 29,600 36,800
35 - 39 18 43 19,175 26,193 -7018 0.732 16,000 16,300 30,800 39,948
40 - 44 3 16 25,700 31,966 -6266 0.803 21,000 25,900 32,000 45,000
45 - 49 - 3 - 31,800 - - - 28,100 - 38,300
50 - 54 - 3 - 37,766 - - - 34,300 - 39,700
Over 54 - - - - - ~
Table A3-2
Earnings by Full Time Labour Force Experience, Sample 1
(1982 Dollars)
Years of n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Service F M F M F M F M
0 - 1 16 12 17,514 23,987 -6,473 0.730 12,800 15,850 24,800 36,800
1 - 2 22 19 17,664 17,373 290 1.017 13,500 12,800 22,190 24,900
2 - 4 25 30 18,866 21,460 -2,594 0.879 13,850 13,900 24,600 27,000
4 - 6 22 38 18,682 20,370 -1,688 0.917 15,500 15,800 28,000 29,100
6 - 8 26 24 18,235 23,481 -5,245 0.777 15,500 15,800 24,800 36,800
8 - 10 33 20 17,534 20,599 -3,066 0.851 15,890 14,000 26,200 39,948
10 - 12 18 12 18,935 25,615 -6,680 0.739 16,000 16,000 30,800 33,400
12 - 14 7 21 19,061 24,528 -5,467 0.777 17,200 16,300 29,600 31,214
14 - 16 5 3 20,747 23,316 -2,569 0.890 16,200 16,400 25,116 27,650
16 - 20 - 16 - 31,579 - - - 25,900 - 45,000
20 - 24 1 5 32,000 31,560 440 1.014 32,000 29,000 32,000 32,500
24 - 28 - 2 - 33,200 - - - 28,100 - 38,300
over 28 - 3 - 37,766 - - - 34,300 - 39,700
Table A3-3
Earnings by Full Time Years Of Service With the Company, Sample
(1982 Dollars)
Years of n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Service F M F M F M F M
0 - 1 7 5 18,742 19,166 -424 0.978 12,800 15,850 26,046 27,181
1 - 2 27 25 17,511 17,856 -345 0.981 13,500 12,800 22,190 27,000
2 - 4 62 49 17,407 21,324 -3,917 0.816 13,850 13,900 24,600 35,214
4 - 6 48 59 18,034 21,803 -3,769 0.827 15,500 15,800 28,000 39,948
6 - 8 19 19 19,652 24,744 -5,092 0.794 16,000 16,300 24,800 45,000
8 - 10 6 7 24,025 25,678 -1,654 0.936 17,300 17,800 30,800 29,500
10 - 12 2 8 22,800 28,573 -5,773 0.798 16,000 25,500 29,600 39,300
12 - 14 4 14 25,554 30,478 -4,923 0.816 21,000 25,900 32,000 39,700
14 - 16 - 6 - 27,741 - - - 25,900 - 29,400
16 - 20 - 8 - 30,225 - - - 26,500 - 34,700
20 - 24 - 5 - 31,920 - - - 28,800 - 34,300
24-28 - - - - - -
- -
over 28 - - - - - - - - - -
Table A3-4
Earnings by Levels of Education, Sample 1
(1982 Dollars)
Level of n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Education F M F M F M F M
1 1 5 16,000 22,040 -6040 0.725 16,000 13,900 16,000 34,300
2 39 33 15,926 15,571 355 1.022 12,800 12,800 22,000 17,800
3 134 162 19,110 24,336 -5226 0.785 14,800 14,000 32,000 39,700
4 - 3 - 41,079 - - - 38,290 - 45,000
1 = High school degree
2 = Community college (Cegep) or technical college degree
3 = College degree (college classique)
4 = Professional degree (Masters, Doctorate)
Table A3-5
Average Years of Education and Areas of Concentration, Sample 1
Female Male
Average Years of Education 16.29 16.46
% ACON1 (Humanities Concentration) 30.8 12.1
% ACON2 (Social Sciences) 18.2 14.1
% ACON3 (Applied Sciences) 50.2 69.2
% ACON4 (Vocational Tarining) 0.0 0.4
Table A3-6
Earnings by Area of Concentration, Sample 1
(1982 Dollars)
n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
ACON F M F M F M F M
1 54 25 16,926 18,786 -1,860 0.901 14,000 13,801 32,000 45,000
2 32 29 17,980 22,369 -4,388 0.804 14,800 15,800 30,800 39,948
3 88 142 19,424 24,025 -4,601 0.808 12,800 12,800 28,000 38,300
4 - 1 - 14,000 - - - 14,000 - 14,000
ACON 1 = Humanities Concentration
ACON 2 = Social Sciences
ACON 3 = Applied Sciences
ACON 4 = Vocational Training
Table A3-7
Earnings by Occupation, Sample 1
(1982 Dollars)
n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Occupation F M F M F M F M
OCC1 5 21 21,765 33,255 -11,490 0.654 17,200 17,800 30,800 45,000
OCC2 57 109 21,962 26,051 -4,089 0.843 15,000 13,850 32,000 34,300
OCC3 113 75 16,404 16,115 289 1.017 12,800 12,800 22,800 17,800
OCC1 = JOB
JOB
JOB
(Team Leader)
(Project Leader)
(Supervisor)
OCC2 = JOB 4 (Analyst)
JOB 7 (Programmer)
OCC3 = JOB 5 (Operations Support)
JOB 6 (Computer Operator)
Table A3-7a
Within Job Earnings, Sample 1
(1982 Dollars)
n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Job F M F M F M F M
JOB1 - 2 - 42,474 - - - 39,948 - 45,000
JOB2 1 10 30,800 36,853 -6,053 0.835 30,800 32,230 30,800 39,700
JOB3 4 9 19,506 27,208 -7,702 0.716 17,200 17,800 26,046 36,100
JOB4 6 32 25,218 28,145 -2,927 0.896 20,544 21,000 32,000 34,300
JOB7 51 77 21,579 25,180 -3,601 0.856 15,000 13,850 28,000 29,850
JOB5 89 50 16,425 16,711 -286 0.982 15,500 15,800 17,500 17,800
JOB6 24 25 16,322 14,922 1,400 1.093 12,800 12,800 22,800 16,800
JOB 1
JOB2
JOB3
JOB4
JOB7
JOB5
JOB6
= Team Leader
= Project Leader
= Supervisor
= Analyst
= Programmer
= Operations Support
= Computer Operator
Table A3-8
Earnings by Family Status, Sample 1
(1982 Dollars)
n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Family Status F M F M F M F M
Married 1) 36 42 19,046 20,576 -1,530 0.925 14,000 14,000 30,800 29,600
2) 49 77 17,357 22,946 -5,588 0.756 14,000 14,000 28,000 39,948
3) - 40 18,008 28,715 -10,707 0.627 15,850 14,000 29,600 39,700
Single 1) 42 46 18,598 21,018 -2,420 0.884 12,800 12,800 26,046 45,000
2) 3 - 22,342 - - - 15,899 - 28,000 -
3) 14 - 19,402 - - - 15,800 - 32,000 -
1 = Without children
2 = Living with children
3 = Living with children
(5 years and under)
(6 years and up)
Married = or living together as a couple
Single = includes divorced, separated and widowed
Table A3-9
Earnings by Age, Sample 2
(1982 Dollars)
AGE n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
F M F M F M F M
18 - 24 104 60 19,729 23,147 -3,418 0.852 10,000 9,000 32,000 36,000
25 - 29 177 244 23,230 28,763 -5,533 0.808 7,300 10,244 42,000 53,000
30 - 34 96 286 24,995 34,070 -9,075 0.734 7,400 11,000 43,000 72,000
35 - 39 72 262 29,018 39,041 -10,023 0.743 14,000 20,000 52,500 70,000
40 - 44 44 180 27,643 41,828 -14,186 0.661 15,800 22,868 54,000 82,000
45 - 49 20 127 27,726 42,329 -14,602 0.655 20,000 16,000 50,000 80,000
50 - 54 14 108 26,508 41,306 -14,798 0.642 16,000 20,747 42,000 80,000
55 - 59 9 72 28,475 41,472 -12,997 0.687 18,000 20,000 55,000 88,800
60 - 64 3 15 23,012 37,218 -14,206 0.618 15,000 25,075 33,036 54,000
Over 64 - 1 - 65,000 - - - 65,000 - 65,000
Table A3-10
Earnings by Full Time Labour Force Experience, Sample 2
Years of n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Service F M F M F M F M
0 - 1 6 8 21,200 30,850 -9,650 0.687 18,000 22,800 25,000 44,000
1 - 2 32 36 18,984 23,313 -4,329 0.814 14,130 9,000 40,065 47,600
2 - 4 50 62 21,190 26,632 -5,443 0.796 12,000 16,000 34,000 43,000
4 - 6 90 107 22,386 29,303 -6,917 0.764 10,000 13,500 39,353 58,000
6 - 8 75 120 22,980 32,035 -9,055 0.717 7,300 10,244 40,000 54,000
8 - 10 79 155 24,867 34,602 -9,735 0.719 7,400 11,000 49,500 70,000
10 - 12 51 96 26,241 35,397 -9,155 0.741 7,500 19,000 52,500 72,000
12 - 14 23 83 24,895 38,357 -13,463 0.649 20,000 16,000 33,000 65,000
14 - 16 26 98 27,367 37,840 -10,472 0.723 15,000 16,000 54,000 70,000
16 - 20 42 173 26,809 40,122 -13,312 0.668 14,000 20,000 50,000 65,000
20 - 24 30 110 28,319 42,414 -14,095 0.668 16,000 22,868 49,726 82,000
24 - 28 18 102 27,091 41,111 -14,019 0.659 18,200 21,892 40,000 78,000
over 28 17 205 31,594 39,926 -8,333 0.791 21,000 20,000 55,000 88,800
Table A3-11
Earnings by Full Time Years Of Service With the Company, Sample 2
(1982 Dollars)
Years of n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Service F M F M F M F M
0 - 1 10 9 16,227 22,279 -6,052 0.728 7,300 11,000 26,000 44,000
1 - 2 84 118 21,433 27,357 -5,924 0.783 11,071 9,000 47,000 53,000
2 - 4 90 146 22,948 31,592 -8,644 0.726 15,600 16,000 45,000 80,000
4 - 6 98 163 23,075 32,448 -9,373 0.711 10,000 10,244 48,000 63,000
6 - 8 60 130 24,018 34,083 -10,065 0.705 8,000 18,000 45,000 65,000
8 - 10 62 112 26,931 36,823 -9,892 0.731 18,000 12,000 52,500 70,000
10 - 12 30 87 24,822 38,492 -13,670 0.645 8,480 21,000 43,000 72,000
12 - 14 19 67 24,697 38,827 -14,130 0.636 7,500 22,000 33,400 65,000
14 - 16 18 89 28,901 39,121 -10,220 0.739 19,000 16,000 52,000 63,000
16 - 20 27 141 27,428 41,898 -14,470 0.655 19,000 24,500 54,000 80,000
20 - 24 22 93 28,546 42,478 -13,932 0.672 16,000 22,000 49,726 88,800
24 - 28 12 92 31,561 40,857 -9,296 0.772 25,000 22,800 41,000 78,000
over 28 7 108 34,005 40,934 -6,930 0.831 26,000 22,000 55,000 80,000
Table A3-12
Earnings by Level of Education, Sample 2
(1982 Dollars)
Level of n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Education F M F M F M F M
0 11 50 22,072 32,712 -10,640 0.675 11,071 18,000 33,500 50,000
1 284 352 22,806 31,083 -8,277 0.734 7,300 16,000 41,000 62,000
2 156 573 23,038 35,256 -12,218 0.653 10,600 9,000 45,000 82,000
3 49 163 29,389 39,061 -9,672 0.752 8,000 17,000 55,000 70,000
4 37 216 35,373 47,026 -11,653 0.752 12,500 11,000 52,000 88,800
0 = Less than high school
1 = High school degree
2 = Community college (Cegep) or technical college degree
3 = College degree (college classique)
4 = Professional degree (Masters, Doctorate)
Table A3-13
Average Years of Education and Areas of Concentration, Sample 2
Female Male
Average Years of Education 13.66 14.93
% ACON1 (Humanities Concentration) 2.9 1.6
% ACON2 (Social Sciences) 8.3 9.2
% ACON3 (Applied Sciences) 11.1 19.6
% ACON4 (High School with Vocational Concentration) 77.5 69.5
Table A3-14
Earnings by Area of Concentration, Sample 2
(1982 Dollars)
n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
ACON F M F M F M F M
1 16 22 28,528 36,045 -7,518 0.791 12,500 25,500 49,726 55,000
2 45 125 29,372 39,449 -10,076 0.744 8,000 10,244 55,000 79,000
3 60 266 31,883 43,375 -11,492 0.735 13,000 9,000 52,500 88,800
4 418 942 22,556 34,069 -11,513 0.662 7,300 12,000 45,000 82,000
ACON I = Humanities Concentration
ACON 2 = Social Sciences
ACON 3 = Applied Sciences
ACON 4 = Vocational Training
Table A3-15
Earnings by Occupation, Sample 2
(1982 Dollars)
n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Occupation F M F M F M F M
OCCO 4 202 29,250 35,730 -6,481 0.819 20,000 13,000 34,000 70,000
OCC1 59 330 36,044 46,272 -10,228 0.779 12,500 17,000 55,000 88,800
OCC2 374 100 21,300 23,184 -1,884 0.919 7,300 10,244 32,000 34,176
OCC3 7 115 34,900 40,101 -5,202 0.870 24,300 13,500 45,000 63,000
OCC4 3 22 37,333 39,717 -2,385 0.940 30,000 17,000 45,000 58,000
OCC5 35 32 28,308 30,383 -2,075 0.932 14,130 9,000 43,000 45,000
OCC6 2 28 23,250 24,281 -1,031 0.957 19,000 16,800 27,500 40,000
OCC7 8 28 31,432 34,033 -2,601 0.923 26,000 11,000 41,000 79,000
OCC8 24 65 27,043 33,330 -6,287 0.811 16,000 12,000 39,353 70,000
OCC9 3 229 33,000 31,304 1,696 1.054 27,000 14,000 38,000 60,502
OCC10 20 74 25,831 33,031 -7,200 0.782 13,870 16,000 40,000 53,500
OCC11 - 130 - 35,996 - - - 22,000 - 52,000
OCCO = Unidentifiable Group
OCC1 = Management and Administrative Staff
OCC2 = Clerical Staff
OCC3 = Engineering Staff
OCC4 = Scientific Research Staff
OCC5 = Computer Staff
OCC6 = Secondary Services
OCC7 = Finance Staff
OCC8 = Primary Services
OCC9 = Skilled Labour
OCC10 = Public Relations
OCC11 = Bluecollar Supervisors
Table A3-16
Earnings by Family Status, Sample 2
(1982 Dollars)
n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Family Status F M F M F M F M
Married 1) 175 233 23,693 32,228 -8,535 0.735 7,300 12,000 47,000 70,000
2) 101 431 24,427 34,101 -9,674 0.716 7,400 11,000 49,500 65,000
3) 70 507 25,781 41,556 -15,776 0.620 15,600 20,747 55,000 88,800
Single 1) 165 159 23,856 31,834 -7,979 0.749 12,000 9,000 50,000 82,000
2) 12 2 27,035 25,000 2,036 1.081 16,000 22,000 46,000 28,000
3) 16 23 27,548 42,059 -14,511 0.655 18,000 16,000 52,500 65,000
1 = Without children
2 = Living with children (5
3 = Living with children (6
years and under)
years and up)
Married = or living together as a couple
Single = includes divorced, seperated and widowed
Table A3-17
Earnings by Age, Sample 3
(1982 Dollars)
AGE n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
F M F M F M F M
18 - 24 11 18 14,319 15,597 -1,278 0.918 800 6,200 22,200 28,500
25 - 29 23 52 22,763 30,731 -7,968 0.741 12,000 6,960 31,400 54,000
30 - 34 8 48 19,808 38,439 -18,631 0.515 9,361 18,750 31,300 80,000
35 - 39 10 30 29,970 44,989 -15,020 0.666 16,500 29,000 51,000 84,000
40 - 44 6 19 24,616 46,126 -21,510 0.534 17,000 31,400 32,400 74,000
45 - 49 3 8 29,359 52,682 -23,324 0.557 23,077 29,000 37,000 66,000
50 - 54 2 8 31,400 42,495 -11,096 0.739 23,000 28,730 39,800 51,400
54 - 59 1 8 23,000 50,426 -27,427 0.456 23,000 21,500 23,000 73,000
59 - 64 - 1 - 38,200 - - - 38,200 - 38,200
Table A3-18
Earnings by Full Time Labour Force Experience, Sample 3
(1982 Dollars)
Years of n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Service F M F M F M F M
0 - 1 2 5 19,500 16,060 3,440 1.214 12,000 6,200 27,000 34,000
1 - 2 12 25 20,247 20,790 -543 0.974 10,659 7,380 31,400 38,600
2 - 4 7 30 19,293 31,150 -11,857 0.619 13,000 15,000 30,000 52,000
4 - 6 9 22 21,217 34,574 -13,356 0.614 9,361 6,960 31,300 54,000
6 - 8 8 21 18,250 38,669 -20,420 0.472 800 26,560 27,000 48,000
8 - 10 4 13 20,812 42,307 -21,495 0.492 19,000 20,000 22,000 80,000
10 - 12 3 11 21,200 43,399 -22,200 0.488 18,600 24,000 23,000 65,000
12 - 14 2 12 50,500 47,466 3,033 1.064 50,000 38,000 51,000 69,400
14 - 16 6 5 26,217 49,200 -22,983 0.533 17,200 30,000 50,000 84,000
16 - 20 8 16 24,397 44,650 -20,253 0.546 17,000 29,000 34,500 74,000
20 - 24 3 14 35,500 47,720 -12,220 0.744 29,700 34,700 39,800 66,000
24 - 28 - 4 - 46,298 - - - 28,730 - 63,400
over 28 - 14 - 45,361 - - - 21,500 - 73,000
Table A3-19
Earnings by Full Time Years Of Service With the Company, Sample 3
(1982 Dollars)
Years of n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Service F M F M F M F M
0 - 1 3 6 10,866 10,106 760 1.075 800 6,200 19,800 21,000
1 - 2 25 69 20,486 29,836 -9,350 0.687 9,361 11,000 34,500 51,000
2 - 4 11 28 24,554 35,356 -10,802 0.694 13,000 21,000 50,000 52,000
4 - 6 7 21 27,171 39,242 -12,071 0.692 16,500 20,000 50,000 54,000
6 - 8 9 8 23,100 42,145 -19,045 0.548 19,000 37,000 29,7000 48,000
8 - 10 7 19 26,993 43,863 -16,870 0.615 17,200 21,500 51,000 80,000
10 - 12 - 8 - 45,531 - - - 34,000 - 54,000
12 - 14 2 7 29,450 46,857 -17,407 0.628 26,500 32,000 32,400 69,400
14 - 16 - 3 - 74,333 - - - 65,000 - 84,000
16 - 20 - 14 - 50,215 - - - 31,000 - 66,000
20 - 24 - 6 - 43,621 - - - 28,730 - 55,000
24 - 28 - 1 - 52,000 - - - 52,000 - 52,000
over 28 - 2 - 58,500 - - - 44,000 - 73,000
Table A3-20
Earnings by Levels of Education, Sample 3
(1982 Dollars)
Level of n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Education F M F M F M F M
0 4 2 21,350 28,100 -6,750 0.760 17,200 21,500 28,000 34,700
1 14 8 17,839 39,819 -21,979 0.448 800 20,000 23,000 73,000
2 14 28 23,546 30,973 -7,427 0.760 13,452 6,960 34,500 63,400
3 18 71 24,114 33,651 -9,536 0.717 9,361 6,200 51,000 58,000
4 14 83 25,852 42,430 -16,578 0.609 10,659 11,000 50,000 84,000
0 = Less than high school
1 = High school degree
2 = Community college (Cegep) or technical college degree
3 = College degree (college classique)
4 = Professional degree (Masters, Doctorate)
Table A3-21
Average Years of Education and Areas of Concentration, Sample 3
Female Male
Average Years of Education 15.84 18.43
% ACON1 (Humanities Concentration) 10.9 0.5
% ACON2 (Social Sciences) 15.6 4.7
% ACON3 (Applied Sciences) 35.9 89.0
% ACON4 (Vocational Training) 37.5 5.2
Table A3-22
Earnings by Area of Concentration, Sample 3
(1982 Dollars)
n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
ACON F M F M F M F M
1 7 2 25,285 36,500 -11,983 0.693 16,500 29,000 51,000 44,000
2 10 9 24,720 38,030 -13,311 0.650 13,000 21,275 50,000 73,000
3 23 170 25,669 37,652 -11,983 0.682 9,361 6,200 50,000 84,000
4 24 10 18,591 29,671 -11,079 0.626 800 6,960 28,000 49,053
ACON 1 = Humanities Concentration
ACON 2 = Social Sciences
ACON 3 = Applied Sciences
ACON 4 = High School with Vocational Concentration
Table A3-23
Earnings by Occupation, Sample 3
(1982 Dollars)
n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Occupation F M F M F M F M
OCCi 27 125 22,207 31,837 -9,630 0.697 9,361 6,200 39,800 53,000
OCC2 20 66 28,375 47,414 -19,039 0.598 16,500 6,960 51,000 84,000
OCC3 17 - 17,276 - - - 800 - 23,000 -
OCC1 = Member of Scientific Staff, Engineering and Computing
OCC2 = Management, Administrative and Finance
OCC3 = Clerical and Secretarial
Table A3-24
Earnings by Family Status, Sample
(1982 Dollars)
n Mean Difference Ratio Minimum Maximum
Family Status F M F M F M F M
Married 1) 26 53 22,837 34,029 -11,192 0.671 10,659 6,200 34,500 56,000
2) 6 42 26,283 40,366 -14,083 0.651 17,200 20,000 50,000 69,400
3) 9 49 30,488 47,342 -16,853 0.644 16,500 21,500 51,000 84,000
Single 1) 18 48 18,185 27,797 -9,612 0.654 800 6,960 39,800 80,000
2) 1 - 20,000 - - - 20,000 - 20,000 -
3) 4 - 21,900 - - - 18,600 - 26,500 -
1 = Without children
2 = Living with children
3 = Living with children
(5 years and under)
(6 years and up)
Married = or living together as a couple
Single = includes divorced, seperated and widowed
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APPENDIX 4
TOTAL SAMPLE AND
MARRIED SAMPLE MEANS
TABLE A4-1
TABLE A4-2
TABLE A4-3
TABLE A4-4
TABLE A4-5
TABLE A4-6
TOTAL SAMPLE 1 MEANS
TOTAL MARRIED SAMPLE
TOTAL SAMPLE 2 MEANS
TOTAL MARRIED SAMPLE
TOTAL SAMPLE 3 MEANS
TOTAL MARRIED SAMPLE
1 MEANS
2 MEANS
3 MEANS
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SAMPLE 1 Table A4-1
Total
370
LUbTES
Intercept
SEX
AGE
AGE2
FYSERVC
FESERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACON2
ACOW3
ACON4
occi
OCC2
SDul
SDv 2
SDN4
FLN1
FDN2
FDN4
FDN5
NARITAL
CHILD1
QILD2
LFAM
TDTABFC
OSJAP1
wlOP
CAROT
INFORM
PERCD
mOSl
EARSOC
EARDL
9.908116
1
.4621622
30.77297
975.8054
69.70270
7239.768
91.55946
12769.83
.1945946
.772973
.0081081
.1567568
.6081081
.0027027
.0648649
.4297297
.1054054
.3648649
.1486486
.1081081
.3162162
.4486486
.0351351
.727027
.4297297
.4459459
1.781081
2.656757
.2162162
3.783784
13.18378
1.316216
.2054054
.672973
9.674692
4.241216
TOTAL SAMPLE MEANS
Male
199
10.00281
0
31.68342
1040.960
81.00503
9953.075
101.7035
16059.56
.1658291
.7839196
.0150754
.1407035
.6934673
.0050251
.1005025
.5226131
.1708543
.4120603
.1457286
.1557789
.3718593
.3567839
.0552764
.7738693
.4974874
.4572864
.1708543
1.346734
.2512563
4.422111
13.97487
1.748744
0
.6482412
7.280139
4.247487
Female
Female
- Male
171
9.797919
1
1
29.71345
899.9325
56.54971
4082.175
79.75439
8941.427
.22000702
.7602339
0
.1754336
.5087719
0
.0233918
.3216374
.0292398
.3099415
.1520468
.0526316
.251462
.5555556
.0116959
.6725146
.3506772
.4327485
3.654971
4.181287
.1754386
3.040936
12.26316
.8128655
.4444444
.7017544
12.46128
4.233918
-.204839
-1.96997
-140.977
-24.4553
-5870.9C
-21.9491
-7118.14
.0622411
-. 023686
-. 015075
.0347351
-. 184695
-.005025
-. 077111
-. 200976
-. 141615
-. 102119
.0063182
-. 103147
-. 120397
.1987717
-. 043581
-. 101355
-. 146610
-.024533
3.484117
2.834553
-. 075818
-1.38117
-1.71172
-. 935678
.4444444
.0535132
5.181090
-.013569
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SAMPLE 1 Table A4-2
MARRIED SAMPLE MEANS
Total
250
L[BTES
Intercept
SEX
AG
AGE2
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACOW2
ACON3
ACON4
OCCl
OCC2
SD41
SDW12
SL4
F]l
F242
FM4
FW5
CHILD1
CHILD2
LFAN
DLHil
TOrABiC
OSJAP1
WOUP
CAROT
INFHOR4
PERCD
NarS1
EARSOC
EARDL
Ui40V
SPSCAR2
SP140B
SfPTRPNi
IMPCARTF
9.927062
1
.4263566
31.49225
1016.229
74.65116
7950.194
96.21705
13480.84
.1705426
.7984496
.0077519
.1705426
.5891473
.003876
.0697674
.4147237
.127907
.3449612
.1085271
.1162791
.3139535
.4341085
.0387597
.5352713
.5193793
1.937985
91.75112
2.934109
.2248062
3.895349
13.13953
1.395348
.2209302
.6782946
9.372191
4.201550
.2364341
1.307866
.4224806
.0232558
.6511628
Male
148
10.03322
1
0
32.62162
1095.784
87.39865
10952.57
107.8716
17184.90
.1283784
.8243243
.0135135
.1418919
.6959459
.0067563
.1013514
.5405405
.2027027
.4121622
.0945946
.1621622
.3986486
.3103108
.0675676
.6486486
.5010311
.1824324
27.59939
1.506757
.2432432
4.695946
13.93243
1.878378
0
.6554054
7.240445
4.25
.0405405
1.421821
.6959459
.0337838
.9391892
Fem ,ale
- Male
9.7C4236
29.97273
909.1909
57.5
3910.627
80.53636
8497.191
.2272727
.7636364
0
.2090909
.4454545
0
.0272727
.2454545
.0272727
.2545455
.1272727
.0545455
.2
.6
0
.5
.4363636
4.3
178.0644
4.854545
.2
2.818182
12.07273
.7454545
.5181818
.7090909
12.24036
4.136364
.5
1.154545
.0545454
.0090909
.2636364
-. 248931
0
1
-2.64039
-186.593
-29.8936
-7041.95
-27.3353
-8687.71
.0903943
-.060683
-.013514
.0671990
-.250491
-. 006757
-. 074079
-.29503
-.17543
-. 157617
.0326781
-. 107617
-.190649
.2891892
-.067568
-.148649
-. 14471C
4.117568
150.4650
3.347789
-. 043243
-1.87776
-1.85971
-1.13292
.5181818
.0536855
4.999912
-.113636
.4594595
-. 267275
-.641401
-.024693
-.675553
Female
110
nLNTES
Intercept
SEX
AGE
AGE2
EYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACON2
ACON3
ACON4
Occi
OCC3
OCC4
OCC5
OCC6
OCC7
OCC8
OCC9
OCC10
0CC11
MARITAL
CiILD1
CHILD2
LFAM
TOTABFC
OSJAP1
WNP
CAROT
INFORM
PERCD
MO1S1
EARSOC
EARDL
1894
10. 34267
1
.2845829
35.89863
1380.517
143.9176
32083.2
180.9578
46141.22
.3848997
.1119324
.1335797
.0897571
.1721225
.718057
.2053854
.0644139
.0131996
.0353749
.0158395
.0190074
.0469905
.1224921
.0496304
.0686378
.8009504
.3854277
.7059134
4.542239
11.11932
.2835269
1.370116
25.30412
4.540127
.063358
.3046463
9.692306
4.221935
Table A4-3
TOTAL SAMPLE MEANS
1355
10.45744
1
0
37.61697
1505.396
160.1616
38007.29
200.2716
54357.03
.4228782
.1202952
.1594096
.0922509
.19631
.695203
.2435424
.0848708
.0162362
.0236162
.0206642
.0206642
.0479705
.1690037
.0546125
.095941
.8642066
.4413284
.8671587
1.025092
8.730627
.3107011
1.660517
25.89889
4.894465
.0081181
.2760148
8.403647
4.256601
539
10.05414
1
131.57885
1066.584
103.0816
17190.55
132.4045
25487.36
.2894249
.0909091
.0686456
.0834379
.1113173
.7755102
.109462
.012987
.0055659
.0649351
.0037106
.0148423
.0445269
.0055659
.0371058
0
.6419295
.244898
.3005566
13.38404
17.1243
.2152134
.6400742
23.80091
3.649351
.2022263
.3766234
12.93188
4.134788
Total
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SAMPLE 2
Male Female
Female
- Male
-. 403292
0
1
-6.03812
-438.812
-57.08
-20816.7
-67.8671
-28369.7
-. 133453
-. 029386
-. 090764
-. 003763
-. 084993
.0803072
-. 071384
-. 010670
.0413189
-. 016954
-. 005822
-. 003444
-. 163430
-. 017507
-. 095941
-.222277
-. 196430
-. 566602
12.35895
8.393673
-. 095488
-1.02044
-2.08998
-1.24511
.1941032
.1006336
4.528233
-. 121813
Table A4-4
MARRIED SAMPLE MEANS
Feiaale
Female
- male
n
LiiTES
Intercept
SEX
AGL
AGE2
FYSERVC
FYLERVC2
FrLFEX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACOW2
ACOW3
ACON4
OCC3
OCC4
OCC5
OCC7
OCC8
OCC9
OCC1c
occil.
CH-ILD1
LEAN
DLHHi-
TOCTAi3FC
OSJAP1
IVOP
CAROTI
PI&RCD
MOTUS1.
EAROL
U1t10V
SR3jCAR2
SPS~iHP&.i
I00C1
3421507
10.37645
1
.2289317
36.69542
1435.784
151.3099
34385.47
189.5036
49276.16
.3954877
.1061712
.1393497
.0036098
.1738553
.7272727
.2169874
.0650299
.0119443
.0272064
.0172528
.01858
.0464499
.1287326
.052422
.0836098
.4717983
.8414068
4.489715
93.22641
11.30723
.2853351
1.426676
25.14068
4.657598
.0491042
.30G5693
9.455045
4.225627
.2627737
1.257356
.64499
.0165893
.810219
1162
10.47472
1
0
38.21773
1548.037
166.3597
39976.34
207.2831
56941.36
.4302926
.1153184
.1574871
.0895009
.1901893
.7002616
.2504303
.0791738
.0137694
.0180723
.020654
.0215146
.0473322
.1643718
.0576592
.1084337
.5086059
.9741824
.5180723
73.65549
8.802065
.3089501
1.729776
25.83563
4.975904
.0094664
.2771034
8.400171
4.253330
.2013769
1.231355
.7607573
.0197935
.9414802
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SAMPLE 2
Total Male
10.04548
1
1
31.56812
1057.701
100.6203
15554.77
129.6203
23458.87
.2782609
.0753623
.0782609
.0637681
.1188406
.7913043
.1043478
.0173913
.0057971
.057971
.0057971
.0086957
.0434783
.0086975
.0347826
c
.3478261
.3942029
17.86667
159.1436
19.74493
.2057971
.4057971
22.8
3.585507
.1826037
.4057971
13.05167
4.132320
.4695652
1.344928
.2550725
.0057971
.3681159
-. 429232
0
1
-6.64961
-490.336
-65.7394
-24421.G
-77.6628
-33482.5
-. 152032
-. 03995G
-. 079226
-. 025733
-. 071349
.0830427
-. 146083
-. 061733
-. 007972
. 0393937
-. 014857
-. 012819
-. 003854
-. 155674
-. 022877
-. 108434
-. 160780
-. 579980
17.34359
85.48807
10.94286
-. 103153
-1.32398
-3.03563
-1.39040
.1731423
.12068E7
4.651497
-. 121009
.2681883
.1135723
-. 505685
-. 013996
-. 573364
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SAMPLE 3
TOTAL SAMPLE MEANS
male
Table A4-5
Fenale
- MaleFeaale
191
1L.43842
1
0
34.07853
1243.335
81.63351
12703.70
132.5812
30128.38
.1465969
.3664921
.434555
.0471204
.8900524
.052356
-6544503
.3455497
07486911
.3036649
.5963 506
.1361257
5.701571
.2774369
i1.88482
25.31414
8.392670
0
.1570681
8.785065
4.042319
9.936013
1
1
31.67188
1074.766
54.10938
45C5.797
106.5313
1773.53
.21875
.23125
.218.075
.15625
.359375
.421875
-3125
.640625
.140625
.375
56.*4375
5.875
.25
8.828125
23.09375
5.203125
1171875
.53125
12.08417
3.096875
-. 502402
-2.406G66
-168.569
-27.5241
-8197.90
-26.0499
-12364.9
.0721531
-. 085242
-. 215305
.1091296
-. 530677
.322644
-. 232575
-. 033050
-. 10306G
-. 163040
-. 221ru59
56.30137
.1734293
-. 027437
-3.05669
-2.22039
-3.18955
.171875
.3741819
3. 299109
-. 0735G9
Total
255
LU3TES
Intercept
SEX
AGE
AGU2
FYSERVC
IYSLRVC2
1TLFEX
FiLFEX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACON2
ACOL,43
ACO4
occi
OCC2
MARITAL
CIIILDi
Ci ILD2
TOTAbFC
OSJAP1
INFORM
PERCD
EARSOC
EARDL
10.31233
1
.25093A4
33.47451
1201.027
74.72549
10646.18
126.0431
27025.05
1647059
.345098
.3803922
.0745090"
.7568627
.1333333
-5950784
.3372549
.7215686
.2627451
.5411765
14.26667
5.745098
.27050032
11.11765
24.75686
7.592157
.0431373
.2509804
9.613076
4.023855
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SAMPLE 3 Table A4-6
MARRIED SAMPLE MEANS
Total
183
LNBTES
Intercept
AGE
AGL2
FYSERVC
FYSEIAVC2
FILFLX
P7LFEX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACQN; 2
ACOi43
ACON4
occi
OCC2
ChILD1
CilILD2
LFA111
DLHH
'OrABkC
OSJAP1
WOP
CAROyr
INFOlei
PERCD
Morsi
EAiSoc
EARDL
UNOV
SPSCAR2
SPSTRPRL
IMPCAR2F
10.44972
1
.2243437
35.25683
1327.497
87.15847
13420.82
147.0492
33613.31
.1639344
.3169399
.3989071
.0546443
.7759563
.1202136
.5519126
.3909071
.3551913
.7103025
16.213503
87.53005
6.054545
.234153
11.22951
25.46446
7.890710
.0273224
.2349727
9.426439
4.066027
.2622951
1.573382
.60G5574
.0273224
.8C32707
Male
142
10.55930
10
0
36.19713
1394.232
96.16901
16012.52
157.7324
38 038.68
.154929G
.3239437
.4507042
.0422535
.8873239
.056338
.5915493
.4034507
.4084507
.7887324
.1619718
67.85211
6.387324
.3028169
11.936G2
25.85915
3.654930
C
.1478373
8.681G16
4.014668
.1549296
1.521271
.6901403
.02112GS
.9295775
Female
- Male
10.0G845 0
32
1096.195
55.95122
4444.6U3
11C .0488
18233.44
.195122
.2926829
.2195122
.097561
.3902439
.3414634
.4146341
.3653537
.1707317
.4390244
71.82927
155.6329
4.902439
.2195122
8.730483
24.09756
5 . 243902
.1219512
.5365054
12.0G529
4.243902
.6341463
1.756090
.3170732
.0437805
.3650537
-.491339
C
-4. 19710
-29.037
-40.2172
-11557.0
-47.635
-19752.2
.0401924
-. 031261
-. 231192
.0553175
-. 49703
.2351254
-. 176915
-. 0.2597
-. 237719
-. 349722
71.G5732
87.83031
-1.43433
-.0-3335
-3.15013
-1.7615,
-3.41103
.1219512
.3335931
3.324072
.2292341
.4792167
.2348271
-.37320
.0276537
-. 5G3724
1emale
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APPENDIX 5
REGRESSION TABLES
TABLE A5-1 SAMPLE 1 TOTAL SAMPLE HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL
TABLE A5-2 SAMPLE 1 TOTAL SAMPLE FULL REGRESSION
TABLE A5-3 SAMPLE 1 TOTAL SAMPLE PERSONAL REGRESSION
TABLE A5-4 SAMPLE 1 TOTAL FULL REGRESSION MALES
TABLE A5-5 SAMPLE 1 TOTAL FULL REGRESSION FEMALES
TABLE A5-6 SAMPLE 1 TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION MALES
TABLE A5-7 SAMPLE 1 TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION FEMALES
TABLE A5-8 SAMPLE 2 TOTAL SAMPLE HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL
TABLE A5-9 SAMPLE 2 TOTAL SAMPLE FULL REGRESSION
TABLE A5-10 SAMPLE 2 TOTAL SAMPLE PERSONAL REGRESSION
TABLE A5-il SAMPLE 2 TOTAL FULL REGRESSION MALES
TABLE A5-12 SAMPLE 2 TOTAL FULL REGRESSION FEMALES
TABLE A5-13 SAMPLE 2 TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION MALES
TABLE A5-14 SAMPLE 2 TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION FEMALES
TABLE A5-15 SAMPLE 3 TOTAL SAMPLE HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL
TABLE A5-16 SAMPLE 3 TOTAL SAMPLE FULL REGRESSION
TABLE A5-17 SAMPLE 3 TOTAL SAMPLE PERSONAL REGRESSION
TABLE A5-18 SAMPLE 3 TOTAL FULL REGRESSION MALES
TABLE A5-19 SAMPLE 3 TOTAL FULL REGRESSION FEMALES
TABLE A5-20 SAMPLE 3 TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION MALES
TABLE A5-21 SAMPLE 3 TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION FEMALES
TABLE A5-22 SAMPLE 1 TOTAL MARRIED SAMPLE HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL
TABLE A5-23 SAMPLE 1 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
TABLE A5-24 SAMPLE 1 MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
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APPENDIX 5
REGRESSION TABLES
TABLE A5-25 SAMPLE 1 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION MALES
TABLE A5-26 SAMPLE l MARRIED FULL REGRESSION FEMALES
TABLE A5-27 SAMPLE 1 MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION MALES
TABLE A5-28 SAMPLE I MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION FEMALES
TABLE A5-29 SAMPLE 2 TOTAL MARRIED SAMPLE HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL
TABLE A5-30 SAMPLE 2 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
TABLE A5-31 SAMPLE 2 MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
TABLE A5-32 SAMPLE 2 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION MALES
TABLE A5-33 SAMPLE 2 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION FEMALES
TABLE A5-34 SAMPLE 2 MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION MALES
TABLE A5-35 SAMPLE 2 MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION FEMALES
TABLE A5-36 SAMPLE 3 TOTAL MARRIED SAMPLE HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL
TABLE A5-37 SAMPLE 3 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
TABLE A5-38 SAMPLE 3 MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
TABLE A5-39 SAMPLE 3 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION MALES
TABLE A5-40 SAMPLE 3 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION FEMALES
TABLE A5-41 SAMPLE 3 MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION MALES
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION FEMALESTABLE A5-42 SAMPLE 3
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SAMPLE 1 Table A5-1
TOTAL SAMPLE
Human Capital Model
DEP VARIABLE: LNBTES
SOURCE
100&L 8
ERRQR 361
I TIAL 369
ROUT MSE
DEP MEAN
E.V.
4ARIABLE DF
SUM CIE
SQUARES
13.75920'4
11.601029
25.360233
0.179261
9.908116
1.809271
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
M EAN
S UARE
1.719901
0.032136
R-S2UARE
ADJ R-S0
STAMDARD
ERROR
F VALUE.
53.523
PRDB>F
0.0001
0 .5426
0.5324
T FOR HO:
PAKAMBTER=0 PR.Oa > IT
INTIRCEP
§EX
EDTSZ
f0(52
lOPS2
EYSIRVC
EYSERVC2
ETLEEX
ETLEEX2
9.760481
-D.129843
-0.091059
0.133456
0.644721
0.002430539
-.0000029893
-0.0010925
.00000542151
0.065173
0.01942[P
0.065044
0.061952
0.121 379
0.0007075495
.00000291956
0.0004122505
.00300149219
149.763
"6.686 0
41.40 Q
2.154**0
5.31 ''
3.435 *
,-1.024
-2.650
3.633 9
0.0ol
O.o01
0.16214
0.0319
0.3001
0.0007
O .30b6
0.0044
U.0333
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SAMPLE I Table A5-2
TOTAL FULL REGRES SION
DEP VARLABLE: LNBTES
SOURCE OF
tDOEL 35
IRROR 334
C TOTAL 369
RO0 MSE
DEP MEAN
C.v.
dARiABLE
INTIRCEP
1EX
&GE
8GER
IDTS2
1DCSZ
IEPS2
8CCN2
B CON3
ACCN4
EYSERVC
EYSEBVC2
ETLFEX
ETLEEX2
acci
a CCI,
10N2
IDN4
EJT2
EJT4
EJTS
6 AR4T AL
CHILD I
CHILD2
LFAM
SOTABFC
ASJAO1
*WOP
CAROD
INFORM
BERCO
SOTS)
I AR SOC
EARDO
SUM OF
SQUARES
23.181173
2.179062
25.360233
0.080772
9.908116
0.8152119
PARAMETER
ESTIMATO
8 .3348 22
-0.059049
0.081595
-0.00113459
-0 .032602
-0.00644853
0.163365
-0.000670254
-0.D0119934
-0.160134
0.0001311509
3.10224E-01
-0.000833013
.00000500245
0.273700
D.164329
0.209322
0.104541
0.018255
0.079632
0.067737
-a.014603
0.082291
0.015318
-0.017149
-0,.012923
-0.000183512
0.0008898622
-0.013521
0.0004486263
0.001512576
0.010714
-0.00269343
-0.00774449
0.001631815
-0.00270582
MEAN
SUARE
0.662319
0.006524139
R-S2UARE
ADJ R-5Q
STAIDARD
ERROR
0.225637
0.016072
0.014809
0.000239619
0.033369
0.031782
0.060423
0.015387
0.013237
0.090090
0.0003916847
.00000162204
0.0002944074
.00000139038
0.026985
0.026271
0.027342
0.024407
0.018397
0.027268
0.024573
0.017247
0.031430
0.011467
0.008957773
0.009194111
0.001533397
0.001237886
0.011593
0.001034213
040005071669
0.00277786
0.013560
0.009384159
0.002204351
0.004634506
F VALUL
101.51&
40B>F
0.0001
0.9141
9.9051
7 FOR Ho:
PARAMITER=D
36.939
63.674
5.510
84.4735
40.977
-0.203
2.704
*0.044'.
+0 .091
+1 .777
0.335
0.191
"2.&29
3.598
10.142
6.255
7.656
4.284
0.f" 992
2.757
*0.847
2 . 61 a
1.336
W1.91
4-1.412
40120
0.719
*1.b166
0.434
2.982
3.857
10.199
*0.825
0.740
-0.584
POB > III
0.0001
0.00U3
0.0001
0.0001
0.3293
0.8393
0.0012
0.9653
0.9219
0.0764
0.7380
0.8484
0.0049
0.0004
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.3218
0.0037
0.30b2
0.3918
0.0092
0.1825
9.05b4
0.1540
0.9048
0.4727
0.2444
0.6647
0.0031
0.0001
0.8427
0.409B
0.4597
1.5597
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SAMPLE 1 Table A5-3
TOTAL SAMPLE
PERSONAL REGRESSION
3EP WARIABLE: LMBTES
9DUILE
dODEL 26
IkRiR 343
£ TOSAL 369
RoaT MSE
DEP MEAN
c.V.
SUm OF
SQUARES
17.040933
8.319303
25.360233
0.155739
9.908116
1.571829
MEAN
52U ARE
0.655420
0.0Z4255
R-S3UARE
ADJ R-5Q
IARiABLE
INTERCEP
SEX
AGE
AGE2
10TS2
1DC62
1OPS2ACNz2
A COR3
aC0114
EYSIRVC
EYSIRVC2
ETLFEX
ETLERX2
tARISAL
IHILDI
£HILD2
LFAK
5OTABFC-
jSJAR1
dwo
9AROT
NFORM
3ERCD
OTS1
EARSOC
EAROL
PARAMETES
DF ESTIMAT8
1 8.449045
1 -0.086608
1 0.079395
1 -0.00109799
1 -0.161236
1 0.005642689
1 3.446421
1 -0.059333
1 0.096633
1 -0.179376
1 0.001874766
1 -.0030045293
1 -0.00200473
1 .00000905974
1 0.006720006
1 -0.04048)
1 -0.031768
1 -0.00170058
1 0.002531378
1 -0.055731
1 0.004558492
1 0.001779096
1 0.030173
1 -0.033141
1 -0.026829
1 0.0003255703
1 0.011356
STAiWARD
ERROR
0.319624
0.030288
0.026205
0.0004334197
0.061961
0.060068
0.111530*
0.029118
0.023303
0.169980
04000 6986629
.00000277501
0.0005556473
.00000261475
0.021915
0.016892
0.017197
0.002928612
0.002346968
0.021918
0.001862445
0.0009590118
0.005061932
0.025613
0.017907
0.004202574
0.008837141
T FOR Ha:
PARAMETER=O
21.685
6.2.959
3.Q30
*2.551
,2.602 -
0.094
4.003
*2.036
4.347 -
*1.055
2.683-
*1.632
-3.608
3.465
0.307
a2.396-
*1.47
-0.581
1.079
*2.543
2.446
1.855
5.962
*1.321
-1 .496
0.077
1.285
PiOB > [Ii
0.0001
0.0045
9.002
0.0112
0.9252
0.0001
0.0 4z4
0.0001
0.2920
0.0016
0.1036
Q.0004
0.00G6
0.7593
0.017L
0.0656
0.5618
0.2815
0.0114
0.0149
0.0644
0.0001
0.1973
0.1350
0.9303
0.1996
F VALUE
27.023
PRBD>F
0.0001
*.6720
0.6471
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SAMLE 1 Table A5-4
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION
Males
DEP VARIABLE: LNBIES
I gUR E
SO0L 33
IRROR 165
C TOIAL 198
SUM OEt
SQUARES
MEAN
SQIUARE
15.70789S 0.475997
0.890929 0.005399569
16.598829
90T MSE
OEP MEAN
c.V.
0.073482
10.002809
0.7346113
R-52UARE
ADJ R-S9
NUTE: MODEL 15 NOT FULL mANK. LEAST SQUtARES SOLUTIONS FaR THE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT JNIQUE. SOME STAIISTICS d1LL BE
MISLEADING. A REPaTiED DF OF 0 OR 8 MEANS THAT THE
ESTIMATE IS BIASED4 THE FOLLOWING PAkAMETERS HAVE BEEN
SET TO 0, SINCE THE VARIABLES ARE A LINEAR COMBINATION
DE OTHER VARIABLES AS SHOWN.
BERCO =
VARJABLE
INTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
I0CS2
IDPS2
ACONZ
ACOma
iCO4
EYSERVC
EYSIRVCZ
ETLEIX
ETLFIX2
Accl
3CC2
£ NI
IDN2
IDN4
EJTI
EJT2
EJT4
EJTS
dARITAL
CHIL01
CHIL02
(FAK
SGTABFC
I SJAR 1
dWOP
1AROT
PARAMETEB
OF ESTIMATB
1 8.617991
1 0.067385
1 -0.000895763
I -0.060826
1 -0.036221
1 0.0968173
1 -0.014463
1 -0.00923289
1 -0.141414
1 0.0004809396
1 -.0000014333
1 -0.000397576
1 .00000321046
1 0.370159
1 0.248748
1 0.178603
1 0.099916
1 -0.011543
1 0.036194
1 0.032822
1 -0.017979
1 0.065192
1 0.01863ft
1 -0.028842
1 -0.020051
1 -0.015681
1 0.0008711617
1 -0.036293
1 0.00120942
1 0.0006055723
STAIDARD
ERROR
0.299605
0.019117
0.0002973164
0.039811
0.035213
0.060105
0.022421
0.018781
0.3&8854
0.000497657
.00000190197
0.0004176241
.00000173614
0.031993
0.030755
0.030-528
0.028902
0.025418
0.033240
0.030741
0.026469
0.038819
0.017013
0.010516
0.012335
0.010465
0.001223235
0.014284
0.001406464
0.0005910939
T FOR HO:
PAkAMETER=O
28.765
3.525
03.013
0-1.528
+1.*029
1.612
00.645
*0.492
4h1.592
0.966
*0.754
0-0.952
1.849
11 .57D
8.088
5.850
3.457
*0.454
1.089
1.068
*0.679
1.679
1.095
"2.743
-1.626
if1.499
0.712
*2 541
0.860
1 .024
PROB > ITI
0.0301
9.0095
0.0030
0.1 2d5
9.3351
0.10d9
0.5199
9.6236
0.1134
0.3353
0.4522
0.3425
0.0662
0.03Q1
0.0001
9.00U1
0.0007
9.65U4
9.2778
Q.2812
0.4919
0.0950
0.2750
a.006b
0.10!9
0.1358
2.4774
0.0120
9.3911
0.3011
F VALUE
88.155
BRDB>F
0.0001
9.9463
0.9356
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SANPLE 1 Table A5-4
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION
Males
WARiABLE DF
PARAMETER
ESTIMATB
STAMOARD T FOR Ha:
ERROR PAkAMETEA=0 PRIOB > IiI
a.011346 0.003211554
I -0.019811 0.012010'
1 -0.00548353 0.00431699
1 -0.00488395 0.006130484
INFORM
BERCD
dOTS1
EARSBC
E AR DO
3.532
.
41-.650
*1 .270
*0.797
9.0005
.
Q.1008
0.2058
9.4268
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SAMPLE 1 Table A5-5
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION
DEP VARIABLE: LNBTES
Females
SOURCE OF
dODEL 32
RRDR 138
1 TOTAL 170
SuM OF
SQUARES
M EAN
S2UARE
4.25232a 0.132885
0.648207 0.004697155
4.900527
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
E.V.
0 .068536
9.797919
0.6994934
R-S3UARE
ADJ R-S0
toTi: MSDEL IS NOT FULL BANK. LEAST SQUARES SOLUTIONS FOR THE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT JNIQUE. SOME STATISTICS WILL BE
MISLEADING. A REPORTED DF OF 0 OR B MEANS THAT THE
ESTIMATE IS BIASED& THE FOLLOWING PAAAMETERS HAVE BEE4
SET TO 0, SINCE THB VARIABLES ARE A LINEAR C04BINAT1O4
DE OTHER VARIABLES AS SHOWN.
IDPSZ
iCGN4 =
VARiABLE
INTIRCEP
AGE
AGE2
1DT52
1DCSZ
IDPSE2
acoeizACOM2 9A C4U3
EYSIRVC
EYSERVCZ
ETLFEX
ETLFEX2
iCCI
ICC2
IDNI
IDN2
6DN4
EJT1
'EJT2
EJT4
EJTS
SARITAL
GHIL01
EHILD2
L F AIS
5OTA8FC
ISJAP1
*Wo9
PARAMETER
OF ESTIMATE
1 3.576829
1 0.065229
1 -0.000999913
1 -0.00631464
1 0.028219
0
I -0.020023
1 -0.009259260 3
1 0.0007192072
1 8.72327E-01
1 0.0003245204
1 -. 0000023431
1 0.086799
1 0.046 4
1 0.274719
1 0.10900b
1 0.019102
1 0.132393
1 0.113458
1 -0.019332
1 0.325367
1 -0.000955946
1 -0.00781185
1 0.008819579
1 -0.00105166
1 0.00112043
1 0.025599
1 -0.000899133
STANDARD
ERR1R
0.3&9132
0.025915
0.0004296061
0.053010'
0.052438
0.019051
0.016379
0*0008167677
.00000527805
0.0004948991
.00000295216
0.042283
0.042199
0 .050135
0.037870
0.024262
0.043503
0.037930
0.019923
0.065133
0.014348
0.015138
0.012577
0.00373826
0.003709436
0.016892
0.001343226
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=13
22.041 -
2.517
*2.328 -
-0.119
0.538
+1.051
0.831
0.165
0.656
;0.794
2.053
1.131
5.480
2.S78
0.737
3.043
2.991
'0.970
4.995
0.067
*0.516
0.701
.0.281
0.302
1.515
-0.669
PAOB > III
0.0001
0.0130
0.0214
9.90t4
0.5913
-
0.291
0.5749
9.3501.
9.8690
0.5131
9.042
0.2730
9.00 il
0.00'.6
0.4314
0.0328
0.0033
0.3336
0.0001
0.9410
0.6066
0.4843
0 .7749
0.7631
0.1319
0.5044
F VALUE
28.291
PRDB>F
O.8677
9.8371
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SANLE 1 Table A5-5
TOTAL FULL REGRSSION
Females
tARIABLE OF
PARAMETER
ESTIMATB
STA:DARD T FOR HO:
ERROR PARAMETER=G P&OB > it
0.002958139
0.00190494
-. 0116 71
-0.033666
0.0006281027
0.0 02773946
Y.000795653
0.004419389
0.012699
0.013640
0.002299509
0.00611384
(ARUT
INFORM
BERCO
BOTS1
IAR5C
IARDL
3.118 -
0.43L
4.0 . 920
o-2.468
0.273
0.454
0.0003
Q.6631
0.35934
0.0148
9.7851
0.65118
-222-
SAMPLE 1 Table A5-6
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Males
DEP VARIkABLE: LNBTES
OUILEE
d 00EL 24
EkRDo 174
6 TOTAL 198
ROOT MSE
QEP MEAN
c.v.
SU4 OF
SQUARES
12.004839
4.593981
16.598826
0.162489
10.002801
1.62442
MEAN
S JU ARE
0.530202
0.026402
R-SQUARE
A0J R-S0
40TE; MODEL IS NOT FULL 14NK. LEAST SCLJARFS SDLUTIDmS F3R THE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT JNIQUE. SOME STATISTICS WILL BE
MISLEADING. A REPOIED OF OF 0 CR B MEANS THAT THE
ESTIMATE IS BIASED* THE FOLLOWING PARAMETERS HAVE BEE4
SET TO 0, SINCE THE VARIABLES ARE A LINEAR CaiBINA.T0a4
OE OTHER VARIABLES AS SHOWN.
BERC =
f ARIABLIB
INTERCEP
AGE
&GER
10C52
IDPS2
&coma
A CN2
EYSERVC
EYSERVC2
ETLEIX
ETLFEX2
SARiTAL
CHILD1
SHILD2
L F All
50iTABFC
ASJAR1
dwDP
SARQT
iNFBRM
SERC0
OTS3
1AR&QC
1ARDO
OF
PARAMETEA
ESTIMATB
7.951344
0.106842
-0.0014273
-0.272131
-0.051265
0.338344
-0 .041115
0.139443
-0.182613
0.001874872
-0.000006576
-0.00221062
.00000967051
-0.00751999
-0.04911FA
-0.022231
-0.012113
0.00165874
-0.084299
0.005824356
0.0006920902
0.031751
a
-0.029293
.013851
0.003352326
STAND ARD
ERROR
0 .567925
0.037623
0 40005987327
0.080416
0.074941
0.126502
0.047570
0.036743
0.186046
0.0009954283
0.0000035934
0.0008887132
.00000368315
0.037103
0.022427
0.026301
0.0Z2865
0.002632272
0.030273
0.002799323
0.00129467
0.006514133
0.025933
0.009090209
0.013090
T FOR HO:
P&RAMITER=D
14.001
*2.3851
*3.384
'0.684
2.675
*0 .864
1.883
61.830
-2.487
2.626
0.203
a2.190
K0.530
0.630
*2 . 78 5
2.081
0.535
4.75
-1. -130
1.521
0.z56
PRDOB > ITI
0.0001
0.0051
D.0009
0.4948
9.0092
9.3886
0.3277
0.0613
0.0690
0.0138
0.0394
0.83vb
0.0299
0.3992
0.5910
0.5294
0.0060
6.0389
0.5936
9.0001
0.2601
0.12&6
0.7982
F VALUE
18.945
PRDB>F
0.0011
9.7232
9.6851
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SAMPLE 1
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Females
Table A5-7
DEP UARIABLE: LNBTES
5OURCE
NUDEL 23
IRRI.R 147
9 TOTAL 170
ROT MSE
DEP MEAN
CoV
SUM Of
SQUAREI
2.499874
2.400653
4.900527
0.127793
9.797919
1.304284
MEAt
SQUARE
0.108690
0.016331
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
qGTE: MODEL IS NOT FULL AANK. LEAST SQUARtS SLUTIavs F'R THE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT UNIQUE. SOME STATISTICS WILL OE
MISLEADING. A REPONTED 0F OF 0 DR B MEANS THAT THE
ESTIMATE IS BIASEDa THE FaLLOWING PAKAMETERS HAVE BEE4
SET TO 0, SINCE THE VARIABLES ARE A LINAR CO4BINATIO4
OE OTHER VARIABLES AS SHOWN.
IDP62
1C004
#ARIABLE2
INTERCEB
AGE
AGE2
ffDTS2
IDC52
IDPSZ
ACON3
'CON".ACDN4
EYSEVC
EYSIRVC2
FTLFEX
ETLFSX2
EARiTAL
SHIL01
EHILD2
LFAH3
TOTAdFC
ISJAR1
"WOP
CAROT
INFORM
3ERCO
dcT51
1ARSD1C
EAROL
PARAMETEik
0F ESTIMATB
1 8.831039
1 0.063061
1 -0.00110592
1 -0.078626
1 0.052151
0
1 -a.073181
1 0.04068%1
0 3
1 .00002128595
1 O.0000169783
1 -0.000743992
1 .00000217383
1 0.002742223
1 -0.051723
1 -0.00243263
1 0.0002660694
1 0.00189536
1 -0.032236
1 0.001062092
1 0.003783523
1 0.010412
1 -0.034483
1 -0.058941
1 -0.00439447
1 0.022613
STAIDAR0
ERROR
0.643067
0.043383
0.0007265342
0.098309
0.097626
0.033667
0.027318
0.001393727
.0000093921 B
0.0008146694
.00000472187
0.0a5918
0.027212
0.022583
0.006814477
0.006722927
0.030046
0.002310298
0.001367195
0.008022572
0.022205
0.0a3879
0.004146496
0.010966
T FOR Ha:
PARAMETER=D
13.733
1.454
+1.522
-0.800
0.534
+2.I74
1.489
0.015
1.967
-i+0.913
00 460
0.106
0-1.901
'40.108
0.039
0.282
-1.073
0.460
2.727
1.298
'1.0553
02.46' a
41 .060
2.062
PAOB > III
0.00i1
0.1482
0.1301
0.421
0.59%0
0.0313
0.13a6
0.9878
0.0638
0.3626
0.6459
0.91!9
0.0593
0.9144
0.9689
0.77#4
0.2351
0.64b4
0.0012
0.1964
0.1226
0.0 147
0.2910
0.0410
F VALUE
6.655
PROBF
0.0001
9.5101
0.4335
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SAMPLE 2
TOTAL SAMPLE
Human Capital Model
DEP VARIABLE:
Table A5-8
SOURCE
MODEL a
ERR3R 1185
C TOTAL 1893
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
C.V.
SUM OF
SQUARES
138.624
110.497
249.121
0.242114
10.342667
2.340923
MEAN
SQUARE
17.328025
0.058619
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-S
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
SEX
E)TS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
FYSERVC,
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
PARAMETER
DF ESTIMATE
1 9.887912
1 -0.244689
1 0.131139
1 0.234686
1 0.456998
1 0.002225607
1 -. 0000032546
1 0.001617767
1 -. 0000026448
STANDARD
ERROR
0.021190
0.0133b5
0.013283
0.019202
0.018389
0.0002488162
6.08 9 13E-07
0.0002457611
5.15377E-07
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0 PR3B > IT I
466.637
-18.309
9.873
12.222
24.851
8.945
-5.345
6.583
-5.132
0.0001
0.201
0.0001
0.0001
LNBTES
F VALUE
295.604
PROB>F
0.0001
0.5565
0.5546
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SAMPLE 2 Table A5-9
TOTAL SAMPLE
Full Regression
DEP VARIABLE: LNBTES
S3UICE
MODEL 36
ERROR 1857
C TOTAL 1593
R3OT 4SE
DEP MEAN
C.V.
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
SEX
AGE
AGE2*
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACON2
ACON3
ACDN4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
OCCl
UCC3
CCC4
DCC5
CCC6
0 DC7
DCCe
OCC9
DCc10
Dccli
MARITAL
CIILD1
CrILD2
LFAM
TDTABFC
0SJAP1
kWOP
CAROT
I NF3R'1
PERCD
M3TS1
EARSOC
EARDL
SUM OF
SQUARES
156.477
92.644659
249.121
0.223359
10.342667
2.159592
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
9.504008
-0.158997
0.022070
-0.000241805
0.113045
0.136105
0.278493
-0.036741
0.057429
-0.00425376
0.002145631
-.0000034697
:).0005208802
-8 .86915E-07
0.229914
0.115552
0.109889
0.085314
-0.124169
0.054384
0.047927
0.117332
0.013684
0.106827
-0.00478017
0.027422
0.022275
-0.000304033
-n.00074649
-0.013553
0.005213214
-0.000315404
0.0001124537
-0.014898
-0.00560177
-0.00198139
0.00131401
MEAN
SQUARE
4.346572
0.049889
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SO
STANDARD
ERROR
0.123697
0.023891
0.006578144
0.0003824259
0.012713
0.023110
0.027483
0.041425
0.040695
0.040394
0.00023b6848
5.71376E-07
0.000296623
6.15020E-07
0.018323
0.031395
0.049797
0.031904
0.042844
0.040287
0.026373
0.018842
0.025814
0.023543
0.014538
0.009069668
0.006715334
0.0002099547
0.0002348617
0.011730
0.3010831
0.0002633188
0.0004761554
0.022866
0.011379
0.00398565
0.005325884
F VALUE
87.124
PROW)F
0.0001
0.6281
0.6209
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
76.833
-6.655
3.355
-2.934
8.892
5.890
10.133
-0.887
1.411
-0.105
9.065
-6.073
1.756
-1.442
12 .215*
3.716
2.207
2.674
-2.898
1.350
1.817
6.227
0.530
4.53A
-0.329
3.023
3.317
-1.448
-3.178
-1.155
4.813
-1.198
0.236
-0.652
-0.492
-0.497
0.247
PR3B > IT[
0.0001
0.0001
0.000B
0 0.34
0.0001
0.0031
0.DD01
0.3752
0.1584
0.9161
0.0031
0.00Gi
0.0792
0.1494
0.001
D.3)32
0 .02 75
0.3076
3.0038
0.1772
0.0693
0. 0321
0.5961
0. 0001
0.7423
0.3:25
0.0009
0.1478
0.0015
0.2481
0.3331
0.2311
0.8133
0.5148
0.6226
0.6192
0.8052
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Table A5-10SAMPLE 2
TOTAL SAMPLE
Personal Regression
DEP VARIABLE:
SOURCE OF
MJODEL 26
ERR3R 1867
C TOTAL 1893
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
C.V.
SUM OF
SQUARES
146.276
102.845
249.121
0.234704
10.342667
2.269279
MEAN
SQUARE
5.625993
0.055086
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
SEX
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDC52
E)PS2
AbCO42
ACDN3
ACON4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
MARITAL
CHILD1
CHiLD2
LFAM
TOTABFC
OSJAP1
WWOP
CARDT
INFORM
PERCO
MOTS1
EARSOC
EAR)L
PARAMETER
OF ESTIMATE
1 9.502022
1 -0.186028
1 0.024849
1 -0.000286667
1 0.114878
1 0.173743
1 0.330942
1 -0.00264458
1 0.084206
1 -0.013672
1 0.002145577
1 -. 0000030808
1 3.0007117086
1 -. 0000010646
1 -0.00355487
1 0.022973
1 0.027476
1 -0.00029675
1 -0.000893405
1 -0.014120
1 0.007300292
1 -0.000181705
1 0.0005783672
1 -0.00933476
1 -0.00747502
1 -0.00405921
1 0.304600707
STANDARD
ERROR
0.128328
0.024109
0.006801342
.00008511552
0.013214
0.023621
0.026921
0.042681
0.041203
0.041598
0.0002454982
5.96236E-07
0.00C3088715
6.40734E-07
0.015236
0.009513408
0.007001177
0.0002201344
0.000245504
0.012241
0.001114331
0.000275894
0.0004977264
0.023982
0.011917
0.004168623
0.005549593
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=O
74.045
7-.716
3.654
-3.368
8.694
7.355
12.293
-0.062
2.044
-0.329
8.740
-5.167
2.304
-1.662
-0.233
2.415
3.924
-1.348
-3.639
-1.154
6.551
-0.659
1.162
-0.389
-0.627
-0.974
0.829
PR39 > ITI
0.0001
0.031
0.0003
0.0008
0.0001
0.0031
3.9536
0.0411
0.7424
D.3213
0.0968
0.8155
0.0158
0.3)31
0.1778
0.0003
0.2488
0.3331
0.5102
0.2454
0.6971
0. 53 06
0.3303
0.4072
LNBTES
F VALUE
102.131
PRD3B>F
0.ODDJ
0.5872
0.5814
-227-
SAMPLE 2 Table A5-11
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION
Males
DEP VARIABLE: LN5TES
SOURCE OF
MODEL 35
ERROR 1319
C TOTAL 1354
ROUT MSE
DEP MEAN
C .V
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
AGE
4GE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
fDPS2
ACO42
ACCN3
ACON4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
g,.T L F E X 2
C 1
UCC3
OCC4
DCC5
0CC6
DCC7
DCC10a
%C~C11
MARITAL
CilLD1
CIILD2
LFAM
TOTABFC
0SJAPI
WWoP
CAR3T
INFORM
PERCD
MOTS i
EARSOC
EAR)L
SUM OF
SQUARES
71.761831
54.072649
125.834
0.202473
10.457437
1.93616
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
9.389633
0.021642
-0.000206487
0.116817
0.153910
0.298976
-0.035721
0.052647
0.004409153
0.001590828
-. 0000023528
0.001062571
-. 000021507
0.171074
0.062180
0.036459
-0.038348
-0.169217
-0.059030
0.024553
0.075050
-0.032173
0.066369
0.016827
0.021245
0.017067
-0.000296264
0-.000583372
-0.022260
0.00555369
-.0000202569
.00002855031
-0.085830
0.011424
0.005264033
0.00828901
MEAN
SQUARE
2.050338
0.040995
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-S
STANDARD
ERROR
0.145700
0.007807289
.00009499338
0.314009
0.025149
0.029948
0.048461
0.047953
0.047121
0.0002507474
5.78139E-07
0.0C330418
6.48512E-07
0.019878
0.030765
0.048939
0.040194
0.040951
0.042112
0.028403
0.018457
0.027337
0.022437
0.01815 b
0.009197492
0.006909126
0.000272497
0.0002882877
0.012230
0.001065093
0.0002841647
0.0004516137
0.062724
0.012544
0.004518824
0.005809032
F VALUE
50.014
PROS>F
0.0D01
0.5703
0.5589
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
64.445
2.772
-2.174
6 .339
6.120
9.983
-0.737
1.098
0.094
6.344
-4.070
3.216
-3.316
8.606
2.021
0.745
-0.954
-4.132
-1.402
0.864
4.066
-1.177
2.958
0.927
2.310
2.470
-1.087
-2.024
-1.820
5.214
-0.071
0.063
-1.368
0.911
1.165
1.427
PRDB > ITI
0.0001
0.3299
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.!612
0.2725
0.9255
0.3001
D.3331
0.0013
0.0009
0.3001
0.0435
0.4564
0.3402
0.0001
0.1612
3.3375
0.0301
3.2a396k
0.0032
0.3542
0.0210
3.3136
0.2771
0.0432
0.0690
0.0031
3.9432
0.9496
0.1714
0.3626
0.2443
0.1538
-228-
SAMPLE 2 Table A5-12
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION
Females
DEP VARIABLE: LN8TES
SOURCE OF
MODEL 34
ERR3R 504
C TJTAL 538
ROUT MSE
DEP MEAN
C .V.
SUM OF
SQUARES
26.944089
33.625362
60.569452
0.258296
10.054144
2.569053
MEAN
SQUARE
0.792473
0.066717
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-S0
NOTE: M3DEL IS NOT FULL RANK. LEAST SQUARES SOLUTIONS FO THE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT UNIQUE. SOME STATISTICS WILL BE
MISLEADING. A REPORTED OF OF 0 DR B MEANS THAT THE
ESTIMATE IS BIASED. THE FOLLOWING PARAMETERS HAVE BEEN
SET TO 0, SINCE THE VARIABLES ARE A LINEAR COMBINATION
OF OTHER VARIABLES AS SHOWN.
0CC11
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
tDTS2
EDCS2
LDPS2
ACDN2
ACON3
-4CON4
FYSERVC
FYSERVCZ
FTLFEX
FITLFEX2
oCCi
OCC3
DCC4
0CC5
0CC6
DCC7
OCC8
OCC9
DCC10
('C11
MARITAL
CA I LD I
CIILD2
LFAM
TOTABFC
OSJAPI
WWOP
PARAMETER
OF ESTIMATE
1 9.695833
1 0.020000
1 -0.000266054
1 0.034085
1 0.045512
1 0.196520
1 -0.083971
1 0.040711
1 -0.072603
1 0.003785638
1 -.0000078196
1 -0.00125741
1 .00000356429
1 0.345572
1 0.255026
1 0.346369
1 0.187674
1 0.123536
1 0.282809
1 0.073434
1 0.444693
1 0.107138
0 0
1 -0.030734
1 0.042776
1 0.030667
1 -0.000202059
1 -0.000968407
1 0.015211
1 0.006763304
STANDARD
ERROR
0.258022
0.013390
0.0001707825
0.029546
0.051422
0.065196
0.082694
0.079106
0.079490
0.0006234391
.00000188704
0.0007208849
.00000182631
0.045507
0.114276
0.161817
0.059444
0.191782
0.098882
0.062B31
0.152623
0.061771
0.025330
0.027344
0.019980
0.0003867899
U.004603232
0.028489
0.003638341
T FOR Ho:
PARAMETER=0
37.578
1.494
-1 .55R
1.154
0.885
3.014
-1.015
0.515
-0.913
6.072
-4.144
-1.744
1.952
7.594
2.232
2.141
3.157
0.644
2.860
1.169
2.914
1.734
-1.213
1.564
1.535
-0.522
-2.104
0.534
1.859
PROB > ITI
0.0001
0.1359
0.1199
0.2492
0.3765
0.0327
#.3134
0.6070
0.3615
0.0001
0.3D31
0.0817
0.0515
0.0001
0.0261
0.3328
0.0017
0.5198
0.0044
D.26 31
0.0037
D.3935
0.2256
0.1184
0.1254
0.6n016
0.0359
0.5936
0.0636
F VALUE
11.878
PROB>F
0.0001
0.4448
0.4074
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SAMPLE 2 Table A5-12
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION
Females
VARIABLE DF
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
STANDARD
ERROR
T FOR HD:
PARAMETER=0 PROB > [TI
-0.000745374
0.00124598
-0.020358
-0.022543
-0.00871535
-0.013970
0.0005761167
0.001985761
0.028780
0.023869
0.007927312
0.011430
CAROT
IN FDR
PER:D
MOTS1
EARSOC
EARDL
-1.294
0.627
-0.707
-0.944
-1.099
-1.222
0.1963
0.5306
0.4797
0.3454
0.2721
0.2222
-230-
SAMPLE 2
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Males
Table A5-13
DEP VARIABLE:
SUM OF
SQUARESSCURCE
MODEL 25
ERROR 1329
C T)TAL 1356
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
C.v.
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACON2
ACON3
ACD44
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
MARITAL
CHILDI
CHILD2
LFAP
TOT48FC
0SJAP1
-WW0P
CARDT
I NFJRM
-PERCD
MDTS1
EARSOC
EARDL
OF
65.231545
60.602935
125.834
0.213543
10.457437
2.042016
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
9.388485
0.020722
-0.000197955
0.120191
0.183342
0.348882
-0.00405071
0.068022
0.018569
0.001674824
-.0000022546
0.001259228
-.0000024795
0.017085
0.017698
0.022669
-0.000255582
-0.000633058
-0.025814
0.007639391
D.0001016678
).0004833789
-0.130575
0.011708
0.004297345
0.011445
MEAN
SQUARE
2.609262
0.045600
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-S
STANDARD
ERROR
0.150145
0.008032479
.00009755014
0.014662
0.025754
0.029732
0.050403
0.049403
0.049011
0.0002592599
6.02404E-07
0.0003431827
b.75515E-07
0.019066
0.009672113
0.00723703
0.0002868085
0.0003025098
0.012790
0.001092586
0.0002978069
0.0004733134
0.065622
0.013164
0.004732809
0.00606991
F VALUE
57.220
PR3B>F
0.0001
0.5184
C .5093
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER= 0
62.529
2.580
-2.029
8.311-
7.119
11.734
-0.080
1.377
0.379
6.460
-3.743
3.669
-3.671-
0.896
1.830
3.132-
-0.891
-2.093,
-2.018
6.992
0.341
1.021
-1.990
0.889
0.908
1.886
PR38 > I TI
0.0001
0.0100
0.0426
0.3331
0.0001
0.0001
0.93b0
0.1688
0.7048
0.0001
0.0002
0.0003
0.0003
0.3704
0.0675
0.0018
0.3730
0.03b6
0.0438
0.0001
0.7329
0.3073
0.066
0.3740
0.3640
0.0596
LNBTES
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SAMPLE 2
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Females
Table A5-14
DEP VARIABLE:
SOURCE
M3EL 25
ERRDR 513
C TOTAL 538
ROOT MSE
DEP MEA'4
c.V.
VARIABLE
I4TERCEP
AGE?
E)TS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
-AC092
ACO43
ACON4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
MARITAL
CI1L01
C1ILD2
LFAM
TOTABFC
OSJ&Pi
CAR3T
I4F3R 4
PERCD
ST1 Si
EARSOC
EARDL
SUM OF
SQUARES
22.345014
38.224438
60.569452
0.272968
10.054144
2.714981
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
9.586029
0.030965
-0.000409489
0.035871
0.119285
0.302017
0.0003912744
0.144691
-0.098448
0.003886556
-. 0000074449
-0.00147107
0.0000043891
-0.025225
0.048439
0.032195
-0.000209662
-0.00142463
0.026970
0.007363724
-0.000764206
0.0009207347
-0.00604904
-0.033703
-0.012194
-0.011190
MEAN
SQUARE
0.893801
0.074512
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
STANDARD
ERROR
0.268779
0.013962
0.0001786005
0.031045
0.052917
0.063285
0.083566
0.079448
0.081291
0.000655532b
.00003196858
0.0007432811
.00000187131
0.026625
0.028708
0.020923
0.0004036985
0.0004813559
0.029948
0.003766315
O.0006060842
0.00208498
0.030168
0.025003
0.009318698
0.011950
F VALUE
11.995
PRDB>F
0.0301
0.3689
0.3382
T FOR Ho:
PARAMETER=O
35.665
2.218
-2.295
1.155
2.254
4.772
0.005
1.821
-1.211
5.929
-3.782
-1.979
2.345
-0.947
1.687
1.539
-0.519
-2.960
0.901
1 .955-
-1.261
0.442
-0.201
-1.348
-1.466
-0.936
PR3B > ITI
0 . 0001
0.0270
0.0221
3.2684
0.02b
0.0001
0.9963
0.0692
0.22b4
0.0001
0.0002
0.0483
0.0194
3.3439
0.0922
3.1245
0.6037
0.0332
0.3682
0.0511
3.2379
O.6590
0.8412
0.1783
3.1433
0.3495
LNBTES
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SAMPLE 3
TOTAL SAMPLE
Human Capital Model
DEP VARIABLE:
Table A5-15
SOUICE OF
MODEL 8
ERROR 246
C TOTAL 254
R30T SE
DEP MEAN
C .V
SUM OF
SQUARES
40.119768
29.833415
69.953183
0.348244
10.312327
3.37697
MEAN
SQUARE
5.014971
0.121274
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
VARIABLE
PNTERCEP
SEX
EDTS2
EDCS2
E3PS2
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEK2
PARAMETER
DF ESTIMATE
9.439535
-0.305614
0.139947
0.382402
0.524316
0.004912166
-. 0000099302
0.004596291
-.0000090894
STANDARD
ERROR
0.094158
0.055610
0.087410
0.082549
0.081287
0.00107685
.00000347618
0.0007715032
0.0000017847
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0 PRDB > ITI
100.252
-5.496
1.601
4.632
6.450
4.562
-2.857
5.958
-5.093
0.0001
0.0001
0.1106
0.0001
0.0331
0.0001
0.0346
0.0031
0.3331
LNBTES
F VALUE
41.352
PROB>F
0.0001
0.5735
0.5597
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Table A5-16
SAMPLE 3
TOTAL SAMPLE
Full Regression
DEP VARIA3LE:
SUN OF
SQUARESSOURCE
MODEL 28
ERR3R 226
C T3TAL 254
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
C.v.
46.832147
23.121035
69.953183
0.319852
10.312327
3.10165
MEAN
SQUARE
1.672577
0.102305
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-S0
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
SEX
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
E3CS2
EOPS2
ACO42
ACDN3
ACH4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
occl
OCC2
MARITAL
C41LD1
CHILD2
LFAM
T3TABFC
ISJAPI
CAROT
INFORM
PERC0
M3TS1
EARSOC
EARDL
PARAMETER
OF ESTIMATE
1 8.153305
1 -0.240978
1 0.061072
1 -0.000784385
1 0.026021
1 0.160759
1 0.274813
1 0.247531
1 0.230040
1 0.058842
1 0.004611793
1 -0.000008486
1 0.002297837
1 -. 0000041688
1 0.084187
1 0.174524
1 0.248018
1 -0.007b6726
1 -0.042126
1 0.0001784129
1 -0.00151162
1 0.027525
1 0.005098096
1 -0.00151079
1 -0.000334419
1 0.153780
1 -0.050323
1 0.000907507
1 0.009272162
STANDARD
ERROR
0.526072
0.0686b01
0.029037
0.0003833074
0.108299
0.122346
0.125875
0.145517
0.132604
0.150132
0.001055419
.00000342746
0.001158301
.00000266959
0.115337
0.119714
0.052737
0.039713
0.031584
0.0003309704
0.0009363151
0.047958
D.002194101
0.001275515
0.0009899154
0.115008
0.054885
0.006171456
0.018775
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
15.498
-3.523
2.103
-2.046
0.240
1.314
2.183
1.701
1.737
0.392
4.370
-2.476
1.984
-1.562
0.730
1.458
4.703
-0.193
-1.334
0.539
-1.614
0.5,74
2.224
-1..184
-0.338
1.337
-0.917
0.147
0.494
PROS > ITI
0.0001
0.3005
0.0366
0.0419
0.8103
3.1902
0.3300
0.0903
0.3337
0.6955
0.0001
0.0140
0.3495
0.1198
0.4662
0.1463
0.0001
0.8471
0.1836
0.5904
o.1078
0.5666
0.3210
0.2375
0.7358
0.1825
0.3602
0.8832
0.6219
LHBTES
F VALUE
16.349
PROB>F
0.00D
0.6695
0.6285
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SAMPLE 3 Table A5-17
TOTAL SAMPLE
.Personal Regression
DEP VARIABLE: LNBTES
S3URCE
MODEL 26
ERROR 228
C TOTAL 254
R3OT 4SE
DEP MEAN
C.V.
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
SEX
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPSz
ACON2
ACOI3
ACON4
FYSERVC
FISERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
MARITAL
CHILDI
CHILD2
LFAq4
TDTABFC
OSJAP1
wwup
CAROT
I1F3R4
PERCD
M1TSI
EARSOC
EARDL
DF
SUM OF
SQUARES
46.436419
23.516764
69.953183
0.321160
10.312327
3.11433
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
8.289446
-0.250097
0.057543
-0.000726956
0.037807
0.176541
0.283126
0.229265
0.179832
-0.015438
0.004882996
-.0000091927
0.002544466
-0.000004749
0.256422
-0.00223436
-0.041874
.00005670844
-0.00168942
0.041323
0.006360587
-0.00166146
-0.000296665
0.164008
-0.059312
0.001531447
0.012141
MEAN
SQUARE
1.786016
0.103144
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-S
STANDARD
ERROR
0.518064
0.066108
0.028968
0.0003820026
0.108564
0.122394
0.126269
0.145383
0.130450
0.140017
0.001036444
.00000340768
0.001152051
.00003264519
0.052747
0.039670
0.031696
0.0003263729
0.0009334656
0.047622
0.002100915
0.00127793
0.0009937441
0.114544
0.054778
0.006185028
0.018722
F VALUE
17.316
PRO3>F
0.0001
0.6638
0.6255
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
16.001
-3.783
1.986
-1.903
0.348
1.442
2.242
1.577
1.379
-0.110
4.711
-2.698
2.209
-1.795
4.861
-0.056
-1.321
0.174
-1.810
0.868
3.028
-1.300
-0.299
1.432
-1.083
0.248
0.648
PR38 > ITI
0.0001
0.0002
0.0482
0.3553
0.7280
0.1506
0.0259
0.1162
0.1696
0.9123
0.0001
0.0375
0.3282
3.3739
0.0001
0.9551
0.1878
0.9622
0.0716
0.3865
0.0027
0.1949
0.7656
0.1536
0.2801
0.8047
0.5173
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SAMILE 3 Table A5-18
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION
Males
DEP VARIABLE: LNBTES
SOURCE DF
MODEL 25
ERR3R 165
C TOTAL 190
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
C.V.
SUM OF
SQUARES
27.649544
11.722287
39.371831
0.266541
10.438420
2.553462
MEAN
SQUARE
1.105982
0.071044
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
NOTE: M3DEL IS NOT FULL RANK. LEAST SQUARES SOLUTIONS FOR THE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT UNIQUE. SOME STATISTICS WILL BE
MISLEADING. A REPORTED DF OF 0 OR B MEANS THAT THE
ESTIMATE TS BIASED. THE FOLLOWING PARAMETERS HAVE BEEN
SET TO 0, SINCE THE VARIABLES ARE A LINEAR COMBINATION
OF 3TIER VARIABLES AS SHDWN.
OCC2
P ER CD
=+INTERCEP-1'DCC1
U
VARIABLE
IPTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPSZ
ACON2
ACON3
ACON4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEK2
0%C I
OCC2
MARITAL
CIILD1
CIILD2
LFAM
TOTABFC
OSJAPI
WWOP
CAkRDT
INFORM
PERCD
MOT51
EARSOC
EARDL
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
8.250170
0.082085
-0.000933594
-0.317924
-0.171209
-0.082882
0.269922
0.256400
-0.204643
0.003153152
-.0000056865
0.00323339
-.0000070817
-0.098101
0
0.171787
-0.010499
-0.075522
0.012766
-0.00121585
0.008378295
0.005603548
0.000407614
-0.000243844
0
-0.031870
0.0006803968
-0.00562974
STANDARD
ERROR
0.566839
0.031234
0.0004082152
0.152028
0.160978
0.164753
0.234568
0.216341
0.217197
0.001028553
.00000328461
0.001220973
0.0000027875
0.050604
.*055202
0.036629
0.030692
0.035318
0.0008430423
0.045961
0.002105009
0.001241113
0.0008462912
0Do056828
0.006716233
0.019111
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0 PR3B > ITI
14.555
2.628
-2.287
-2.091
-1.064
-0.503
1.151
1.185
-0.942
3.066
-1.731
2.648
-2.541
-1.939
.
3.112
-0.287
-2.461
0.361
-1.442
0.182
2 .662
0.328
-0.288
-0.561
0.101
-0 .295
0.0001
0.0094
0.0235
0.0380
0.2891
0.6156
0.2515
0.2377
0.3475
0.0025
0.0853
0.0089
0.0120
0.:543
0.0022
0.7748
0.3169
0.7182
0.1511
0.8556
0.0085
0.76 30
0.7736
0.5757
0.9194
0.7687
F VALUE
15.568
PROD>F
0.0001
0.7023
0.6572
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SAMPLE 3 Table A5-19
TOTAL FULL REGR.ESSION
Females
DEP VARIABLE: LNBTES
S3URCE
MODEL
ERROR
C TOTAL
DF
27
36
63
RaoT MSE
DEP MEAN
c.v.
SUM OF
SQUARES
11.807254
6.674345
18.481599
0.430579
9.936018
4.333519
MEAR
SQUARE
0.437306
0.185398
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACON2
ACON3
ACO44
F YSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
OCCi
DCC2
MARITAL
CHtILD1
CHILD2
LFA14
TOTABFC
OSJAPI
WWOP
CAROT
INFDRM
PERC D
MOTS1
EARSOC
EARDL
PARAMETER
DF ESTIMATE
1 6.997745
1 0.069894
1 -0.00109728
1 0.310859
1 0.469969
1 0.660633
1 0.277109
1 0.278151
1 0.426325
1 0.030408
1 -0.000156147
1 -0.00623322
1 .00002659838
1 0.244597
1 0.239519
1 0.153426
1 0.022017
1 0.087310
1 0.0005466887
1 -0.00626392
1 -0.065276
1 0.003404528
1 -0.00569913
1 0.002279029
1 0.035328
1 -0.146215
1 0.008499068
1 0.069181
STANDARD
ERROR
1.595777
0.096230
0.00138588
0.212988
0.321279
0.347405
0.292375
0.267408
0.308651
0.007680511
.00004748082
0.005403687
.00001722578
0.212580
0.232766
0.156317
0.160166
0.126000
0.000940305
0.005621644
0.159483
0.007062566
0.00458082
0.014689
0.190713
0.147405
0 .015489
0.065971
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
4.385
0.726
-0.792
1.460
1.463
1 .902
0.948
1.040
1.381
3.959-
-3.289
-1.154
1.544
1.151
1.029
0.982
0.137
0.693
0.581
-1.114
-0.409
0.482
-1.244
0.155
0.185
-0.992
0.549
1.049
PR38 > ITI
0.0001
0.4723
0.4337
3.1531
0.1522
0.0652
0.3496
0.3052
0.1757
0.0003
0.0023
0.2563
0.1313
0.2575
0.3103
0.3329
0.8914
0.4928
0.5646
0.2726
0.6967
0.6327
0.2215
0.8776
0.5561
0.3279
0 .58 66
0.3013
F VALUE
2.359
PROB>F
0
.
0083
0.6389
0.3680
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SAMPLE 3 Table A5-20
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Males
DEP VARIABLE: LNBTE5
SOURCE
MJDEL
ERROR
C T0TAL
SUM OF
SQUARESDF
24
166
190
R30T MSE
DEP MEAN
C.V.
27.382544
11.989288
39.371831
0.268746
10.438420
2.574589
MEAN
SQUARE
1.140939
0.072225
R-SUARE
ADJ R-SQ
NOTE: MODEL IS NOT FULL RANK. LEAST SQUARES SOLUTIONS FOR THE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT UNIQUE. SOME STATISTICS WILL BE
MISLEADING. A REPORTED DF OF 0 OR B MEANS THAT THE
ESTIMATE IS BIASED. THE FOLLOWING PARAMETERS HAVE BEEN
SET TO 0, SINCE THE VARIABLES ARE A LINEAR COMBINATION
OF OTHER VARIABLES AS SHOWN.
PERCD =
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACON2
ACOdN3
ACOM4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
MARITAL
CiILD1
CHILD2
LFAM
TOTABFC
OSJAP1
WWOP
CAR3T
INFORM
PERCD
MOTS1
EARSOC
EARDL
DF
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
8.258974
0.073615
-0.000818436
-0.324899
-0.170702
-0.085121
0.293446
0.251173
-0.203395
0.003542423
-. 0000065486
0.003592532
-. 0000080002
0.177977
-0.00401318
-0.075888
0.012623
-0.00150057
0.021838
0.007024879
D.0002064531
-0.000249877
0
-0.033374
0.0005873345
-0.00123199
STANDARD
ERROR
0.571511
0.031183
0.0004072115
0.153243
0.162309
0.166112
0.236192
0.218114
0.218993
0.001017108
.00000328129
0.001216821
.0000027696b
0.055565
0.036777
0.030945
0.035610
0.0008370191
0.045809
0.001989528
0.001247
0.0008532874
0.057293
0.006771628
0.019133
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
14.451
2.361
-2.010
-2.120
-1.052
-0.512
1.242
1.152
-0.929
3.483
-1.996
2.952
-2.889
3.203-
-0.109
-2.452
0.354
-1.793
0.477
3.531,
0.166
-0.293
-0.583
0.087
-0.064
PROB > ITI
0.0001
0.0194
0.0461
0.0355
0.2945
0.6090
0.2158
0.2512
0.3544
0.3336
0.0476
0.0036
0.3044
0.00 16
0.9132
0.0152
0.7234
0.0748
0.6342
0.0005
0.B697
0.7700
0.5610
0.9310
0.9487
F VALUE
15.797
PRDB>F
0.3031
0.6955
0.6515
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SAMPLE 3 Table A5-21
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Females
DEP VARIABLE: LNBTES
S JU RCE
MODEL
ERROR
C TOTAL
SUM OF
SQUARES
25
38
63
R30T MSE
DEP MEAN
C.v.
VARIABLE
I4TERCEP
AGE
AGEZ
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
AC042
ACON3
ACON4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
MARITAL
CHILD1
C4IL02
LFAM
TDT&BFC
0SJAP1
WiIOP
CARDT
I 4FOR
PERCO
MOTS1
EARSOC
EARDL
11.536583
6.945016
18.481599
0.427509
9.936018
4.302615
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
7.468477
0.054376
-0.000839386
0.301277
0.434044
0.645476
0.250628
0.251219
0.246989
0.029206
-0.000150646
-0.0057595
.00002531498
0.184797
0.029640
0.084984
0.0003366225
-0.00591572
-0.036925
0.004840962
-0.00644502
0.002476339
0.053368
-0.185097
0.010455
0.071861
MEAR
SQUARE
0.461463
0.182764
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-S
STANDARD
ERROR
1.536390
0.094625
0.001357317
0.210226
0.317594
0.343456
0.289211
0.255927
0.259289
0.007518657
.00004679535
0.005350886
.00001706993
0.152857
0.158296
0.123412
0.0008971588
0.005570086
0.155095
0.006902647
0.004506582
0.01438b
0.188650
0.142526
0.014926
0.065101
F VALUE
2.525
PROB>F
0.0049
0.6242
0.3770
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
4.861'
0.575
-0.618
1.433
1.367
1.879
0.867
0.982
0.953
3.885-
-3.219,
-1.076
1.483
1.209
0.187
0.689
0.375
-1.062
-0.238
0.701
-1.430
0.172
0.283
-1.299
0.700
1.104
PROS > ITI
0.331
0.5689
0.5400
0.1600
0.1798
0.0679
0.3916
0.3325
0.3468
0.0004
0.0326
0.2886
0.1463
0.2341
0.8525
0.4952
0.7096
0.2949
0.8131
0.6974
0.1608
0.8662
0.7788
0.2019
0.4879
0.2766
-239-
SAMPLE 1 Table A5-22
TOTAL MARRIED SAMPLE
Human Capital Model
DEP VARIABLE: LNBIES
SOURGE DF
80DEL 6
IRROR 249
1 TQIAL 257
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
c.V.
SUM DF
SQUARES
9.672389
8.442611
18.115004
0.184136
9.927062
1.85489
MEAN
SJUARE
1.209048
0.033906
R-S UARE
ADJ R-SQ
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
S EX
IDTS2
2DCSZ
IDPS2
EYSERVC
EYSERVCZ
ETLFEX
ETLEEX2
PARAMETER
DF ESTIMATJ
9.856741
-0.155919
-0.149521
0.048009
0.498735
0.002379246
-. 0000033523
-0.00118202
.00000614691
STA1DARD
ERRR
0.08-5789
0.024459
o .oa4150
0.079577
0.152302
0.0008875339
0.0000035105
0.0004782254
.00000168968
T FOR HO:
PAKAMETER=0
114.845
-6.375
"1.777
0.603
3.275
2.681
--0.955
-2.472
3.63&
PROB > III
0.00j1
).0001
0.0768
Q.5469
0.0912
9.0318
0.34U5
0.0141
0.0003
F VALUE
35.659
PRDB>F
0.00i1
0.5339
0.519
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Table A5-23SAMPLE 1
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
DEP VARIABLE: LNBTES
SOURCE
dODEL 40
aRR uB 217
£ TQKAL 257
ROOT. MSE
DEP MEAN
C.V.
SUR OF
SQUARES
16.921683
1.193323
13.115004
0.074156
9.927062
0.7470135
MEAN
S3UARE
0.423042
0.005499185
R-S2UARE
AOJ R-SQ
iARIABLE
INTERCEP
SEX
AGE
AGER
10T52
l0C52
10P£2
&tDN2
1113
A CON4
EYSBRVC
EYSERVC2
ETL FEX
ETLFEX2
31cc
20C2
60N1
S0N2
5DN4
EJT1
EJT2
EJT4
EJTS
IHILO1
6HIL02
9FAH
LHH10TABFC
SJAB1
dWOP1ARD1T
3ERCD
6011
EARSOC
BARD&
&maw
SPSCARZ
IPM91
PARAMETEA
DF ESTIMATO
1 B.678035
1 -0.073289
1 0.059243
1 -0.00077277
1 -0.042529
1 -0.044816
1 0.114861
1 0.01063L
1 0.014859
1 -0.147961
1 -0.000374192
1 .00000196569
1 -0.000601385
1 .00000393639
1 0.313591
1 0.198465
1 0.184741
1 0.084234
1 -0.011862
1 0.063239
1 0.065871
1 -0.01171(1
1 0.047702
1 -0.00621429
1 -0.013576
1 0.0005076463
1 .00006911519
1 -0.000294634
1 -0.00159829
1 -0.0001536
1 0.001841182
1 0.009287169
1 -0.013686
1 -0.00210343
1 0.004198665
1 0.000237167
1 0.009756311
1 -0.00652089
1 -0.016252
STANDARD
ERROR
0.332275
0.024997
0.019153
0.0003022849
0.040685
0.038110
0.070315
0.017285
0.015351
0.088500
0.00044&8929
.00000186319
0.0003569461
.00000172057
0.032936
0.030785
0.029532
0.026110
0.022662
0.031547
0.029103
0.01915.1
0.035819
0.010048
0.011677
0.001577851
0.0001126859
0.001236747
0.013286
0.001177968
0.0005890842
0.003204135
0.015607
0.010781
0.002439511
0.095114601
0.015671
0.008452909
0.014240
T FOR HQ:
PAKAMETER=0
28.709
-2.93B
3.093
4-2.556
-1.045
a1.176
1.634
0.615
0.968
-1.672
1.055
- 1l.685
2.28a
9.521
6.447
6.256
3.226
-0.523
2.005
2.263
-0.611
1.332
A0.61%
+1.163
0.322
0.613
-0. a38
*0.120
-0.130
3.125
2.898
"0 .877
-0.195
1.743
0.046
0.623
-0.771
.*1 .341
PROB > III
0.0001
0.0037
0.0022
0.0113
9.2911
0.2 4U9
0.103S
0.5392
0.3341
0.0960
0.40!4
0.2926
0.0935
0.0231
0.0001
0.0001
9.0001
0.0014
0.60i2
0.0462
0.0246
0.5415
0.1843
9.5369
9.2463
0.7480
0.54U3
0.8119
0.9044
0.8964
0.0020
0.0041
9.3815
G.8455
0.0828
0.9631
0.5 342
9.4413
0.25sn
F VALUE
76.928
PROBF
0.O001
0.9341
0.9220
-241-
SAMPLE 1 Table A5-23
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
OARIABLE DF
P&RAMETER
ESTIMATB
STANDARD T FOR HQ:
ERROR PAkAMETER=Ok PRDB > it
SPSTRPRK
IMPCARTE
1 -0.020059
1. 0.021946
o.032942
0.016309
+0.609
1 .36b
9.5432
0.1798
-242-
SAMPLE 1
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
DEP VARIABLE:
Table A5-24
OURCE
dG00EL 31
IRRUR 226
£ TOTAL 257
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
C .V w
SUM OE
SQUARES
12.902631
5.212374
18.115004
0.151867
9.927061
1.529829
MEAN
SQUARE
0.416214
0.023064
R-S2UARE
ADJ R-SL
VARIABLE
INTERCEPL
SEX
AGE
AGE2
8DTSZ
&DCSZ
'OPS2
A Cr fi3
aCOM4
EYSERVC
EYSERVC2
ETLFEX
ETLERX2
eHILDI
GHIL02
&FAB
OLHH
5UTAbFC
2SJAP1
dWOP
EARGI
INFORM
SERCO
-OTS1
fARSOC
iAROL
*MOV
SPSCAR2
IPMDB
IPSTRPR
IMPCARTF
PARAMETER
DF ESTIMAT6
1 8.413001
1 0.026134
1 0.085183
1 -0.00120039
1 -0.202557
1 -0.097289
1 0.327257
1 0.001520316
1 0.133346
1 -0.256011
1 0.001745709
1 -. 0000053103
1 -0.00204159
1 .0000101877S
1 -0.024674
1 -0.022198
1 -0.00141774
1 -0.030556842
1 0.001220664
1 -0.038651
1 0.003839873
1 0.001685923
1 0.033081
1 -0.051291
1 -0.026344
1 0.00427036
1 0.014513
1 -0.059628
1 -0.0310001
1 -0.029209
1 -0.016551
1 0.068354
STAIDARD
ERRDA
0.546078
0.049381
0.035554
0.0005715784
0.079518
0.075600
0.134081
0.034732
0.028425
0.175484
0.0008336358
.0000320535
0.000 70 96538
.30000339872
0.019596
0.023117
0.003202721
0.0002205496
0.002479007
0.026301
0.00226897
0.001152829
D.006146453
0.031031
0.021543
0.004862629
0.010334
0.031262
0.017058
0.028302
0.066450
0.032681
T FnR H (:
PAKAMETER=O
15.4D6
0.529
2.396
-2 . 100
-2.547
*1.287
2.441
0.044
4.691
+o1.459
2.094
*1.657
-2.877
2.99&
-1.259
-0.9601
*-0.443
0.492
-1.470
1.692
1.462
4.894
*1.653
b1.223
0.87a,
1.405
*1.907
-1.8171
-1.032
2.092
PROB > III
0.0001
0.5912
9.0174
9.0368
0.0115
0.1995
0.0154
0.9651
0.0OUl
0. 1460
9.0374
0.0990
0.00'44
0.0030
9.2093
9.33d0
9 .6584
0.0123
0.6229
9.1431
0.0920
0.1450
0.00)1
0.0997
9.2227
0.38U8
0.1614
0.0517
9.07u5
0.3032
0.8035
0.0376
LNBTES
F VALUE
18.066
PROBF
Q.0001
9.7123
0.6728
-243-
SAMPLE 1
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Males
DEP VARIABLE: LNBTES
Table A5-25
IDURCE
dODEL 38
IRROR 109
E TOIAL 147
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
(.V.
SUM OF
SQUARES
11.062169
0.520347
11.582515
0.069093
10.033217
0.6886413
MEAN
SQUARE
0.291110
0.004773826
R-5 UAiRE
ADJ R-S
MOTE: MQDEL IS NOT FULL R4NK. LEAST SCUARES SLUTIUMS F3R THE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT fNIQUE. SOE STATISTICS WILL BE
MISLEADING. A REP0tTED DF OF 0 OR 8 REARS THAT THE
ESTIMATE IS BIASED. THE FOLLOWING PARAMETERS HAVE BEEN
SET TO 0, SINCE THE VARIABLES ARE A LINEAR C1M1lNATION
OF OTHER VARIABLES AS SHOWN.
RERC =
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
1DTSZ
DC 52
EDPS2
AEP42
ACON3
EYSERVC
EYSERVC2
ETLFEiX
ETLE6X2
'CC3
dCC2
50DNIIDNI
10N4
EJT1
EJT2
EJT4
EJTS
eHILD1
£HILD2
KFAM
OLHd
1OTABFC
35JAP1
"wOp
BARBI
PARAMETER
OF ESTIMAT6
1 8.72548S
1 0.058943
1 -0.000764596
1 -0.062253
1 -0.048454.
1 0.035321
1 -0.024762
I -0.01418S
1 -0.14483D
1 0.0003516153
1 -. 0000015977
1 -0.000145012
1 0.00000248a
1 0.421711
1 0.307(53
1 0.U330i
1 0.gj0904
I 0.0009026626
1 -0.00396O2
1 -0.00810244
1 -0.05115a
1 0.050023
1 -0.016956
1 -0.017934
1 -0.011123
1 0.0301291397
1 -0.000555786
1 -0.030566
1 0.002052296
1 0.0002697673
STA40ARD
ERROR
0.394715
0.024501
0.0003700075
0.050990
0.042368
0.072475
0.026681
0.021748
0.092846
0.000592671
.00000224357
0.0005073602
.00000211443
0.041522
0.039095
0.034036
0.031676
0.030565
0.039536
0.036801
0.031316
0.042822
0.012854
0.015604
0.012286
0.0001809709
0.001270363
0.016314
0.001438574
0.0008102397
T FOR Ha:
PAKAMETER=0
12.306
2.406
-2.066
-i&1.221
4-1.144
0.487
-0.928
4-0.652
41.560
0.593
--0 .712
-0.286
1.174
10.156
7.69
4.504
2.23d
0.030
;-0.10 O
-0.220
-o,1.633
1.166
41.319
-1.149
+0.906
0.714
-0.43 U
-1.874
1.379
0.333
P408 > III
0.0001
0.0118
0.0412
0.2248
0.2553
0.6210
0.3554
0.5156
9.1217
0.5542
0.4779
0.7756
0.2430
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0272
0.9765
0.92)2
0.8 262
Q.103
0.2453
0.1899
0.2529
0 .3611
%.4770
0.6626
0.0637
0.17U
0.7398
F VALUE
60.98D
PROB>F
0.0001
0.9551
0.9394
- ---------
-244-
SAMPLE 1 Table A5-25
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Males
OARUABLE DF
INFORM
*ERCD
NOTS1
IARSDC
IAR0L
9am0
IPSCAR2
IPMO
I PSTRPRK
IMPCARTF
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
0.010303
1 -0.00616531
1 0.0001820E5b
1 -0.00428729
1 0.005643375
I -0.014136
1 -0.000154238
1 -0.047071
1 0.031213
STAIDARD
ERROR
0.003797179
0.013652
0.004951887
0 .007008838
0.035581
0.010230
0.015534
0.037727
O .028512
I FOR HQ:
PARAMETER=0
2.712
&0.45a
0.037
+0 .612
0.159
b1 .32
4-0.010
-1.248
1.0.95
PIOB > III
0.0071
9.6525
0.9707
0.5 423
0.8743
0.1699
0.9941
0.2148
0.2760
Table A5-26
hIARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Females
3EP VARIABLE: LNBTES
IOURCE OF
80DEL 36
SR R 99 73
8 TUTAL 109
SUM OF
SQUARES
MEA1N
SQUARE
2.363897 0.065664
0.256882 0.003518933
2.623773
AOOT MSE
DEP MEAN
c.V.
0.059321
9.784236
0.6062875
R-SJUARE
ADJ R-SQ
90TE; MODEL IS NOT FULL AANK. LEAST 50ARES SLUTI3OS F3R 1HE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT JNIQUE. SOME STATiSTICS WILL BE
MISLEADING. A REPORtED OF OF 0 OR 8 MEANS THAT THE
ESTIMATE IS LIASED. THE FOLLOWING PAgAMETERS HAVE BEEN
SET 10 0, SINCE THE VARIABLES ARE A LINEAR C048INATI0N
OF OTHER VARIABLES AS SHOWN.
iDPS2 =
ACON4
EJT =
VARiABLE
iNTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
10752
DCS2
9DP12
ACON2
ACDN3
A L0%4
EYSERVC
EYSERVCZ
ETLEIX
ETLEEX2
acc3
JCC2
0N1
I U N E
1DND4
EJTI
EJTE
EJT4
EJTS
&HILO1
eHILD2
LFAM
0LHH
5OTABFC
JSJAP1
PARAMETER
OF ESTIMATB
1 7.491469
1 0.132573
1 -0.00207F28
1 -0.00849754
1 0.005051196
0 3
1 0.007357047
1 0.020252
0 a
1 0.001118826
1 -.0000061816
I .00009984543
I -4.99121E-07
1 0.082975
1 0.015346
1 0.314031
1 0.697275
1 0.016283
1 0.156363
1 0.14968a
1 -0.00457827
0 3
1 -0.022737
1 -0.00457893
1 -0.00272637
1 -. 0000477689
1 0.003656192
1 0.043951
STAN4DARV
ERROR
0.650087
0.043139
0.0007111172
0.064769
0.064542
0.021838
0.019278
0.00101761
.00000726751
0.0007254854
.00000451352
0.094015
0.049046
0.063117
0.046044
0.033891
0.060171
0.058138
0.021482
0.017379
0.017951
0.003889125
0.0001439728
0.003891086
0.019232
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
11.524
3.073
'2.923
*0.131
0.078
0.337
1.05a
1 .099
0.851
0.136
-.0.111
1.536
0.313
4.975
2.113
0.480
2.599
2.575
+-0 .213
-i. Z+1 .38
-0.255
~-0.701
-0.332
0.940
2.255
PLOB > ITI
00001
0.D30
0.0046
0.89b0
0.9318
0.7372
0.2910
0.2752
0.3978
0.8909
0.9123
0 .1288
0.7553
0.0001
0.0 381
0.6323
0.0113
0.0121
0 .8 318
0.1949
0.7994
0.4855
0.7410
0.35U5
0.0252
F VALUE
18.660
PROB>F
0.0001
0.9(121
9.8536
SAle7-i
-246-
SAMPLE 1 Table A5-26
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Females
OARIABLE OF
dWo0
CARUT
INFORM
13LRCO
0 Tr 5 I
IARSDC
BARDO
sMov
PSCAR2
SPMDB
SPSTRPRII
IMPCARTF
PARAMETEA
ESTIATB
-0.00126807
0.002776496
-0.00128131
-0 .024023
-0 .016097
0.001694469
D.011183
0.00120325
0.002403436
-0.00993388
0.14807b
0.022463
STANDARD
ERROR
0.00 1728995
0.0008227163
0.005645063
0.014476
0.018437
0.002587808
0.007418531
o.015796
0.013218
0.039185
0.077816
0.018279
T FOR HO:
PAstAMBTE t=0
40.733
3.375
40.227
*1.659
* .873
0.655
1.507
0.076
0.38a
+0.254
1.903
1.229
Pit0B > III
0.4657
0.0012
D.8211
0.1014
0.3855
0.5147
0.13a1
9.9345
0.8562
0.8006
0.0610
0.2230
-247-
SAMPLE 1 Table A5-27
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Males
DEP WARIABLE: LMBTES
SOURCE OF
0D0EE 29
IRR@R 118
6 TOTAL 147
RO0 MSE
DEP MEAN
.V.
SUM OF
SQUARES
8.432339
3.150176
11.582515
0.1633901
10.033217
1.628494o
MEAN
S2UARE
0.290770
0.026696
R-S3UARE
4DJ R-SQ
90TE; MaDEL IS NOT FULL RANK. LEAST SQUARES SLUTIDVS F3R THE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT UNIQUE. SOME STATISTICS WILL BE
MISLEADING. A REPORTED OF OE 0 OR 8 MEAKS THAT THE
ESTIMATE IS BIASED. THE FOLLOWING PAxAMETERS HAVE BEEN
SET TO 0, SINCE THE VARIABLES ARE A LINBAR C03BINATIaN
OE OTHER VARIABLES AS SHOWN.
BERCD=
VARiABLE-
iNTERCEP
AGE
IGE2
IDTS2
a0C52
80PS2
4COL2
ACCN3
AC0M4
EYSERVC
EYSERVCZ
ETLFEX
ETLFEX2
CHILD1
EHIL02
LFA4
DLHH
5OTABFC
DSJAPl
4WOP
GAROI
INFORM
RERCD
40TS3
BARSOC
fARDK
aMOV
SPSCAR2
iPMDA
SPST&PRK
PARAMETEA
DF ESTIMAT6
1 8.036927
1 0.108873
1 -0.00150134
1 -0.366219
1 -0.152138
1 0.211154
1 -0.017731
1 0.134454
1 -0.318660
1 0.001594105
1 -.000006E819
1 -0.00182733
1 .00001009404
1 -0.035119
1 -0.026737
1 0.003738612
1 -0.00069799
1 -0.000712974
1 -0.070967
1 0.07399809a
1 .00008004443
1 0.03237Z
0 3
1 -0.01462a
1 0.026695
1 -0.000370427
1 -0.129099
1 -3.038189
1 -0.00663401
1 -0.122233
STAADARO
ERROR
0.821333
0.052007
0.0007985644
0.137279
0.093902
0.155648
0.099995
0.046089
0 .232682
0.001267309
.30000445128
0.001144638
.00000477144
0.028169
0.034615
0.028236
0.0004023832
0.002815888
0.036636
D.003162227
0.001852493
0.007990751
0.030879
0.010811
0.015873
0.019351
0.023344
0.034866
0.085348
I FOR HO:
PARAMETER=-
9.785
2.093
*1.8Bf)
"-3.414
hi .620
1.357
-0.2* Z95
2.917
-1.572
1.2586
-1.546
-1.596
2.116
-1.a47
-0.772
0.132
4-*.735
*0.246
-1.937
1.264
0.043
4.051
hO0.474
2.469
*0.023
'-1 .627
+-1.636
*0.19a
1 .432
PROB > [it
0.0001
6.0345
0.0626
0.00J9
V.1019
0.1715
9.76d4
0.0042
&.1186
0.21U9
0.1248
0.1131
0.0365
0.2150
0.4414
0.8949
0.0854
9.80a0
0.0551
0.23d6
0.96.6
0.0001
0.630?
0.0150
0.9814
0.10o4
0.1045
0.8944
0.15147
F VALUE
30.892
PROB>F
0.00ul
0.7280
0.6612
-248-
SAMPLE 1 Table A5-27
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Males
VARIABLE DF
PARAMETEA
ESTIMATE
STADARD T FOB HM:
ERROR PAkAMETER=O PAOB > III
IMPCARTF 1 0.011590L 0.065216 0.17& 0.8592
-249-
SAMPLE 1 Table A5-28
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Females
DEP VARIABLE: LNBTES
10URCE
800ft 28
IRRB 81
8 TOTAL 109
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
c.V.
SUM OF
SQUARES
1.535263
1.085516
2.620779
0.115765
9.784236
1.183176
MEAM
SQUARE
0.054831
0.0134D1
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SC
1UTI; MOEL 15 NOT FULL AANK. LEAST 5UARES SLUTILIMS F3R THE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT UNIQUE. SOME STATISTICS WILL BE
MISLEADING. A REPDBTED OF OF 0 DR B MEANS THAT THE
ESTIMATE IS SIASED. THE FOLLOWING PARAMETERS HAVE BEEN
SET TO 0, SINCE THE VARIABLES ARE A LINEAR CaBINATI4
OE OTHER VARIABLES AS SHOWN.
IDPS2
AC0M4 =
#ARiABLE
INTERCEP
IGE
AGE2
IDTSZ
0C52
BDPSZ
ACONZ
ACON3
ACDM4
EYSERVC
EYSiRVC2
ETLFEX
ETLFEX2
IHIL01
SHILD2
KFAM
OLHH
IOTABFC
ISJA81
dwoR
IAR9 0
NFORM
SERCD
10TS)
IARSUC
ARDL
8Mov
IPSCAR2
IPMDB
PARAMETER
OF ESTIMATE
1 7.851503
1 a.124326
1 -0.00205416
1 -0.051509
1 -0.00387962
0 a
1 -0.000628097
1 0.112983
0 3
1 0.0004932926
1 .00000577071
1 -0.000183945
1 -0.000001301
1 -0.068429
1 0.01146h
1 0.0004304481
1 -0.000197975
1 0.002143612
1 0.001080479
1 0.30256296i
1 0.00275347
1 0.020100
1 -0.052611
1 -0.065185
1 -0.00342789
1 0.034776
1 -0.043079
1 -0.00710063
1 -0.023933
STAODARD
ERROR
1.049499
0.070507
0.001176855
0.125536
0.125327
0.040245
0.033440
0.001771111
.000012&3536
0.001238467
0.000007801
0.031814
0.033311
0.006955104
0.0002764806
0.006890796
0.035380
0.003091783
0.001415191
0.010405
0.025959
0.031228
0.004693819
D.0 0 12 556
0.029081
0.023971
0.071241
T FOR HO:
PAKAMETER=0
7.481
1.763
4-1.745
0.41()
+0.031
a0.016
3.379
0.279
0.450
i-0.149
-0.168
-2.2151
0.3 491
0.062
*0.716
0.311
0.031
0.829
1.946
1.932
42027
i,-2.0.837I
+'0.730
2.770
6-1.481
**0.296
-0.336
PROB > III
0.0001
0.0816
0.0847
0.6827
0.9754
0.9876
0.0011
0.7813
0.6542
0.8823
0.8614
0.0345
0.7317
0.9508
9.4760
0.7565
0.9757
0.4096
D.0552
9.0569
0.0460
R.0440
0.4673
0.0070
(J.1424
0.7618
0.7378
F VALUE
4.091
PROBF
0.0001
Q.5959
0.4426
-250-
SAMPLE 1 Table A5-28
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Females
VARIABLE VF
&PST&PRII
IMPCARTF
PARAMETER
ESTIMATB
0.183044
0.041694
STAIDARD T FOR HO:
ERROR PARAMETER=4)
0.145410
0.033562
1.2a59
1.242
PROB > III
0.2117
0.2117
-251-
SAMPLE 2
TOTAL MARRIED SAMPLE
Human Capital Model
DEP VARIABLE:
Table A5-29
SOURCE
M3DEL 8
ERROR 1498
C TOTAL 1506
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
c.V 0
VARIABLE
1TERCEP
SEX
EDTS2
EDCS2
E)PS2
FYSERVC
FYSERVCZ
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
SUM OF
SQUARES
107.714
87.849232
195.563
0.242166
10.376451
2.333803
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
9.909774
-0.261479
0.139001
0.226191
0.474251
0.00229323
-. 0000032815
0.00138353
-. 0000023312
MEAN
SQUARE
13.4b4259
0.058644
R-SUARE
ADJ R-SQ
STANDARD
ERROR
0.024989
0.016158
0.014887
0.022195
0.020321
0.0002767421
6.71294E-07
0.0002789571
5 .71195E-07
F VALUE
229.592
PROB>F
0.5508
0.5484
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
396.560
-16.182
9.337
10.237
23.338
8.287
-4.888
4.960
-4.081
PROB > IfI
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
D.33)1
LNBTES
-252-
SAMPLE 2
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
DEP VARIABLE:
Table A5-30
SOURCE
M3DEL 41
ERROR 1465
C TOTAL 1506
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAR4
Co.v
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
SEX
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDCSZ
EDPS2
ACDM2
ACD43
ACO44
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
DCC1
OCC3
0CC5
0CC6
DCC?
OCC9
DCC1 9o G4-"
C-IILD1
CHILD2
LFA4
DLHNH
ITABFC
OSJAPi
WWDP
CAROT
i4FORI
PERCD
M1T151
EARSOC
EARDL
UMoV
SPSCAR2
OF
SUM OF
SQUARES
121.791
73.771822
195.563
0.224402
10.376451
2.162607
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
9.570120
-0.119652
0.018873
-0.000207028
0.112933
0.110599
0 .270002
0.010157
0.090279
0.014245
0.002191509
-. 0000035239
0 .0003664696
-6.35799E-07
0.211675
0.122523
0.169239
0.111424
-0.122509
0.003276274
0.046385
0.086503
0.017902
0.087112
0.024551
0.026348
-0.000369038
-0.00030284
-0.000660892
-0.018698
0.004780751
-0.000441554
D.0003019057
-0.033141
-0.00846061
-0.00293481
0.001298023
0.00371789
-0.012048
MEAN
SQUARE
2.970524
0.05035b
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
STANDARD
ERROR
0.148530
0.031310
0.007542088
.00009357159
0.014456
0.027151
0.031905
0.052689
0.051184
0.052285
0.0002668708
6.37790E-07
0.0003336433
6.83150E-07
0.021454
0.035023
0.059622
0.040711
0.046778
0.046488
0.029955
0.021022
0.028742
0.024890
0.009668 254
0.007382359
0.0003105b54
0.0001269811
0.0002851832
0.013197
0.001208997
0.0003017222
0.0005264842
0.028748
0..012876
0.004593371
0.00602841
0.014071
0.009745276
F VALUE
58.990
0 .6228
0.6122
T FOR Ho:
PARAMETER=O
64.432
-3.821
2.502
-2.213
7.812
4.073-
8.463
0.193
1.764
0.272
8.212
-5.525
1.098
-0.931
9.866
3.498
2.839
2.737-
-2.619
0.070
1.549
4.115
0.623
3.500,
2.539
3.569-
-1.188
-2.385-
-2.317
-1.417
3.954
-1.463
0.573
-1.153
-0.657
-0.639
0.215
0.264
-1.236
PROB >F
0.0001
PRDB > ITI
0.0001
0.0001
0.D12
0.0271
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.8472
0.0780
0.7e53
0.0001
0.00DI
D.2722
0.3522
0.0001
0.0005
0.3)46
0.0063
0.0089
0.9438
D.1217
0.0001
0.5335
0.0005
0.31.12
0.0004
0.2349
0.0172
0.0206
0.1568
0.0001
0.1436
0.5664
0.2492
0.5112
0.5230
0.8295
0.7916
0.2165
LNBTES
Table A5-30
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
VARIABLE DF
SPM DB
SPSTRPRM
14PCARTF
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
0.023858
-0.028973
0.034699
STANDARD T FOR H:
ERROR PARAMETER=0
0.014380
0.045949
0.019465
1.659
-0.631
1.783
PR38 > ITI
0.0973
0.5284
0.0749
-253-
SAMPLE 2
-254-
SAMPLE 2
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
DEP VARIABLE:
Table A5-31
S0URCE DF
MODEL 31
ERROR 1475
C TJTAL 1506
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
C .V.
SUM OF
SQUARES
114.997
80.566188
195.563
0.233712
10.376451
2.252328
MEAN
SQUARE
3.709584
0.054621
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
SEX
A SE
ASE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACN2
ACDN3
ACON4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
CHiILD1
CHILO2
L FAA
TDTABFC
0SJAP1
kWOP
CAR0T
14FDRM
PERCO
MOTS1
EARSOC
EAROL
U40V
SPSCAR2
SPDB
SPSTRPRM
IAPCAXTF
PARAMETER
OF ESTIMATE
9.538847
-0.135513
0.021366
-0.000248843
0.118028
0.148427
0.328656
0.035819
0.127573
0.003589915
0.002204842
-. 0000030908
D.0005557152
-9.098b4E-07
0.018485
0.029184
-0.000394263
-0.000301666
-0.000729158
-0.020992
0.006935882
-0.000359243
0.0006270857
-0.030094
-0.00987926
-0.00370399
0.003973156
0.001050464
-0.00559772
0.027433
-0.00681106
0.045762
STANDARD
ERROR
0.152648
0.032025
0.007716952
.00009560396
0.014807
0.027458
0.031049
0.053858
0.051947
0.053377
C.0002728281
6.55813E-07
0.0003436404
7.04112E-07
0.010035
0.007637868
0.0003226553
0.0001319316
0.000296236
0.013662
0.001226415
0.0003132078
0.0005456736
0.029870
0.013352
0.004758837
0.006233102
0.014b16
0.010066
0.014895
0.047683
0.020163
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
62.489
-4.231
2.769
-2.603
7.971
5.406
10.585
0.665
2.456
0.067
8.081
-4.713
1.617
-1.292
1.842
3.821
-1.222
-2.287
-2.461
-1.536
5.655
-1.147
1.149
-1.007
-0.740
-0.778
0.637
0.072
-0.556
1.842
-0.143
2.270'
PRJB > ITI
0.0001
0.0001
0.0057
0.3393
0 .0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.5061
0.0142
0.964
0.0001
0.0001
0.1061
3.1965
0.0657
0.0001
0.2219
0.)224
0.0140
0.1246
0.0001
0.2516
0.2507
0.3139
0.4595
0.4365
0.5239
0.9427
3.5782
0.0657
0.8864
0.0234
LNOTES
F VALUE
67.915
PROW>
0.0001
a.5880
0.5794
-255-
SAMPLE 2
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Males
DEP VARIABLE:
Table A5-32
SOURCE OF
MODEL 40
ERR3R 1121
C TTAL 1161
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
C.V.
SUM OF
SQUARES
57.567366
41.264184
98.831550
0.191860
10.474715
1.831646
MEAN
SQUARE
1.439184
0.036310
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-S
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACON2
ACODM3
ACD4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
OCC
DCC3
DCC4
OCC5
DCCb6
OCC7
DCCeB
0CC9
acci0
LLC C 11
CHILDI
CHILD2
LFAM
DLH41
TDTkBFC
OsJAP1
WWOP
CAROT
INFDR4
PER:D
MOTS1
EARSOC
EAR)L
UmDv
SPSCARZ
SPM3B
PARAMETER
OF ESTIMATE
1 9.467149
1 0.021263
1 -0.000200096
1 0.122675
1 0.132868
1 0.282252
1 -0.012739
1 0.068504
1 -0.00195603
1 0.001401925
1 -.0000019712
1 D.0006737696
1 -. 0000014765
1 -0.167263
1 -0.065801
1 0.080143
1 0.005417263
1 -0.169101
1 -0.063301
1 0.026526
1 0.049171
1 -0.0075867
1 0.060000
1 0.018536
1 0.023271
1 -0.00126094
1 -0.000223173
1 -0.000486807
1 -0.022788
1 0.005348841
1 -0.000141522
1 0.0003316684
1 -0.085350
1 0.009210636
1 0.002782637
1 0.00989695
1 -0.00188961
1 -0.020009
1 0.031068
STANDARD
ERROR
0.159003
0.008091737
.00009747962
0.014393
0.026581
0.031682
0.056659
0.056081
0.055473
0.000258265
5.91663E-07
0.0003365432
6.59083E-07
0.020648
0.032053
0.054709
0.046113
0.042423
0.042565
0.029273
0.019168
0.027382
0.022133
0.009007966
0.007028933
0.001056721
0.0001311283
0.0002949691
0.012544
0.001075381
0.0002953199
0.0004682259
0.059862
0.012908
0.004579424
0.006036696
0.014467
0.009575659
0.013979
T FOR Ho:
PARAMETER=0
59.541
2.628
-2.053
8.523
4 .999
8.909
-0.225
1.222
-0.035
5.428
-3.331
2.002
-2.240
8.180
2.053
1.465
0.117
-3.986
-1.487
0.906
'2.565 -
-0.277
2.711
2.058
3.311.
-1.193
-1.702
-1.650
-1.817
4.974-
-0.479
0.708
-1.426
0.714
0.608
1.648
-0.131
-2.090
2.222.-
PR3B > ITI
0.0001
0.0087
0.3603
0.*0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.8221
0.2221
0.9719
0.0001
0.0009
0.0455
0.0253
3.3331
0.0403
0.1432
0.9065
0.3)31
0.1373
0.3650
0.0104
0.7818
0.0068
0.0399
0.0010
0.2330
0.0890
0.0991
0.3695
0.0001
0.6319
O.156.2
0.4757
0.5435
3.3997
0.8961
J.03b9
0. 02 b5
LN8TES
F VALUE
39.097
PRaB>F
0.0001
0.5825
0.5676
-256-
SAMPLE 2 Table A5-32
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Males
VARIABLE DF
SPSTRPRM
IPCARTF
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
1 -0.041560
1 0.039130
STANDARD
ERROR
0.040974
0.024700
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
-1.014
1.584-
PROB > IT[
0.3107
0.1134
-257-
SAMPLE 2
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Females
Table A5-33
DEP VARIABLE:
SUCE
MODEL 39
ERROR 305
C TOTAL 344
R30T 4SE
DEP MEAN
C ..
SUM OF
SQUARES
20.357008
27.363436
47.720444
0.299527
10.045483
2.981704
MEAN
SQUARE
0.521975
-0.089716
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
NOTE: MODEL IS NOT FULL RANK. LEAST SQUARES SOLUTIONS FOR THE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT UNIQUE. SOME STATISTICS WILL BE
MISLEADING. A REPORTED OF OF 0 OR B MEANS THAT THE
ESTIMATE IS BIASED. THE FOLLDWING PARAMETERS HAVE BEEN
SET TO 0, SINCE THE VARIABLES ARE A LINEAR COMBINATION
OF nTHER VARIABLES AS SHOWN.
OCCI1
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACDN2
ACODN3
ACON4
FYSERVC
F.SERVC2
FTLFEK
FTLFEX2
UCCU
3CC3
DCC4
3CC
DCC6
0CC7
DCCs
oCC9
OCC10
OCCIl
CILD I
CHILD2
LFAM
DLHH
T3TABFC
osJAPI
wWDP
PARAMETER
OF ESTIMATE
1 9.703820
1 0.023783
1 -0.00C348327
1 0.025591
1 -0.020384
1 0.158923
1 0.022979
1 0.063831
1 -0.035962
1 0.006069819
1 -. 0000145569
1 -0.00216722
1 .00000617361
1 0.368063
1 0.360306
1 0.588851
1 0.257598
1 0.156382
1 0.292925
1 0.101389
1 0.443042
1 0.101058
0 0
1 0.051257
1 0.040609
1 -0.000331321
1 -0.000392391
1 -0.00132352
1 0.012213
1 0.00725371
STANDARD
ERROR
0.398317
0.020387
O.0002605314
0.043865
0.081793
0.104654
0.140008
0.125550
0.137911
0.0009920486
.00000318078
0.001089474
.00002278527
0.071921
0.158501
0.237060
0.103302
0.230423
0.198382
0.098710
0.183734
0.093865
0.037688
0.027702
0.0004868959
0.0003256073
0.00)815189
0.042391
0.007364101
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
24.362 -
1.167
-1.337
0.583
-0.249
1.519
0.164
0.508
-0.261
6.118
-4.577
-1.989
2.217
5.118
2.273
2.484
2.501
0.679
1.477
1.027
2.411
1.077
1.360
1.466
-0.680
-1.205
-1.624'
0.288
0.985
PR35 > ITI
0.0001
0.2443
0. 1822
0.5601
0.8034
0.1299
0.8697
0.6115
0.7945
0.0001
0.0001
0.0476
0.0274
0.0231
0.0237
0.0135
0.0129
0.4979
0.1408
0.3052
0. 01 65
0.2025
-
0.1748
0.1437
0.4967
0.2291
0.1355
0.7735
0.3254
LNBTES
F VALUE
5.818
PRDB>F
0.0001
0.4266
0.3533
-258-
Table A5-33SAMPLE 2
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Females
VARIABLE DF
CAROT
INFORM
PERCD
MJTSI
EARSOC
EARDL
SPSCAR2
SPMJB
SPSTRPRM
I4PCARTF
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
-0.00111457
0.001734698
-0.052161
-0.027827
-0.016031
-0.022076
0.054419
-0.00220918
-0.011573
0.206843
0.024563
STANDARD
ERROR
0.000880619
0.002838718
0.043979
0.034913
0.012792
0.016880
0.036857
0.027956
0.043068
0.227176
0.038819
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
-1.266
0.611
-1.186
-0.797
-1.253
-1.308
1.476
-0.079
-0.269
0.910
0.633
PR3B > Ifl
0.2266
0.5416
0.2365
0.6261
0.2111
0.1919
0.1408
0.9371
0.7883
0.3633
0.5274
-259-
SAMPLE 2
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Males
DEP VARIABLE:
Table A5-34
SOURCE
MODEL 30
EIR2R 1131
C TOTAL 1161
RJOT MSE
DEP MEAN
C.V.
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
E)CS2
EDPS2
AC0N2
AC0N3
ACDN4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
CHILDI
CHILD2
LFA4
DLHH
TOTABFC
OS 3P 1
C RDT
14F3R4
PERCD
MOTS1
EARSOC
EARDL
U40V
SPSCAR2
SPMJB
SPSTRPRM
I MPCARtF
OF
SUN OF
SQUARES
52.867563
45.963987
98.831550
0.201594
10.474715
1.924577
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
9.420594
0.021525
-0.000209641
0.132166
0.164846
0.336174
0.024867
0.100031
0.012712
0.001540641
-.0000018722
0.0008384876
-.0000017858
0.012857
0.026548
-0.00150355
-0.000201949
-0.000510578
-0.027294
0.007454472
-0.000140962
1.0006771512
-0.120379
0.008297611
0.001880486
0.012971
-0.00335882
-0.015025
0.034912
-0.021145
0.050809
MEAN
SQUARE
1.762252
0.040640
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
STANDARD
ERROR
0.163373
0.008275577
.00009952682
0.014747
0.027098
0.031672
0.05881D
0.058102
0.057728
0.0002647039
6.11478E-07
D.0003474984
6.82483E-07
0.009422163
0.007334446
0.001107301
0.0001373129
0.0003091247
0.013084
0.001093716
0.0003083214
0.0004891176
0.062315
0.013474
0.004774142
0.006260718
0.015157
0.009984698
0.014595
0.042924
0.025847
F VALUE
43.362
PROB>F
0.0001
0.5349
0.5226
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0 PROB > ITI
57.663
2.601
-2.106
8.962
6.083
10.614
0.423
1.722
0.220
5.820
-3.062
2.413
-2.617
1.365
3.620
-1.358
-1.471
-1.652
-2.086
6.816
-0.457
1.384
-1.932
0.616
0.394
2.072-
-0.222
-1.505
2.392
-0.493
1.966
0.0001
0.3394
0.0354
0.0001
0.0031
0.0001
0.6725
0.0!54
0.8257
0.001
0.0323
0.0160
0.0090
0.1727
0.0003
0.1748
0.1416
0.0989
0.0372
0.0301
0.6476
0.1665
0.D536
0.5381
0.6937
0.3385
0.8247
0.1327
0.3169
0.6224
0.3496
LNBTES
-260-
SAMPLE 2
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Females
Table A5-35
DEP VARIA3LE:
SOURCE DF
MODEL 30
ERRJR 314
C TOTAL 344
ROOT MSE
DEP MEANC.V.
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
E)PS2
ACO42
ACON3
ACON4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
CHILD1
CHILD2
LFA%
DLH-i
TDTAEFC
0SJAP1
1NFORM
PERCD
MOTS1
EARSOC
EARDL
U40V
SPSCAR2
SPM38
SPSTRPRM
IMPCARTF
OF
LNBTES
SUN OF
SQUARES
17.309128
30.411316
47.720444
0.311209
10.045483
3.098004
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
9.671986
0.027898
-0.000400908
0.013243
0.045409
0.288609
0.~085305
0.213393
-0.078884
0.005640499
-. 0000120932
-0.00199888
.O0000592482
0.055770
0.045225
-0.0002223
-0.000439977
-0.00179987
0.026273
0.006186104
-0.0008764
0.001397723
-0.032488
-0.034698
-0.017666
-0.018689
0.045602
0.017282
0.012425
0.192016
0.047979
ME AN
SQUARE
0.576971
0.096851
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
STANDARD
ERROR
0.402492
0.020893
0.0002681545
0.045348
0.083018
0.094396
0.134731
0.124452
0.133247
0.001021254
.00000322476
0.001101412
..00000280175
0.038803
0.028475
0.0004989545
0.0003347269
0.0008301829
0.043760
0.007625247
0.0009009434
0.002932872
0.045071
0.035712
0.013031
0.017269
0.037814
0.028504
0.043843
0.229582
0.039480
F VALUE
5.957
PR 08>F
0.0001
0.3627
0.3018
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
24.030
1.335
-1.495
0.292
0.547
3.057
0.633
1.715
-0.592
5.523
-3.750
-1.815
2.115
1.437
1.588
-0.446
-1.314
-2.168
0.600
0.811
-0.973
0.477
-0.721
-0.972
-1.356
-1.082
1.206
0.606
0.283
0.836
1.215
PROD > ITI
0.0001
0.1327
0.1359
0.7705
0.5848
0.3026f
0.5271
D.3874
0.5543
0.0001
0.0002
0.0705
0.0352
0.1516
0.1132
0.6562
0.1397
0.0309
0.5487
0.4178
0.3314
0.6340
0.4716
0.3320
0.1762
0.2800
0.2287
0.5447
0.7771
D.036
0.2252
-261-
SAMPLE 3
TOTAL MARRIED REGRESSION
Human Capital Model
Table A5-36
DEP VARIABLE:
SJUICE
MODEL 8
ERROR 174
C TOTAL 182
R30T 4SE
DEP MEAN
C .V.
VARIABLE DF
SUM OF
SQUARES
17.563676
9.778288
27.341964
0.237059
10.449719
2.26857
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
MEAN
SQUARE
2.195459
0.056197
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-S
STANDARD
ERROR
F VALUE
39.067
PR33>F
0.0001
0.6424
C .6259
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=O PR3B > Ifl
1NTERCEP
SEX
EDTS2
E)CS2
E3PS2
FYSERVC
FYSER1C2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
9.798217
-0.300513
0.056402
0.293134
0.394423
0.001592728
-7.30425E-07
0.004053324
-. 0000079051
0.077404
0.046241
0.068548
0.064018
0.062383
0.000831355
.00000256173
0.0005359387
.000D138233
LNBTES
126.586
-6.499
0.823
4.579
6.323
1.916
-0.285
6.374'
-5.719
D.3331
0.0001
0.4117
0.0D01
0.0570
0.7759
0.3331
0.0001
-262-
SAMPLE 3
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
DEP VARIASLE: LNBTES
SUN OF MEAN
SOURCE OF SQUARES SQUARE
MDDEL 33
ERR3R 149
C TOTAL 182
R3OT M45E
DEP MEAN
C.V.
20.341028
7.000936
27.341964
0.216763
10.449719
2.074342
0.616395
0.046986
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-50
Table A5-37
F VALUE
13.119
PROB>F
0.0001
0.7439
0.6872
VkRIABLE
INTERCEP
SEX
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACD-42
ACD43
ACON4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFE K2
0CC 1
0CC2
CHILDI1
Ci1LD2
LFAM
DLHi
TOTABFC
0SJAP1
WWOP
CAR3T
INFORM
PERCD
MDTsi
EARSOC
EARDL
U40V
SPSCAR2
SPMDB
SPSTRPR4
I1PCA.RTF
PARAMETER
OF ESTIMATE
1 9.286438
1 -0.078155
1 0.028829
1 -0.000363965
1 -0.00806798
1 0.109862
1 0.223713
1 0.224580
1 0.191178
1 0.058166
1 0.001332196
1 -4.66424E-07
1 0.002909696
1 -. 0000053329
1 -0.021184
1 0.086111
1 0.047570
1 -0.00522291
1 .00004147943
1 -0.00134525
1 -0.00109281
1 -0.000206422
1 0.004690318
1 -0.00183917
1 -0.000472309
1 -0.035631
1 0.010721
1 -0.000448171
1 0.010854
1 0.070488
1 -0.054881
1 0.050916
1 -0.239628
1 0.107805
STANDARD
ERROR
0.474871
0.073790
0.024689
0.0003079985
0.104805
0.109520
0.110362
0.115325
0.097727
0.125880
0.0008735755
.00003276516
0.00102233
.00003212658
0.109253
0.115296
0.029202
0.024971
0.0002559695
3.0004145581
0.000716238
0.040483
0.001786845
0.0009735715
0.0007030155
0.115499
0.048080
0.005157373
0.016468
0.048786
0.030895
0.040860
0.112146
0.059834
T FUR HO:
PARAMETER=0
19.556
-1.059
1.168
-1.182
-0.077
1.003
2.027
1.952
1.956
0.462
1.525
-0.169
2.846
-2.508
-0.194
0.747
1.629
-0.209
0.162
-3.245
-1.526
-0.005
2.625
-1.889
-P.672
-0.308
0.223
-0.087
0.659
1.445
-1.776
1.246
-2.137
1.802
PR38 > III
0.0001
0.2912
0.2448
0.2392
0.9367
0.3174
0.0444
0.3528
0.0523
0.6447
0.1294
0.8663
0.0050
3.)132
0.8465
0.4563
0.1054
0.836
0.8715
0.3315
0.1292
0.9959
0.0096
D.3638
0.5027
0.7581
0.8239
0.9309
0.51DB
0.1506
0 .0777
0.2147
0.0343
0.0736
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SAMPLE 3
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
DEP VARABLE:
Table A5-38
SOURCE DF
MCDEL 31
ERROR 151
C 73TAL 182
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
C.V.
VARM ABLE
I4TERCEP
SEX
AGE
AGE2
EDT52
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACOI2
A"043
ACON4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEK
FTLFEX2
CHILD I
CHILDZ
LFA14
TGTABFC
OSJAP1
WWOP
CARJ1
PERCD
M3TS1
EARSOC
EARDL
U40V
SPSCAR2
SPMOB
SPSTRPRM
I4PCAITF
OF
SUN OF
SQUARES
20.058489
7.283475
27.341964
0.219625
10.449719
2.101727
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
9.286669
-0.058113
0.027005
-0.000300916
-0.036921
0.101509
0.200923
0.237055
0.148635
-0.000656563
0.001917003
-.0000020849
0.003045333
-. 0000060521
0.049995
-0.00657404
-0.000127932
-0.00153201
-0.0013546
0.011699
0.006004498
-0.00198659
-0.000430546
-0.063482
0.006186726
0.001315253
0.015326
0.064606
-0.043724
0.050962
-0.216965
0.090172
MEAN
SQUARE
0.647048
0.048235
It-SQUARE
ADJ R-S0
STANDARD
ERROR
0.463656
0.072689
0.025301
D.0003109399
0.102798
0.108288
0.109393
0.116278
0.097273
0.109143
0.0009489394
.00000272062
0.001031351
D.0000021326
0.029524
0.025292
0.0302487335
0.0004128738
0.000716935
0.040619
0.00172124
0.0009841676
0.0007119176
0.114480
0.048399
0.005173935
0.016537
0.049016
0.030899
0.041378
0.112879
0.060179
F VALUE
13.415
PROB)F
0.0001
0.7336
0.6789
T FOR H0:
PARAMETER= 0
20.029
-0.799
1.080
-0.968
-0.359
0.937
1.837
2.039
1.528
-0.006
2.258
-0.766
2.953
-2.838
1.693
-0.260
-0.514
-3.711
-1.889
0.288
3.488
-2.019
-0.605
-0.555
0.128
0.254
0.927
1.318
-1.415
1.232
-1.922
1.498
PR38 > ITI
0.0001
0.4253
0.2818
0.3347
0.7200
0.3500
0.0682
0.3432
0.1286
U.9952
0.0254
0.4447
0.0037
3.3352
0.0925
0.7953
0.6078
0.3)33
0.0608
0.7737
0.0006
0.3453
D. 54 62
0.5800
0.8985
0.7997
0.3555
0.1895
0.1591
0.2200
0.0565
0.1361
LNBTES
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SAMPLE 3
Table A5-39
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Males
DEP VARIABLE: LNBTES
SOURCE OF
MODEL 30
ERR3R 111
C T3TAL 141
ROUT MSE
DEP MEAN
C.V.
SUN OF
SQUARES
10.687223
4.329949
15.017173
0.197506
10.559801
1.870356
MEAN
SQUARE
0.356241
0.039009
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
NOTE: MODEL 15 NOT FULL RANK. LEAST SQUARES SOLUTIONS FOR THE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT UNIQUE. SOME STATISTICS WILL BE
MISLEADING. A REPORTED DF OF 0 OR B MEANS THAT THE
ESTIMATE IS BIASED. THE FDLLOWING PARAMETERS HAVE BEEN
SET TO D, SINCE THE VARIABLES ARE A LINEAR COMBINATION
OF OTHER VARIABLES AS SHOWN.
OCC2
PERCD
=+INTERCEP-1*DCC1
=
VARIABLE
1NTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
EDT52
,EDC 52
E3PS2
ACON2
ACON3
ACON4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
OCci
0DC2
CII LD I
CHILD2
LFAM
DLHH
T3TABFC
OSJAP1
WWOP
CAROT
INFORM
PERCD
MJTS1
EARSOC
EARDL
u4nv
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
- 9.38518S
0.039902
-0.000451398
-0.122669
0.023250
0.117653
0.124485
0.161195
-0.049235
S.0008049606
8.47464E-07
0.002434214
-0.000004994
-0.111280
0
0.036146
-0.014469
-0.00128625
-0.00133587
-0.000859873
-0.013944
0 .005765245
-0.000948327
-0.000498151
0
0.010298
-0.000151006
-0 .0025736
0.059140
STANDARD
ERROR
0.555161
0.030410
0.3003678809
0.153819
0.159328
0.160825
0.191873
0.169740
0.179122
3.0009432305
0.0003030717
0.001247977
.03000249885
0.046818
0.028851
0.026028
0.029132
0.0004473271
0O.006778b62
0.042273
0.001832985
0.001014569
0.3006570346
0.052881
0.006153144
0.017307
0.056527
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
16.905
1.312
-1.227
-0.797
0.146
0.732
0.649
0.950
-0.275
0.853
0.276
1.951
-1.999
-2.377
1.253
-0.556
-0.044
-2.986
-1.268
-0.330
3.145
-0.935
-0.758
0.195
-0.025
-0.149
1.046
PROB > ITI
0.Do01
0.1922
0.2224
0.4269
0.8842
3.6660
0.5178
0.3443
0.7839
0.3953
0.7031
0.0536
0.0481
0.0192
0.2129
0.5794
0.9649
0.0035
0.2073
0.7421
0 .35 200.3520
0.4499
3.3459
0.9805
0.8821
3.2M7
F VALUE
9.132
PROB)F
0.0001
0.7117
0.6337
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SAMPLE 3 Table A5-39
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Males
VARIA3LE OF
SPSCARZ
SPMDB
SPSTR'>R4
14PCARTF
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
-0.063568
0.048369
-0.400957
0.089722
STANDARD
ERROR
0.031186
0.042322
0.127984
0.080730
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
-2.038
1.143
-3.133"
1.111
PR3B > ITI
0.0439
0.2556
0. 022
0.2688
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SAMPLE 3
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Females
DSP VARIABLE:
Table A5-40
SOURCE
MaDEL
ERROR
C TOTAL
SUM OF
SQUARES
32
8
40
ROUT ?SE
DEP MEAN
Cov.
4.006494
0.637904
4.644398
0.282379
10.068462
2.804592
MEAN
SQUARE
0.125203
0.079738
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACON2
ACON3
ACON4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
oCCi
0C2
CHILDI1
CHILD2
LFAM
OLHi
TOTABFC
OSJAP1
wwop
CARDT
INF3RM
PERCD
MOTS1
EAR SO C
EARDL
UMOV
SPSCAR2
SPMD 0
SPSTRR.4
I4PCARTF
PARAMETER
OF ESTIMATE
1 12.278752
1 -0.220089
1 0.003281936
1 0.800915
1 0.827754
1 0.971328
1 0.373613
1 -0.096434
1 0.615999
1 0.001317558
1 .00004748444
1 0.025934
1 -. 0000772765
1 0.423449
1 0.166014
1 -0.00575719
1 0.122777
1 -0.00227292
1 -0.00631595
1 -0.028574
1 -0.194538
1 -0.016927
1 -0.010597
1 -0.017112
1 0.195787
1 0.079090
1 -0.034786
1 -0.022592
1 -0.102989
1 0.398483
1 -0.043326
1 0.319394
1 0.090213
STANDARD
ERROR
3.067872
0.152357
0.002252922
0.492833
0.589606
0.721161
0.327768
0.287586
0.439071
0.012644
.00007856147
0.010332
.00003121367
0.376161
0.359629
0.232870
0.168456
0.001605385
0.002709319
0.015245
0.235928
0.011512
0.005685916
0.023666
0.368128
0.256289
0.021159
0.102185
0.292890
0.185515
0.232504
0.378467
0.200764
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=0
4.002
-1.445
1.457
1.625
1.404
1.347
1.140
-0.335
1.403
0.104
0.604
2.510-,
-2.476
1 .126
0.462
-0.025
0.729
-1.416
-2.331
-1.874
-0.825
-1.470
-1.864
-0.723
0.532
0.309
-1.644
-0.221
-0.352
2.148
-0.186
0.844
0.449
PR35 > ITI
0.0039
0.1866
0.1933
0.1428
0.1980
0.2149
0.2873
0.740bO
0.1982
D.9196
0.5623
0.0364
0.0384
0.2929
0.6566
0.9809
0.4869
0.1946
0.3491
0.0978
0.4335
0.1797
0.0994
0.4902
0.6093
0.7655
0.1388
0.3326
0.7342
0.0640
0.8568
0.6232
0.6651
LNBTES
F VALUE
1.570
PROB>F
0.2591
0.8627
0.3133
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SAMPLE 3 Table A5-41
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Males
DEP VARIABLE: LNBTES
SUICE DF
MODEL 29
ERR3R 112
C T3TAL 141
R3DT SE
DEP MEAN
CO.V
SUN OF
SQUARES
10.466841
4.550332
15.017173
0.201564
10.559801
1.908784
MEAN
SQUARE
0.360926
0.040628
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-S0
NOTE: MODEL IS NOT FULL RANK. LEAST SQUARES SOLUTIONS FOR THE
PARAMETERS ARE NOT UNIQUE. SOME STATISTICS WILL BE
MISLEADING. A REPORTED OF OF 0 OR 8 MEANS THAT THE
ESTIMATE IS BIASED. THE FOLLOWING PARAMETERS HAVE BEEN
SET TO t0, SINCE THE VARIABLES ARE A LINEAR COMBINATION
OF DT4ER VARIABLES AS SHOWN.
PERCD
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
AGE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EJPS2
AC042
ACON3
ACO44
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEK2
CILD1
CrI1LD2
LFAM4
DLHH
T)TABFC
.05JAP1
WWdOP
CARJT
INFOR
PER:D
MOTS1
EARSOC
EARDL
U40V
SPSCAR2
SPM38
SS RDR4
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
9.376569
0.033958
-0.000330239
-0.209165
-0.046728
0.039451
0.204970
0.183175
-0.100540
0.001553903
-. 0000014618
0.00264296
-. 0000059818
0.035625
-0.018406
-0.00245062
-0.00157042
-0.00120521
0.004946564
0.007244052
-0.00111246
-0.000471325
0
-0.00606161
0.001278401
0.002783893
0.035942
-0.049339
0.056953
-0.381944
STANDARD
ERROR
0.566555
0.030929
0.0003718179
0.152523
0.159802
0.160658
0.192742
0.172970
0.181470
0.0009072781
.00000297388
0.00127046
.00003251667
0.029643
0.026509
0.029726
0.0004452711
3 .0006757163
0.042373
0.001759592
0.001033013
0.0006704352
0.053509
0.006249503
0.017512
- 0.'056822
0.031235
0.043034
0.130358
T FOR HO:
PARAMETER=O
16.550-
1.098
-0.888
-1.371
-0.292
0.246
1.063
1.059
-0.554
1.713
-0.492
2.080
-2 .379
1.210
-0.694
-0.082
-3.527-
-1.784
0.117
4.117
-1.077
-0.703
-0.113
0.205
0.159
0.633
-1.580
1.323
-2.930
PR38 > 1I1
0.0001
0.2746
0.3766
0.1730
0.7705
0.8065
0.2999
0.2019
0.5337
0.0395
0.6240
0.0398
3.3191
3.2258
0.6889
0.9344
0.0006
0.0772
0.9073
0.0001
0.2838
0.4835
0.9100
0.8383
0.8740
0.5233
0.1170
0.1884
0.311
F VALUE
8.884
PR38>F
0.0001
o.6970
0.6185
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SAMPLE 3
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Females
DEP VARIABLE:
Table A5-42
SOURCE
MODEL
E RR3R
C T3TAL
DF
30
10
40
ROOT MSE
DEP MEAN
C.V.
VARIABLE
INTERCEP
ASE
AGE2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EOPS2
A'%042
ACON3
ACON4
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
CHILD1
CHILD2
LFAM
DLIMI
TDTABFC
0SJAP1
WWOP
CAR3T
IMF3R 4
PER CD
MDTSI
EARSOC
EARDL
UMOV
SPSCAR2
SpM J
SPSTRPRM
IMPCARTF
SUn OF
SQUARES
3.858489
0.785909
4.644398
0.280341
10.068462
2.784345
PARAMETER
ESTIMATE
13.676521
-0.242598
0.003247673
0.348180
0.451109
0.577328
0.518573
0.089090
0.291368
-0.00458365
.00006524115
0.022805
-0.000064065
0.103004
0.194609
-0.00112042
-0.0043596
-0.024494
0.014394
-0.013768
-0.011989
-0.00891612
0.419543
-0.128630
-0.036521
-0.035964
-0.00279973
0.314053
-0.035761
0.256760
-0.00149514
MEAN
SQUARE
0.128616
0.078591
R-SQUARE
ADJ R-SQ
STANDARD
ERROR
2.803480
0.145214
0.002166287
0.342380
0.516048
0.645491
0.306455
0.250444
0.314200
0.011793
.00007690123
0.009944919
.00002941584
0.216035
0.158587
0.001338929
0.002256785
0.014622
0.171711
0.010963
0.005488631
0.022676
0.325984
0.187947
0.020767
0.099039
0.239356
0.172309
0.204912
0.364662
0.181097
F VALUE
1.637
PROB>F
0.2079
0.8308
0.3231
T FOR HO:
PARAKETER=O
4.878-
-1.671
1.499
1.017
0.874
0.894
1.692
0.356
0.927
-0.389
0.848
2.293.-
-2.178
0.477
1.227
-0.837
-1.932
-1.675
0.084
-1.256
-2.184.
-0.393
1.287
-0.684
-1.759
-0.363
-0.012
1.823
-0.175
0.704
-0 .008
PROS > ITI
0.D06
0.1257
0.1667
0.3332
0.4025
0.3921
0.1215
0.7294
0.3756
0.7057
0.4161
0.0448
0.0544
0.6438
0.2479
0.4223
0.3922
0.1248
0.9348
0.2377
0.0538
0.7324
0.2271
0.5093
0.1092
0.7241
0.9909
0.0984
0.8649
0.4974
0.9936
LNBTES
-r .- .
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APPENDIX 6
F-TEST TABLES
TABLE A6-1 GENERAL F-TESTS
TABLE A6-2 TOTAL SAMPLE 1
TABLE A6-3 MARRIED SAMPLE 1
TABLE A6-4 TOTAL SAMPLE 2
TABLE A6-5 MARRIED SAMPLE 2
TABLE A6-6 TOTAL SAMPLE 3
TABLE A6-7 MARRIED SAMPLE 3
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The F-Test Tables
There are basically two types of tests included on this table. There
are the tests across the regression models--that is, are males and females
significantly different? The second type of test is between the models
(full and personal) and poses the question: are the excluded variables
(the Occupation variable) as a group important, above and beyond the other
included variables.
For Sample 1:
The test across the full regression model has an F statistic of 4.06,
with numerator degrees of freedom 31 and denominator degrees of freedom
303. Looking at an F table, the critical values are 1.51 (for 5%) and
1.76 (for 1%). Thus we can reject the hypothesis that there are no signi-
ficant differences between males and females at the 1 percent level.
For the personal regression, the F statistic is 2.76, with numerator
degrees of freedom 22 and denominator degrees of freedom 321. The criti-
cal values are approximately 1.62 and 1.97. Thus again we reject the
hypothesis that males and females are the same.
In looking at the total sample, we can test the hypothesis that there
is a significant difference between the full and personal regressions.
The F statistic for this test is 104.57, with numerator degrees of free-
dom 9 and denominator degrees of freedom 334. The critical values at the
5% and 1% are 1.91 and 2.48 respectively. Thus, we clearly reject the
hypothesis that the occupational variables are not important in explaining
differences in earnings across individuals.
We can also test the same hypothesis for the sub-samples of males
and females separately. For males, the F statistic is 76.20, with degrees
of freedom 9 and 165. The critical value at the 1% level is 2.53, so
again we conclude that the occupational variables are important. For
females, the F statistic is 41.45, with degrees of freedom 9 and 138. The
critical value is 2.55, thus we reject the hypothesis that occupations
are not important.
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Table A6-1
GENERAL F-TESTS
Significant at Significant at
Models 1% level 5% level Not significant
Sample 1
TFR: TPR 104.57
TFR(F): TPR(F) 41.45
TFR(M): TPR(M) 76.20
MFR: MPR 81.20
MFR(F): MPR(F) 61.21
MFR(M): MPR(M) 29.43
Sample 2
TFR: TPR 20.45
TFR(F): TPR(F) 7.66
TFR(M): TPR(M) 15.93
MFR: MPR 13.49
MFR(F): MPR(F) 3.77
MFR(M): MPR(M) 12.77
Sample 3
TFR: TPR 1.93
TFR(F): TPR(F) 0.73
TFR(M): TPR(M) 3.76
MFR: MPR 3.01
MFR(F): MPR(F) 0.93
MFR(M): MPR(M) 5.65
F-Tests between the male and female regressions for each model yield the
following results:
Significant at Significant at
Models 1% level 5% level Not significant
Sample 1
TFR(F): TFR(M) 4.06
TPR(F): TPR(M) 2.76
MFR(F): MFR(M) 2.78
MPR(F): MPR(M) 1.70
Sample 2
TFR(F): TFR(M) 3.02
TPR(F): TPR(M) 3.00
MFR(F): MFR(M) 2.74
MPR(F): MPR(M) 2.64
Sample 3
TFR(F): TFR(M) 2.06
TPR(F): TPR(M) 2.06
MFR(F): MFR(M) 1.62
MPR(F): MPR(M) 1.54
TABLE A6-2
Total Sample 1: The F-test Table
Full
Regression
F-test
R-sg: I
N: I
ESS: I
DF: I
I
I
I
n.d.f. I
d.d.f. I
Total
Regression
1
.9141 1
370 1
2.179062 1
334 1
I
104.5730 1
9 1
334 1
! F-test
I n.d.f.
I CLd.f.
1
4.063894 1
31
303 1
I
-3'
I
Male
Regression
.9463
199
.89092
165
I Female
I Regression
.8677
171
.643207
138
I
76.20164 1 41.45410 1
9
165
9 1
138 I
I
Personal R-sq:
Regression N:
ESS:
DF:
.672
370
8.3193
343
1 2.763258 1
22 1
321 1
.7232
199
4.593987
174
.5101 I
171 I
2.400653 1
147 1
I
TABLE A6-3
Married Sample 1: The F-test Table
I Total
Regression
I F-test I I I
I n.d.f . I Male I Female I
i .d.f. I Regression I Regression 1
Full
Regression
R-sq: I
N: I
ESS: I
DF: I
F-test
I
I
n.d.f. I
d.d.f. I
.9341
258
1.193323
217
1 2.783850 1 .9551 1
1 148
35 1 .520347 1
182 1
.902 1
110 1
.256882 1
73 1
1
61.20945 1 29.43486 181.20499 1
9
217
9 1
109 1
8
73
Personal R-sq: I
Regression N: I
ESS: I
DF: I
I
.7123
258
5.212374
226
1 1.699488 1
27
199
.728 1
1 148 1
1 3.150176 I
118 1
.5858 !
110 1
1.085516 I
81 1
I
I
I
109 1
1
TABLE A6-4
Total Sample 2: The F-test Table
1 Total
I Regression
I
R-s~: I
Regression N: I
ESS: I
DF: I
.6281
1894
92.64466
1857
I F-test I
n.d.f . I Male
j.d.f. i Regression
I Female
I Regression
I I -!
1 3.024329 1 .5703
1 1 1355
1 34 1 54.07265
1823 1 1319 1
.4448 1
539 1
33.62536 1
504
I III
20.44590 1 15.92940 1 7.659345 1
10 1
1319 1
9
504
1 1 1 1
Personal R-sg: I
Regression N: I
ESS: I
DF: I
.5872
1894
102.845
1867
1 2.995311 1
25 1
1842 1
.5184
1355
60.60294
1329
I I I
1 .3689 1
1 539 1
1 38.22444 1
1 513 1
Full
F-test
n.d.f. I
d.d.f. I
10
1857
TABLE A6-5
Married Sawple 2: The F-test Table
Full
Regression
R-sg: I
N: I
ESS: I
DF: I
Total
Regression
.6228
1507
73.77182
1465
1 F-test
n.d.f.
I d.d.f.
1 2.740779 1
I Male
I Regression
.5825 1
1162
39 ! 41.26418
1426 1 1121
I Female
I Regression
.4266
345
27.36344
305
11
F-test
n.d.f. I
d.d.f. I
I
Personal R-sq: I
Regression N: I
ESS: I
DF 1i
I,
13.49261 1
10 1
1465 1
I I - I I
1 12.76768 1 3.774718 1
I
10 1
1121 1
9
305
I 1 ! 1
.588
1507
80.56619
1475
1 2.643014 1 .5349
1 1162
30 1 45.96399
1445 1 1131 1
1 .3627
1 345
3 30.41132
314
I
I 1 1
TABLE A6-6
Total Sample 3: The F-test Table
I
I
I
Total
Regression
F-test
n.d.f.
d.d.f.
I Male
I Regression
I Female
I Regression
- ~I-
Full R-sq: I
Regression N: I
ESS: I
DF: I
I
.6695
255
23.12104
226
1 2.064737 1 .7023
1 1 191
1 25 1 11.72229
201 1 165 1
1
1 .6389
64
1 6.674345
36 I
~- U -
F-test
n.d.f. I
d.d.f. I
,I.
Personal R-sq:
Regression N:
SS:
DF:
I
1.934056 1
2 1
226 I
.6638
255
23.51676
228
1 2.057161 I
1 3.758240 1 .7299710 1
1 1
165 1
.6955 1
191 1
2 1
36 1
.6242 1
64 1
24 I 11.98929 1 6.945016 1
204 1 166 I 38 1
-I - -- I I
TABLE A6-7
Married Sample 3: The F-test Table
I F-test
n.d.f.
Adf
Male I
Rearession I
Female
Regression
Full
Regression
R-sq:
N:
ESS:
DF:
.7439 1
183 1
7.000936 1
149 1
1.623350 1
I Regression i
.711.+ .82
-7117 1
1 142 1
30 1 4.329949 1
.862741
.637904 18 1
I I -1
3.006620 1
2 1
-1 5.649608
1 1 2 18 1
.d.f. I 4997
.8308 1
Personal
Rejression
7336 1 1.535128 1R-sq:
N:
ESS:
183
7.283475
151
1 142
29 1 4.550332
112 1
.8303
41 1
.785909 1
10
- 1 1
Total
F-test
n.d.f. I
111 
:119 -
1 .9280707
-697 1
-
122 1
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APPENDIX 7
DETAILED DISCUSSION OF
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
For each of the three samples, the regression results will be discussed in
the following order:
TFR - total full regression
TPR - total personal regression
TFR(F), TFR(M) - total full regression for females and for males
TPR(F), TPR(M) - total personal regression for females and for males
MFR - married full regression
MPR - married personal regression
MFR(F), MFR(M) - married full regression for females and males
MPR(F), MPR(M) - married personal regression for females and males
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Appendix 7 Detailed Discussion of the Regression Results
Sample 1: Large multinational involved in research and development
TFR
*Intercept
The extensive use of dummy variables in all the models has definite
implications for the interpretation of the results. In Sample 1, for
example, it means that the intercept term can be interpreted as the base
earnings of an individual who is single, male, has a high school educa-
tion, a background in the humanities, entered the firm in operations
support, is currently employed either as a technician in operations
support or as a computer operator, is in the operations support depart-
ment, and does not feel that he is discriminated against. The base
earnings of a female are the constant plus the coefficient of SEX. In
fact, the coefficient of SEX in Sample 1 is negative (-.059) and signi-
ficant at the 1 percent level indicating an unexplained differential in
average earnings of 5.73 percent. To obtain the expected earnings of a
given individual, we start with the base and then add or subtract per-
centage increments indicated by the coefficients on the independent
variables for each unit of an attribute that the individual possesses.
*Human capital
For males and females, AGE is positively related to earnings and its
coefficient is significant, but the negative and significant coefficient
on AGE2 indicates that there are decreasing returns to maturity. The
coefficient of FYSERVC and FYSERVC2 are both positive, but not signifi-
cant. But perhaps because of the strong positive relation between age
and earnings, FTLFEX is negatively related to earnings with a signifi-
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cant impact. The coefficient of FTLFEX2 is positive and significant.
The distinct possibility of multicollinearity between the squared terms
makes the interpretation of individual coefficients difficult. (In
Appendix 4, for all the samples we examine the impact of these variables
together, under some reasonable assumptions.)
The impact of technical and college education on earnings cannot be
distinguished from that of high school, but the relative impact of a
professional degree--EDPS2--is highly signficant and positive. The
holder of a professional degree gains an earnings differential of 18
percent over someone with a high school degree. However, because of an
anomally in the data (see table of earnings by education), the high
school group is not a stable reference group. There is apparently an
individual with extermely high earnings in this group, that due to the
small sample (only 6 individuals with a high school degree), tends to
dominate the mean earnings. We are therefore using the technical school
group as our reference group.
When compared to an individual with a trade school degree, an indi-
vidual with a professional degree can expect to earn 22 percent more
than an otherwise equally qualified individual. An individual with a
college degree can expect to earn 3 percent more than this same repre-
sentative individual. In addition, we can now calculate the expected
differential for possessing a high school degree relative to a technical
degree, this being 3.31 percent (clearly something unusual is happening
with this group and this result is what predicated us to normalize with
respect to technical school rather than high school.)
We can also estimate the implied rate of return for a year of ad-
vanced education, assuming that a technical degree represents 2 years, a
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college degree represents 5 years (standard in Quebec), and a profes-
sional degree represents 10 years. We obtain two estimates of this rate
of return from the model, one based on a comparison of the EDTS2 and
EDCS2 coefficients and the EDTS2 and EDPS2 coefficients. These esti-
mates are 1 percent and 2 percent respectively. We should also note
that because these estimates should be interperted as "within occupa-
tion" measurements, we would expect the coefficients to change dramati-
cally when we drop the occupational variables (OCC, SDN, and FDN) from
the model.
The impacts of the area of concentration are interpreted with res-
pect to the excluded category, ACON1 (humanities). None of the coeffi-
cients on the included ACON variables are significant, implying either
that most relevant skills are learned on the job or that there is a
problem of multicollinearity between education level and area of concen-
tration.
*Occupational segregation
Occupations are categorized both by hierarchical and functional
position in the firm. Given the other variables in the model, the fact
that the hierarchical OCC variables are significant determinants of
earnings indicates either that inefficiency exists in the allocation of
jobs within the firm or that our model does not capture all the personal
attributes that contribute to vertical mobility. For example, if we
could really capture what it is that makes someone a team leader rather
than a technician, then hierarchical position per se would be less
important as a determinant of earnings. (The same interpretations apply
as well to the significance of the functional allocation of jobs dis-
cussed immediately below.) The coefficient of OCC1 indicates that an
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individual at the managerial level makes 3 percent more than an identi-
cally qualified individual would make in computer operations. The coef-
ficient of OCC2 indicates that an individual who is either a programmer
or an analyst makes 18 percent more than an identically qualified person
in computer operations.
Employees are also classified by functional (or horizontal) depart-
ments, within which there are hierarchies of jobs. Except for SDN4
(computer operations) the coefficients on the departmental dummy vari-
ables are positive and significant at the 1 percent level, indicating
that those in technical support (SDN1) and software development (SDN2)
earn significantly more than those in operations support (23 percent and
11 percent respectively.)
*Port of entry
Employees are classified by their first functional department to
test whether current earnings are related to port of entry. The coeffi-
cients of the first department dummy variables indicate that two depart-
ments (technical support and software development) as well as the "not
elsewhere classified" department (FJT5) are significantly different from
the excluded operations support department. The implied differentials
are 8 percent, 7 percent, and 9 percent respectively. Analogous to our
discussion of the current hierarchical and functional occupation vari-
ables, the port of entry would not be a significant determinant of
earnings if there was an efficient allocation of people to their first
jobs or if we had included all the attributes that determined both
initial job placements and subsequent advancement. Below we drop all
the occupational variables in our personal attributes models in order to
determine the extent to which the impact of these variables is picked up
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by personal attributes included in the model and/or there is an ineffi-
cient allocation of people to jobs. Insofar as females are clustered in
low-paying departments and occupations, this inefficiency might be
attributed to sex discrimination.
*Commitment to the home
The variables reflecting marital status and number of children show
no significant impact on earnings in the total sample regression. The
coefficient of LFAM, absence from the labour force for family purposes,
has a negative sign as expected, but it is not significant. There are
two possible reasons for the lack of impact of LFAM. First, the months
of service to the firm may compensate for the absence measured by this
variable, or second, the firm may not consider past absences for family
reasons to be a good predictor of future absences. For example, when
females return to work after an absence to have children, the firm may
view them as stable rather than unstable employees.
*Commitment to the firm
There are no significant impacts on earnings because of total ab-
sence from the company (TOTABFC), number of outside job applications
(OSJAPl), or working overtime without pay (WWOP). The coefficient of
another indicator of commitment to the firm, CAROT -- the present in-
crease in pay needed to induce one to leave the company is, however,
significant. An individual who would require 10 percent more than she
or he is currently earning to leave the company earns a 1.5 percent
premium compared to an individual who would leave the company with no
earnings increment. In line with our hypothesis it can be argued that
an individual with the lower supply elasticity to the outside labour
market sees his or her future with the firm as better, and this greater
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commitment to the firm is reflected in more current motivation to per-
form resulting in higher current earnings.
*Informal networks
Informal networks within the firm are measured by an index (INFORM)
of both the frequency of contacts with superiors and the quality of
these contacts for upward mobility. The index has a highly significant
and positive impact.
*Perceived discrimination
To the last man, males in the sample do not see themselves as the
subject of sex discrimination. But, many females do. For the total
sample, the relation between the perception of discrimination and earn-
ings is negative, but the coefficient on the perceived discrimination
variable is not statistically significant. Holding other factors con-
stant, those who feel discriminated against do not have significantly
lower earnings or, presumably lower productivity, than those who do not
feel discriminated against.
Another variable (MOTS) used to test this hypothesis is the effect
on work motivation, and hence presumably on productivity and earnings,
of having people of the same sex in top positions. The variable is
constructed as an index that ranges from 0--unimportant--to 2--very
important. The coefficient of MOTS is negative and insignificant.
*Early socialization
Variables--EARSOC and EARDL--are included that measure whether an
individual experienced a stereotypical feminine or masculine upbringing
in terms of childhood activities and the division of labor in the home
among parents. The coefficients of these variables are not statisti-
cally significant.
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TPR
In the second model, the total personal regression, we drop the
occupation (hierarchical and functional) and port-of-entry variables.
The correlation between these variables and those that remain in the
model means that there is a left out variable bias. This bias, however,
is interesting in its own right. To the extent that the left out vari-
ables are endogenous, determined in part by the remaining variables in
the system, the comparison of the first and second models reveals the
indirect effects of the exogenous variables through the channels of
occupation and advancement. Thus, we are able to analyze not only
direct earnings discrimination, but also the impact of indirect discri-
mination through occupational segregation, port of entry, and functional
or horizontal departments.
*Intercept
The coefficient of SEX (-.087) is more negative than in the earlier
model indicating that SEX is correlated with the variables dropped out
of the model. This suggests that occupation and ports of entry function
as avenues of sex discrimination and in conjunction with earnings dis-
crimination, they account for a total of 8 percent cost for being
female.
*Human capital
The coefficients of AGE, AGE2, FTLFEX, FTLFEX2, FYSERV, and FYSERV2
change because of their correlations with the dropped variables, but our
interpretations of their impacts are not altered. The coefficient of
EDTS2 becomes significant, implying that the expected earnings of an
individual with a technical school degree are less than those with a
high-school diploma by 15 percent. This anomolous result may well be
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caused by the presence of one or more older employees who have attained
relatively high earnings but entered the company with high school dip-
lomas. In fact, Table 5-6 indicates that one of the five males with
only a high-school degree makes over $34,000. The coefficient of EDPS2
is higher, most likely because of a correlation between having a profes-
sional degree and occupation. It indicates a differential of 56 percent
for possessing a professional degree over a high-school diploma. If we
compare the coefficients of EDCS2 and EDPS2 with respect to EDTS2 rather
than EDHS2, we find that a college degree provides a premium 18 percent
and a professional degree 84 percent. We can also calculate the implied
rate of return as above, of 6 percent and 8 percent repectively for each
additional year of advanced eduaction. In our opinion, this is a more
accurate estimate of the value of the degree than the estimate from TSR
because it takes into account the indirect effect that the possession of
the degree has on occupations.
The coefficient of ACON2, the social sciences concentration, is now
negative and significant at the 5 percent level (implying a 6 percent
difference) compared to a humanities concentration. This change from
TFR is probably because of correlation with the port of entry variable,
since one's area of concentration would most likely have the greatest
impact in determining one's initial job. This explanation would not
hold, however, if a concentration in the humanities were also correlated
to roughly the same extent with the same ports of entry as ACON2. The
coefficient of ACON3 is positive and significant at the 1 percent level
(implying a 10 percent difference) whereas it was insignificant in TFR.
This change was expected because, as stated earlier, over the past
several years a computer sciences degree has been a necessary prerequi-
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site for entry into the programmer and analyst jobs.
*Commitment to the home
The coefficient of CHILD1 is now significant and negative at the 5
percent level, indicating that having children 5 years of age creates a
loss of 4 percent per child. This is correlated with the lower-paying
occupations or the lower-paying ports of entry. The coefficients of
MARITAL and LFAM remain insignificant as in TFR.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of OSJAPL is negative and now significant at the 1
percent level, indicating that there is a correlation between the lower-
paying occupations and the extent to which employees apply for outside
jobs. This implies that individuals who apply for outside positions
earn 5 percent less than those who do not (although the direction of the
causation is not clear). The coefficient of WWOP, is positive and now
significant at the 5 percent level, indicating a premium of 2 percent
for an individual employee who worked overtime. This result indicates a
correlation between the more highly-paying occupations and the extent to
which employees do extra unpaid work. The size of the coefficient of
CAROT does not change significantly, but is no longer statistically
significant.
*Informal networks
The coefficient of INFORM remains positive and significant, and it
triples in magnitude in this regression compared to TFR, indicating that
the extent of an individuals network is correlated with his or her
occupation.
*Perceived discrimination
The coefficients of both PERCD and MOTS1 are more negative than they
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were in TFR but still not significant, implying that perceived discrimi-
nation is correlated with lower-paying jobs--not a surprising result
given that females tend to be in the lower-paying occupations.
*Early socialization
The coefficients of EARSOC and EARDL remain insignificant, but the
sign of the coefficient of EARDL changes from negative to positive.
TFR(F) and TFR(M)
In TFR and TPR, we have constrained males and females to have the
same earnings function with the exception of the intercept (or combined
intercept and SEX) term. Since the coefficient of SEX is negative and
highly significant in TFR and TPR, the estimation of separate female and
male earnings functions is warranted. The R-square statistic is consi-
derably higher for the TFR(M) than for TFR(F), although even in the
latter the R-square is quite high with over 87 percent of the variance
in earnings being accounted for. In the last part of this chapter, we
shall decompose the differences between the two earnings functions into
three components, one associated with the difference in female and male
coefficients, one associated with the difference in female and male
attributes, and the remaining component related to the interaction
between the differences in coefficients and mean attributes.
*Human capital
The coefficient of the age and experience variables are basically
the same as in TFR. Most of the company and labour-force experience
coefficients are not significant, and there do not appear to be any
significant differences between the female and male equations.
No females in the sample had either a professional degree (EDPS2) or
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high -school vocational training (ACON4). The fact that the coefficient
on EDPS2 in TFR(M) is 0.0969 and in TFR is 0.1634 indicates that the
differential for having a professional degree is higher amongst both
sexes combined than amongst males only. The negative (but insignifi-
cant) signs of the coefficients of EDTS2 and EDCS2 for males appear to
be the result of the relatively high salary of at least one of the males
with a high school degree as mentioned earlier. Again, in comparison to
technical school education, a college degree yields a premium of 3
percent and professional degree a premium of 17 percent for males. By
the same token, a female with a college degree earns 4 percent more
than an equivalent female (there are no females with professional deg-
rees). The effects of ACON variables for females and males are in the
same direction, and do not have significant impacts on earnings.
*Occupational segregation
The coefficients of the hierarchical occupational categories are
dramatically different for females and males. In the female equation,
they are positive and increasing with the level of responsibility in the
firm, but the coefficient of OCC2 is not significant and that of OCC1 is
significant at the 5 percent level. In the male equation, the coeffi-
cients are both numerically large and statistically significant, indica-
ting that the hierarchical pay differentials are significantly more
among males than among females. In particular, males in OCCI earn 45
percent more than those in the reference group and males in OCC2 earn 28
percent more than those in OCC3. One can postulate that the signifi-
cance of occupation in the total regression is primarily because of male
earnings differentials, and hence that females are discriminated against
because they do not receive the same premium for attaining a higher
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position in the hierarchy, holding other factors constant. The effects
of the second department variables are basically the same for females
and males with the exception of SDN1. In this case females receive a
premium of 32 percent whereas males only receive 20 percent. When
interpreting the preceeding result it is important to remember that the
selectivity issue has not been addressed.
*Port of entry
The highly significant and positive coefficients of FDN1, FDN2, and
FDN5 in the female regression indicate that females who entered the
company in technical support, software development, and miscellaneous
ports of entry have higher current earnings (14 percent, 12 percent and
38 percent respectively). These results support the hypothesis that the
particular port of entry is a significant determinant of the earnings
possibilities for females. The absence of significant coefficients for
males indicates that first functional department is not ultimately
important in determining the earnings differentials among males. These
results suggest that the promotion opportunities for males are more
varied than they are for females, perhaps because males have access to a
wider array of (and not just longer) internal job ladders.
*Commitment to the home
The signs of the MARITAL coefficients are, as expected, different
for males and females, but neither is statistically significant. The
signs, however, indicate that males who marry are rewarded and females
who marry are penalized for marriage in the labour market. The only
significant coefficient among the CHILD variables is that for CHILD1,
children under 6, in the male equation. It is negative, indicating that
the earnings capacities of males who have young children living with
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them are hampered. Those who have older children living with them are
apparently less hampered. Among females, the hypothesis is supported
that the earnings of those with either younger or older children living
with them are unaffected. Indeed, the coefficient of CHILD2 is positive
(but not significant) for females.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of TOTABFC, total absences from the company, is not
significant, but positive, among both females and males, a counter-
intuitive result. The coefficient of OSJAP1 is negative and significant
for males, but positive and not significant for females. Males who have
lower earnings apply for more outside jobs. Perhaps males who do not
move quickly up the earnings ladder become pessimistic about their ad-
vancement possibilities. Females, in general, might very well be pessi-
mistic in any case, so that no significant differences among females at
different earnings levels can be discerned. Although neither coeffi-
cient is significant, it is interesting to note that the coefficient of
WWOP, working overtime without pay, is positive for males but negative
for females. The coefficient of CAROT is significant for females but
not for males, although it is positive only for both, indicating the
more highly paid employees are more committed to the firm than lower
paid employees. The direction of causation is difficult to identify.
It may be that because they get higher pay, some employees are more
committed to the firm than others rather than vice versa.
*Informal networks
Amongst males, informal contacts have significant positive impacts
on earnings. The size of the coefficient indicates that one contact
with the personnel department for career advice would increase the
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expected earnings of a male by slightly over one percent, while one
contact with a top executive for career advice would increase expected
earnings by 3.5 percent. Amongst females, the coefficient of INFORM is
positive and not significant, indicating that more contacts with supe-
riors get them nowhere in terms of earnings relative to one another. It
should be noted that the mean value of INFORM is 1.75 for males and 0.81
for females. Males are on average more involved in informal contacts
than females and appear to benefit more from them. This behaviour would
be rational given the positive costs of developing informal networks and
knowledge of the returns. Therefore we should not conclude that differ-
ences in pay based on differences in the informal network in the firm
lack a sex bias. It could be argued that even females who do make
informal contacts are unable to make use of them, perhaps because of sex
biases in promotions or the occupational and departmental location of
females in the corporate structure.
*Perceived discrimination
For females, the coefficient of PERCD is negative and not signifi-
cant. The sign indicates that females who are paid less see themselves
as being discriminated against, although it might be argued that the
lower earnings are the cause rather than the effect of the feeling of
discrimination. The coefficient of MOTS1 is negative and significant
for females, indicating that females who feel it is important to their
own success that there be females in higher positions in the company
structure earn less than females who feel it is unimportant.
TPR(F) and TPR(M)
When the regression coefficients and standard errors for TPR(F) and
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TPR(M) are compared to the full female and male regressions, the R-
square for the female regression has dropped to .510 (from .868) while
the R-square for the male regression has dropped to .723 (from .946).
Occupation, department, and port-of-entry variables clearly play an
important independent role in the determination of earnings. In parti-
cular, as is argued more generally in the occupational-segregation
literature, the earnings of females may be much more dependent on the
jobs to which they are allocated than on their personal attributes,
whereas males may have a wider range of intrafirm opportunities open to
them that make their personal attributes more relevant to the determi-
nation of earnings. That is, females may be allocated to jobs in a
discriminatory manner. Alternatively or in addition, there may be
significant factors that influence earnings of females that have been
omitted from the model. Also, given our emphasis on motivation and
incentives, it is possible that some of the included attributes are
better measures of the productivity of males than of females.
*Intercept
Compared to TFR(M), the male intercept decreases while the female
intercept increases, causing the differential to become .880. At
$6,843, the female base earnings are roughly two and half times the size
of the male base earnings ($2,839). It is possible that some of the
variables, such as humanities concentration, that are implicitly inc-
luded in the value of the intercept term are more important positive
determinants of earnings for males than for females.
*Human capital
An obvious change here is that the age and years of service vari-
ables do not have significant impacts on TPR(F) despite the fact that at
-294-
least some of them did have significant impacts in earlier regressions.
The coefficients on age and years of full time labour force experience
are significant in the male equation.
The coefficient of EDTS2 for males is now negative and significant
at the 1 percent level, undoubtedly because the highly paid high-school
graduate is also in a higher paying occupation, the effect of which is
being picked up by the education variables. The coefficient of EDPS2 is
positive and significant, indicating a 40 percent premium for possessing
a professional degree when compared to a high-school degree. When
comparing a professional degree to a technical degree the premium is 84
percent implying a yearly rate of return to schooling of 8 percent. We
can also compare a college degree to a technical degree and estimate the
premium to be 25 percent (a rate of return of 8 percent. For the females
the premium for a college degree over a technical degree is 14 percent
implying a rate of return to education of only 4 percent.
The coefficient of ACON2 for females is now negative and significant
at the 5 percent level, implying that females with social-science con-
centrations are more prevalent in lower-paying occupations and ports of
entry than females with humanities concentrations. For males, the
coefficient of ACON3, a science concentration, has changed from negative
to positive and is now significant at the 1 percent level. The coeffi-
cient implies a 15 percent earnings differential for males who have a
science degree as opposed to a humanities degree. For females, the
coefficient of ACON3 is not statistically significant and implies only a
4 percent differential.
*Commitment to the home
In TPR(M) the coefficient of CHILD1 is negative and significant at
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the 5 percent level. This implies a cost of 5 percent less in earnings
for each additional child under the age of 5 years. This coefficient
doubles in magnitude from TFR(M), indicating a correlation between the
number of young children and the left out variables.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of TOTABFC again has the wrong sign and is not
significant. For males, the coefficient of OSJAP1 remains negative and
significant at the 1 percent level. For females, it is not significant
in either regression, but the sign changes from positive to negative.
The coefficient of WWOP is not significant for females. For males this
coefficient is positive and significant. For females, the coefficient of
CAROT remains positive at the 1 percent level implying that a female who
would require a 10 percent increase in her salary to leave the company
exhibits commitment to the firm that yields her a 4 percent differential
over an equally endowed female who would leave the company for a zero
earnings increment.
*Informal networks
For males, the coefficient of INFORM remains positive and signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level.
*Perceived discrimination
For females, the coefficient of MOTS1 has remains negative and is
now significant at the 5 percent level.
*Early socialization
In both equations, the coefficients of EARDL are positive, implying
that the more traditional the family background the higher the earnings
for both males and females. The female coefficient is significant at
the 5 percent level, and its magnitude indicates that EARDL could ex-
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plain variations in the earnings of females of up to 12 percent.
MFR
*Intercept
The intercept represents the base earnings ($5,872) for a married
male, with the attributes of the omitted dummy variables and a zero
value for the other included variables. The base earnings of a female
($5,457) are the constant plus the coefficient of sex.
*Human capital
For males and females together, age is positively related to earn-
ings and significant. The coefficient of AGE2 is negative and signifi-
cant, indicating decreasing returns to age. However, when considered
jointly with FTFLEX2 and FYSERVC2, the sign of the quadratic term be-
comes positive (see appendix 3). None of the education variables or the
ACON variables are significant. The differential rate of return of a
professional degree over a technical degree is 17 percent.
*Occupational segregation
For married individuals in OCCI and OCC2 the rate of returns for
being in these particular occupations are 37 percent and 22 percent
respectively. The coefficients of both variables are statistically
significant at the 1 percent level.
The coefficients of the technical support (SDN1) and software deve-
lopment (SDN2) departments are also significant at the 1 percent level,
indicating that individuals in these departments receive a premium of 20
percent and 9 percent respectively than those in operations support, the
reference group.
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*Port of entry
Married employees entering the firm in either FDN1 or FDN2 receive a
statistically significant premium of 6 percent and 7 percent respective-
ly over those entering in FDN3.
*Commitment to the home
The variables representing commitment to the home, CHILD1, CHILD2,
and LFAM are not significant in explaining earnings for married indivi-
duals. An additional variable, measuring the division of labour in the
home (DLHH), has been added to the regression. This variable ranges on
a scale from 0 to 300, a higher value indicating that an individual has
more of the household duties traditionally done by females. The coeffi-
cient is not significant in a sample including both males and females.
*Dominant career
The central reason for examining a subsample of married employees is
to highlight the effects of a dual-career household on the individual's
earnings. For this purpose, the following variables have been included:
whether or not the individual is willing to relocate to advance the
career of the spouse (UMOV); whether a spouse or partner is supportive
of the employee having a career (SPSCAR); whether a spouse would be
willing to relocate in order to benefit an employee's career (SPMOB);
whether the spouse is professional and willing to relocate for the sake
of an employee's career (SPSTRPRM); and the importance of the employee's
career to the family (IMPCARTF). None of the coefficients of these
variables were statistically significant for the married full reg-
ression.
*Commitment to the firm
There are no significant impacts on earnings from TOTABFC, OSJAP1,
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and WWOP. The variable CAROT has a coefficient that is positive and
significant at the 1 percent level.
*Informal networks
The coefficient on informal networks is significant at the 1 percent
level.
*Perceived discrimination
The coefficients of PERCD and MOTS1 are not significant.
*Early socialization
For the married sample neither of the coefficients of EARSOC or
EARDL are significant.
MPR
*Intercept
The coefficient on sex is now positive, although not significant.
As in the earlier interpretation of the change in this coefficient when
moving from the full regression to the personal regression, we can infer
that sex is correlated with the left-out variables (OCC, SDN, FDN). In
this instance, the change is positive leading one to conclude that males
are discriminated against in terms of occupational advancement.
*Human capital
Again we note that age, years of service,and labour-force experience
are significant determinants of earnings. The coefficient of the vari-
able EDTS2 is more negative than in the MFR and is significant at the 5
percent level. As discussed earlier, an anomally in the data is probably
causing the mean income for high-school graduates to be inflated rela-
tive to the remainder of the sample, thereby resulting in an underesti-
mate of the coefficients for education. Therefore, we should focus our
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attention on the relative rather than the absolute magnitudes of the
technical, college, and professional-degree coefficients. An individual
with a professional degree earns 70 percent more than an individual with
a technical school degree, while someone with a college degree earns 11
percent more (with implied rates of return of 7 percent and 4 percent
respectively).
Because of the correlation between entry level positions, occupation
and second department and a science degree (ACON3) the magnitude of the
coefficient (ACON3) increases by a factor of 10. This coefficient now
implies that a recipient of a science degree can expect to earn 14
percent more than an otherwise equally qualified individual with a
humanities degree.
*Commitment to the home
The coefficient of the division of labour in the household variable
is negative and significant, indicating that an individual who is less
constrained by household responsibilities earns more than an individual
who is more constrained.
*Dominant career
The only variable supporting this hypothesis is IMPCARTF, the coeffi-
cient of which is positive and significant at the 5 percent level,
implying a correlation between the left out variables and the importance
of the career to the family unit. This finding indicates that indivi-
duals in higher-paying occupations are more likely to have the primary
career.
*Informal networks
The coefficient of INFORM is positive and significant. As in the
total sample, the magnitude of this coefficient increases in going from
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the full regression to the personal regression.
MFR(F) and MFR(M)
*Intercept
The higher intercept term for males implies that the base salary for
males is 3 times that for females, in part because of the particular
attributes associated with the base earnings.
*Human capital
The linear age terms are positive for both sexes, while the quadra-
tics are both negative, implying decreasing returns to maturity for both
groups. None of the experience variables are significant determinants
of earnings.
None of the coefficients of the ACON or education variables are
significant for males or females.
*Occupational segregation
The coefficients of the occupation variables are dramatically dif-
ferent for males than for females. In the female equation, they are
positive and increasing with the level of responsibility in the firm,
but not significant. In the male equation, the coefficients are both
numerically large and statistically significant. This finding indicates
that the hierarchical pay differences are greater among males than among
females in the same occupations. The premiums among males for being in
OCC1 and OCC2 are 52 percent and 36 percent respectively.
The coefficients for SDN1 and SDN2 are significant in both equa-
tions. But the returns of employees in SDN1 relative to those in SDN3
are two times larger among married females than among married males.
For females, the extra returns for SDN1 and SDN2 relative to SDN3 are 37
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percent and 10 percent respectively, while those for males are 17 per-
cent and 7 percent respectively.
*Port of entry
The highly significant and positive coefficients of FDN1 and FDN2
for the female regression indicate that females who entered the company
in technical support or software development had higher current earnings
than those who entered in FDN4--computer operations. The premiums for
females entering the company in FDN1 and FDN2 are 17 percent and 16
percent respectively. There were no married females in miscellaneous
ports of entry. These results support the hypothesis that the parti-
cular port of entry is a significant determinant of earnings among
married females. As indicated above, the absence of significant coeffi-
cients for males indicates that the first functional department is not
important in determining earnings differences among married males. The
results indicate that the promotion opportunities for males are more
varied than they are for females, perhaps because males have access to a
wider array (and not just longer) of job ladders.
*Commitment to the home
There are no significant coefficients supporting this hypothesis.
*Dominant career
None of the variables are significant determinants of earnings.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of OSJAP1 is positive and significant at the 1
percent level for females, implying a positive correlation between
earnings and applying for outside jobs, a result which is counter-
intuitive. CAROT is positive and significant at the 1 percent level for
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females, indicating that more highly paid females are more committed to
the firm than lower paid females. Again, the direction of causation is
more difficult to identify. It may be that because they get higher pay,
some females are more committed to the firm than others rather than vice
versa.
*Informal networks
The coefficient of INFORM is significant at the 1 percent level for
males.
*Perceived discrimination
None of the variables is a significant determinant of earnings.
*Early socialization
None of the variables is significant determinant of earnings.
MPR(F) and MPR(M)
*Intercept
The difference in the male and female intercept terms is .1854,
implying that the base salary for males is 20 percent higher than that
for females.
*Human capital
Most of the coefficients of the age and experience variables are not
significant. Comparing the coefficients of college and professional
education relative to that of technical school (rather than high
school), we find that among males a college degree yields a 24 percent
differential (a 7 percent annual rate of return) and a professional
degree a 78 percent differential (an annual rate of return of 7 per-
cent). For females the premium for a college degree over a technical
degree is 5 percent, implying an annual rate of return of 2 percent.
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The ACON3 coefficient is positive and significant at the 1 percent level
in both equations. Among males, the differential of applied science
over a humanities degree is 14 percent, whereas among females the dif-
ference is 12 percent.
*Commitment to the home
For married females the coefficient of the CHILD1 variable is nega-
tive and significant at the 5 percent level, indicating that they earn 7
percent less for each additional child they have under the age of 6.
The fact that this coefficient has become larger in magnitude from the
MFR(F) implies that there exists a correlation between having young
children and being in the lower-paying occupational structure, even
after taking into account experience and all the other controls in the
equation.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of OSJAP1 is negative and significant for males.
Among males applying for outside jobs, each additional outside job
application costs the individual 7 percent in earnings (although the
causation is not clear). Among females, the coefficient of CAROT is
positive and significant at the 5 percent level, indicating that females
who are more highly paid tend to be more committed to the firm.
*Informal networks
The coefficient of INFORM is positive and significant among males
and females, but larger in magnitude among males.
*Perceived discrimination
The coefficient of PERCD is significant among females at the 5 per-
cent level, implying that those females who feel discriminated against
earn 5 percent less than those who do not (although here again the
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causation is not clear). The coefficient of MOTS1 is significant at the
5 percent level, indicating that married females who consider it impor-
tant to have someone of the same sex in a top position earn 6 percent
less than those who do not.
*Early socialization
The coefficient of EARDL is positive and significant at the 1 per-
cent level for females, implying that married females who experienced a
household with a more traditional division of labour while growing up
earn more than those married females who do not. The coefficient of
EARSOC is positive and significant for males at 1 percent level, infer-
ring that males who have a more feminine upbringing have higher earnings
than those who do not -- indeed a counterintuitive finding.
Sample 2: Large utilities company
TFR
*Intercept
The intercept term can be interpreted as the base earnings of an
individual who is single, male, has a high school education, a back-
ground in the humanities, is currently a member of the clerical staff,
and does not feel that he is discriminated against. The base earnings
of a female are the constant plus the coefficient of SEX. The coeffi-
cient of SEX is negative (-.159) and significant at the 1 percent level
indicating an unexplained differential in average earnings of 15 per-
cent.
*Human capital
For males and females, AGE is positively related to earnings and
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significant, but the negative and significant coefficient on AGE2 indi-
cates that there are decreasing returns to maturity. The coefficient of
FYSERVC is positive and significant, while the coefficient of FYSERVC2
is negative and significant, indicating decreasing returns to years of
service with company. The impacts of technical, college, and profes-
sional degrees on earnings are all highly signficant and positive rela-
tive to that of high school. When compared to an individual with a
high-school degree, an individual with a * technical school degree can
expect to earn 12 percent more than an otherwise equally qualified
individual. An individual with a college degree can expect to earn 15
percent more than this same representative individual, and an individual
with a professional degree can earn 32 percent more. The annual rates
of return for one year of technical, college, and professional education
are 6 percent, 3 percent, and 3 percent respectively.
The impacts of the area of concentration are interpreted with res-
pect to the excluded category, ACON1 (humanities). None of the coeffi-
cients of the included ACON variables are significant, implying either
that most relevant skills are learned on the job or that there is a
problem of multicollinearity between education level and area of concen-
tration.
*Occupational segregation
Occupations have not been organized entirely in hierarchical order
as they are for samples 1 and sample 3. The occupational categories
included in the regression are: OCC1, management; OCC2, clerical staff;
OCC3, engineering staff; OCC4, scientific research staff; OCC5, computer
staff; OCC6, secondary service staff; OCC7, financial staff; OCC8,
primary services; OCC9, skilled labour; OCC10, public relations; OCC11,
-306-
bluecollar supervisors.
The coefficient of OCC1 indicates that an individual at the manager-
ial level makes 26 percent more than an identically qualified individual
would make in clerical department (the omitted variable). The coeffi-
cient of OCC3 indicates that an individual who is a member of the engi-
neering staff makes 12 percent more than an identically qualified person
who is a member of the clerical staff. The coefficient of OCC4 implies
that an individual who is a member of the scientific staff earns 12
percent more. The OCC5 coefficient indicates that a member of the
computing staff earns 9 percent more. The negative and significant
coefficient of OCC6 (secondary services) indicates that an individual in
secondary services earns 12 percent less. The positive and significant
coefficient of OCC9 indicates that an individual in the skilled labour
category earn 12 percent more than an individual in the clerical cate-
gory. Finally, the positive and significant coefficient of OCC11,
bluecollar supervisors, indicates that earn 11 percent more than someone
in the clerical group.
*Commitment to the home
CHILD1 and CHILD2 have significant impacts on earnings in TFR. The
coefficients of CHILD1 and CHILD2 are both positive and significant at
the 1 percent level. The premiums for having an additional child 6
years and under and 6 years of age and up are 3 percent and 2 percent
respectively. The coefficient of LFAM, absence from the labour force for
family purposes, has a negative sign as expected, but it is not signi-
ficant.
*Commitment to the firm
There are significant impacts on earnings because of total absence
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from the company (TOTABFC), and working overtime without pay (WWOP).
The coefficient of TOTABFC is negative and significant at the 1 percent
level implying that the more individuals are absent from the company for
whatever reasons, the less they earn. The coefficient of WWOP is posi-
tive and significant at the 1 percent level, implying that those indivi-
duals who work overtime without pay 1 times (the mean in the sample)
earn 0.07 percent more than individuals who do no unpaid overtime work.
TPR
*Intercept
The coefficient of SEX (-.186) is more negative than in the earlier
model, indicating that SEX is correlated with the variables dropped out
of the model. The combined effects of earnings discrimination and occu-
pational segregation account for a differential of 17 percent.
*Human capital
The coefficients of AGE, AGE2, FTLFEX2, FYSERV, and FYSERV2 change
very little from TFR, so our interpretations of their impacts are not
altered. The only difference to note is that the coefficient of FTLFEX
is now significant. The coefficients of the education variables remain
positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The premiums for hol-
ding these degrees are 12 percent, 19 percent, and 39 percent respec-
tively over an individual with a high school degree. The annual rates
of return are 6 percent, 4 percent and 3 percent respectively. The
coefficient of ACON3, the sciences concentration, is now positive and
significant at the 5 percent level, implying a 9 percent difference
compared to a humanities concentration.
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*Commitment to the home
The coefficient of the CHILDl and CHILD2 variables remain signifi-
cant and positive at the 1 percent level, indicating that having child-
ren 5 years of age and under is correlated with the higher-paying occu-
pations. The coefficients of MARITAL and LFAM remain insignificant as
in TFR.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of WWOP, working overtime without pay, is positive
and still significant at the 1 percent level, indicating a correlation
between the more highly paid occupations and the extent to which emplo-
yees do extra unpaid work.
TFR(F) and TFR(M)
The R-square statistic is considerably higher for TFR(M) at .570
than TFR(F) of .448
*Intercept
The intercept term for males is 9 and for females is 10, implying
that the female base earnings are about 35 percent higher than the male
base earnings.
*Human capital
The coefficients of the age and experience variables are basically
unchanged from TFR. The fact that the coefficients of all the education
variables are positive and significant for males at the 1 percent level
but only positive and significant for females at the 1 percent level for
a professional degree indicates that for males, schooling works to
allocate males to hierarchical positions, but that for females, it is
only extraordinary credentials that help move them up the company's
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career ladders. That is, amongst females, we are unable to distinguish
the impact of a technical and college education from that of a high
school education. Amongst males, the premium for the degrees are res-
pectively 12 percent, 17 percent, and 35 percent over a male with a high
school education. The returns to each additional year of each parti-
cular type of education are 6 percent, 3 percent, and 3 percent respec-
tively. For females the premium put on a professional degree is 22
percent more than for an equivalent individual holding a high school
degree. The returns to an additional year of professional degree educa-
tion for females is 2 percent.
*Occupational segregation
Amongst males, the premium for being in OCCI (management) rather
than the clerical department is 19 percent, and for being in OCC3 (engi-
neering) is 6 percent. Although not significant, it is interesting to
note that amongst males, those in OCC5 (computer staff), which includes
analysts and programmers, earn 4 percent less than equally qualified
males in the clerical department. The coefficient of OCC6 (secondary
services) is negative and significant at the-1 percent level, indicating
that an individual male in this department earns 16 percent less than a
male in the clerical department. The coefficients of OCC9 (skilled
labour) and OCC11 (bluecollar supervisors) are statistically signifi-
cant, indicating a positive premium of 8 percent and 7 percent respec-
tively over the reference group.
Amongst all females, the coefficients of OCC1 (management), OCC3
(engineering), OCC4 (scientific research staff), OCC5 (computer staff),
OCC7 (finance staff), and OCC9 (skilled labour) are all statistically
significant. There are no females in OCC11 (bluecollar supervisors).
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The premium over the reference group for being in OCCl is 41 percent;
OCC3, 29 percent; OCC4, 41 percent; OCC5, 21 percent; OCC7, 33 percent;
and OCC9, 56 percent.
*Commitment to the home
Amongst females, the coefficients of CHILD1 and CHILD2 are positive,
but insignificant. Amongst males, however, these coefficients are
positive and significant at the 5 percent level. It may be that males
with children are perceived to be more stable employees than males who
do not have children or are single, and are rewarded accordingly.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of TOTABFC is significant at the 5 percent level and
negative amongst both females and males. The coefficient of WWOP is
significant at the 1 percent level and positive amongst males, indica-
ting that males who work overtime without pay ( where the mean is 1.37
times) earn 1 percent more as a result.
TPR(F) and TPR(M)
*Human Capital
The coefficients of age and the experience variables are all statis-
tically significant in both TPR(F) and TPR(M). Amongst males we still
note the highly significant coefficients of the education variables at
the 1 percent level as well as the increasing magnitudes of the coeffi-
cients themselves. The premiums for technical school, college, and
professional degrees are now 13 percent, 20 percent and 42 percent
respectively over the reference group (high school). The returns for an
additional year of a technical school degree are 6 percent; for a col-
lege degree, 4 percent; and a professional degree, 4 percent.
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Amongst the females the coefficient of EDCS2 now becomes significant
at the 5 percent level indicating a correlation between a college degree
and occupation. Compared to TFR(F), the magnitude of the coefficients
triples in TPR(F) for a college degree and doubles for a professional
degree. Amongst females the premium for holding a technical school
degree is 4 percent; a college degree, 13 percent; and a professional
degree, 35 percent. Amongst males, the returns for an additional year
of technical school are 2 percent; for a college degree, 2 percent; and
a professional degree, 3 percent. Comparing males and females, the
greatest difference in returns is for technical school education (al-
though the coefficient of EDTS2 was not significant for females).
*Commitment to the home
In TPR(M), the coefficient of the CHILDI variable is positive and
significant at the 5 percent level, while CHILD2 has a significant
impact at the 1 percent level, implying a gain of 2 percent more earn-
ings for every additional child over the age of 6. This coefficient
doubles in magnitude from TFR(M), indicating a correlation between the
number of older children and the left out occupations.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of TOTABFC is significant for males and females.
For males, the coefficient of OSJAP1 becomes negative and significant at
the 5 percent level, which indicates that the more outside jobs a male
applies for the lower are his earnings. For females, the coefficient of
WWOP now becomes positive and significant at the 5 percent level, indi-
cating a correlation between working overtime without pay and the left
out occuaptional variables. For males WWOP remains positive at the 1
percent level, and increases in magnitude.
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*Perceived discrimination
For males, the coefficient of PERCD becomes negative and significant
at the 5 percent level, indicating that males who feel they have been
discriminated against earn 12 percent less than those males that feel
they have not been discriminated against. It is interesting to note,
however, that only 0.8 percent of the males (11 males) and 22 percent of
the females feel they have been discriminated against.
MFR
*Intercept
The sex coefficient is -.1196 indicating that females earn 11.28
percent less than males, even after controlling for all other variables
in the model.
*Human capital
AGE is positively related to earnings and has a significant impact.
The coefficient of AGE2 is negative and significant, indicating dec-
reasing returns to age. The coefficients of years of service with the
company are positive at the 1 percent level, while the coefficients of
FYSERVC2 are negative at the 1 percent level, indicating decreasing
returns to being with the company over time. All of the coefficients of
the education variables are significant at the 1 percent level. The
premiums for a technical, college. and professional degree over a high
school degree are 12 percent, 12 percent, and 31 percent respectively.
The rates of return to an additional year of each particular type of
education are 6 percent, 2 percent, and 3 percent respectively.
*Occupational segregation
For married individuals the premiums for being in OCC1, OCC3, OCC4,
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OCC5, OCC6, OCC7, OCC8, OCC9, OCC1O, and OCC11 are 2 percent, 3 per-
cent, 8 percent, 12percent, -12 percent, 0.3 percent, 5 percent, 9
percent, 2 percent, and 9 percent respectively. Only those individuals
in secondary services earn 12 percent less than equally qualified indi-
viduals in the clerical department. Among the OCC variables, only OCC7,
OCC8, and OCC10 do not have significant impacts, while the coefficients
of the rest are significant at the 1 percent level.
*Commitment to the home
CHILDI and CHILD2 are significant determinants of earnings for
married individuals. The returns to having an additional child, 5 and
under and 6 years and up are 2 percent and 3 percent respectively. The
coefficient of DLHH is negative and significant at the 5 percent level,
indicating that those individuals who are less constrained by household
duties earn 3 percent more money.
*Commitment to the Firm
There are significant impacts on earnings from TOTABFC (at the 5
percent level) and WWOP (at the 1 percent level).
MPR
*Intercept
The coefficient of sex is still negative, but more so than in the
full regression, implying that females are discriminated against in
terms of occupational advancement. In moving from the full regression
to the personal regression, we can infer that sex is correlated with the
left-out occupational variables. At -.136, the sex coefficient indi-
cates an unexplained differential of 13 percent.
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*Human capital
The age and years of service variables are significant determinants
of earnings. The coefficients of the education variables are slightly
larger than in the MFR and remain significant at the 1 percent level.
The premiums for holding a technical degree, a college degree, and a
professional degree over a high school degree are now 12.52 percent 16
percent 39 percent respectively. The annual returns to holding these
degrees are 6 percent 3 percent and 3 percent respectively, all inc-
reases form the full regression.
Beacuse of the correlation between occupations and a science degree,
the coefficient of ACON3 now becomes significant at the 5 percent level,
implying that a recipient of a science degree can expect to earn 14
percent more than an otherwise equally qualified individual with a
humanities degree.
*Commitment to the home
The coefficient of the CHILD2 variable is now more significant than
before in determining earnings amongst marrieds. The coefficient of the
division of labour in the household variable is negative and signifi-
cant.
*Dominant careers
The only variable supporting this hypothesis is IMPCARTF, the coeffi-
cient of which is positive and significant at the 5 percent level,
indicating that individuals in higher-paying occupations are more likely
to have the primary career.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of total absences from the company is still signifi-
cant and negative at the 5 percent level. WWOP remains significant at
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the 1 percent level.
MFR(F) and MFR(M)
*Human capital
The coefficients of the experience variables and the age variables
for the males are significant and of the expected sign. For females,
however, the signs for full time labour force experience variables
change, the linear terms being negative while the quadratic term is
positive.
None of the coefficients of the education or ACON variables are
significant for females. For married males all the education variables
are significant at the 1 percent level. The premiums to holding a
technical degree, a college degree, and a professional degree over a
high school degree are 13 percent, 14 percent, and 37 percent respec-
tively. The percentage increase in earnings for each additional year of
each particular type of education is 6 percent, 3 percent and 3 percent.
*Occupational segregation
Amongst males relative to the reference occupation, the premiums for
being in OCC1 is 18 percent, OCC3 7 percent and OCC6 earn 16 percent, 0-
CC9, 5 percent and OCC11, 6 percent. Amongst females, the premiums over
the reference group in OCC1, OCC3, OCC4, and OCC5 and OCC9 are 45 per-
cent, 43 percent, 80 percent, 29 percent, and 56 percent respectively
over an equally qualified individual in the clerical group. Hierarchi-
cal pay differences are, therefore greater among females than among
males.
*Commitment to the home
Amongst married males both the coefficients of CHILD1 and CHILD2 are
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significant and positive.
*Dominant career
Amongst males, the coefficient of SPSCAR2 is negative and signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level, while the coefficient of SPMOB is positive
and significant at the 5 percent level. Those males whose spouses
support their careers earn less than those spouses who do support their
careers--a counterintuitive finding. But those males who have spouses
who are mobile and support their careers earn 3 percent more than those
who have spouses who are not mobile. *Commitment to the firm
WWOP was significant at the 1 percent level and positive in the male
equation, indicating that married males who work overtime without pay
earn more than those who choose not to.
MPR(F) and MPR(M)
*Human capital
Amongst males, the coefficients of the age and experience variables
are significant at the 1 percent level in determining earnings. For
females, only years of service with the company have a significant
impact. We note a positive and significant at the 5 percent level
quadratic sign for full-time labour force experience.
In the MFR(F) none of the education coefficients are significant,
whereas EDPS2 (professional education) is now significant at the 1
percent level, indicating a positive correlation between this type of
education and the left out occupation variables. Females with a profes-
sional education earn 33 percent more than females with a high school
education, and have an annual rate of return to their education of 3
percent. We find that amongst males all the education coefficients are
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still significant at the 1 percent level but that the magnitude of the
coefficients has increased. A technical school degree yields a 14
percent differential (with a 7 percent rate of return), a college degree
yields a 18 percent differential (a 3 percent annual rate of return) and
a professional degree a 40 percent differential (a 3 percent annual
rate of return).
*Commitment to the home
None of the coefficients that test this hypothesis are significant
amongst married females. For married males, however, the coefficient of
CHILD1 is no longer significant as it was MFR(M), but now the magnitude
of the coefficient of CHILD2 increases. For every additional child over
the age of 6 married males receive an increase in earnings of 3 percent
compared to 2 percent in MFR(M).
*Dominant career
None of the coefficients for the female regression are significant.
But amongst males, the coefficient of SPMOB is significant, indicating
that those males with mobile spouses earn 4 percent more than those
males with immobile spouses. The coefficient of IMCARTF, the importance
of the career to the family is positive and significant at the 5 percent
level. Males who consider their careers to be more important to the
household than the careers of their spouses earn 5 percent more than
those males who do not.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of OSJAP1 is negative and significant for males.
Amongst males applying for outside jobs, each additional outside job
application costs the individual 2.69 percent in earnings (although,
again, the causation is not clear). The coefficient of WWOP has inc-
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reased in magnitiude from the full to the personal male regression and
remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level.
*Early socialization
The coefficient of EARDL is significant and positive at 5 percent
level for males, implying that married males who grew up in a household
with a more traditional division of labour earn 5.67 percent more than
those married males who grew up in a household with a less traditional
divisional of labour.
Sample 3: A medium-sized high-tech company
TFR
*Intercept
The extensive use of dummy variables in the model means that the
intercept term can be interpreted as the base earnings of an individual
who is single, male, has a high school education, a background in the
humanities, is currently a member of the clerical staff, and does not
feel that he is discriminated against. The base earnings of a female
are the constant plus the. coefficient of SEX. In fact, the coefficient
of SEX is negative (-.240) and significant at the one percent level,
indicating an unexplained differential in average earnings of 21.47
percent.
*Human capital
For males and females, AGE is positively related to earnings and
significant, but the negative and significant coefficient on AGE2 indi-
cates that there are decreasing returns to maturity. The coefficient of
FYSERVC is positive and significant, while the coefficient of FYSERVC2
is negative and significant, indicating decreasing returns to years of
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service with the company. The coefficient on the linear term for full
time years of labour-force experience is significant and negative, but
the quadratic term is not significant.
The impacts on earnings of holding technical and college degrees
cannot be distinguished from the returns to high-school education. But
an individual with a professional degree earns 32 percent more than one
with a high school degree. The annual rate of return for professional
education over high school education is 3 percent. The impacts of the
areas of concentration are interpreted with respect to the excluded
category, ACON1 (humanities). None of the coefficients of the included
ACON variables are significant, implying either that most relevant
skills are learned on the job or that there is a problem of multicol-
linearity between education level and area of concentration.
*Occupational segregation
Occupations are categorized by hierarchical position in the firm
where OCCL is a member of scientific staff, engineering staff and com-
puting staff; OCC2, management, administrative and finance personnel;
and OCC3, clerical/secretarial staff. The occupational variables are
not significant determinants of earnings, indicating that there is an
efficient allocation of people to jobs within the firm and that our
model captures all the personal attributes that contribute to vertical
mobility. There are no males in OCC3, so the male observations in the
data set cannot be used to determine the absolute magnitude of the
coefficients for OCCl and OCC2, although they will influence the differ-
ence between these coefficients.
*Commitment to the home
CHILDI and CHILD2 do not have significant impacts on earnings, but
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the coefficient of MARITAL is positive and significant at the 1 percent
level. An individual who is married earns 28 percent more than someone
who is not married.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of WWOP is positive and significant at the 5 percent
level. Those individuals who worked overtime without pay 11 times (the
sample average) in 1982 earned 6 percent more than an individual who did
no unpaid overtime work.
TPR
*Intercept
The coefficient of SEX (-.250) is more negative than in the earlier
model indicating that SEX is correlated with the variables dropped out
of the model. The coefficient of sex indicates a 22 percent differential
of males over females.
*Human capital
The coefficients of AGE, AGE2, FTLFEX, FTLFEX2, FYSERV, and FYSERV2
change very little from TFR, so our interpretations of their impacts are
not altered. The only difference to note is that the coefficient of
FTLFEX is now significant. The coefficient of the professional educa-
tion variable remains positive and significant at the 5 percent level.
Relative to a high school degree, the premium to professional education
is 33 percent and the annual rate of return is 3 percent.
*Commitment to the home
The only significant coefficient (at 1 percent) is MARITAL. A
married earns 29 percent more than a single person in the sample.
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*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of WWOP is positive and still significant at the 1
percent level, indicating a correlation between the more high-paying
occupations and the extent to which employees do extra unpaid work.
TFR(F) and TFR(M)
*Intercept
The male and female intercept terms are not directly comparable, as
the female intercept assumes a base individual in OCC3 whereas the male
intercept assumes OCC2. We can, however, adjust to a comparable base by
adding the coefficient of OCC2 to the female intercept, which yields a
new intercept of 7.2. Comparing intercepts, a female earns 36 percent
of the income of a comparable male.
*Human capital
Amongst females, FYSERVC is an important determinant (at the 1
percent level) of earnings. Of all the coefficients of the age and
experience variables, the only one that is not significant is FYSERVC2
amongst males. None of the education coefficients are significant
amongst females. Amongst males, however, the coefficient of technical
education is negative and significant, which implies that amongst
technically-trained males earn 27 percent more relative to an equally
qualified male with a high school degree.
*Occupational segregation
None of the OCC variables in either of the two equations has a
significant impact on earnings.
*Commitment to the home
Amongst males, the coefficient of CHILD2 amongst males is negative
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and significant, indicating that for each additional child aged 6 years
and up a person earns 7 percent less. The coefficient of MARITAL is
positive and significant, indicating that those males who are married
earn 19 percent premium to being married.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of WWOP is significant and positive at the 1 percent
level amongst males, indicating that males who work overtime without pay
12 times earn 7 percent more than those males who do no unpaid overtime.
TPR(F) and TPR(M)
*Intercept
As a base pay, a female can expect 45 percent of the earnings of a
male.
*Human capital
Amongst males, the coefficients of age and the experience variables
are all statistically significant, but amongst females, years of service
with the company is the only variable with a significant impact on
earnings. Amongst males, the coefficient of the technical education
variable is negative and significant. Those with technical school
degrees earn 27 percent less than high school graduates.
*Commitment to the home
As in TFR(M), the coefficients of CHILD2 is negative and significant
at the 5 percent level while the coefficient of MARITAL is positive and
significant at the 1 percent level.
*Commitment to the firm
For males, the coefficient of WWOP remains positive at the 1 per-
cent level, increasing in magnitude compared to TFR(M) so that there is
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a 9 percent premium for working overtime without pay 11.88 times.
MFR
*Intercept
The coefficient of the SEX coefficient is -.078, representing an
unexplained male-female earnings differential among marrieds of 7.52
percent.
*Human Capital
The coefficient of professional education is positive and signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level, implying a premium of 25 percent over the
reference group. The coefficient of ACON3 is positive and significant
at the 5 percent level, indicating a premium of 21 percent for holding a
science degree relative to the holder of a humanities degree--not a
surprising finding given that this sample is an R&D company specializing
in telecommunications.
*Commitment to the home
CHILDI and CHILD2 are not significant in explaining earnings for
married individuals. The returns to having an additional child 5 years
and under and 6 years and over are 2 percent and 3 percent respectively.
The coefficient of DLHH is negative and significant at the 1 percent
level, indicating that, amongst marrieds, those individuals who do more
household work earn 11 percent less in the company.
*Dominant career
Only the coefficient of SPSTRPRM is negative and significant (at the
5 percent level). An employee whose spouse is professional and is
willing to relocate for the sake of that employee's job earns less--a
very counterintuitive result.
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*Commitment to the firm
WWOP has a highly significant impact on earnings. Those who do
unpaid overtime 11 times earn 5 percent extra.
MPR
*Intercept
The coefficient of sex has decreased in magnitude to -.058, implying
that married females can expect to earn 5.64 percent less than married
males.
*Human capital
Years of service with the company and years spent full-time in the
labour force are significant determinants of earnings. None of the the
coefficients of the education variables are significant. Because of the
correlation between occupations and a social science degree the coeffi-
cient of ACON2 is still significant at the 5 percent level. This coef-
ficient implies that a recipient of a social science degree can expect
to earn 27 percent more than someone with a humanities degree.
*Commitment to the home
The coefficient of DLHH is negative and significant, indicating
that an individual who is less constrained by household duties earns
more.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of WWOP remains significant at the 1 percent level.
CAROT is significant although negative at the 5 percent level. An
individual who would require 25 percent more than he or she is currently
earning to the leave the company earns 5 percent less compared to an
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individual who would not leave the company with any earnings increment.
MFR(F) and MFR(M)
*Human capital
Amongst married males the coefficient of the quadratic full time
years of service variable for is negative and significant at the 5
percent level indicating decreasing returns to maturity. Amongst fe-
males, we note the statistical significance of both experience vari-
ables.
None of the coefficients of the education or ACON variables are
significant for males or females.
*Occupational segregation
In the male regression, the coefficient of OCC1, interpreted as the
premium for being in OCC1 instead of OCC2, is negative and significant.
An individual in OCC1 can expect to earn 11 percent less than a compa-
rable individual in OCC2.
For females the OCC variables are not significant, although females
in OCC1 can expect to earn 29.36 percent more than in OCC2.
*Commitment to the home
The coefficient of DLHH is negative and significant at the 1% level
for males and the 5 percent level for females respectively. For males
the means are 68 and 156 for females. Amongst males, the average impact
of household work on earnings is a 9 percent reduction, and amongst
females, a 37 percent reduction.
*Dominant career
Amongst males, those who had spouses who supported their careers
earn less than those whose spouses who do support their careers--a
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counterintuitive finding. Amongst males, those who have spouses who are
professional and willing to relocate to support their careers, earn
less. Amongst females, those whose spouses support their careers tend
to earn more than those whose spouses do not.
*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of WWOP was significant at the 1 percent level and
positive in the male equation. Married males who work 12 times overtime
without pay earn 7 percent more than those who do not put in any unpaid
overtime.
MPR(F) and MPR(M)
*Human capital
Amongst both males and females, the coefficients of the years of
full time labour force experience variables are significant at the 5
percent level. In addition, amongst females, the coefficient of FTLFEX
is significant at the 5 percent level.
*Commitment to the home
Amongst both males and females, the coefficient of DLHH is negative
and significant at the 1 percent level.
*Dominant career
Amongst females, none of the variables have a specific impact on e-
arnings. Amongst males, only the coefficient of SPSTRPRM is significant
at the 1 percent level. The negative sign indicates that a male emplo-
yee who is married to a professional and who is willing to relocate for
the sake of the employee's career earns less than a male whose spouse is
not a professional and/or not willing to relocate.
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*Commitment to the firm
The coefficient of WWOP has increased in magnitiude from the first
to the second male regression and remains significant at the 1 percent
level for both males and females. Amongst females, the coefficient of
CAROT is now negative and at the 5 percent level. The less a female
employee needs to entice her away from the firm, the higher are her
earnings--not what we had expected.
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APPENDIX 8
DERIVATIVES FOR
VARIABLES FOR
TABLE A8-1
TABLE A8-2
TABLE A8-3
TABLE A8-4
TABLE A8-5
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TABLE A8-9
TABLE A8-10
TABLE A8-11
TABLE A8-12
TABLE A8-13
TABLE A8-14
TABLE A8-15
TABLE A8-16
TABLE A8-17
TABLE A8-18
AGE AND EXPERIENCE
FULL REGRESSIONS
TOTAL SAMPLE 1
MALE SAMPLE 1
FEMALE SAMPLE 1
TOTAL SAMPLE 2
MALE SAMPLE 2
FEMALE SAMPLE 2
TOTAL SAMPLE 3
MALE SAMPLE 3
FEMALE SAMPLE 3
MARRIED SAMPLE 1
MARRIED SAMPLE 1
MARRIED SAMPLE 1
MARRIED SAMPLE 2
MARRIED SAMPLE 2
MARRIED SAMPLE 2
MARRIED SAMPLE 3
MARRIED SAMPLE 3
MARRIED SAMPLE 3
MALE
FEMALE
MALE
FEMALE
MALE
FEMALE
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The Derivatives
In the linear regression, the derivative with respect to one of the
variables (in most cases) is simply the regression coefficient. In the
case of the AGE, FYSERVC, and FTLFEX variables, the derivative is more
complicated. The derivative is a function of the coefficients and the
variable itself.
Y - B0 + B1 * X + B2 2
dY/dX = B 1 + 2*B 2 * X
We calculate and present these derivatives in the following tables
for each regression and sample. It is important to remember that the
variables are measured in different units, AGE is in years whereas the
experience variables (FYSERVC and FTLFEX) are in months.
We also calculate a total, which is based upon the idea that these
three variables are not independent, but in fact move together. More
specifically, as an employee grows older s/he gains additional experience
(both with the firm and in the labour force). Thus, we need to examine
the overall impact of changing these three variables simultaneously. The
total at the bottom of each table does this, taking into account the
different units, and it represents the impact of increasing age and ex-
perience by one year. These numbers are in log-earnings.
Turning to the first total sample full regression, we see that the
derivative with respect to AGE is .0117656 (evaluated at the mean.) This
means that a person at the age of 31 can expect to earn 1.183 percent more
(taking anti-logs) for an additional year of maturity. An additional month
of service to the firm (FYSERVC) would increase log-earnings by .0001744, or
earnings by 0.017 percent. To estimate the impact of an additional year of
service, we can multiply this number by 12. Doing this we find that an
additional year of service would increase log earnings by .0020928 (or a
0.209 percent increase in earnings.) Likewise, one can examine the impact
of increasing labor force experience (FTLFEX). We find that adding an
additional month of experience, we could expect an increase of .00008303
in log-earnings.
We can also add these effects together. We do this in the total row,
taking into account the difference in units, We find that a one-year in-
crease in AGE, FYSERVC and FTLFEX (i.e., working for the firm for one
additional year) would increase expected log-earnings by .0148547; or in-
crease earnings by 14.96 percent.
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Table A8-1
TUE DEltIVATIVi: TOT/'L SNLE 1
Total Sai.Ie: Full Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.081595
1.312E-4
Quadratic
Coefficient
-.001135
3.102E-7
5.002E-6
Derivative
(at j-iean)
.0117c5G;
1.744E-4
0. 30 3E-5
.0148547
Total Saiple: Personal Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.07S395
.0018740
-. 002005
Quadratic
Coefficient
-. 001098
-4.53E-6
9.0602-6
Derivative.
(at nean)
0118102
.0012434
-3.46E-4
d
022509 0
a = measured in years
b = measured in months
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSE'VC + 12 * FrLFEX
rNeans
AGE
SilkVC
b
FIFEX
30.77297
69.7027
91.55545
'TOTAL
means
AGE
FYSERVC
b
Fi'LFLX
a
TOTAL
30.77297
69.7027
91.559465
notes:
-331-
Table A8-2
TiEi2 DERIVATIVE: TOT±AL SA'iPLE 1
Male Sa1le: Full Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.057385
Quadratic
Coefficient
-8.95E-4
C
Derivative
(at heani)
.ClJ 5235
b
F1SSRVC 1.0'503
FTLFEX
a
=oAL
101.7035
Nale Sanple: Personal Regression
Means
31. 68342
FYSERVC 81.00503
b
FMLFEX 101.7035
Linear
Coefficient
.106842
.0018749
-.002211
Quadratic
Coefficient
-.001423
-6.53E-G
9.671E-5
a
TC A L
Derivative
(at mean)
.0163732
C. 095E-4
-2.44L-4
6
.C231642
a = measured in years
b = measured in months
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mean
d = AGO + 12 * FYSERVC + 12 * FrLFEX
Neans
AGE 31.60342
4. 89E-4 -1.43E-G
3.210E-G
2.437E-4
2.554E-4
.01G6735
AGE
notes:
-332-
Table A8-3
TiiE' DLIVATIVE: TOTAL SAbiPLE 1
Feimale Saple: Full Rejression
eans
a
b
FYSERVC
29.71345
56.54971
b
FrLFEX 79.75439
a
TOTiAL
Linear
Coefficient
.055229
7.192E -4
3.245E-4
Quadratic
Coefficient
8.723E-7
-2.34E-G
Female SaiI)le: Personal Regression
Means
29.71345
b
FYSERVC 56.54971
79.75439
Linear
Coefficient
.06306
2.129E-5
-7.44E-4
Quadratic
Coefficient
-.0011CG
1.693E-5
2.174E-6
Derivative
(at mean)
-.002651
.0G19415
-3. 97E-4
.0153699
a = measured in years
b = measured in mnths
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSrVC + 12 * FnLFEX
Derivativa
(at i-eani)
.0,53073
8. 1792-4
-4.921-5
.015L0310
a
AGL
b
FILFEx
TYAL
notes:
-333-
Table A8-4
Tii DEPVATIV.: TOTAL SZVIPLE 2
Total Sanple: Full Rejression
Linear
Coefficient
.02207
Quadratic
Coefficient
-2.42E-4
Derivative
(at Nean)
.0Ub0,4 7 C.1
b
FY.-aVC 143.91735
b
FILFLX
a
VIVJeAL
180.957w"
Total Sample: Personal Regression
Means
35.89LJ53
b
FYSEAVC 143.91763
18 0.9570
Linear
Coefficient
.024849
.0021456
7.117E-4
Quadratic
Coefficient
-2.87.:-4
-3. 03E-G
-1. 06E-6
Derivative
(at Mean)
.G042671
3. 26412-4
d
.0 -43 2
a = measured in years
b = izeasured in months
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSZRVC + 12 * FrLFEX
Means
AGE 35.89063
.0021456
5.2tSE-4
-3.47L-
-8.87E-7 1.999E-4
d
.02M376'1,
AGA,
b
VTLFX
a
TOTAL
notes:
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Table A8-5
TIlL DIRIVATIVL: TOTAL SM%,-PLL 2
viale Zample: Lull Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.021642
.001590w
.001OG26
Quadratic
Cocfficient
-2.06E-4
-2.35E-6
-2.15E-G
C
Derivative.
(at Lean)
.OL21C72
8.372E-4
2.1CJE-4
d
.01050567
Nale Sample: Personal Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.020722
.0016748
.LU1259.2
Quadratic
Coefficient
- .CE-4
-2.25E-6
-2.4SE-6
Derivative
(at Mean)
9.526E-4
2.661E-4
d
.02G04535
a = measured in years
b = ieasured in unOnths
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * iaean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSERVC + 12 * FrLFEX
Means
FYSURVC
b
37.6167
160.1616G
20G.2716
TOIAL
Means
FYSERVC
b
FLA
37.61697
160.1616
200.2716
TVIAL
notes:
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Table A8-6
Tus DURIVATIVE: TOTAL St1PLL 2
Female Sa.aplc: Full Regression
b
FEErSAArVC 103.0316
b
FrLFAX 132.4045
a
TA%VL
Linear
Coefficient
.02
.003735G
-.001257
Quadratic
Coefficient
-2.6GE-4
-7.822-6
3. 554:-5
Derivative
(at P'ean)
.00X-31956
.0Ll21735
-3.14E-4
.02551G3
Female Sample: Personal Regression
Linear
Coefficient
Quadratic
Coefficient
Derivative
(at Mean)
AGE 31.57885
b
FERVC 103.0316
b
FTLFEX 132.4045
a
a = measured
b = measured
c = linear +
d = AGE + 12
in years
in minths
2 * quadratic * mean
* FYSERVC + 12 * FTLFEX
Means
AG 31.57 35
Means
.03k'9G5
.003886G
-.001471
-7.44E-5
4. 389E-6
.01050774
.0023517
-3.09E-4
.0295921
notes:
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Table A8-7
THE DERIVATIVE: TOTAL S/LI'LE 3
Total Sample: Full Regression
Linear
Coefficient
Quadratic
Coefficient
Derivative
(at :jean)
AGE 33.47451
FYSiC 74.7254S,
FILFEX
a
T01iA
126.0431
Total Saipe: Personal Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.057543
Quadratic
Coefficient
-7.27E-4
Derivative
(at Mean)
.0008741
b
FYSERVC 74.72549
b
FTLFEX 125.0431
notes:
.004ES30
.0025445 -4.75E-5
a = i.easured in years
b = measured in mnths
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mviean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSEIVC + 12 * PPLFEX
Means
.061072
.004611.*
.0022970
-8.49E-5
-4 .17E-5
.0033436
.0012459
.0G33441
Means
AGE 33.47451
TOTAL
.00359l
."013473
.0671514
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Table A8-8
TiLE DEIJVATIVZ: T'1TAL SANTLE 3
Male Samle: Full 1Zegression
Linear
Coefficient
. 032035
.0031532
.0C32334
Quadratic
Coefficient
-9.34E-4
-5.69E-6
-7.08E-6
Derivative
(at m'ean)
.M01454,
.0022247
. 001355
.061417
Male Sample: Personal Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.073615
.0035424
.0 IV35925
Quadratic
Coefficient
-8.18E-4
-6.55E-6
-3.00E-6
Derivative
(at Mean)
.0170320
.024733
.0014712
.0651660
a = measured in years
b = imeasured in months
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * rean
d = AG& + 12 * FYSEIVC + 12 * FILFEX
means,
FYssRVC
b
FTLFEX
34.07853
81.63351
132.5S12
TOTAL
Means
b
FY31;RVC
b
FCLFLX
34.07853
81.63351
132.5812
TOTAL
notes:
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Table A8-9
TIE DEiIIVAIVE: TOAL SKIPLE 3
Female Sample: Full Rejression
Linear
Coefficient
.069894
Quadratic
Coefficient
-. 001097
Derivative
(at "iean)
3.882E-4
b
FYSLRVC 54.10938 .030406
-.CJ6233
-1.561-4
2.66iL-5
.0135101
.1557145
Feiiale Sapile: Personal Regression
Quadratic
Coefficient
-8.39E-4
-1.51E-4
2. 531E-5
Derivative
(at mean)
.001205l1
.0129Z33
-3.66E-4
Linear
Coefficient
.054376
b
FMISERVC 54.10933
.1516555
a = measured in years
b = measured in mnths
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSERVC + 12 * FTLFEX
means
a
AGIE 31.67180
b
FIUEIX
a
TOIAL
105.5313
Ieans
a
31.67188
b
FTLFEX
TOTAL
106.5313
.02920G
-. 005765
notes:
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Table A8-10
TIE DERIVATIVE: WkRRIED SAMPLE 1
Total Sample: Full Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.059248
-3.74E-4
-6.01E-4
Quadratic
Coefficient
-7.73E-4
1.960E-6
3.936E-6
Derivative
(at Mean)
.0105754
-8.07E-5
1.561E-4
.01148L2
Total Sample: Personal Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.08518
.0017457
-.002042
Quadratic
Coefficient
-.001200
-5.31E-6
1.019E-5
Derivative
(at Mean)
.0095740
9.529E-4
-8.11E-5
.0200350
a = measured in years
b = measured in months
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSERVC + 12 * FELFEX
Means
AGE
FYSERVC
b
FTLFEX
31.49225
74.65116
96.21705
TOTAL
Means
AGL
FYSERVC
b
FTLFEX
31.49225
74.65116
96.21705
TOTAL
notes:
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Table A8-11
Means
AGE 32.62162
FYSElVC 87.39365
FTLFEX
a
TOTAL
107.8716
THE DERIVATIVE: MARRIED SAIPLE 1
Male Sample: Full Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.05894
3. 516E-4
-1.45E-4
Quadratic
Coefficient
-7.65E-4
-1. 62E-6
2.432E-6
Derivative
(at Mean)
.0090553
7.234E-5
3.905E-4
.L146089
Nale Sample: Personal Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.108873
Quadratic
Coefficient
-.001501
C
Derivative
(at Nean)
.0109207
FYSERVC 87.39,365
notes:
.0015941
-. 001827
-6. ME-6
1.009E-5
a = measured in years
b = measured in mnths
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSERVC + 12 * FTLFEX
means
AGE 32.62162
FTLFEX
a
TOTAL
107.8716
3.912E-4
3.504E-4
.0198196
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Table A8-12
TIIE DERIVATIVE: MARRIED SAMPLE 1
Female Sample: Full Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.132573
.00111C8
9.985E-5
Quadratic
Coefficient
-. 002076
-6.18E-6
-4.99E-7
C
Derivative
(at Mean)
.0079895
4.079E-4
1.945E-5
d
.0131182
Female Sample: Personal Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.124325
4.933E-4
-1.84E-4
Quadratic
Coefficient
-.002054
5.771E-6
-1.31E-6
c
Derivative
(at Mean)
.0011874
.00115G9
-3.94E-4
d
.0103369
a = measured in years
b = measured in months
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSERVC + 12 * FTLFEX
Means
AGE
FYSERVC
b
FTILFEX
29.97273
57.5
C.53G36
TO'i.AL
Neans
a
AGE
b
FYSERVC
b
FTLFEX
29.97273
57.5
80.53636
TOT~AL
notes:
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Table A8-13
THiE DERIVATIVE: MARRIED SAMPLE 2
Total Sample: Full Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.018873
.0021915
3.655E-4
Quadratic
Coefficient
-2.07E-4
-3.52E-6
-6.36E-7
Derivative
(at Mean)
.00330157
.0011251
1.255E-4
.0188229
Total Sample: Personal Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.0213050
Quadratic
Coefficient
-2.49E-4
Derivative
(at Nean)
.0032674
FYSERVC 151.3099
notes:
.0022043
5.557E-4
-3.09E-6
-9.10E-7
a = measured in years
b = measured in months
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSERVC + 12 * FTLFEX
Means
36.36542
151.3099
1o9.5036
AGE
b
FYSER-VC
b
FTLFEX
'TAL
Means
a
AGE 36.36542
b
FrLFEX 189.5036
TOTAL
.0012695
2.109E-4
-0210319
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Table A8-14
THE DiERIVATIVE: MARRIED SN4PLE 2
Male Sample: Full Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.021263
Quadratic
Coefficient
-2.00E-4
C
Derivative
(at Mean)
.0059686
b
FYSEiVC 166.3597
b
FTLFEX 207.2831
a
TO62AL
male Sample: Personal Regression
Means
AGE 33.21773
b
FYSERVC 166.3597
b
FTLFEX 207.2831
a
TO.VAL
Linear
Coefficient
.021525
.0015406
8.385E-4
Quadratic
Coefficient
-2.l CE-4
-1.87E-6
-1 .79E-6
Derivative
(at Mean)
.005501C
9.177E-4
9.816E-5
.0176915
a = measured in years
b = measured in mnnths
c = linear +
d = AGE + 12
2 * quadratic * mean
* FYSERVC + 12 * FTLFEX
Means
AG 38.21773
.0014019
G.73SE-4
-1.97E-6
-1.48E-6
7.461E-4
6.166L-5
.0156613
notes:
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Table A8-15
THE DERIVATIVE: MAwRRIED SAMPLE 2
Female Sample: Full Regression
b
FYSLRVC lU0.6203
Linear
Coefficient
.023783
.006069;
-. 002167
Quadratic
Coefficient
-3.48E-4
-1.46E-5
6.174E-6
Derivative
(at Mean)
.0017909
.00314.4A
-5.67E-4
.032G743
Fe.iale Sample: Personal Regression
Means
31.560>12
FYSERVC 100.6203
129.6203
Linear
Coefficient
.02789S
.0056405
-.001999
Quadratic
Coefficient
-4.01E-4
-1.21E-5
5.925E-6
Derivative
(at Mean)
.0025862
.0032069
-4.63E-4
d
.0355133
a = measured in years
b = measured in months
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSERVC + 12 * F7LFEX
Means
AGE 31.56812
E!'LFEX
a
TOAL
129.6203
AGr,
FTLFEX
a
TOTAL
notes:
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Table A8-16
THE DERIVATIVE: lwRRIED SAi1PLE 3
Total Sample: Full Regression
Linear
Coefficient
.028029
Quadratic
Coefficient
-3.64E-4
Derivative
(at Mean)
.0031545
FYSERVC (7.15S47
FrLFEX
a
TiIAL
147.0492
Total Sample: Personal Regression
means
35.25G3
FYSERVC 87.15847
b
FILFEX 147.0492
a
TOTrAL
Linear
Coefficient
.027005
.0019170
.0030453
Quadratic
Coefficient
-3.01E-4
-2.08E-6
-6.05E-6
Derivative
(at Pean)
.0057863
.0015536
.0012654
d
.0396142
a = measured in years
b = measured in months
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSERVC + 12 * FTLFEX
Means
AGE 35.25683
.0013322
.0029097
-4.66E-7
-5. 33E-6
.0012509
.0013413
.0342708
AGE
notes:
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Table A8-17
THE DERIVATIVE: MARRIED SAmPLE 3
Male Sample: Full Regression
Means
AGE 36.19716
FYShvC 95.1G901
b
FT'LU.X 157.7324
Linear
Coefficient
.039902
8.050E-4
.0024342
Quadratic
Coefficient
-5.41E-4
8.475E-7
-4.99E-6
TOTAL
Derivative
(at Mean)
9.6SCE-4
8.588L-4
.02252,88
Male Saiple: Personal Regression
Means,
36.19716
b
FYSERVC 96.16901
b
FTLFEX
a
TOTAL
157.7324
notes:
Linear
Coefficient
.033958
Quadratic
Coefficient
-3.30E-4
.0015539 -1.46E-6
.0026430 -5.98E-6
a = measured in years
b = measured in months
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSERVC + 12 * FTLFEX
Derivative
(at Mean)
.0100506
.0012727
7.559E-4
d
.0343944
a
AGIL
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Table A8-18
THE DERIVATIVE: NARRIED SAMPLE 3
Female Sample: Full Regression
Linear
Coefficient
-.220039
.0013176
.025934
Quadratic
Coefficient
.0032819
4.748E-5
-7.73E-5
C
Derivative
(at Nean)
-. 010045
.0066312
.0089256
d
.1766366
Female Sauple: Personal Regression
Linear
Coefficient
-.242598
-.004584
.022805
Quadratic
Coefficient
.0032477
6.524E-5
-6.41E-5
c
Derivative
(at Mean)
-. 034747
.0027170
.0087044
d
.1023104
a = measured in years
b = measured in months
c = linear + 2 * quadratic * mean
d = AGE + 12 * FYSERVC + 12 * FrLFEX
Means
AGE
FYSERVC
b
FTL'EA
a
TOTAL
55.95122
110.0488
means
AGE
FYSERVC
b
FTLFEX
TOTAL
55.95122
110.0488
notes:
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DECOMPOSITION
TABLE A9-1
TABLE A9-2
TABLE A9-3
TABLE A9-4
TABLE A9-5
TABLE A9-6
TABLE A9-7
TABLE A9-8
TABLE A9-9
TABLE A9-10
TABLE A9-11
TABLE A9-12
TABLE A9-13
TABLE A9-14
TABLE A9-15
TABLE A9-16
TABLE A9-17
TABLE A9-18
TABLE A9-19
TABLE A9-20
TABLE A9-21
TABLE A9-22
TABLE A9-23
SAMPLE 1
SAMPLE 1
SAMPLE 1
SAMPLE 1
SAMPLE 1
SAMPLE 1
SAMPLE 1
SAMPLE 1
SAMPLE 2
SAMPLE 2
SAMPLE 2
SAMPLE 2
SAMPLE 2
SAMPLE 2
SAMPLE 2
SAMPLE 2
SAMPLE 3
SAMPLE 3
SAMPLE 3
SAMPLE 3
SAMPLE 3
SAMPLE 3
SAMPLE 3
TABLE A9-24 SAMPLE 3
APPENDIX 9
BY FEMALE AND MALE WEIGHTS
FEMALE
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
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APPENDIX 9
DECOMPOSITION BY FEMALE AND MALE WEIGHTS
MALE
TABLE A9-25 SAMPLE 1 TOTAL FULL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TABLE A9-26 SAMPLE 1 TOTAL FULL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TABLE A9-27 SAMPLE 1 TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TABLE A9-28 SAMPLE l TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TABLE A9-29 SAMPLE 2 TOTAL FULL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TABLE A9-30 SAMPLE 2 TOTAL FULL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TABLE A9-31 SAMPLE 2 TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TABLE A9-32 SAMPLE 2 TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TABLE A9-33 SAMPLE 3 TOTAL FULL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TABLE A9-34 SAMPLE 3 TOTAL FULL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TABLE A9-35 SAMPLE 3 TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TABLE A9-36 SAMPLE 3 TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TABLE A9-37 SAMPLE 1 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TABLE A9-38 SAMPLE 1 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TABLE A9-39 SAMPLE 1 MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TABLE A9-40 SAMPLE 1 MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TABLE A9-41 SAMPLE 2 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TABLE A9-42 SAMPLE 2 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TABLE A9-43 SAMPLE 2 MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TABLE A9-44 SAMPLE 2 MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TABLE A9-45 SAMPLE 3 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TABLE A9-46 SAMPLE 3 MARRIED FULL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
TABLE A9-47 SAMPLE 3 MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY HYPOTHESIS)
TABLE A9-48 SAMPLE 3 MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION (BY VARIABLE)
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SATLE 1 Table A9-1
Female
TOTAL FULL REGRZSSION;
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Comoonent
(b 
-b M)*X
Attributes
Component
b *(X f-x)
Interaction
Component
-(b -b *f m
Intercept
Human
Capital
Occupational
Segregation
Port of
Entry
Com itmst to
tie -1cc
Comnitut-IL to
the Fi~-i
Info,--al
Network
Perce-'.v!d
D c-r:r.ation
Ear -1-
Soci alization
Total
-. 04112
-. 025677
-. 046162
.0312385
-. 04S185
-.CM2953
-. 175514
.0135315
.C036S2
-. 041162
-. 066542
-. 061410
.0276313
-0601925
.0343379
-. 007673
-. 014908
-1085S10
.J390405
-7.35E-4
-. 065942
-. 4533&
-. 002638
-.002587
-. 001783
-. 0069v1
.0032166
-. 122758
.0051004 .035Z517
-. 003W34
.0059339
-. 031561
-. 121149
-. 0159~9
.CZ023~7
-351-
SAMCLE 1
TOTAL FULL REGRSSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-2
Female
Intercept
AGE
AG-E2
FMSERVC
FSERVC2
-FrLFEX
FTLFEX2
EDTS2
EDS2
EDPS2
A=42
VC2
SWl
FWl
FM2
FU4
FD45
MRITAL
QiILD1
CHILD2
LFAM
2!TABFC
(G3API
CNMFCARPT
3NFCEM
PERCD
MOSI
FARSOC
FA RDS
Coefficients
Component
(bf-bm)*X f
-.041162
-. 064062
-.093735
.0134740
.0094120
.0575904
-.049657
.0124324
.0489925
0
-9.76E-4
-1.34E-5
'3
-.006628
-.0650680
.00281"
.0020174
.0046592
.0050631
.0202769
-7.52E-4
.0030430
-. 013175
.0073790
.0124963
.0534917
.0010422
.0108577
-.006412
.0288499
-. 007673
-.005190
-. 009719
.0761585
.0324225
.0390485
Attributes
Component
f (X-X)
0
-.126499
.1409651
-.017588
-. 005121
-.007123
.0166785
-3.93E-4
-6.68E-4
0'
-6.95E-4
.0017101
0
-.006693
-.009334
-. 038904
-.011132
1.207E-4
-.013656
-. 013660
-. 003843
-. 014180
9.689E-5
.0011453
-2.16E-4
-. 03664
.0031759
-.001941
.0012419
-.005063
-.801783
-.005190
-.00102
.9032543
-3.76E-5
-.122798
Interaction
Component_ _
-(bf-bm)*(Xf-Xm)
0
-. 004247
-. 014683
.0058269
.9135361
.0158494
-. 039531
-. 003393
.0015264
-. 001460
1.932E-4
-4.87E-6
7.10GE-4
-.021050
-.043658
.0136114
9.283E-4
-1.94E-4
.0099227
.00970#84
2.689E-4
.0113386
-. 001986
.0030632
7.086E-4
-. 050991
-7.07E-4
.0046923
-.002912
.0040269
-.008834
.0051898
7.411E-4
-. 031665
1.039E-4
-. 121149 -.204390
Total
Impact
-. 041162
-W.19603
.0325470
.0017124
.017&207
.065316C
-. 072509
.0006465
.0490505
-. C01460
-.001476
.001691&
7.10GE-4
-.035171
-.115031
-.022402
-. 007386
.0045863
.0013298
.0163252
-. 004325
2.019E-4
-. 015063
.0116075
.0129885
-.001164
.0035115
.0136091
-. 008082
.0278133
-. 018289
-. 005190
-.010779
.0477480
.0324C38
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SAMPLE 1 Table A9-3
Female
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Component
(b f-bm) f
Attributes
Component
b *(X -X)
Interaction
Component_
-(b f-b m)*(X f-XmT
Intercept
inan
Caeital
Co .itrment to
the Hx.ie
Com4itment to
the Firm
Infonal
Network
Perce ived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Total
Impact
-6.CUE-6
.879594
-. 903162
.0335523
-.017351
-.036129
-. 146188
-,129785
-. 083343
.0032919
-1.27E-4
-. 009744
-. 023075
-. 126977
-. 041f7
.0019909
-. 019977
.0169122
.09494C2
.0518E13
.C2%0141
.03541C3
-. 047073
-.037697
-. 074314
-. 2&43%
-353-
SAMPLE 1
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-4
Fema 1 e
Coefficients
Component
(b f-bm) X
.879694
-1.30091
.2895954
-.104S20
.0961528
.1169700
-. 067031
.0441341
.0786226
0
-. 005626
-.050246
0
.0069015
-9.15E-4
.0085673
.0452451
9 .893E-4
.0091340
-. 014482
.0379107
-. 017351
-.015326
-. 020804
-. 227736
.0815481
-. 129785
Attributes
Component
b *(x 
- )
0
-.124226
.1559097
-5.21E-4
-. 099678
.0163300
-. 015473
-. 004894
-.001235
0
-.002542
-.007513
0
-2.78E-4
.0075831
5.969E-5
9.270E-4
.0053724
.0024440
-.001467
-. 006476
-. 009744
-. 015326
-. 003154
-. 022768
-3.07E-4
Interaction
Component
-(bf-h ) * -x
-,00G249
.045337
-.045333
.1332849
.0321912
-. 053363
-. 012044
.0024496
-. 005101
.0011143
-.018241
9.176E-4
.0010401
-3.82E-4
4.858E-4
-.043130
-6.71E-4
.0039474
-.006578
.0052917
-.019977
.0153258
.0015864
.0946868
2.614E-4
.0518813 -.204881
Total
Impact
Intercept
AGL
AGC2
MSERVC
1YSERVC2
ITLFEX
ITLFEX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
AM43
1kUTAL
CHI LD1
ChILD2
LFAN
CWAP1
WwP
CARP=
INFORri
?=rS1
EARSOC
EARDL
. S7969 4
-1. 51139
.49C3697
-. 1507.
.13475.3
.1654912
-. 135867
.271960
.0798369
-. 005101
-. 007055
-.07600
9.176E-4
.0076637
.0062357
.0091128
.0033420
.0056911
.0155254
-.022526
.0367260
-. 047373
-.015326
-. 022371
-.155817
.0815026
-o.126977
-354-
SAMPLE 1
Table A9-5
Female
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Component
(b f-b) f
Attributes
Component
bf*(X-~X )
Interaction
Component_
-(bf-b M)*(Xf-X,)
Intercept
iunan
Caital
Occupational
Segregation
Port of
Entry
Cacaittnent to
the Homie
Cam.nitmnent to
the Firi-
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Da;,inant
Career
Total
Impact
-1.23462
1.IC631
-. 067933
. 0582449
.007558S
-. 008633
-. 019409
.0324904
.0157834
.00V5G33
.0425010
-. C47835
-. 014371
.0075572
.0014517
-*013311
.0072017
-. 012549
-. 073725
.031749%
-. C12452
-. 013121
.012979S
-.-005804
-9.10E-4
-. 147679
-1.234:;2
1.077157
.22799-
.0521595
-. 013711
.0513G22
-. 020303
-.01V2Z
-0C23230
-. 249W00
-- VM7949
-355-
SAMPLE 1
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-6
Female
Intercept
AGL
AGE2
EYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFIX2
EDT'S2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACON2
ACON3
ACO14
CIc
OCC2
srai
ETu
FUa5
QUILD1
CraILD2
LEAN
70TABF'C
063AP1
CARZOT
PEkRCD
t-aS1
EARSC
EAR1DL
UNOV
SPCAT2
SPN1cu
.SPSTRPkt.1
IPFCA~rF
Coefficients
Component
(bf-b M)*X T
-1.23402
2.206982
-1.19439
.0441145
-. 017926
.0197199
-. 025331
.0122171
.0408585
0
.0067158
.0153401
0
-.009233
-. 071749
.0043336
.0067126
.0019575
.0087453
.0315565
.0279430
0
-.002891
.005S277
.0361227
-.031501
.0204472
.0149036
-.009357
.0302630
-.008633
-. 012447
-.007042
.0185121
.0639783
-. 002220
.0190697
-5.33E-4
.0017741
-.002307
.0085633
Attributes
Component
bf* (Xf-X)
0
-.351172
.3677922
-. 033451
.0435305
-. 002729
.0043362
-8.40E-4
-3.C7E-4
0
4.944E-4
-.005073
a
-.006147
-.004528
-.055091
-.015332
5.321E-4
-. 016827
-. 029734
-.001324
0
.0033793
6.627L-4
-. 011226
-.007188
.0122402
-.001901
.0023811
-. 005163
.0014517
-. 012447
-. 64E-4
.0084722
-.001270
5.528E-4
-6.42E-4
.0063716
-. 003656
-.015175
Interaction
Component-
-(b f-b M)*(X f-XM
C
.195046
-. 245124
.0229335
-. 032280
.0066932
-. 025899
-. 005316
.0032471
-4.77E-4
-. 032158
.00862G2
9.7L6SE-4
-. 025094
-. 035256
.0281970
.00415G5
-5.03E-4
.0172543
.0313433
-. 013468
-. 00330C
-8.*59E-4
.0019327
-.034590
.0260185
-.014101
.0032224
-.006235
.00466103
-. 013121
.0124467
5.332E-4
-.007562
.0017576
.C20401
.0044146
-. 006273
.004818C
-. 005911
9-.147679 -. 249005
Total
Impact
-1.234 2
2.05O855
-1.05172
.0335017
-. 006675
.0236339
-. 046894
.0060607
.0437901
-4.77E-4
.0050518
.0183933
9.736E-4
-. 040479
-.162533
-.022510
-. 004453
.001987v
.0091724
.0331660
.0131510
-.00330
.003423;
-.009653
-.012070
.0185866
.0162254
-. 013211
.C297614
-.020303
-. 012447
-. 007373
.0194225
.0644555
3.728E-4
.0223419
-4.35E-4
.0029355
-. 023393
-. 109890 &'
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SAMPLE 1 Table A9-7
Female
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomosition (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Component
(bf-b *X f
Attributes
Component
bf*( (-X)
Interaction
Component _
-(b F-b M)*(Xf-Xm)
Intercept
HuIan
Capital
Coa.nitiment to
the Hkr.ie
Cornitinent to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Dminant
Career
Total
Impact
-. 1r0424
.0531721
-. 185424
.16DS235
.C748230
.0565030
-. 00U148
-. 063119
-. 223336
.0886715
-. 018236
-. 019503
-. 002304
-. 022772
-- 030765
-- 021091
-- 035231
-. 150401
-. C1'037
-- 004171
-1545057
-- 00i&5713
.0495335
-- 45323
-C G 3."'J4
-. 0, 22
-- 014435
-0015254
S. ------r, 7Z'
-357-
SAMPLE I
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-8
Female
Coefficients
Component
(bf-b,)*X
Intercept
AME
AGi2
- FSER*VC2
FTLFEX
FZLFrX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDP32
AD~a4
OflLD1I
CHILD2
LFA.-
DLaili
1VTABFC
DSAPa
CA;=T
INFOR4
PERCD
FEIS1
EAKSOC
EAR.DL
UM4V
SPSCAR2
SReosw
SPSTRPR4M
1VCQUF
-. 185424
.4631386
-. 502G19
-. 063297
.0494793
.1323523
-. 09S877
.0715250
.1132155
0
.0035710
-. 009566
-. 016655
.0166682
-.014225
.0890349
.0138674
.0144095
-. 004044
.0322755
-.009148
-. 027266
-. 035e54
-.368715
.1453784
.0430105
.0350929
-9.44E-4
.0027752
.0079365
Attributes
Component
0
-. 329324
.3832916
-. 014749
-. 040637
.0050232
.0113548
-.,005094
2.354E-4
0
-4.22E-5
-. 020301
0
.0101719
-. 001659
* 017724
-. 029738
.0071764
-4.67E-5
-. 004313
-. 005121
-. 022772
-. 027266
-. 003499
-. 017139
.003952
-. 019793
.0018978
.0153506
-. 004520
-. 023167
Interaction
Component_
-(b f-bM)*(X 
-Xm
0
.04"9307
-. 103152
-. 032913
.0W90984
.C449224
-. 099049
-. 031123
.0039975
-. 002053
-. 01143
-. 05379
.0021531
-. 004951
.0355279
.0130216
-. 075235
-.009553
.0031156
-. 002695
.0049718
-. 013903
.0272657
.0027145
.1506118
.0039939
-. 039523
.0083091
-. 011096
.0075381
.02b3360
-.100102 
-.150401
Total
Impact
-. 185424
.1747455
-. 222430
-. 110950
.0979426
.1823028
-. 104571
.0L353000
.1224404
-. 002Z53
.0023312
-. 043245
.0021531
-. C011435
.0205375
.0011609
-.C15938
.01148r5
.0174703
-. 011552
.0321267
-.045023
-. 02726C
-.036339
-. 235242
.1454205
-. 016305
.0450990
.0033115
.0057935
1.069t-4
.0015254 -. 24897vr
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SAMPLE 2 Table A9-9
Female
TOTAL FULL REGRSSION
Decomposition of Impact (by Hypothesis)
Intercent
Human
Capital
Occupational
Segregation
Commitment toa
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Coefficients
Component
(b f-bm xf
.3062
".250'547
.05357Z2
-.019909
-. 015019
-004442C
4.474E-4
-. 272316
-. 193632
Attributes
Component
bf*(X fin)
--107161
-. 139157
-. 21444
-. 014925
-. 001551
-- 006220
-. 037763
-. 328222
Interaction
Component
-(b -b m)*(X 
-X )
C
--. 35913
.0948338
1.991E-4
.0065237
.0C15153
-. 009291
.0605905
.1105635
Total
Inpac t
.322
.0092475
-. 041155
-. 023415
.0044C73
-. 40329V
Female
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Coefficients Attributes Interaction Total
Component Component Component Impact
(b f-b )*Xf bf *(Xf-Y) 
-(b f-bm (xf -m
.3062 0 0 .3062
AGE -.051852 -. 120762 -. 009915 -.182529
AGE2 -. 063533 .1167477 -.026139 .0270758
FYSERVC .2262445 
-.216084 .1252798 .1354401
FYSERVC2 -. 093977 .1627786 -.113801 -. 045000
FTLFEX -.307176 .0853368 -.157450 -. 379290
FTLFEX2 .1456600 -.102900 .1649899 .2077500
EDTS2 -.023945 -. 004549 -.011041 -.039534
EDCS2 s-*009854 -.001337 -. 003185 -.014377
EDPS2 -*007033 -. 017837 -.009299 -. 034169
ACON2 -.004028 7.358E-4 -4.23E-4 -.003715
ACON3 -.001329 -.003460 -. 001014 -.005803
ACON4 -. 059724 -.005831 .00G1846 -.059370
OCC1 .0191009. - -.046334 .023396S -.003837
OCC3 .0025045 -.018332 .0138625 -.001965
OCC4 .0017249 -.003696 .0033068 .0013359
OCC5 .0146768 .0077545 -.009339 .0130923
OCC6 .001863 -.002094 .0049632 .0039551
OCC7 .0050737 -.0C1646 .0019902 .0054173
.0021765 
-2.53E-4 1.683E-4 .0020920OCC8 
.0020574 
-.072680 
.0604136 
-. 010209OCC9 
.0051692 
-.001876 .0024389 
.0057325OGClo 0 0 
-.006368 
-.006368OCCil 
-. 030531 .0068315 
-.010572 
-. 034271
MARITAL .0052729 
-.008403 .0042293 .0010997
CHILD1 .0040876 
-. 017376 .0077058 
-.005583
CHILD2 .0012608 
-.002497 
-. 001164 
-.002401
LFAM 
-. 006593 
-.008128 .0032319 
-.011490
TOTABFC .0080643 
-.001452 .0035780 .0101898
OSJAP1 7.742E-4 -.006902 .0012343 -.004393
WWOP -.017264 .0015578 -.001515 -. 017222
CAROT .0044428 -. 001551 .0015158 .0044073
INFORM .0132402 -.003952 -.0127J9 -.00342'
PERCD -*012793 -.002268 .0034174 -.011643
MOTS1 -- 180780 -. 039465 .0633019 -. 156943
EARSOC -*092036 .0017017 -.002711 -. 093046
EARDL
SAMPC-LE - 59- Table A9-10
-. 193632 -.~o328222
.1185635 -.403290
-360-
SAMPLE 2 Table A9-11
Female
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Component
(b f-b) *X
Attributes
Component
b *(X-Xm)
Interaction
Component_
-(b f-b 7n)*(Xf-X )
Intercept
Human
Capital
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Total
Impact
.197544
-. 065547
-- 01G153
-- 022987
.0015961
.0030796
-*306855
-. 204323
-. 15G759
-. 024740
-. 020450
-. 001145
-. 004565
-. 053854
-. 261515
-. 01390
.0014633
.0005935
5.446E-4
-. 019603
.0719194
. 0625203
.197544
-.223\95
-. C3943&
-. 033044
9.942E-4
-. 285792
-.4Ld331C
-361-
SAMPLE 2 Table A9-12
Female
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Coefficients
Component
(b f-b,)*Xf
Intercept
AGE
AGE2
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACON3
ACON3
ACON 4
MARITAL
CHILD 1
CHILD2
LFAM
TOTABFC
OSJAP 1
WWOP
CAROT
INFORM
PERCD
MOTS1
EARSOC
EARDL
197544
3234622
-. 226045
o2279389
-. 089224
-. 361504
,1750625
-.024404
-. 005823
-. 003217
3.709E-4
e0085346
-. 09074C
-. 027160
.0075284
.0028631
6.152E-4
-. 013555
.011359S
-1,76E-4
-. 020616
.0015961
-0251824
60,017103
--213264
-.093591
-.204323
Attributes
Component
b* (Xf-X )
-- 18697u
.1793642
-. 221845
.1549785
.0998373
-. 126712
-.*04707
-. 003505
-. 027412
-3.43E-6
-. C12298
-. 007906
.005069
-. 009515
-. 018242
-. 002591
-. 011958
-. 002575
- C7514
*0015972
-. 001146
-. 001174
-. 003391
-. 055217
.013631
-. 261515
Interaction
Component
-(bf-bM)*(X f-XR )
0
-0618485
-. 092999
.1262457
-. 108045
-. 185297
.1982942
-. 011253
-. 001082
-.004254
3.893E-5
.0065153
.0093973
-. £09405
.0060385
.0053975
-5.68E-4
.0066442
,0050402
-2,81E-4
-.00C1810
5.4468-4
-. 024172
.0045687
.0746767
-. 002757
.0625283
Total
Impact
.197544
.1983402
-. 139180
.1323399
-. 042291
-. 446954
.2456440
-. 040444
-. 011211
-. 034383
4. 063E-4
.0027532
-. 089257
.0040520
-. 009901
-. 002544
-.C180069
- 138 247
-.020828
9.942E-4
-1.63E-4
-. 015925
-.193805
-.094985
-. 403310
-362-
SAMPLE 2 Table A9-13
Female
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Component
(b f-bm *X f
Attributes
Component
b *(X -xm)
Interaction
Component_
-(b 
-bm (Xf-x m
Intercept
Human
Capital
occupational
Segregation
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Dominant
Career
Total
Impact
.236671
-. 065505
.0590671
*0078951
-. 03C730
-.093069
-. 148190
-. 071C36
-. 021963
-. 043163
.1035061
.0130551
.0123347
*23CZ71
.20737
.C12Z2
-.049533
-. 04 .l35r
-. 002412
-. 000969
-. 377672
.0355812
-. 13C611
-. 012612
-. 071897
.032173
-. 410010
-9 . 80E-4
*0836426
-. 043561
.1273871
-. 02252
-. 335926
-. CL04763
-. 42c242
-363-
SAMPLE 2
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-14
Female
Coefficients
Component
(b 
-b m)*X
Intercep.t
AGE
AGE2
IYSERVC
- EYSiVC2
FTLFEX
ETLFLX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACOW3
A00142
0C3
00C4
CC5
00C6
000
0cce0C71
0ccic
00C11
CHILD1
CHILD2
LFAM
DLHII
IVTA8FC
M3AP1
CART
INFks
HDAIS1
EARSOC
EARDL
SPSCAA2
SPSTARPRM
IMPoCARTF
.236671
.0795517
-.1567Z4
.469684C
-.195768
-. 368250
.1794330
-.027015
-.011549
-.009652
.0022777
-5.55E-4
-.026909
.0209530
.0051218
.0029490
.0146192
.00188G9
.0030976
.0032549
.0034257
.0037789
0
.0113812
.0068347
.0166092
-. 026930
-.016521
.9072031
7.730E-4
-.022185
.005C300
.0060606
-.015030
-. 245549
-.132122
.0264406
.0239395
-. 010877
.0014400
-.005362
-. 138611
Attributes
Component
b *(x -x)
0
-. 15C148
.1707971
-. 399026
.3555023
.16C3125
-.20G708
-. 003891
8.145E-4
-.012591
-5.91E-4
-. 004554
-. 002986
-. 053768
-. 022261
-.004694
.0102778
-.002323
- .03755
-3.91L-4
-. 06897E
-.002312
0
-.008241
-. 023552
-. 005748
-. 033545
-.014433
-. 001260
-. 009604
.0033834
-. 002412
-.0C9031
-.003581
-. 074568
.0026714
.0145945
-2.S1E-4
.0058523
-. 002895
-.014084
-.418018
Interaction
Component
-(b -bm f~AmI-
0
.016757
-.072683
.3068G47
-.307362
-. 220039
.2561447
-.0147GG
-.006123
-.009771
9.191E-4
-3.33E-4
.0028239
.0293334
.0181953
.0040556
-.010062
.0048357
.0045664
2.C35E-4
.0613156
.0024854
-.906506
.0052609
.0100557
-. 016128
.0144661
.0091560
.0036105
.0025220
-.902954
.0019508
-.0o5746
.0047663
.0675116
-.903869
-. 015101
-.002022
-.021563
.0034767
-.008352
.1273871
Total
Impact
.236G71
-. 061839
-0.05867"
.3775231
-. 147620
-.420577
.228899w
-.0456E5
-. 016058
-.032014
.0L026C55
-. 005443
-.027072
-. 033431
.0010565
.0023101
.0148353
.0043992
.0039091
.0031527
-.004229
.0039525
-. 006506
.0084010
-.006662
-. 005266
-. 046009
-. 021843
. 0'95538
-.006309
-. 021756
.0045694
-.003717
-.013844
-. 23266G
-. 13332
.025933S
.0216670
-. 026587
.0C20217
-.C2779E
-. 429242
-364-
SAMPLE 2
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Table A9-15
Female
Coefficients
Component
(b f-bM)*X f
Attributes
Component
b *(X -fm)
Interaction
Component
-(b f-bm *(Xf-X m
Intercept
Human
Capital
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Dominant
Career
-. 429242
-. 377037
Total
Impact
-.CC305G
.251392
-.035444
.0072998
-. 031716
-0025836
-.001398
-. 385943
.0600990
-.1582C3
-. 076666
-.027936
-. 00C1943
-. 010090
-. 079912
-. 022287
.0158525
.0157223
.0010019
-. 009 685
.0870893
-.026810
-. C53513
-. 043929
-0016421
-. C21173
-.373736
.C118012
.0 01 15 3-.,132326
-365-
SAMPLE 2 Table A9-16
Female
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Coefficients Attributes Interaction Total
Component Component Component Impact(bf-b )*Xf b f*(Xf-X) 
-(b-b,)*(X f-)
Intercept .251392 0 0 .251302
MaL .2011835 -. 185511 .0423780 .058W507
AG2 -. 202303 .1965794 -. 093705 -. 099500
FSEAVC .4125289 -. 370803 .2595223 .3112481
FiSEMC2 -.158935 .2953349 
-.249613 -.1132G3
FTLI*.x -. 36778C .1552337 -. 220358 -. 43290C
FTLFEX2 .1808825 -. 198378 .2581707 .2405755
EDIS2 -. 033092 -. 002013 -. 010o0 -. 053185
EDCS2 -. 009001 -. 001814 -. 0N4772 -. 015586
EDPS2 -. 003722 -. 022865 -. 003768 -. 030355
AC4L2 .C38540 -. 002195 .0015552 .0032141
AC0.3 .0134720 -. 015225 .0030802 .0063349
AC44 -. 0724E0 -. 0L6551 .40760564 -. 071425
OCXLD1 .0149263 -.008967 .0068995 .0123591
MILD2 .0073625 -. 02623w .01108323 -. 08I35
LFAiN .0220917 -. 003857 -. 022228 -. 003193
=Liu -. C37881 -. 037613 .0203406 -. 055145
VT1AbiC -. 025457 -. 019696 .0141C05 -. 031344
C3icAP1 .0110239 -. 002710 .0055256 .0133394
k'W -5.1SE-4 -. 008190 -. 001679 -. 010384
CAR-r -. 016768 .0026604 -. 002233 -. 016340
INOHN. .0025836 -. 001943 .0010019 .0016421
CD .0160497 -. 005625 -. 015218 -. 004793
NMIY1 -. 017447 -. 004465 .0055330 -. 016380
EARSOC -. 255114 -. 082173 .0909204 -. 246357
AHDL -. 130829 .0022615 -. 003831 -. 132399
UMOV .0229903 .0122299 -. 013131 .0220695
SPSCAR2 .6434506 .0019628 -.003669 .0417441
SPHOL -. G05736 -. 006283 -. 011371 -. C23392
SPSYMPie .0012357 -. 002688 .0029r835 .0015317
IPCAMRT -. 001042 -. 027509 -. 001G23 -. 03L174
7.01153 -.429248-.,132326 -.377037
-366-
SAMPLE 3
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Table A9-17
Female
Coefficients
Component
(bf-bM f
Attributes
Component
b f*(x f-)
Interaction
Component
-(b f-bM)* f- m
Intercept
Human
Capital
Occupational
Segregation
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Total
Impact
.1533541 -.3c37,2.5509990
-. 02L094
-.635755
-- 208512
-.06,4CD3
-.0007U1
.0C29556
-1 .1;12Z1
.31057;::
."027223
.0L'239ZG
-.226935
.C13 Z4..0131268
.7274059
-. 021430
.0300463
-.054674
o3913873
.C367138-.04863D
.022949C
.0497372-. 76427
-. 020291
.4242E33
.394L,432
-.5'2357
-367-
SA'LE 3
TOTAL FULL IREGRESSI
Decomposition (by Variablp)
Table A9-18
Female
Coefficients
Component
(bf-b )*X
-1.01291
-. 36112
-. 175924
1.474743
-. 677944
-1.00349
.5902772
.1375463
.1803313
.1626439
.0011230
.0078168
.23693C
.0435236
0
-. 063622
-. 011763
.0045726
.061062
-. 689627
-.029657
-. 018414
-. 019413
-. 141028
.0131263
.006072
-. 0G0746
.0944822
.2969051
-. 976427
Attributes
Component
b *(X -X )
-.16C211
.1841079
-. 836954
1.230077
.1623748
-. 328885
.0224294
-.040061
-. 142558
.03024J8
-. 147603
.1375512
-. 001181
-. 063622
-. 016580
-. 003590
-. 019370
.0307793
-. 001006
.0017942
-. 010407
.0126543
-.007269
.006072
-. 054711
.0280393
-. 005090
Interaction
Component
-(b9-b m)*(X 
-mITI(X-X
0
-. 029340
-. 027592
.75016G1
-1.23346
-. 245604
.4164492
-. 045369
.054G554
.1604543
-7.84L-4
.0115423
-. 203901
.0239969
0
.0630222
-. 001934
.0053CL14
.0361257
.6679540
8.755E-4
-.002025
-.00G722
-. 013559
.0080468
-.00G072
.0427E58
-. 025795
.0055037
.4242033 -. 502357
Intercept
AG=
AGL2
MtERVC2
FLFEX2
EDT1S2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACO42
ACOF3
AC014
00C2
*0CC3"
MARTAL
CilILD1
CHILD2
OS3API
WAOP
CARIT
INFORN
PERCD
EARSOC
EAhRL
Total
Imp1a ct
-1.C1291
-.5203662
-.010549
1.387955
-. 631327
-1.09272
.6058413
.1145Z71
.1949255
.1005303
.0305794
-. 123240
.1706335
.0653445
0
-. 063622
-. 030327
.0062843
.0778172
.0291160
-. 029863
-.01344
-. 036542
-. 141933
.0139046
.006072
-.072671
.0967269
.2973193
.0497872
-368-
SAMPLE 3 Table A9-19
Female
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Component
(b f-bm *X f
Attributes
Component
b *(X-x)
Interaction
Component
-(b -b m)*(X 
-x m
Intercept
Human
Capital
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Total
Impact
0..790497
.3321257
-. 623904
-. 213517
.0141C48
.0979262
-.- 024705
-07893
-. 333J25
.7336546
-.022204
-006954
.0475994
-027177
.4074537
-.071430
- 273
-. 233309
* 4;'.0 3.00
-- 03918
-41135Z7
-- 50 239%
*4053304
...*943707
.0292054
*0339432
-369-
SAMPLE 3
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-20
Female
Coefficients
Component
(bf-b )*Xf
Intercept
AG.,
AGi2
FYSEVC
FYSr.VC2
-FTLFEX
FTLFEA2
EtIS2
LJCS2
EDP32
ACO.2
ACDA3
WilTAL
CAILD1
011LZ2
LFAA
QJ.Pi
PM4CD
EARSOC
EA)L -
-. 790497
-. 609335
-. 022516
1.3364
-.649274
-. 996284
.5917952
.135976
.170040*
.1593161
-. 006690
1.653L-5
.16C694
.0043691
.0047325
.060327
-. 693412
-. 025939
-. 014W91
-. 0192 00
-.153607
.0141348
.0091726
-. 030603
.1192426
.29008705
-. 943787
Attributes
Component
b *(-x -Ym)
f f
-. 130364
.1414948
-. 03070
1.234931
.1530344
-. 313016
.0217381
-. 0369V99
-. 139297
.0273509
-.133316
.0796895
-.01997w
-.004333
-.018B54
.0189523
-.00132G
.001015 J
-.014797
.0143104
-.,007090
.0091726
-.0692G
.0344922
-. 005237
.0339432
Interaction
Component
-(b f-b) *(Xf-Xm
0
-.0463 2
-. 003532
.7363677
-1.18130
-. 243620
.4119372
-.045161
.515498
.1576665
.0043727
2.441E-5
-.145314
7. 3702-4
.0054688
.035698
.6917399
7.657E-4
-. C01615
-. 006376
-.0147G9
.0306954
-. 009173
.0537720
-. 032555
.0C53774
.4074537
Total
Impact
1.,73497
-. 73 531
.115447::
1.251133
-. 59552 V
-1.09*
.69371C5
.1135335
.184!35
.1761876
.0253333
-. 133275
.1032593
-. 01454
.005335'
.0771634
.0172793
-. 02G195
-. 015291
-. 040753
-. 15C :5
.0149C13
.0091726
-. 093091
.121103
.29C170'
-.5C239:
-370-
SAMPLE 3
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Table A9-21
Female
Decomposition of Impact (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Component
(b f-bm *f
Attributes
Component
b *(X -x m)
Interaction
Component
-(b -b f)* M
Intercept
Human
Capital
Occupational
Segregation
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Dominant
Career
3.059531
-1 .9729.Z
.11643D7
-. 793385
-.672GCO
-.037121
.0607892
-.500794
'714837 &
-.00198C
-. 759197
.1307265
.0503395
.0546186
-.120831
.01C3613
-1.04102
0
.1284263
.10 1734
3. 5$5s1
-2.1r573
.13%122i
.54G1513
-. 144013 -. 621355
-. 05C376
-. 050516 .C647.21
.1197391
-.O84G59
.55D2255-.45375
Total
Impact
-371-
SAMPLE 3 Table A9-22
Female
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition of Impact (by Variable)
Coefficients Attributes Interaction Total
Component Component Component Impact
(b -b)*X b *(X -x) -(b -b f*(X x
Intercept 3.059581 0 0 3.05551
AGC -8.31971 .923753 -1.C9123 -E.4719
AGG2 4.092463 -. 978301 1.112357 4.22701L
?YSERVC .C26304 -. 052989 .0206155 0036-3
FYSLtC2 ' .2072865 
-. 5492;2 .5394Z90 .1974.32
kTLFEX 2.586123 -1.23663 1.120555 2.470051
krLx2 -1.32179 1.526304 
-1.42774 -1.22315
JrS)T2 .102116 .0321907 -. 037121 .1752612
EX2 .2354646 -. 025876 .0251494 .2347370EDPS2 .1673921 -. 224563 .1973628 .16!1916
A.= 2 0243052 .0206G3& -. U13779 .0311901
ACO'3 -. 100538 .0479354 -. 128062 -. 18665
ACa4 .2271531 .1756370 -. 109675 .2131149
DCCl .1528018 -. 045544 .0G52313 .17256'9
OCC2 0 0 0 0
"OC3" -. 036442 -. 036442 .0334421 -. C36442
CH1ILD1 
-.0.7154 .0013686 -.009961 -. 015747
CHILD2 .0602543 -. 042936 .0479950 .0653143
LFA' -. 07072 -. 162094 .0707120 -. 16354
DimL -. 775313 -. 554735 .4374045 -.092644
TXAb kC -. 135057 .0424291 -. 041152 -. 13459.
CEJAP1 -. 039643 .01G2059 -. 015044 -. 030431
10P -. 199249 .0534238 -. 071620 -. 217445
CARO' -. 232509 .0186676 -. 016997 -. 230639
INORN -. 087121 .0583695 -. 056670 -.035422
PECD .0238765 .0233765 -. 023076 .0238765
M l.0369128 .0307421 -. 026739 .0409155
EARSOC -. 415C30 -. 115652 .11515;2 -. 41634L
EADL -. 004956 -. 005179 .0045039 -. 0&5545
RuOV -. 102014 -. 049354 .0776949 -. 074473
SPSCAR2 .81140G7 .0935743 -. 103502 .7964792
SPriw -.029074 .0161635 -.034203 -. 047119
SPSTR-PR .0351391 .0008324 -.019'20 .0240511
DAPARTF 1.796E-4 -.050355 2.766E-4 -.05039S
.5592255 -. 491379-. 009582 -1.04102
-372-
SAMPLE 3
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Table A9-23
Female
Coefficients
Component
(bf-bm *Xf
Attributes
Component
bf*(x f-m)
Interaction
Component
-(bf-bm *(xf 
-xm
Intercept
Human
Capital
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Dominant
Career
4.299952
-3.31773
-. 23365S
-. 558592
-- 044204
- .C14605
-. 61C273
.5991635
-. 40E321
-. 555747
.0997451
.0304131
.0011655
-.129665
.0936910
.1863265
.2401544
-. 119271
-. C23C5
-.003522
.1345532
-. 143950
-.401355
.111374 ~-.8871C 2546
Total
Impact
-3. 53.o72
-. 54c25L
-. 5 7021C
-. 42C75
-. 61335
.54S9L45
. 654861
-373-
SAMPLE 3 Table A9-24
Female
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Coefficients
Component
(b f-bM) *X
4.299952
-8,84979
3.9220910
-. 343404
,2964735
2.218303
-1.00213
.103753
-1457084
.1180706
.C305954
-. 036716
e133%222
.0115037
.0935108
.0955473
.4342203
-. 114172
.0020733
-. 104495
-. 262098
-. 044284
.0511633
-. 06576.
.153331
Awo164442
0424568
.6331518
-.029397
e0311563
-.16 13
*111e754
Attributes
Component
b *(X 
-X )
0
1.018223
-.96=038
.1843443
-. 754699
-1.03742
1.265427
.0139942
-.014102
-. 133474
.0236810
-.044285
.0330764
-. 024436
-. 068056
-. 080297
-. 3C2907
.V363708
-.0L1199
.0434536
.0211197
.0304131
07511634
-. 049993
-.121421
6008244
609001342
o0737432
e0133413
*0071004
8.42SE-4
ap.860710
Interaction
Component_
-(b -bM)*(X f-X)
':C'
-1.GZ7C
1.065528
-. 24C"39
.7716039
.9613909
-1.14727
-. C22401
.155G28
.124352.
-. 017345
-. 046740
-. 111743
.0160173
.0744930
-. 095332
.244970
-. C34501
7.87&3-4
-. 066317
-. 019160
60*0283C5
-. 051164
*0476421
* 12567Cv3
o0083323
.0185657
-.*035334
-. 034509
.017663
-0249310
,2654851
Intercept
AG2
FWALFfX
EDCS2
EE232MPS 2
ACDA
CiIILL1
CHILD2
70TABI-C
OEJAP1
SCAR
- -
SPS'TRPR-
DIPCerf
Total
Impact
-8. 9V232
4.023)52~
-. 40589r
.3133:33
2.0927C2
-. 943931
.1003434
.1471691
.10: 54.11
* 04193 1
-. 127769
.1051557
.0030356
.0999555
-. 03CL'2
-. 572159
-. 112302
.0015613
-. 20735-
-.260133
-.04267v
40511633
-. oC 6 %312 5
-. 449580
-. 1638C4
-.007344
.6265657
--450644
.0205941
a-C.04'267
-.*491356
-374-
SAMPLE 1
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Table A9-25
Male
Coefficients
Component
(b -bm)*X
-f04116
Intercept
Human
Capital
Occupational
Segregation
Port of
Entry
Marriage
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
-W.041162
-. 092210
-. 109572
.0588693
-. 015160
.0261676
.0394303
-. 016506
-. 008977
.0770201
-. 082100
Attributes
Component
bm*(X f-X)
-. C26412
-. 114104
-. 014100
-. 001889
-. 049935
.0025138
-. 010617
-. 028344
-.243947
Interaction
Component
(bf-bm)* (Xf-X)
.0256767
.048162j
-. C31239
.0019855
.0471994
-. 005100
.0038338
-. 005931
.0315609
.1211485
Total
Tpact
-. 041152
-. 092953
-. 175514
.0135315
.0234324
.036&517
-. C1)29
-. 015069
.0%02357
-. 2u4L23
-375-
SAt?'LE 1
TOTAL FULL RESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-26
Male
Coefficients
Component
(b f-b m )
Intercept
AGr.
AGE2
FYsERVC
FMSERVC2
FTLFzx
FTLFEX2
EDS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACWJ2
ACO&N3
SDN1
SM2S24
SDN4
milFW2
KWRTAL
CHILD1
CHILD2
LFAM
TOrABKc
OJAP1
MOP
CARaT
PERCD
MOTS1
EARSOC
EARDL
-. 041162
-. 068309
-. 108418
.0193009
.0229481
.0734397
-. 089187
.0090396
.0505189
-. 001460
-7.82E-4
-1.83E-5
7.106E-4
-. 028473
-. 105726
.0164218
.0037456
.0044656
.0149858
.0299852
-4.83E-4
.0143815
-. 015160
.0104622
.0132049
.0025005
3.357E-4
.0155500
-. 009324
.0328768
-. 016506
0
-. 008977
.0444937
.0325264
-. 082100
Attributes
Component
bm *(Xf-m
0
-.132746
.1262820
-. 011762
.008414C
.0087264
-. 022652
-. 003786
8.580E-4
-. 001450
-5.02E-4
.0017053
7.106E-4
-. 028543
-. 049992
-. 025293
-. 010203
-7.29E-5
-. 003733
-. 003952
.003574
-. 002841
-. 001889
.042285
4.922E-4
-. 054655
.0024694
.0027514
-. 001670
-. 0o1037
-. 010617
0
-. 0010G0
-. 028411
6.627E-5
-. 243947
Interaction
Component
(h-b) *f(- )
0
.0042472
.0146831
-. 005827
-. 013536
-. 015849
.0395309
.0033928
-. 001526
.0014604
-1.93E-4
4.870E-6
-7.11E-4
.0218501
.0406580
-. 013611
-9.28E-4
1.936E-4
-. 009923
-. 009708
-2.69E-4
-. 011339
.0019855
-. 003083
-7.09E-4
.0509912
7.065E-4
-. 004692
.0029123
-. 004027
.0088338
-. 005190
-7.41E-4
.0316648
-1.04E-4
.1211485
Total
Impact
-. 0411G2
-.196808
.0325470
.017124
.0178267
.066316c
-.072509
.0006465
.0498505
-. 001460
-. 00147L
.0016919
7.106E-4
-.035171
-. 115061
-. 022482
-. 007386
.0045863
.0U13298
.0163252
-. 004325
2.019E-4
-.015C63
.0116075
.0129385
-.001164
.0035115
.0136091
-. 003082
.0278133
-. 018289
-.005190
-. 010779
.0477430
.0324838
-.204098
-376-
SAMPLE 1 Table A9-27
Male
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Component
(b -h )*xf nm
Attributes
Component
h *(X -X)m f n,
Interaction
Component
(h -h )*(Y -Y )
Intercept
Human
Capital
Marriage
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
.879G94
-. 903168
*0079416
.0098706
.0355431
-.037329
-. 019217
-. 051239
-. 077904 -. 051801 -. 204881
Total
Impact
6.089E- 6 -. 987l11
-. 001040
.0430267
-.001991
. 0D76537
.01&44Z5
-0354163
-. 083849
7.622E-4
-. 034457
.,18640
-. 029722
-. 001560
.0718732
-. 075096
.0199773 -. 047073
-. 016912 -. 037697
-. 094948 -. 074314
-377-
SAMPLE 1
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-28
Male
Coefficients
Component
(b -b )*Xm
Attributes
Component
bm*(X -Xm)
Interaction
Component
(bF-bm*(x x)
Intercept
AGE
AC2
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
PrLFEX
FITLEEX2
EDIS2
ECS2
EDP32
ACON3
ACON4
MRITAL
CHILD1
ChILD2
70TABFC
0SJAP1
IW6MOP
CAROT
INFO
PERCD
HMrs1
EARSOC
EARDL
.879694
-1.38716
.3349600
-. 150150
.2344377
.1491612
-. 120394
.032C890
.0310722
-. 005101
-. 004513
-. 068437
9.176E-4
.0079416
-. 001297
.0090531
.OL21150
3.186E-4
.0130814
-. 021059
.0432024
-.037329
0
-. 019217
-. 133049
.0818095
-. 077904
0
-. 210475
.2012734
-. 045851
.0386070
.0485212
-.068836
-. 016938
.0012143
-. 005101
-. 001428
-. 025754
9.176E-4
7.622E-4
.0072003
5.455E-4
-. 042203
.0047018
.0063914
-. 008044
-. 001185
-.029722
0
-. 001568
.0719187
-4.55E-5
-. 075096
0
.0862491
-. 045364
.0453300
-. 138235
-. 032191
.0533625
.0120443
-. 002450
.0051006
-. 001114
.0182405
-9.18E-4
-.001040
3.824E-4
-4.86E-4
.043131
6.707E-4
-. 003947
.0065775
-. 005292
.0199773
-. 015326
-. 001586
-. 094687
-2.61E-4
.8796(.4
-1. 51135
.49036';7
.1347593
.1654912
-. 1358t7
.027196
.079C369
-.005101
-. 0070 55
-. 07 60 00
9.176E-4
.0076 37
.0062857
.0091123
.0030420
.0056911
.0155254
-. 022526
.03G7260
-.047073
-. 015326
-. 022371
-. 155817
.081502G
-. 051881 -. 2C4 OL
Total
Impact
-378-
SAMPLE 2 Table A9-29
Male
TOTAL FULL REGRSSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Component
(b f-bm)* m
Attributes
Component
bm fi m
Interaction
Component_
(b -b m)*(X 
-X m
Intercept
Human
Capital
Occupational
Segregation
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
.3LDG2
Total
TImpact
. 3J 2
.0356132
-. 142975
-. 044323
-. 21245
-. 393522
-. 094034
-1-.993-4
-. 286361
.1484040
-. 019710
-. 0UoL490
e00595e7
-.g)8844
-. 212226
-. 075060
-. 041155
-. 00395 -. 023415
-. 001516 - l4:73
-3.55E-5
.015511
-0220271
-- 209658
-0092913
--0G0590
-. 118563 -. 4f321 0
-379-
SAMP'LE 2
TOTAL FULL REGRSSION
Table A9-30
Ma le
Decomposition (by Variable)
Coefficients
Component
(bf-b )*X
Attributes
Component
b *(Xf- )
Interaction
Component
(bf-bM)*(X-x)
Intercept
AG
AGE2
FYSLOVC
FYZ3VC2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACON2
AM~44
OCC3
00C4
00C5
OCC6
00C7Occ8
00C9
?ARITAL
CHILD1
CHILD2
LFA-i
06JAP1
W40P
PERCD
EARSOC
EAR)L
.3062
-.061767
-.0072
.3515243
-.207778
-.464626
.3106499
-.034986
-. 013040
-.016332
-. 004451
-. 002343
-. 053539
.0424977
.0163670
.0050318
.0053378
.0060495
.070638
.0023448
.0G24710
.0076081
-. 006368
-.041103
.0095022
.0117934
9.657E-5
-.0033G2
.0116423
.00)200b6
-.018780
.0059587
5.315E-4
-. 009375
-.117470
-.094748
-. 075068
0
-. 130677
.0906090
--090804
.0439773
-. 072114
.0620900
-.015590
-. 004523
-.027136
3.130E-4
-.004475
3. 541C-4
-. 022938
-. 004470
-3.89E-4
-.001584
.0028688
3.437E-4
-8.46E-5
-. 012266
5.632E-4
-. 006368
-.003740
-. 004173
-. 009670
-. 003662
-. 004897
.0021256
-.W05667
4.234E-5
-3.55E-5
-.016660
.0011494
.023836S
-. 001010
-.209658
.0099146
.0261337
-. 125200
.1133010C
.1574504
-.164952
.0110409
.0031854
.0092993
4.228E-4
.010145
-. 0~06185
-. 023397
-. 013863
-. 003307
.0093390
-. 004953
-.001990
-1.68E-4
-. 060414
-. 002439
.0063675
.0105717
-. 004229
-. 007706
.0011643
-.003232
-.003573
-.001234
.0015155
-. 001516
.0127037
-. 0C3417
-. 063302
.0027114
-. 118563
-.102525
.0270753
.13544.1
-.045300
-.379290
.2077500
-. 039534
-. 014377
-. 034165
-. 003715
-.005803
-.059370
-. 003837
-. 001965
.0013359
.0130923
.0039551
.0054173
.0020923
-.010209
.0057325
-.006360
-.034271
.0010997
.005503
.002431
-.011490
.0101093
-.004393
-.017222
.0044073
-. 003420
-.011643
-.156943
-.0930
-.403293
Total
Impact
-380-
SAMPLE 2 Table A9-31
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Component
(b f-bM)*) m
Attributes
Component
b *(X 
-x m)
Interaction
Component
(b -b M)*(X 
-x m
Intercept
Human
Capital
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
.197544
Total
Impact
.0013S97
.1*.7544
-. 22335
-. 001463
-.06G937
-. 014690
-. 013394
.0321406
-. 011523
-. 234936
-. 141795
-. 150143
-. 023277
-- 010857
-6.02E-4
-. 02416S
.0180652
-. 19937
-.009503
-5.45E-4
.0196023
-. 071919
-. 06252'u
-- 33044
9.942E-4
-.236790
-.4:,331.:
-381-
SAMPLE 2
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-32
Male
Coefficients
Component
(bf-b )*i,
Intercept
AGE2
FYEI;RVC
FysERVC2
FTLFX
FILFEX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDIS2
ACO12
;A=06 3ACD3
MhITAL
CIILD1
CHILD2
LFAM
70~rAbFC
cSJAP1
EARSOC
E~riDL
.197544
.3353106
-. 319045
.3542345
-. 197269
-. 546801
.37335G7
-. 035657
-. 007706
-. 007471
4.098E-4
.0150509
-. 001351
-. 036555
.0135669
.008260G
4.712E-5
-. 006911
,U164000
-4.58E-4
-.022425
oCC21436
10010109
-. 012534
-.138587
-. 096348
-m.141795
Attributes
Component
b,*(Xf-X )
-. 125122
.0368650
-. 095599
.0409334
-. 005460
.0715823
-. 01604VF
-. 005363
-. 0316G
3.550E-5
-. 005731
.0014912
-. 003798
-. 003476
-. 012344
-. 003159
-. 005314
,0024649
. 007796
-2. 12E-4
-6,, 02E-4
-0.025346
-0011779
,0194594
-. 001394
-. 198S37
Interaction
Component _
(bf-b )*(Xf-Xm)
0
-. 0361840
.0929992
-. 126240
.1030451
.1852974
-. 193294
.011252#3
.018024
.0042537
-3.09E-5
-. 0065153
-. C09397
.0094345
-.005033
-. 005397
5. 68E-4
-W,006644
.,005040
2.813E-4
.0013097
-5.45E-4
.0241715
-.004569
.*0740577
,0027572
-. 0C2528
Total
Impact
.197544
.19334 2
.1323M
-. 04221
--
4409 -
.24 64 -
-.043444
-. 011211
-. C34603
4.063E-4
. 0027532
-- 009257
.0040520'
-- 002544
-. 01S6
o0138247
-007972
6 942E-4
-1 o63E-4
-. 015925
-. 193305
-. 094935
-. 43331(
-382-
SA TLE 3
TOTAL FULL REGR:SSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Table A9-33
Male
Coefficients
Component
(b f-b M )*X
Attributes
Component
bm*(X 
-X)
Interaction
Component
(b -b f*(X -x
Intercept -1.01291
Human .1572166
Capital
Occupational .0675255
Segregation
Commitment to .0916516
the Homre
Commitment to -. 229942
the Firm
Informal .0211736
Network
Perceived -. 017960
Discrimination
Early .3710964
Socialization
-.552144
-.240428
.0228159
.7186460
-. C182475
7.778E-4
-. 011925
.0026589
.4740705
0
.3937824
-. 087619
-. 727407
.0214301
-.008047
-. 036714
.0202909
-1. 012S1
.3105708
.CC27223
.0828906
-.223985
.0139045
-.066599
.3940462
-. 4242C3 -. 502357
Total
i'.pact
-383-
StMPLE 3
TOTAL FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-34
Male
Coefficients
Component
(bf-b m )x
Intercept
AGE
AGk2
FYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
EDCS2
EDP32
ACON2
AO43
ACN4
0CI
OCC2
"OCC3"
MARITAL
CHILD
CHILD2
LFAm
TOTABC
0SJAP1
We:p
CAROT
INlwR.A
PERCD
KTS1
EARSOC
EARDL
-1.01291
-. 415451
-. 203517
2.224909
-1.91140
-1.25509
1.014726
.0921776
.2349867
.3230982
3.387E-4
.0193595
.0330873
.0675255
0
0
-. 013747
.00987480
.0971877
-. 001663
-. 028782
-. 020438
-. 026135
-. 154537
.0211736
0
-. 017960
.0686875
.3024089
-. 552144
Attributes
Component
b *(Xf-X)bm f m)
0
-. 197551
.1573754
-. 0867883
.0456174
-. 034229
.C375642
-. 022939
.C145942
.0178864
.0294565
-. 136066
-. 066349
.0220159
0
0
-. 018564
.0017118
.0167552
.7187433
-2.11E-4
-2.30E-4
-. 017128
-9.05E-4
7.778E-4
0
-. 011925
.0022447
4.142E-4
.474,0705
Interaction
Component
(b f-bm M)*f 
_xm
0
.0293396
.0275925
-. 750166
1.233460
.2465343
-. 416449
.0453686
-. 054655
-.160454
7.843E-4
-. 011543
.2039307
-. 023997
-. 063G22
.0019342
-. 005301
-. 036126
-. 687964
-8.75E-4
.0020245
.0067217
.0135593
-. 008047
.006072
-. 042786
.0257946
-. 005504
-. 424283
Total
Impact
-1. C1291
-.5335 C2
-. 010549
1.37:55
-. 631327
-1.00272
.685%413
.11460'71
.1949255
.1805303
.0305794
-. 120249
.1706385
.0663445
0
-.0G3G22
-. 030327
.00G2843
.C770172
.0291160
-. C29838
-.01544
-. 03G542
-.141933
.0139045
.C06072
-. 072671
.0957269
.2973193
-.502357
-384-
SAMPLE 3 Table A9-35
Male
TOTAL FULL REGRSSION
Decomposition (by Hvothesis)
Coefficients
Component
(bf-b m X
Attributes
Component
b m*(X -x )
Interaction
Component
(h km) *
Intercept
Human
Capital
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Total
Impact
-. 790497
-B.-99Z-- .333L1246 - 7. 273
.70S9497 -. 733355
-.235811
.C228C02
-. 023831
.3821533
-. 536334
-. 022792
7.970Z-4
*,G12488
.0020283
.4413969
.0222939
-. 0u3695
-. 047599
-0271771
-. 407454
-. 2363W9
-Z149X21C
-. CE3916
-411)537
-. 50239 0
-385-
SAMPLE 3
TOTAL PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-36
Male
Coefficients
Component
(b -bm)*Xm
Intercept -.790497
AGC -. 655637
AGE2 -.026048
FYSERVC 2.095008
MYSERVC2 -1.83057
FILFEx -1.23990
ETLFEX2 1.003732
EDTS2 .0917955
EDCS2 .2216346
EDPS2 .317484G
ACO-42 -. 002018
ACON3 4.094E-5
ACON4 .0235803
MARITAL .0051061
CHILD1 .0102193
CHILD2 .0960178
LEAM1 -.001672
'MTA'FC -.025173
OSJAPI -.016306
W.'OP -.025955
CAROT -. 168376
INFORM .0220802
PERCD 0
MTS1 -. 023831
EARSOC .08668w1t
EARDL .2954652
-. 536334
Attributes
Component
b m*(X 
-m )
-.177166
.1379633
-. 097502
.0536848
-. 093585
.0989213
-.023442
.0145510
.0183695
.0320236
-.133292
-. 065624
-.019233
6.543E-4
.0168364
.7106922
-2.60E-4
-6.00E-4
-. 021473
-4.58E-4
7.970E-4
0
-. 012438
.0019377
9.064E-5
Interaction
Component
(b f-bM) *(X - )
0
.0463317
.035315
-.706368
1.181296
.2436195
-. 411937
.0451805
-. 051550
-. 157666
-.004673
-2.44E-5
.1453137
-7.37E-4
-. 005487
-. 035691
-. 691740
-7.6G6CE-4
.0016152
.0066756
.0147688
-. 003695
.00(1726
-. 055772
.0325545
-.005377
.4413969 -. 407454
Total
Impact
-. 790497
-. 786501
.1154470.
1.291130
-.59558i
-1. 08907
.6907165
.1135335
.1846358
.170176
.0253333
-.133275
.1032693
-. 014S54
. 0053868
.0771634
.0172793
-. 026199
-. 015291
-.040753
-. 154066
.014931C
.0091726
-.093091
.1211803
.2901704
-.5C2390
-386-
SAMPLE 1
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Table A9-37
Male
Coefficients
Component
(b f-bM)*Xm
Intercept
Human
Capital
Occupational
Segregation
Port of
Entry
Commitment to
the Home
-1.23432
1.034570"
-. 147432
.0999944
6.6G5E-4
Attributes
Component
b m*(X 
-X )
-. 031144
-. 160054
-. 016135
-. 021269
Interaction
Component
(b f-bm)*(X f-Xm
.0737243
.07 499C
-.03175.
. 0065932
Commitment to .0438050
the Firm
Informal -.021754
Network
Perceived .006509
Discrimination
Early 10766863
Socializat ion
Dominant .0148732
Career
-. 139116
Total
Impact
-1.23412
1.077157
-. 227c9
.0521005
-. C13711
-. 004894
-. 011659
-3.31E-4
.00139706
-. 013450
-. 257539
.0124515
.013120W
-. 0 12.003 0
.0058041
9.103E-4
.1476794
.0513622
-.020303
.0c 20
.0030300)
.023239
-. 24, 0
-387-
SAMPLE I
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-38
Male
Coefficients
Component
(bf-b )*X
Intercept
AGE
AGE2
EYSERVC
FYSERVC2
FTL7EX
FTLFEX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
ED±-S2
ACOG3
ACX4
OCCl
00C2
SDN1
SDA2
FD44
FMA5
CHILD1
CHILD2
LFMa~
DLhH
TVTABFC
06JAP1
MOP
CAROTY
INFORN
PEKCD
EARSOC
EARDL
LMV
SPSCAR2
SP14W3
SPSTRPas
IMPCNUEF
-1.23402
2.402028
-1.43951
.0670530
-. 050206
.0264132
-. 051230
.0069010
.0441056
-4.77E-4
.0045574
.0239663
9.786E-4
-.034332
-. 158005
.0325806
.0108691
.0014549
.0259996
.0628997
.0144750
-. 003380
-. 003750
.0077604
.0015325
-. 004883
.0063464
.0181260
-. 015592
.0349248
-. 021754
0
-. 006509
.0109503
.0G5736L
-1.8LE-4
.0234C43
-.006806
.0065929
-. 008218
-. 139116
Attributes
Component
b *(Xf-X )
0
-. 156126
.1426632
-. 010513
.0112509
.0039639
. 021563
-. 006156
.0029406
-4.77E-4
-. 0016G4
.0035532
9.786:-4
-.031240
-.090784
-.026094
-. 011176
2.950.E-5
4.270E-4
.0016095
-.014792
-. 003380
.0025205
.0025954
-. 045816
.0194310
.001861
.0013218
-. 003854
-5.02E-4
-.011669
0
-3.31E-4
9.104E-4
4.872E-4
.0025929
.0037722
9.893D-5
.0011624
-. 021C86
-. 257569
Interaction
Component
(bf-bm)*(X 
-X)
C,
-.195046
.2451241
-. 022939
.0322796
-. 006693
.0253991
.0053161
-. 003247
4.773E-4
.0021584
-. 003626
-9.79E-4
.0250937
.0862563
-. 028197
-. 004157
5.025E-4
-. 017254
-. 031343
.0134630
.0033799
8.593E-4
-. 001933
.0345902
-.026619
.0141006
-. 003222
.0062349
-. 004662
.0131208
-. 012447
-5.331-4
.0075618
-. 001750
-. 00240
-. 004415
.0062727
-. 004819
.0059111
.1476794
Total
Impact
-1. 234:z2
2.050Z.5G
-1.05172
. 33G017
-. 006675
-. 4
.OCGZGJ7
.04379&1
-4 .77E-4
.05E107
SC1889 33
9.76E-4
-. 040479
-. 162533
-. 022510
-. 004463
.0019070
.0091724
.0331650
.0131510
-.00330a
. 003423
-.009693
-. 012C7L
.0185666
.0162254
-.013211
.0297E14
-.C20303
-.012447
-. 007373
.0194225
.0644655
3. 723E-4
.022841.9
-4.35S-4
.0029355
-. 0233 93
-. 2490
-388-
SAMPLE 1
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Table A9-39
Male
Coefficients
Component
(b f-b )*Xm
Attributes
Component
bm*(X 
-X)
Interaction
Component
(b f-b )*(X,-X )
Intercept
iuan
Capi tal
Com.aitiaent to
the kine
Commitment to
the Fina
Informtal
NetworK
Perceived
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Dominant
Caretr
-. 001525 -. 24 76
Total
Impact
-. 185424
.C714034
.0137862
.0523372
-. 023051
-. 033139
-. 068731
.10742369
.0895151
.0610367
.0041707
.0139032
. 531721
-. 025716
.0495336
-. 045k23
-. 107751
-. 080539
-. 006974
-. 036075
-7.85E-4
.1335148
-. 049665
-.14Z;0875
-. 029900
-. 154506
.014434G
.03,0064
-389-
SAMPLE 1
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-40
Male
Coefficients
Component
(bf-b )*X
Intercept
AGG
AML2
MSEAVCFY~I. E IWC2EYSERVC2
FLFEX
FrLFEX2
UDrS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
AON2
DiILDI
QiILD2
LFAN '
TTAEFC
OBJAPI
CAl IT
F CD
EARSOC
EARDL
uWov
SPSCAR2
SPGTRPR i
XJMPCARrF
-. 105424
.504.593
-. 605771
-. 096210
.1385777
.1772746
-. 195926
. 0404020
.1222130
-. 002353
.0024234
-. 014945
.0021531
-. 021606
.02219G1
-6.04E-4
.0138001
.0043042
.0175251
-. 006739
.0372473
-. 023051
0
-. 033139
-. 218103
.1493723
.0034873
.0442020
-. 012039
.0103133
.0202734
-. 003577
Attributes
Component
b *(X -x )
0
-.280393
.2801393
-. 047552
.0484613
.0499505
-. 037694
-. 036217
.0092329
-*002053
. 001190
-. 033680
.0021531
.00522G4
.003C693
.0153940
-. 105023
S.002337
.0030638
-. 007507
-1.49E-4
.036675
0
-7.85E-4
.1334727
4.209E-5
-. 059316
.0102070
.0042551
.0030182
-. 00730
-.148375
Interaction
Component
(bf -b) * (Xf-X)
C
-.040931
.1031523
.0329128
-. 044922
.0990489
.0311230
-. 003997
.0028534
.0011477
.0053791
-. 002153
.0049515
-.00552G
-. 013522
.0752347
.009532
-. 00311G
.002694C
-. 004972
.0139032
-. 0272GG
-. 002714
-. 150612
-. 00'~ 3994
.0395232
-. 008309
.0110956
-. 007533
-. 020337
-.001525
Total
Impact
-. 105424
.1747455
-.2224 .
-.11 UL49794L'
.1823,S
-. 164571
.03533Z0
.12244:4
-. C02053
.U02312
-. 043245
.0L21531
-. 011435
.0205375
.W011G09
-.01598
.0114&L05
.01747C3
-.011552
.03212G7
-.045323
-. 027250
-.0303&
-. 23524
.14542,'5
-. C16325
'.0499
.0133115
.0057935
1.0G9-4
-. 24Z975
-390-
SAMPLE 2 Table A9-41
Male
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Component
(b f-bm)*Xm
Attributes
Component
bm*(X 
-X)
Interaction
Component
(b f-b M)*(Xf-X m
Intercept
Human
Capital
Occupational
Segregation
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment to
the Firm
Informal
Network
.236671
-. 1136G8
.1675952
.0215502
-. 018396
.00G9813
Perceived 
-. 009949
Discrimination
Early 
-. 294029
Socialization
Dominant -. 007980
Career
-. 011224
-. 141232
-. 03963
-. 057431
-. 009629
-4.61E-4
-d.013592
.0117458
-. 040344
-. 290631
1 0
.U481628
.23rZ71
-. 2c.737
-. 10853
-. 013655
-. 012335
-. 001951
9.801 :-4
-. 033643
.0435612
-.04953G
-.040359
.0045G94
-. 022562
-.3G5926
-. X04763
-. 127367 
-. 429242
Total
Impact
-391-
SAMPLE 2
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-42
Male
Coefficients
Component
(b -b )*X
Intercejt
AGL
AGE2
FYSERVC
FYS1RVC2
FrLFEX
FILFEX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
ACON2
ACOiW3
ACN4
OCCli
0OC3
OCC4
OCC5
OCC6
00C7
00C8
OCC9
cccle00Cil
QiILDI
CHILD2
LFAY
DLiH
T0TABFC
OiJAPi
KNOP
CAROT
INFORM
PERCD
EARSOC
EARDL
SECAR2
SPNCE
SPSTRIPRN1
IvPCARTF
.236671
.0963087
-. 229467
.7765496
-. 503130
-. 588889
.4356076
-.041775
-. 017673
-.019423
.0031968
-8.89E-4
-.024085
.0502864
.0233171
.0070045)
.0045575
.0067225
.0076G41
.0035434
.0647413
.0062644
' -. 006506
.0166421
.0168904
4.816E-4
-. 012464
-. 007365
.0108136
.0032950
-. 025139
.0069813
3.142E-4
-.010263
-. 158038
-.135991
.0113393
.0219179
-.032439
.0049168
-. 013715
-. 011224
Attributes
Component
b *(X -X )
C
-.141391
.0981142
-. 092162
.0431393
-. 052327
.0494369
-. 018650
-. 005309
-.022362
3.278E-4
-.004888
-1.62E-4
-. 024434
-. 004065
-6.39E-4
2.161E-4
.0025123
8.114E-4
-1.02E-4
-. 007655
1.736E-4
-.006506
-. 002980
-. 013497
-.021876
-. 019079
-. 005327
.0023507
-. 007082
4.296E-4
-4.61E-4
-. 014778
.0011853
.0129434
-. 001198
-5.07E-4
-. 002272
-. 015711
5.817E-4
-. 022436
Interaction
Component
(b -b ) * (x
0
-. 016757
.0726829
-.306355
.3073325
.2205393
-. 256145
.0147598
.0061234
.0097709
-9.19E-4
3.334E-4
-. 002824
-. 029333
-.018195
-.004056
.0100617
-. 004836
-. 00450G
-2.89E-4
-.061316
-.002485
.00650G0
-.005261
-. 010056
.0161276
-.014466
-. 009156
-. 003610
-. 002522
.0029538
-. 001951
.0057464
-.004766
-.087512
0038690
.0151013
.0020216
.0215629
-.003477
.0083522
-. 290631 -. 127387
Total
Impact
.236671
- 00039
-. C5b6782
.3775231
-. 147520
-.420577
228099
-. 04560
- 010635;
-. 032014
.0025C55
-. 005443
-. 027072
-. 003481
.01U555
.0023101
.0140353
.004391.2
.0L39091
.0031527
-. 004229
.0039525
-. 006506
.0084010
-. 006632
-. 005266
-. C4600
-. 02184w
.0095533
-. 006309
-. 021756
.0045694
-. 003717
-. 013e44
-.232606
-. 1333201
.025933v
.0216S70
-.026587
.0020217
-.027798
-.429242
-392-
SAMPLE 2
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Table A9-43
Male
Coefficients
Component
(bf-b )*X
Attributes
Component
b *(X f-X )
Interaction
Component__
(bf-b M)*(Xf-Xm
Intercept
Human
Capital
Commitment
the Home
Commitment
the Firm
Informal
Network
.251392
-. 038499
to .0231523
to -. 015993
.0035855
Perceived -. 011002
Discrimination
Early
Socialization
Dominant
Career
-. 298854
.0340886
-. 161259
-. 060313
-. 012213
-9.42E-4
-. 019775
.0071775
-.049093
-. 296922
Total
Impact
0
.0030557
-. 015852
-. 015722
-. 061002
.0095O46
-. 037089
.0268104
.2513'2
-.195722
-. 053513
-. 043929
.0016421
-. 021173
-. 37G
.0118SG12
-. 42143.-. 052211
-393-
SAMPLE 2
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-44
Male
Coefficients
Component
(bf-bm)*Xm
Attributes
Component
b *(Xf-X)
Interaction
Component
(bf-b )*(X-X )
Intercept
AGE
AG:2
FYSURVC
FYSERVC2
FTLkLx
FrLFE;X2
EYTS2
EDCS2
EDPS2
AC0142
ACON3
ACON4
CHILD1
QiI LD2
LFAN
DLHi
VTTABFC
06JAP1
WOP
CAR Ci
INFORM
PERCD
EARSOC
EARDL
SPSCAR2
SPH.Xdb
SPSTRPRi
IMPCARTF
.251392
.2435616
-. 296088
.6820512
-. 40,590
-. 588138
.4390532
-. 051172
-.013773
-. 007491
.0054093
.0215602
-. 064074
.0218258
.0181948
6.638E-4
-.017532
-.011348
.0165495
-.002194
-. 019001
.0035855
8.320E-4
-.011914
-.164194
-.134660
.0098596
.0397814
-.017107
.0042192
-.002664
-.052211
0
-. 143133
.1027944
-. 101281
.0457221
-. 065119
.0597930
-.020093
-.006587
-. 026634
-6.40E-4
-. 007137
.0010556
-. 002067
-.015397
-. 026004
-. 017264
-.00557
.0028155
-.009870
4.279E-4
-9.42E-4
-. 020843
.0010678
.0087471
-.001570
-9.01E-4
-.001706
-.017654
2.960E-4
-. 029132
-.296922
0
-. 042378
.0937850
-.269522
.2496123
.2203582
-.258171
.0180801
.0047722
.0037684
-.001555
-.003038
-.007606
-.006900
-.010332
.0222279
-.020349
-.014109
-.005526
.0016793
.0022325
-.001002
.0152176
-.005533
-.090920
.0038311
.0131307
.0036692
.0113713
-.002903
.0016226
-. 080115
.2513&'
.0580507
-. (A95C0
.311242L
-. 1132G3
-. 432900
.2406755
-.053185
-. 01550C
-. 030356
.0032141
.0063349
-. 071425
.0128591
-. 0;'035
-. 003193
-. 055145
-. 031044
.0136394
-. 0103C4
-. 016342
.0016421
-. 004793
-. 016320
-. 246367
-. 132399
.0220895
.0417441
-.02339C
.0015317
-. 03174
-. 429241S
Total
Impact
-394-
Table A9-45
Male
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Component-
(b f-b m *
Attributes
Component
b M*(X f-x m)
Interaction
Component
(b f-bm)*(XX)m
Intercept
Human
Capital
Occupation
Segregation
3.059531
-1.84454
.2181131
Commitment to -.246934
the Home
Informal --752081
Network
Perceived 
-.143792
Discrimination
Early 
.0101735
Socialization
Dominant 
-. 381055
Career
.6301786
.5496439
SAMPLE 3
Total
Impact
-. 212664
.0193871
-. 213045
-. 014087
.0016992
.0040020
-. 001092
-. 066293
-. 481797
-. 128420
-. 101673
-. 546151
.1448134
.0506158
-. 119739
.0046592
-. 559225
3. -59531
-2.1C553
.1351258
-1.00513
-. 621355
-.005422
.0G4721
-. 50 1836
.6435379
-. 491379
-395-
SAMPLE 3
MARRIED FULL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-46
Male
Coefficients
Component
(b 
-b,)*X
Intercept
AGE
AGL2
IYSERVC
kI SLavC2
FTLFEx
M'i'LtA2
EDTS2
EDJCS2
EDPS2
ACON2
ACOW3
ACEX4
OCC2
03"
CHILD1
CHILD2
DLHH
TUTABFC
OMJAP1
wewp
CAROT
INFORM
PEhCD
uMcYS1
EARSOC
EARDL
SPSCAR2
SPSTPR'.
MPSCAR2Ti
3.059581
-9.41094
5.205319
.0492960
.746775G
3.706678
-2.74953
.1430905
.2606140
.3847549
.0105265
-. 228600
.03747C0
.2181131
0
0
-. 017115
.1032504
-1.60E-4
-. 337909
-.177019
-. 054687
-. 270869
-. 249507
-.143792
0
*0101735
-. 300688
-. 080367
-. 025119
.7029046
-. 063282
.0152187
4.564E-4
.5496439
Attributes
Component
bM (Xf-X)
-. 167476
.1345557
-.032374
-. 009803
-. 116072
.09&6427
-. 004930
-7.27E-4
-. 027200
.0068850
-. 080127
-. 014038
.0196871
0
-. 03593
.0050599
-. 092182
-. 117331
.0U12760
.0011616
-. 018196
.0016706
.0016992
0
.0040028
-5.02E-4
-5.90E-4
.0283409
-. 014927
-. 018045
-. 011083
-. 050578
-. 481797
Interaction
Component _
(b f-b 1 )*(X -FX )
0
1.091230
-1.11286
-. 020316
-. 539489
-1.12C55
1.427741
.0371211
-. C25149
-. 197363
.0137786
.1280622
.1896751
-. 065231
0
-.036442
.0099G12
-. 047996
-.070712
-.437404
.0411523
.0150443
.0716197
.0169970
.0566703
.0238765
.0267393
-. 115150
-.004589
-. 077695
.1085021
.0342034
.01992L4
-2.77L-4
-. 559225
Total
Impact
3.059581
-8.48719
4.227018
-. 0L3C53
.1974332
2.470051
-1.22315
.1752812
.2347378
.16019',16
.0311961
-. 18065
.2131149
.1725689
C
-.036442
-.015747
.0653143
-.163054
-. 892644
-. 13459C
-.033481
-. 217445
-. 23&839
-.085422
.0238765
.0409156
-. 41634.
-.08554E
-. 074473
.7964792
-.047119
.0240511
-. 05039
-.491379
Table A9-47
Male
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Hypothesis)
Coefficients
Component
(b -bm) *X
Attributes
Component
bM*(X 
-X)
Interaction
Component _
(b-b) * (Xf-X,)
Intercept
Human
Capital
4.299952
-3.13140
Commitment to
the Home
Commitment tc -.677963
the Firm
Informal -. 073039
Network
Perceived -.018126
Discrimination
Early 
-.483720
Socializati-j
Dominant .4552136
Career
-. 265436
-396-
SAMPLE 3
Total
Impact
-. 221994
-. 315593
-. C1952G
.0016077
-.002356
.0048884
-. 050259
-. 1*327
-. 240154
.119271b
.02,8054
.0035217
-. 134553
.1439499
4. 2 52
-3.53.72
-. 54.25G
-.57C21L
-. '4267"
-.C1C9,1
-.6133E5
.54o5L45
.3773616 -.603232 -. 491355
-397-
SAMPLE 3
MARRIED PERSONAL REGRESSION
Decomposition (by Variable)
Table A9-48
Male
Coefficients
Component
(b f-bM)*Xm
Attributes
Component
bm *f-x m)
Interaction
Component
(bf-bM) f xm
Intercept
AGE
AGE2
ESERVC
FYStVC2
FTLFEX
FTLFEX2
EDTS2
EDCS2
LDPS2
ACO '3
CHILD1
CiILD2
LFA
DLHH
TOTABFC
OSJAP1
WNW
CAROT
INF 0RN
PERCD
EAHSOC
EARDL
SPSCAR2
SPTM v
IMPCARTk
4.299952
-10. 0105
4.986617
-. 590242
1.068082
3.180207
-2.20941
.0863492
.1612712
.2424234
.0132508
-. 083434
.0220793
.0275210
.1680118
2.155E-4
-. 189252
-. 148753
.0028608
-. 250813
-. 21258
-.073089
0
-. 018126
-. 328160
-. 155560
-. 006002
.5528175
-. 063986
.0134938
-. 041110
.3773616
0
-.142528
.0984398
-. 062495
.0169099
-. 126026
.1181539
-.0 04'7
.0014606
-. 0L9121
.0113364
-. 091053
-. 028667
-.008469
.0064367
-. 175629
-. 137931
.0017896
-4.12E-4
-. 022863
.0019597
.0016077
0
-. 002356
.0042503
6.382E-4
.0172240
-. 011586
-. 021247
-. 010562
-. 024087
-. 603232
0
1.160756
-1.0G653
.2468388
-. 771609
-. 9G1399
1.147273
.0224010
-. 015563
-. 124353
.0173446
.0467678
.1117429
-. 016017
-. 074493
.0953318
-. 244976
.0345812
-7.87E-4
.0663168
.0191600
.0288054
.0511638
-. 047642
-. 125671
-.003882
-. 018566
.0853343
.0345886
.0176G25
.0249302
-. 265435
4. 299952
-8.99232
4.020529
-.405&98
.3133,33
2.0927E 2
-. 943931
.1003434
.1471691
.1089490
.0419318
-. 127769
.1051557
.0030350
.0999555
-.08 L0 W 2
-.572159
-. 112382
.001GG18
-. 207359
-.260138
-.042676
.0511G38
-.06G8125
-. 449586
-. 1633J4
-. 007344
.6265657
-. 050644
.0205941
-.040267
-.49135G
Total
Impact
-398-
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